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OF 1898 



With Diagrams and Index 

New York 

D. Appleton and Company 




MUCH has been published on the brief but in 
teresting and very important war of 1898 between 
the United States and Spain ; but practically every 
thing that has appeared belongs to one of two classes. 
On the one hand, there are the narratives of sailors, 
soldiers, and correspondents who took part in it, 
and who describe what they saw. These books are 
not history, though many of them are excellent ma 
terial for history. On the other hand, there are 
records of a more general character, most of which 
are hasty compilations of little value. The con 
temporary accounts of the war were very inaccurate 
and imperfect ; it was not until some time later that 
there was a sufficient body of trustworthy evidence 
to make it possible to write anything like a real 

For the present volume it is claimed that it is 
based upon a study of all the available first-hand 
evidence. On the American side there is a great 
quantity of this in the shape of the copious reports 


made public by the War and Navy Departments, 
and the numerous books and magazine articles writ 
ten by participants in the war. On the Spanish side 
comparatively little has been published, but there 
is interesting material in the works of Lieutenant 
Miiller and Captain Severe Gomez Nunez, which 
have been translated and printed by the Bureau 
of Naval Intelligence, and in a few letters and re 
ports by Admirals Cervera and Montojo and other 

This narrative appeared serially in Munsey s 
Magazine, and has since been revised in the light 
of recently published evidence and of letters re 
ceived by the writer. 

NEW YORK, December, i8gg. 






1898 36 











XV. THE PORTO Rico CAMPAIGN . . . .331 



INDEX 395 


^**C\ B R A ft 





THE war of 1898 between the United States and 
Spain was the logical and inevitable ending of a 
long chapter of history. The conditions that 
caused it began with the earliest settlements of the 
English and the Latin peoples in the new world. 
The race that was to dominate the wide continent 
of North America came into conflict with its French 
rivals two centuries ago, and their struggle was de 
cided by Wolfe at Quebec in 1759. While Spain 
held Florida and Louisiana, hostilities with the 
English colonies, which had now become the 
United States, were a constant probability, and were 
averted only by the timely cession of both those 
great provinces. The possession of Texas and Cali 
fornia was the prize of victory in the war of 1846 
and 1847 against the Spaniards of Mexico a war 
that seems to have finally settled the southwestern 
frontier of the Union. Cuba, lying scarcely more 
than a hundred miles from the shores of the great 
republic, facing its southern seaports, and com 
manding the Gulf of Mexico, is geographically as 
necessary an appanage of its territory as Florida. 
Under Spanish rule the so-called Pearl of the An 
tilles has been an unfailing source of anxiety in the 
foreign relations of the United States, a perpetual 


problem to American statesmen a problem to 
which there could be but one ultimate solution. 
The unhappy island has long been a running sore 
in the body politic of the northern half of the new 
world. It is extraordinary that the nineteenth cen 
tury should almost have ended before the great 
power to which Nature has set her in such close 
relation found itself compelled to draw the sword 
against the government responsible for her intoler 
able condition. 

It was the first westward voyage of Columbus 
that made Cuba known to European civilization. 
Sixteen days after the Italian navi- 
gator s landing on the island that he 
christened San Salvador which was 
probably Watling s Island he sighted the Cuban 
coast at a point near the present site of Nuevitas. 
This was on the 28th of October, old style, or the 
7th of November, new style, in the year 1492. Here 
was no low-lying islet, such as he had seen in the 
Bahamas ; it was a land of forests and rivers and 
noble mountains a part, doubtless, of the Asiatic 
mainland of which Columbus was in search. In the 
discoverer s optimistic way he described it in his 
diary as " the most beautiful land that human eyes 
ever beheld." The natives received him with won 
dering hospitality, but, naturally enough, could give 
him little information. Hearing them mention a 
village or district called Cubanacan, Columbus 
concluded that he had reached the dominions of 
Kublai Khan, the great Tartar sovereign whose 
court Marco Polo visited two hundred years before. 
He sent some of his men inland, as ambassadors to 
the reigning prince ; but after travelling a dozen 
leagues they came back, reporting that they could 
find no prince, no cities, no roads nothing but the 
same primitive villages of naked, harmless Indians. 
Columbus spent two months on the northern 
coast of Cuba; then he sailed from Cape Maysi 


which he named " Alpha and Omega," supposing it 
to be the easternmost extremity of Asia to His- 
paniola (Haiti), where his flagship, the Santa 
Maria, was wrecked, and he left its crew to build 
the fortified post of La Navidad. He never founded 
any settlement in Cuba, though on his second voy 
age (1494) he passed along almost the entire length 
of its southern coast, and on his fourth and last 
(1503) he paid it another brief visit. When he 
died, three years later, he still believed that it was 
part of the mainland of Asia. He had named it 
Juana, in honour of the Infant Juan (John), the 
son of his patrons, Ferdinand and Isabella. It 
also appears on early maps as Fernandina, Isa 
bella, Santiago (after the patron saint of Spain), 
and Ave Maria ; but all these titles were soon 
superseded by the old Indian name which it still 

To the chance that wrecked the Santa Maria on 
its shores was due the fact that Spanish colonization 
of the new world began in Hispaniola. In 1511 
Diego Columbus, the great discoverer s son, who 
was ruling in that island as admiral of the Indies, 
sent out Diego Velasquez, with four ships and 
three hundred men, to conquer Cuba. With this 
force of which Hernando Cortez, the future con 
queror of Mexico, was an undistinguished member 
Velasquez established the armed posts of Bara- 
.coa (1511), Santiago de Cuba (1514), and some 
others whose names still appear on the maps of the 
island. Baracoa, now a decayed seaport with the 
population of a village, was the first seat of gov 
ernment, being made a city and a bishopric in 
1518; but four years later the capital was trans 
ferred to Santiago, of whose long history the latest 
and most eventful chapter is fresh in all American 

In Hispaniola the Spaniards had already estab 
lished the bloody and brutal system of enforced la- 


hour or slavery, to give it its true name which 
utterly exterminated the West Indian aborigines. 
They carried the same policy to Cuba. The In 
quisition, established in Spain thirty years before, 
went with it, and the torch of the Holy Office sec 
onded the sword of the soldier in cowing the help 
less natives. " Thus began," says Arrate, the 
Cuban historian of the eighteenth century, " that 
gathering of an infinite number of gentiles to the 
bosom of our holy religion, who otherwise would 
have perished in the darkness of paganism." They 
were gathered so rapidly to that gentle bosom that 
within fifty years the Indians of Cuba, who had 
numbered several hundred thousand when the 
Spaniards came, were totally extinct. 

There is a characteristic story of Hatuey, a chief 
whom Velasquez ordered to the stake for his re 
sistance to the conquerors. A priest soothed his 
last moments by asking if he wished to go to 
heaven. " Are there any Spaniards there ? " Ha 
tuey inquired. " Many," replied the priest. 
" Then," said the Indian, " I would rather go to 
hell ! " 

Spain has suffered from no little misrepresenta 
tion at the hands of Cuban writers, and of some 
Americans; but the facts of this dark page of her 
colonial annals do not rest upon the testimony of 
any foreign critic. They are told by that great 
Spaniard, Bartolome de las Casas, whose Destruc 
tion of the Indies is a narrative of what he himself 
saw in Cuba and Hispaniola between 1502 and 


For more than two hundred years after the first 
colonization of Cuba the development of the island 
was very slow. Spanish interest centred upon the 
richer provinces of Peru and Mexico, and the chief 
value of Cuba was as a port of call for treasure 
ships sailing from the mainland. It was this traffic 
that gave Havana its importance. 


The history of the chief city and seaport of the 
West Indies begins in 1515, with the settlement of 
fifty of the men of Diego Velasquez s 
expedition at the post of San Cristo 
bal de la Habana, on the present site 
of the town of Batabano, on the southern coast of 
Cuba. A few years later, finding the spot they had 
chosen unhealthy, the settlers crossed to the north 
ern shore, little more than thirty miles distant, and 
established themselves at the narrow entrance of a 
bay in which Ocampo the Spanish admiral who 
first circumnavigated Cuba had repaired his ships 
in 1508. Here, beside its fine harbour, Havana 
had a long struggle for existence. The sixteenth 
century was a stormy time in West Indian waters. 
There might be peace at home, but in the new 
world the Spaniard, the Frenchman, the English 
man, and the Hollander were foes wherever they 
met ; and all of them were fair game to the bucca 
neers who fought under any flag or no flag. Havana 
suffered several hostile visitations. In 1538, the 
settlement having been burned by a French pirate 
or privateer the distinction between the two was 
often very slight Hernando de Soto, the governor 
of Cuba, came from Santiago, his capital, and built 
the fort of La Fuerza to defend it. The old build 
ing, not a formidable fortress, still stands, the most 
ancient relic of Havana s early days. 

It was at Havana that De Soto gathered his 
expedition for the exploration of Florida, and from 
thence that he sailed with nine ships on the I2th 
of May, 1539 never to return. A dozen years 
later the seat of government was transferred from 
Santiago to Havana ; but this did not save the place 
from another piratical raid in 1554. In 1589, to 
protect his treasure ships from those dreaded 
wolves of the sea, Drake and Hawkins, who " held 
the power and glory of Spain so cheap," Philip II 
ordered two strong fortresses built to defend the 


harbour. These, too, are standing to-day the Ba- 
teria de la Punta (Battery of the Point) at the 
northernmost point of the city, west of the entrance 
to the bay, and the famous Morro * on the low 
heights that rise on the east side of the channel. In 
the same year the colonial government of Cuba was 
reconstituted, and Juan de Tejada was sent out as 
the first captain-general. 

During the next century the fortification of Ha 
vana was completed by the building of a wall 
around the town ; and from this time, owing to its 
situation and defences, it was long regarded as im 
pregnable. A contemporary description pictures 
it as an unkempt place, with houses of straw and 
wood, surrounded by little gardens with hedges of 
a prickly shrub. At night the narrow streets were 
unlighted, and swarmed with land crabs. 

As agriculture slowly gained a footing in Cuba, 
and commerce developed, gold seekers were no 
longer the only adventurers in the West Indies, and 
the day of the buccaneers passed away. Trade 
questions began to be the motives of political con 
tention. In 1717 the first clash between the inter 
ests of the colony and those of the mother country 
was caused by the proclamation of the tobacco in 
dustry as a royal monopoly. In 1739 hostility be 
tween Spanish and English traders broke out into 
war, which lasted for nine years without any de 
cisive result, its principal incident being an unsuc 
cessful British attack upon Santiago de Cuba in 

In 1762 occurred an event which, memorable and 
interesting in itself, is of historical importance as 
having first brought Cuba prominently into the field 
of international politics, and as marking the begin- 

* The Spanish word tnorro, which means " a protruding lip," is fre 
quently applied to forts standing upon an elevation at the mouth of a 
harbour. There is another famous Morro at Santiago de Cuba, and 
another at San Juan, in Porto Rico. 


ning of the island s relations with the United States, 
then a dependency of England. This was the cap 
ture of Havana by the British and 
Havana taken co i on i a i troops commanded by the 

by the British, r> i f A ti 1 T " r i 

I762< Earl of Albemarle. It was one of the 

scenes of that great drama of battle, 
the Seven Years War, in which Europe s soldiers 
and sailors met and fought in Asia and America, on 
Atlantic and Pacific. England, after some initial 
reverses, had shattered the French fleets at Lagos 
and Quiberon, and driven the Bourbon flag from 
Canada and India. When Spain entered the con 
flict as France s ally, the next blows were directed 
against her colonial possessions, and British expe 
ditions were despatched against Havana and Manila. 
Both were completely successful, although in each 
case diplomacy gave back to Spain what had been 
won from her by the sword. 

Havana being reputed a strongly fortified and 
garrisoned place, the force sent against it was a 
powerful one. There were thirty-two ships of war, 
with nearly two hundred transports, in the fleet that 
was sighted off the harbour on the 6th of June, 
1762. A landing was effected at Guanabacoa, a 
few miles east of Havana, on the I7th, and the Brit 
ish army, numbering about twenty thousand men, 
advanced and captured the heights above the har 
bour, where the fortress of Cabanas now stands. 
The Spaniards, who had twenty-seven thousand 
regulars, besides an auxiliary force of volunteers, 
still held the Morro, and prevented the English 
men-of-war from entering the port by sinking ships 
in the channel. 

In many respects the campaign suggests com 
parisons with the experiences of Shafter s army at 
Santiago a hundred and thirty-six years later. Al 
though a considerable part of their force had been 
raised in the West Indies, the British found the 
fevers of the Cuban coast a deadlier foe than the 


Spanish guns. Before the end of July nearly half 
of their force was disabled by sickness, and the ar 
rival, on July 28th, of a body of fresh troops from 
the North American colonies was a most welcome 
reinforcement. These earliest American invaders 
of Cuba consisted of a thousand men from Connec 
ticut, eight hundred from New York, and five hun 
dred from New Jersey, with General Lyman, of 
the first-named colony, in command. It is worth 
recording that Israel Putnam, destined to win 
fame in the Revolution, was acting colonel of the 
Connecticut regiment. 

The Morro was stormed a few days later, and 
on August 1 3th the city surrendered, the garrison 
being allowed to march out with the honours of 
war. An immense quantity of spoil fell to the vic 
tors, who confiscated public property and levied 
contributions unsparingly. The tobacco and sugar 
seized and sold on the spot alone brought three and 
a half million dollars. Sir George Pocock, who 
commanded the fleet, and Lord Albemarle drew six 
hundred thousand dollars apiece as prize money. 
The comparative value that eighteenth-century 
officialdom attached to officers and men may be in 
ferred from the fact that each soldier s share was 
twenty dollars and each sailor s eighteen. 

The territory surrendered to the British 
stretched eastward to Matanzas, but they had made 
no effort to push their conquests when peace was 
proclaimed, and on the 6th of July, 1763, they 
evacuated Cuba, George Ill s Government having 
accepted in exchange the Spanish province of 
Florida which was returned to Spain twenty years 
later. While holding Havana the soldiers were ter 
ribly scourged by disease. Mante, a chaplain from 
New England, has left in his diary a vivid picture 
of the sufferings of his compatriots, in whose camp 
the " putrid fever " wrought frightful havoc. Only 
a remnant returned alive. 


To Havana a year of British occupation was 

not without benefit. Efforts were made to improve 

the sanitary condition of a city 

Cuba s golden w hi c h Spanish incompetence allowed 

period. r . 1 1 i r r 

to remain a hotbed ot lever to 
the present day. Its port, for the first time, was 
opened to the commerce of the nations, and the 
world s attention was called to the possibilities of 
Cuba as a mart for trade. Havana s importance as 
a modern city may be said to have begun at this 
point, although with the restoration of Spanish rule 
the law giving Spain a monopoly of traffic with Cuba 
was temporarily reaffirmed. At the end of the 
eighteenth century it was probably the largest 
American city of European settlement, and cer 
tainly the richest and most important seaport in the 
new world. 

Luis de las Casas, who came out as captain- 
general in 1790, did much for Havana, helping to 
form its Sociedad Patriotica (Patriotic Society), to 
found its first newspaper, the Papel Periodico, and 
to promote useful public works. Another name of 
the same period that is held in grateful memory is 
that of Francisco Arango. Born in Havana in 
1765, Arango was secretary of the local chamber of 
commerce when Napoleon drove the Bourbon 
dynasty from Madrid, in July, 1808. The Spanish 
officials in Cuba promptly met, and at four thou 
sand miles distance defied the conqueror of Europe 
by affirming their loyalty to the deposed sovereign. 
Their action won for Cuba the title of the Ever 
Faithful Isle a name of grim irony, in the light of 
later events and the privilege, bestowed by the 
constitution framed in 1812, when Ferdinand VII 
returned to his throne, of representation in the 
Cortes at Madrid. Arango went to Spain as one 
of the first Cuban delegates, and secured the final 
abolition of the law debarring foreign ships from 
the ports of the island. -*" x * "R A K **" 

OF Tf*tt 



The first quarter of the nineteenth century has 
been called the " golden period " of Cuba s history. 
It was for her a time of general internal tranquility, 
and of great industrial and commercial develop 
ment. She was benefited by the fact that Spain was 
at its lowest ebb of weakness both at home and 
abroad. For years at a time, during the Napoleonic 
wars, communication with Madrid was cut off by 
the hostile sea power of Britain, which, though it 
seized Trinidad, made no further attack upon Cuba. 
The successful revolt of all the mainland colonies, 
too, seemed at least temporarily to have opened the 
ear of the Spanish Government to Cuban griev 
ances. At the same time it brought loyalist settlers 
to the island, just as Canada, after the American 
Revolution, became a refuge for colonists who pre 
ferred their old allegiance. A more important im 
migration came from Haiti, whence thirty thousand 
white families, victims of the island s race war, are 
said to have fled to Cuba between 1798 and 1808, 
bringing with them the cultivation of coffee which 
became the chief Cuban product, till superseded by 
sugar. All these causes contributed to the island s 
rapid advance in wealth and population. She 
had but 170,370 inhabitants in 1775, and 272,140 
in 1791. The number grew to 551,998 in 1817, to 
704,487 in 1827, and to 1,007,624 in 1841. 

But with all this material development signs of 
Cuba s later troubles were not lacking. 

The West Indies seem to be well fitted by na 
ture to be the home of civilized and prosperous 
communities, yet European colonization can show 
little, if anything, but failure in that rich chain of 
islands. They have had four centuries of checkered 
history history full of revolts and massacres, of 
crimes and horrors, of battles fought for the spoils 
of war. The white conquerors exterminated the 
native tribes, to replace them with negro slaves ; 
and it has been their just retribution to see the 


African multiply and possess the land where the 
superior race failed to take thrifty root. In Haiti 
negro domination has long been absolute. Ja 
maica, always orderly under English rule, and for 
a time a prosperous colony, has but a dwindling 
remnant of a few thousand whites to more than 
half a million coloured inhabitants. In the lesser 
islands British or French, Danish or Dutch the 
story is the same. 

To this long chapter of failures Cuba has ap 
peared as the conspicuous exception. With all her 
mistakes and shortcomings as a colonizing power, 
Spain seemed to have done in the West Indies 
what France and England could not do to have 
planted the seeds of a community capable of be 
coming a civilized nation. But recent history sug 
gests a serious question of this conclusion. There 
are many to-day who hold that the prosperity of 
Cuba was founded upon slave labour; that from 
the industrial viewpoint Cuba without slavery 
which, it must be remembered, ended little more 
than a dozen years ago is still an experiment; 
that from the social and political viewpoint the 
islanders, taken as a community, have yet to prove 
their capacity for self-government and their right 
to rank with the free peoples of America. 

There were no schools in Cuba till near the 
end of last century. In 1836, when the population 
was nearly a million, only nine thousand pupils 
were receiving instruction. In 1860 the munici 
palities of the island had two hundred and eighty- 
three schools for white children, and just two for 
coloured, and the total attendance was no larger, 
in proportion to the population, than in 1836. In 
1883 a report shows eight hundred and thirty-five 
schools, but their management is described as one 
of utter neglect, few teachers being paid their sal 
aries, and sixty-seven schools being entirely vacant. 
There is no census of illiteracy in Cuba, but, of 


course, it is practically universal among the 
negroes and quite general among the poorer 
whites. Enrique Varona, a Cuban deputy to the 
Cortes, stated in 1895 that seventy-six per cent of 
the population meaning, presumably, the adult 
population could neither read nor write ; and his 
estimate is probably too low. Of another test of 
popular enlightenment the relative proportion of 
legitimate and illegitimate births we find no re 
cent report. The percentages of forty years ago are 
given by Ballou : 




67 8 

02 2 


66. q 


CQ. C 

4Q. ^ 

Even allowing for the existence of slavery, the 
figures are sufficiently shocking. Both Spain and 
Cuba were to pay a terrible penalty for allowing 
successive generations to grow up under such con 
ditions of savagery. 

Negro slavery, as has been said, ended in Cuba 

in 1886, but it has left a deep and indelible mark 

upon the island s present and future. 

Slavery in Cuba. T * , . \ . . c . , 

It began almost with the bpanish oc 
cupation, and by a curious anomaly its origin is 
traced to the sainted Las Casas. Seeing that the 
native Indians, a people neither accustomed to la 
bour nor physically competent for it, were perish 
ing in thousands under the lash of their taskmas 
ters, Las Casas suggested, as an alternative, the 
importation of a limited number of African slaves. 
The suggestion, developed to an extent of which its 
author never dreamed, was destined to bring mo 
mentous results, and to stain the history of the new 
world with a crime to be expiated by the blood 
and tears of nations. Yet to stigmatize Las Casas 


as the founder of American slavery is scarcely fair. 
There were African bondsmen in Spain before the 
time of Columbus, and the institution was certain 
to cross the Atlantic to lands where it found so fer 
tile a field prepared for it. 

Nominally, at least, the Spanish laws that regu 
lated slavery in Cuba were fairly humane. They 
forbade the owner to work his slaves longer than 
from sunrise to sunset (from six to six, in the 
tropics), with two hours for a siesta at noon, and 
with Sunday as a day of rest. They prescribed a 
certain quantity and variety of food, allowed slaves 
to keep pigs and cultivate patches of their own, and 
created a system whereby an industrious negro 
could secure his freedom by paying the amount of 
his first cost to his master; but it appears that if 
there was little ill treatment of slaves and Ballou, 
Abiel Abbott, and other American travellers in 
Cuba testify that they witnessed none it was 
rather from self-interest on the part of their owners 
than from respect for the statutes. 

Whatever the material condition of the slaves, 
the institution was a fruitful source of social and 
political disorder. It was bitterly opposed by the 
mass of white Cubans, just as it was opposed by 
the free labouring class in the United States. On 
the other hand, it kept the rich planters loyal to 
Spanish rule, which protected them in the posses 
sion of their chattels ; especially as the cafctals 
(coffee farms) were turned into great sugar plan 
tations, operated on a far larger scale of agricul 
ture. It was a fruitful source of official corruption. 
The negroes themselves formed a dangerous ele 
ment of the population in slavery, and an unde 
sirable one since emancipation. Their numbers, at 
different times, are given in the table on the next 

Their number in 1898 was estimated at half a 
million. If these figures are correct, it is strange 











4.42 ooo 


1867 . . 



that Cuba s coloured population should have de 
creased by nearly one hundred and fifty thousand 
in the last half century, while that of the United 
States during the same period has considerably 
more than doubled. It looks as if many Cuban 
negroes had been set down as whites. 

The first blow at slavery in Cuba was struck in 
1817, when Spain agreed to prohibit the importa 
tion of African negroes into her colonies. A con 
sideration for this act of humanity was the receipt 
of two million dollars from the British Government 
which, a hundred years before, had itself bought 
from Spain a monopoly of the slave trade in her 
ports. But long after 1817 the forbidden traffic 
went on clandestinely. With the full cognizance 
of the Spanish officials, and to their great financial 
profit, the barracoons of Havana continued to be a 
mart for planters who needed labour. The trade 
was not without its risks, of course, and many a 
human cargo from the east coast of Africa was con 
fiscated and liberated by the watchful British 
cruisers ; and as the demand outran the supply, the 
price of slaves went up. In 1830 an able-bodied 
negro was worth two hundred and fifty dollars or 
less; in 1850 his value had doubled, and in 1870 it 
had doubled again. 

But the government at Madrid could not much 
longer maintain an institution offensive to the civi 
lized world, and in 1870, without compensating the 
planters, a law was passed to effect its gradual 
abolition. Slaves sixty years old were declared 
free, and those not yet sixty were to become free 


on reaching that age ; children born to slavery were 
to remain under " patronage " until they were 
twenty-two, and then be free. One purpose of this 
act was to dissuade the negro population from join 
ing the revolt then in progress. Ten years later 
the Spanish Cortes hurried matters by declaring 
slavery abolished, while patronage the same thing 
under another name was to end in 1888. Shortly 
before the latter date arrived, the liberation of all 
negroes was completed by the decree of October 7, 

It was the Cuban negroes who first began the 
series of revolts that have made the island s later 
history so turbulent and disastrous. 
During the race war in Haiti, ending 
in the triumph of the blacks, order 
was preserved in Cuba; but in 1812, when the first 
agitation for the abolition of slavery was in the air, 
there was a revolt under a free negro, one Jose 
Aponto, which was speedily ended by the execution 
of its leaders. 

The first rising of white Cubans Creoles, as 
they used to be called, though the word is not often 
used now was that of the Soles de Bolivar in 1823. 
The revolution of 1820 in Spain had led to inter 
vention by the Holy Alliance, and a French army, 
commissioned by that league of rulers by divine 
right, had invaded the peninsula and restored Bour 
bon absolutism by force of arms, suppressing the 
newly established liberal constitution. Of this con 
stitution Cuba had briefly enjoyed the benefit, but 
Marshal Vives was sent to Havana to cancel the 
privileges it had granted. Intense discontent was 
the result, and the secret association of the Soles 
de Bolivar was organized, its aim being to accom 
plish for Cuba what the South American liberator 
had achieved for the mainland colonies. It is said 
to have been in correspondence with Bolivar, and 
to have received from him promises of help. Au- 


gust 16, 1823, was fixed as the date for simultaneous 
risings in several cities ; but there were traitors in 
the camp. On the day of the intended outbreak 
the head of the society, Jose Lemus, and his chief 
lieutenants, were arrested, and the conspiracy col 



THAT same year, 1823, was a memorable one in 
American history. The close political relations of 
Cuba and the United States may be dated from it. 
The Holy Alliance, organized to combat de 
mocracy wherever found, sought to follow up its 
success in Spain by reconquering her 
revolted colonies, the South Ameri 
can republics. With Cuba as a mili 
tary base it would not have been a difficult task, 
had there not been strenuous and probably unex 
pected opposition. In December, 1823, President 
Monroe sent to the United States Congress his fa 
mous message declaring that " we could not view 
an interposition by any European power in any 
other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition toward the United States " thus laying 
down the principle that has become historic as the 
Monroe Doctrine. The stand he took was backed 
by England, and the Continental powers were 

The Monroe Doctrine was not a new principle 
of American statesmanship, but its enunciation at 
this time marked a new era in the foreign relations 
of the United States. vTo the destiny of Cuba it was 
a fact of decisive importance, for it directly implied 
that the island would not be allowed to pass to any 
power other than Spain? Thus much had been 
foreshadowed a few months before by John Quincy 



Adams, then Secretary of State, writing to Mr. 
Nelson, American minister at Madrid: 

e transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an 
*S event unpropitious to the interests of this Union./ The 
opinion is so generally entertained that even the ground 
less rumours, that it was about to be accomplished which 
have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced 
to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to 
it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its 
occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our 
right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by 
force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the 
administration is called upon, in the performance of its 
duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within 
its competency to guard against and forefend it. 

At nearly the same time the veteran Jefferson 
wrote to Monroe, whose valued political counsellor 
he had always been : 

( Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war 
to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be 
a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us 
in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, 
/ except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were 
our own. But should she take it, I would not immedi 
ately go to war for it; because the first war on other ac 
counts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to 
us when able to do so./ 

After Monroe s message, American statesmen 
took a more decisive tone. For instance, in Henry 
Clay s instructions to the American ministers in 
Europe, issued shortly after he became Secretary 
of State in 1825, he said : 

* You will now add that we could not consent to the 
/ occupation of those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by 
any other European power than Spain under any contin 
gency whatever. 

Spain s extreme weakness at this period, and 
her loss of great colonies in rapid succession, natu 
rally led to the belief that she could not retain 
her hold upon her remaining dependencies. That 
England intended to seize Cuba seems to have been 


a baseless supposition. At that time and later 
American politicians were prone to mistrust of 
British designs. There was a strong feeling in 
favour of annexing the island to the United States. 
Adams, in the note already quoted, declared: 

It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that s 
the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be 
indispensable., to the continuance and integrity of the 
Union itself. / 

And Jefferson gave his opinion that 

her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted 
to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost 
interest. . 

But nothing was done to realize the suggestion. 
The sinister shadow of the slavery question was an 
obstacle to action, either in the direction of acquir 
ing Cuba from Spain, or in that of helping the 
island to assert its independence. All the South 
American states, on throwing off the Spanish yoke, 
had abolished human servitude. An influential ele 
ment in the United States was very unwilling to 
aid Cuba to take a similar step. f As for admission 
to the Union, the North would not accept the island ^ 
with slavery, the South or those who controlled 
the South s political course would not admit her 
as a free State. Van Buren, as Secretary of State, 
in 1829, thus stated the situation, after asserting 
the country s " deep interest " in the fate of the 
Spanish Antilles : 

Considerations connected with a certain class of our 
population make it to the interest of the Southern section 
of our Union that no attempt should be made in that island 
to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first 
effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a 
numerous slave population, which result could not but be 
very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United 

It is noteworthy that a couple of years after 
Jefferson s expression of a wish that England would 


join in guaranteeing Cuba to Spain, the British 
Government made that very proposal to France and 
the United States, the consideration from Spain be 
ing her acknowledgment, which she still refused, of 
the independence of the South American republics ; 
but both Paris and Washington Declined the sug 
gestion. The former, possibly, did not care to re 
nounce its chance for a valuable possession that 
seemed to be in the international market ; the latter 
acted strictly on the lines of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Amid these international complications a sec 
ond rebellion against Spanish rule was planned by 
Cuban Creoles in 1826. Its chief 
organizers were fugitives of the 
unsuccessful movement of three 
years before ; their headquarters were in Caracas, 
and again the aid of Bolivar was expected ; but 
again, through treachery or lack of support, the 
rising collapsed before a blow was struck. The 
Spanish authorities were now equipped against dis 
affection with the weapon which from that time 
they used so unsparingly to subvert popular rights 
and render pretended concessions worthless. By 
the decree of May 28, 1825, the captain-general had 
been permanently invested, in " extraordinary cir 
cumstances " of which he was to be the sole judge 
with " all the powers which are conceded to the 
governors of cities in a state of siege " in other 
words, with absolute military power superseding all 
forms of law and all guarantees of liberty. 

With his authority thus asserted in Cuba, Cap 
tain-General Vives formed a highly ambitious plan 
for the reconquest of Spain s mainland colonies. It 
was a task far beyond his powers. Landing at 
Tampico in August, 1828, with three thousand five 
hundred men, he was speedily hemmed in by su 
perior Mexican forces, and compelled to surrender 
his arms and withdraw. But Spain s power in Cuba 
was not shaken by this reverse, and a third native 


rising, planned by the secret society of the Aguila 
Negra (Black Eagle), was crushed as readily as its 
predecessors. Vives, who personally was a clear 
sighted ruler and capable administrator, refrained 
from any bloody vengeance upon the conspirators, 
none of whom was executed. 

Vives was succeeded by Ricafort, Ricafort by 
Tacon, the most famous of Spain s colonial gov 
ernors. Cuban historians paint 

Mi s uel Tacon in dark colours - A 

more impartial estimate of him is 
given by an American * who lived in Havana dur 
ing his administration. He seems to have been a 
benevolent tyrant. He took vigorous measures to 
end the social and political disorders that had made 
Cuba a place where there was no honesty in gov 
ernment and little security for life and property. 
He warred fiercely upon the organized bands of 
criminals. He divided the island into partidos, and 
required all who went from one district to another 
to carry a passport. He shut the gates of Havana 
at eleven o clock at night, and allowed no one on 
the streets after that hour without a lantern. He 
forbade the carrying of weapons. Even swearing 
was prohibited till it was found that Cuban horses 
and cattle could not be driven without the cries 
to which they were accustomed. He inspected 
prisons, and invited petitions from all who had 
grievances. He promoted public works, and built 
the first railway in the island, the line from Havana 
to Guines. 

" General Tacon," says the American chroni 
cler, " was the only Spanish official I ever knew 
who would not accept a bribe." When an importer 
who did not know his peculiarities, and who had 
recently landed a shipload of slaves, brought him 

* Jonathan S. Jenkins, an artist, who was afterward United States 
consul in Samoa, and whose memoirs were published in the Century 
Magazine in 1898. 


what was both before and after his time the captain- 
general s customary tribute a doubloon per head 
of the cargo Tacon gave the money to a favour 
ite orphan asylum. Some of his corrupt underlings 
he punished severely, thereby earning much hatred 
among the Spanish officials in Cuba. He was not 
merciful to those who dared to oppose him, whether 
they were great or small. When he learned that 
some negroes in Havana were organizing a rebel 
lion, he promptly arrested them, and their punish 
ment is thus described : 

The leaders and instigators were taken to the garrote. 
The iron collar was drawn until they were nearly dead 
from suffocation; then they were released until life was 
restored, their heads were struck off, inclosed in parrot 
cages, and set on the bridges as a warning to others. 

Well-meaning despot as he was, the benefits of 
Tacon s rule were temporary, while the evil he 
wrought was lasting. It was he who deliberately 
destroyed the last chance of reconciliation between 
Spaniard and Cuban. Amid the troubles that fol 
lowed the death of Ferdinand VII, in 1833, the revo 
lution of La Granja secured for Spain the re-estab 
lishment of the liberal constitution of 1812. When 
the news crossed the Atlantic, General Lorenzo, 
governor of the province of Santiago, at once pro 
claimed the new order, which affirmed the liberty 
of the press, and created local governing bodies and 
a national militia. At Havana, Tacon utterly re 
fused to recognise the reformed constitution, and 
used his arbitrary power to suppress it. Declaring 
Lorenzo a public enemy, he was moving an armed 
force to invade the eastern province, when the gov 
ernor of Santiago fled to Spain and laid his case 
before the Cortes. With fatuous inconsistency, 
the Madrid legislators approved Tacon s course, 
excluded the deputies who had arrived as repre 
sentatives of Cuba, and declared that the island was 
not governed by the restored constitution, but by 


special laws. Meanwhile Tacon had established a 
reign of terror in Santiago, where he laid heavy 
hands on those who had dared to antagonize him. 
Clergymen and leading citizens were imprisoned or 
banished, and five hundred men were set to work 
with shackled feet in the streets of Havana. 

fTn the early forties, when the troubles of the 

Texan border were bringing the United States 

nearer and nearer to war with Mex- 

pians for American attention again be- 

annexing Cuba. fe . i 

came focused upon Cuba. / The 
British Government s active work for the abolition 
of the slave trade which, as has been said, con 
tinued to flourish in the Spanish West Indies with 
corrupt official connivance gave rise to a wide 
spread belief that England s real aim was the ac 
quisition of Cuba for herself. Such a plan certainly 
never materialized, and there seems to be not a 
scintilla of evidence that it was ever contemplated ; 
but the alarm evidently found credence at Wash 
ington. John Forsyth, Secretary of State, wrote to 
the American minister at Madrid, in 1840: 

You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government 
that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to 
wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may se 
curely depend upon the military and naval resources of 
the United States to aid her either in preserving or re 
covering it. 

Daniel Webster, who succeeded Mr. Forsyth in 
the State Department, told the same official, three 
years later : 

It is represented that the situation of Cuba is at this 
moment in the highest degree dangerous and critical, and 
that Great Britain has resolved upon its rule. 

Had such a design been formed in London, the 
war with Mexico offered a favourable opportunity 
for its execution ; but nothing of the sort occurred. 
That war over, leaving the United States with a vast 
accession of territory, President Polk sought to 


round out its new acquisitions by a stroke like Jef 
ferson s purchase of Louisiana, and in 1848 a year 
of trouble in Europe he instructed his minister at 
Madrid to offer the Spanish Government a hundred_ 
million dollars for the sovereignty of the island.- 
Spain refused the proposal, regarding the mere 
suggestion of such a transaction as an indignity ; 
/and it was never officially renewed, though various 
plans for the purchase of Cuba were brought for- 
t- xX ward by individuals or newspapers, and President 
Buchanan twice urged Congress to consider the 

At this same date, just fifty years ago, the po 
litical disorders of Cuba developed a new phase, 
bringing them into closer connection 

Filibustering *,.i_ _*.!_ TT -^ j O.L j 

begins, 1849 Wlt ^ " ie United States, and consti 
tuting a source of annoyance that 
ultimately became almost intolerable. In 1848 
the first society of Cuban refugees in America was 
formed by Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan soldier of 
fortune, who had escaped from the island after an 
other attempt at rebellion, too feeble and abortive 
to deserve chronicling; and in the following year 
Lopez organized his first filibustering expedition. 
He was stopped by the United States Government, 
but in 1850 he rendezvoused six hundred men on 
an island off the Yucatan coast, and effected a land 
ing at Cardenas, where he expected that recruits 
would flock to his standard. 

The story of a dozen insurrections shows that 
while the grievances of the Cubans have undoubt 
edly been great, and their outcry against their op 
pressors correspondingly loud, they have been sin 
gularly backward in striking a bold and united 
blow for liberty. The expectations of Lopez were 
totally disappointed. The people did not rise. 
They did not even obstruct the railway from Ha 
vana, which speedily brought two thousand five 
hundred of Captain-General Roncali s soldiers ; and 


at his approach the invaders, who had seized the gov 
ernment house, retreated to their steamer. They 
disbanded at Key West, and Lopez was arrested by 
the Federal authorities. Brought to trial he was dis 
charged, but his ship, the Creole, was confiscated. 

The expedition of 1851 was at least a more stir 
ring and romantic failure. Lopez had gathered 
about four hundred and fifty men and procured a 
steamer, the Pampero. His second officer, Gen 
eral Pragay, was an exiled Hungarian rebel. 
There were a few more Hungarians and Germans 
among his men ; forty-nine were Cubans, the rest 
Americans, one of them being a well-known Ken- 
tuckian, Colonel Crittenden. They sailed from 
New Orleans, and, after nearly running into Ha 
vana harbour by mistake, landed at Bahia Honda, 
some forty miles to the west, on the nth of August. 
As Lopez stepped ashore he went down on his 
knees and kissed the earth, saying : " Querida 
Cuba!" (" Beloved Cuba!") 

With about three hundred of his soldiers, Lopez 
pushed inland toward the mountains, where he 
planned to establish himself in an intrenched camp. 
Colonel Crittenden and one hundred and fifty men 
were left at Bahia Honda to land the ammunition 
and baggage. They had not brought everything 
ashore when a Spanish steamer entered the harbour 
and attacked them. Some of the filibusters fled in 
land and rejoined Lopez ; Crittenden and most of 
his men attempted to escape in their boats, but 
were captured, taken to Havana, and shot. 

The Spanish troops found Lopez at Las Pozas. 
Attacking his camp, they were received with a 
deadly fire, and driven off with a loss of two hun 
dred killed. The filibusters had lost thirty-five 
men, and when they abandoned Las Pozas they had 
to leave their wounded behind to be murdered by 
the Spaniards, who had no mercy for outlaws. They 
made a second stand at Las Frias, where two hun- 



dred of them defeated thirteen hundred of the 
enemy, but their doom was certain. No recruits 
jointed them, they had no supplies, and their scanty 
ammunition was ruined by tropical storms. They 
became scattered, and wandered through the for 
ests till every one of them perished miserably, or 
was captured and taken to Havana for execution. 
Lopez met a felon s death by the garrote in the 
castle of La Punta. 

The annihilation of the Lopez expedition did 

not deter the Cubans and their sympathizers in the 

United States among whom Gen- 

interferences era j Quitman of Mississippi was ac- 

with American , , r , 

tively prominent from threatening 
fresh descents, andfthe result was a 
serious strain in the relations between the Govern 
ments at Washington and Madrid. The bitter feel 
ing of the latter found expression in interferences 
with American commerce, which provoked intense 
indignation in the United States. In 1851 the 
American ship Falcon was fired on, and two other 
vessels were seized upon a vague suspicion that 
they had been concerned in Lopez s operations. 
In 1852 the United States mail bags at Havana 
were opened and examined by order of the cap 
tain-general ; and the Crescent City was debarred 
from landing her passengers and mails because her 
purser, a Mr. Smith, was personally obnoxious to 
the Spanish officials. In his annual message that 
year President Fillmore stated the situation thus : 

The affairs of Cuba remain in an uneasy condition, 
and a feeling of alarm and irritation on the part of the 
Cuban authorities appears to exist. This feeling has in 
terfered with the regular commercial intercourse between 
the United States and the island, aQd led to some acts of 
which we have a right to complain./ 

In the same document the President reported a 
renewal of the British suggestion of 1825, and its 
renewed rejection : 


Early in the present year (1852) official notes were re 
ceived from the ministers of France and England inviting 
the Government of the United States to become a party 
with Great Britain and France to a tripartite convention, 
in virtue of which the three powers should severally 
and collectively disclaim, now and for the future, all in 
tention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and 
should bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to 
that effect on the part of any power or individual what 
ever. This invitation has been respectfully declined. I 
have, however, directed the ministers of France and Eng 
land to be assured that the United States entertain no de 
signs against Cuba, but that on the contrary I should re 
gard its incorporation into the Union at the present time 
as fraught with serious peril. 

/ During the next two years the friction of which 
Mr. Fillmore complained became still more serious, 

The Ostend 

Manife^o" i8 54 . can shi P BJ ack Warrior at Havana, 
on a charge of violating the custom 
house regulations, brought Spain and the United 
States to the verge of war. The famous Ostend 
manifesto, issued by the American ministers at 
London, Paris, and Madrid, was generally indorsed 
by American public opinion when it declared: 

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the 
island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justi 
fied by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in 
any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our 
self-respect. Whilst pursuing this course, we can afford 
to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have 
been so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall 
have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its pres 
ent value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be 
time to consider the question: " Does Cuba in the pos 
session of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace 
and the existence of our cherished Union? " Should this 
question be answered in the affirmative, then by every 
law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it 
from Spain if we possess the power: and this upon the 
very same principle that would justify an individual in 
tearing down the burning house of his neighbour if there 
were no other means of preventing the flames from de 
stroying his own home.~~7 


This bold and somewhat undiplomatic state 
ment was signed by Pierre Soule of Louisiana, 
John Young Mason of Virginia, and James Bu 
chanan of Pennsylvania; but neither Congress nor 
the Executive took any action upon it. Two years 
later, when Buchanan was elected to the Presi 
dency, it was thought that he would take some step 
toward carrying out the decided views he had ex 
pressed; but beyond his repeated suggestion that 
Congress should consider the purchase of Cuba, 
nothing was done. All less pressing questions were 
now thrust aside by the great conflict that culmi 
nated in the civil wan 

The prospect of intervention by the United 
States naturally did not tend to allay Cuba s in 
ternal troubles, and the social and political disorder 
of the island continued. In 1865 the Liberal party, 
then in power at Madrid, made a characteristic at 
tempt to restore the once vaunted loyalty of the 
Ever Faithful Isle, by referring its grievances to a 
commission of reform, half of whose members were 
appointed by the Government itself, and the rest 
elected in Cuba, but by a system that gave the 
Spanish party control of the polls. The Cuban de 
mands * were submitted and rejected seriatim. 

Three years later there was again a gleam of 
hope for Cuba, which proved equally illusory. 
The reign of Isabella ended in a revolution, and 
another constitution one of the seven or eight 
that Spain has had in the present century was pro 
claimed. On paper, at least, it was quite an ad 
vanced one, decreeing universal suffrage and a free 
press, and granting Cuba and the Philippines com 
plete political equality with the mother country ; 
but it was never put into operation beyond the 

* The chief points of these were the abolition of the military autoc 
racy of the captain-general ; representation in the Cortes ; mitigation 
of the press censorship ; the right of assembly ; the lessening of taxa 
tion, and the enforcement of the laws against the slave trade. 


2 9 

ocean. It would have destroyed the political su 
premacy of the Peninsular cs, the Spanish element 
that regarded itself as rightfully the ruling class in 
Spain s colonies ; and Lersundi, captain-general at 
Havana, simply ignored it. Had he desired to 
recognise it, the Spanish volunteers, who were now 
established as the strongest political force in Cuba, 
would not have permitted him to do so. 

It was clear that the Cubans could rest no fur 
ther hope on political agitation. Plans for a new 
revolution were already afoot, and on 
October I0 > l868 > the standard of 
revolt was raised by Carlos Cespedes 
on the plantation of Yara, near Manzanillo, in the 
province of Santiago. At the head of one hundred 
and forty men, Cespedes proclaimed the Cuban re 
public ; and thus^fregan the Ten Years War, which,ix 
barren of other results, was destined to bring such 
frightful losses to Spain and such equally terrible 
devastation to the Pearl of the Antilles! 5 

The military history of the Ten Years War is 
utterly insignificant. It consisted of a confused 
series of guerrilla campaigns, similar to those that 
have laid Cuba waste during the last few years. 
There were frequent reports of important actions, 
which were always sweeping victories for the side 
making the report. It was several times announced 
that the insurgents had captured this or that city, 
but quite or almost invariably these triumphs were 
purely imaginary. The Spaniards succeeded in 
confining the rebellion to the provinces of Santiago 
and Puerto Principe, its western limit being prac 
tically marked by the trocha, or fortified line, which 
they threw across the island from Moron to Jucaro. 
In the two eastern provinces they held the sea- 
coast, the towns, and many fortified posts, but were 
utterly unable to dislodge the patriots from the 
forest-clad mountains of the interior. 

Had they sent thirty or forty thousand men to 


Cuba on the outbreak of the rebellion, and moved 
against its scanty and ill-armed forces with prompt 
ness and vigour, it is very improbable that the 
Cubans could have kept the field. But Spain was 
distracted by domestic troubles ; civil war was 
threatened, and in 1872 it broke out, the Carlists 
attacking the supporters of the Italian Amadeo. 
Such troops as could be spared were sent over to 
Cuba in driblets. Some were Carlist prisoners, 
whose loyalty was doubtful. Some officers high in 
command were strongly suspected of a desire to 
continue the war for the chances of illegitimate 
profit it brought them. 

fThere were shocking atrocities on both sides, 
i/terribje waste of life, and great destruction of prop 
erty. / Statistics of the Spanish losses were never 
published, but it is believed that during the ten 
years not less than one hundred and fifty thousand 
soldiers from the Peninsula left their bones in Cuba 
some of them victims of the bullets or machetes 
of the insurgents, but far more slain by the fevers 
of the tropics. The Cubans suffered in turn, for 
half of the island was laid waste ; and though they 
seem never to have had more than a few thousand 
men in the field at once it is impossible to give the 
exact number, estimates varying all the way from 
two thousand to thirty thousand their losses from 
the hardships of guerrilla warfare were dispropor 
tionately heavy. 

Some of the worst excesses of the war were 
committed by the Spanish volunteers a force nu 
merous enough to have suppressed the rebellion had 
they displayed any desire for active service in the 
field rather than for terrorizing the cities. There 
were about sixty thousand of them in Cuba, twenty 
thousand in Havana alone, and they carried matters 
with a high hand in the capital. 

In May, 1870, a performance was announced at 
one of the Havana theatres for the benefit of " Cu- 


ban insolvents," which doubtless meant the insur 
gents. A crowd of armed volunteers broke into the 
house and poured a volley into the audience. In 
the following month, displeased with the mild pol 
icy of Captain-General Dulce, they arrested him 
and forced him to sail for Spain a bold usurpation 
in which the Madrid Government meekly ac 
quiesced. In November, 1871, they seized forty- 
three students of the University of Havana, charg 
ing them with scratching the glass in a cemetery 
vault containing the remains of a Spanish soldier. 
The students were acquitted in court, whereupon 
the volunteers constituted a court-martial of their 
own officers, condemned eight of the young men 
to death, and shot them the next morning. The 
official paper announced that " some negroes had 
killed a volunteer, and two of them were summarily 

" It could not be expected/ wrote an American 
correspondent who was in Cuba in 1873, " that the 
insurgents, on their side, should abstain from fear 
ful reprisals. The practice with them when a pris 
oner, and especially an officer, falls into their hands, 
is to tie his feet up to a tree, and to pile up fuel 
under the dangling head, thus burning their enemy 
alive with a slow fire. It would not be easy to 
ascertain on which side the atrocities first began, 
or are carried to greater lengths." 

A specially sinister reputation was earned by 
the Spanish general, Balmaceda (afterward captain- 
general of Cuba), whose proclamation of April 4, 
1869, in the districts of Bayamo and Jiguani, antici 
pated the ruthless policy of Weyler in some of its 
orders : 

Every man from the age of fifteen years upward found 
away from his habitation, who does not prove a proper 
reason therefor, will be shot. 

Every unoccupied habitation will be burned. 

Every habitation that does not fly a white flag, as a 
sign that its occupants desire peace, will be burned. 


Women not living at their own homes, or at the 
houses of their relatives, will collect in the towns of 
Jiguani and Bayamo, where subsistence will be provided. 
Those who do not present themselves will be conducted 

I It was only natural that popular sympathy in 
the United States should be strongly enlisted on 
behalf of the insurgents. The spec- 
American t j f people struggling to be free 

sympathy for . , fete fe 

the insurgents. ls one tnat appeals too strongly to 
give time for a close scrutiny of the 
standing and the methods of those whom misgov- 
ernment has driven to revolt^ Washington s sol 
diers were ragged regiments, and partisan warfare 
had helped to whj^the struggle against the armies 
of George III. \ On the other side was a power 
against whom Americans had a long series of griev 
ances, and who represented a European domination 
such as they themselves had cast off. There was a 
strong demand that the Government should form 
ally recognise the insurgents as belligerents, as 
had been done by some of the South American 
republics ; but the Administration, with undoubted 
political wisdom, opposed this step, which would 
have been of no practical benefit./ As President 
Grant said in his first annual message (December 
6, 1869) : 

The contest has at no time assumed the conditions 
which amount to a war in the sense of international law, 
or which would show the existence of a de facto political 
organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recog 
nition of belligerency. 

/ Conditions had not changed when in June, 

/ 1870, the President sent to Congress a special mes- 

^-^ sage in which he described the shocking state of 

affairs existing in CubzL/ It was a description that 

applied as well to the rebellion of 1895 as to that of 


The condition of the insurgents has not improved, 
and the insurrection itself, although not subdued, ex- 



hibits no signs of advance, but seems to be confined to 
an irregular system of hostilities carried on by small 
and illy armed bodies of men, roaming without concen 
tration through the woods and the sparsely populated re 
gions of the island, attacking from ambush convoys and 
small bands of troops, burning plantations and the estates 
of those not sympathizing with their cause. 

But if the insurrection has not gained ground, it is 
equally true that Spain has not suppressed it. Climate, 
disease, and the occasional bullet have worked destruction 
among the soldiers of Spain; and although the Spanish 
authorities have possession of every seaport and every 
town on the island, they have not been able to subdue the 
hostile feeling which has driven a considerable number 
of the native inhabitants of the island to armed resistance 
against Spain, and still leads them to endure the dangers 
and the privations of a roaming life of guerrilla warfare. 

^Public feeling in the United States was greatly 
excited by the seizure (January 21, 1869) of the 
American steamer Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, on the 
charge, apparently unfounded, that she had been 
landing arms for the insurgents. She was held for 
three months, and was finally liberated on the 
ground that she carried official despatches, the 
Spanish Government ignoring repeated protests 
from Washington that her arrest on the high seas 
was a violation of international law. Subsequently 
a small indemnity $19,702.50 in gold was paid 
to her owners?") 

In March of the same year another American 
ship, the schooner Lizzie Major, was arrested at 
sea by a Spanish frigate, and two passengers, 
alleged to be Cuban revolutionists, were forcibly 
taken from her. The act wa s disclaimed, however, 
and the prisoners released. In May, Captain-Gen 
eral Dulce attempted to legalize such seizures 
by a proclamation authorizing Spanish men-of-war 
to stop and search foreign vessels. Of course 
the United States Government promptly pro 
tested against this palpable breach of the law of 
nations, and Dulce had to withdraw his procla 



Much greater excitement was caused by the 
Virginius affair, which for a time made war ap 
pear inevitable. The Virginius was 
a sma11 side-wheel steamer, British 
built, but claiming a somewhat ques 
tionable American registry, which had made sev 
eral filibustering voyages to Cuba. On October 
31, 1873, she was sighted off the south coast of the 
island by the Spanish gunboat Tornado, which 
promptly gave chase. By a curious coincidence the 
two vessels were sister ships, built in the same Eng 
lish yard ; and in the light of recent tests of Spanish 
and American seamanship it might have been ex 
pected that the Virginius would outrun her pur 
suer. But though she made frantic efforts to reach 
Jamaican w 7 aters, throwing her cargo of horses and 
arms overboard to lighten the ship, as well as to 
destroy evidences of her unlawful mission, she was 
overhauled and taken to Santiago de Cuba. 

One hundred and fifty-five men were captured 
with the Virginius. On November 4th four of 
them three Cubans and one American were 
summarily shot by order of the Spanish com 
mander, General Juan Burriel. Three days later, 
thirty-seven prisoners, one of whom was the ship s 
commander, Captain Joseph Fry, a former officer 
of the United States navy, were taken ashore, lined 
up before a file of marines, and shot. These men 
were Cubans, Americans, and British subjects. 
The American and British consuls protested vehe 
mently, but without effect. On the 8th twelve 
more, prisoners suffered the same fate. 

The news of the executions was received with 
wild rejoicings in Havana, with a burst of horrified 
indignation in the United States. The Govern 
ment at Washington found itself in a very difficult 
position. Whether they were filibusters or not, the 
shooting of American citizens captured on the high 
seas was an undisguised outrage upon international 



law ; but the weakness of the navy which since the 
end of the civil war had been left to rot in de- 
fenceless harbours rendered a prompt and effec 
tual protest impossible} A fleet was ordered to ren 
dezvous at Key West, but little could be expected 
of the rusty ironclads and obsolete wooden ships. 
The rest of the Virginius prisoners would probably 
have shared the doom of the fifty-three who had 
perished had it not been for Sir Lambton Loraine, 
captain of the British sloop of war Niobe, who ran 
into Santiago harbour with his guns ready for 
action, and threatened to open fire on six Spanish 
gunboats lying in the port if there were any fur 
ther executions. He had come from Jamaica in 
answer to an urgent message from Mr. F. W. 
Ramsden, the British consul at Santiago a gentle 
man who will be mentioned again in this history. 

There followed weeks of tedious correspondence 
between Washington and Madrid. The Spanish 
Government declared that it had sent orders for 
bidding the shooting, but that owing to the interrup 
tion of telegraph lines by the insurgents they had not 
reached Santiago in time. Finally Spain consented 
to surrender the Virginius, to release the surviving 
Americans in her crew, to pay an indemnity of 
eighty thousand dollars, to salute the American 
flag, and to punish " those who have offended." 
By way of carrying out the last promise, General 
Burriel was promoted. The formal transfer of the 
Virginius, which had been taken in triumph to Ha 
vana, was ungraciously carried out in the obscure 
harbour of Bahia Honda; she was in a filthy and 
unseaworthy condition the Spaniards had pur 
posely defiled her and she sank on her way to the 

But once more war with the United States had 
been postponed, and Spain was left to wreak her 
will in Cuba. 



\THE series of unpleasant incidents that culmi 
nated in the Virginius affair created a mutual feeling 
of intense bitterness in America and in Spain) In 
the latter country, where civil war was in progress, 
Don Carlos sent an aide-de-camp to Madrid to 
propose to his cousin Alfonso, lately restored to 
the throne of the Bourbons, that the two factions 
should suspend their strife to join forces against 
their common foe, the United States, whose arro 
gance punished, each prince,should be free to assert 
his claim to the crown. In America the general 
feeling in favour of an official recognition of the 
Cuban insurgents was greatly strengthened, and 
the step would undoubtedly have been taken had it 
not been for the opposition of the Secretary of 
State, Mr. Fish, whose advice was decisive with 
President Grant an opposition that was unpopular 
at the time, but which has been abundantly justified 
by later events?? 

As the hope of American intervention faded, 
the rebellion seemed to wane. In December, 1873, 
its lack of organization was shown by reports of dis 
sensions among its leaders. Carlos Cespedes, who 
had been designated as the first president of the 

* General Grant s position upon the question of recognising the 
Cuban insurgents was fully stated in his first annual message (Decem 
ber 6, 1869) ; in the special message of June 13, 1870; and in his 
seventh annual message (December 7, 1875). 




insurgent republic, was deposed by the so-called 
Cuban congress ; and it was found impossible to 
agree upon a successor, though Salvador Cisneros 
Betancourt assumed the title of acting president. 
Cespedes continued in the field, but in March, 1874, 
he was mortally wounded in a skirmish, and his 
death brought further discouragement. 

The war had dragged on for two years more 
when the Spanish Government decided, in 1876, 
to make a supreme effort to end it. 
^ a p s 87 g 6 esto The old Bourbon dynasty was now 
firmly re-established at Madrid, the 
struggle with the Carlists was over, and the man 
of the hour, the man to whom Spain owed the res 
toration of peace and order, was General Martinez 
Campos. With twenty-five thousand soldiers, the 
flower of the Spanish army, he was sent out to 
Havana as captain-general, in the hope that he 
would do for Cuba what he had accomplished at 

As a rule, the military operations of the Cuban 
wars have been practically limited to the winter 
and spring months, which constitute the dry sea 
son ; there being on both sides a wholesome dread 
of the climatic terrors of the summer and early 
autumn, which decimated the American troops dur 
ing the brief Santiago campaign of 1898. Campos s 
first winter, that of 1876-^77, passed without any 
tangible result ; and he found his task so heavy that 
he turned over the captain-general s office to Gen 
eral Jovellar, devoting himself solely to his work in 
the field against the insurgents. Perhaps the most 
patriotic and clear-sighted public man that his 
country has produced in our time, he recognised 
that Spain s policy in Cuba had been a disastrous 
failure. In one of his reports a remarkable docu 
ment, which must have been read with unpleasant 
surprise in Madrid he openly arraigned its blun 
ders and crimes : 


The insurrection here, acknowledging as its cause the 
hatred of Spain, is due to the causes that have separated 
our other colonies from the mother country, intensified 
by the fact that promises made to Cuba at different times 
have not been fulfilled; that, as I understand it, their ful 
filment, when begun, has been forbidden by order of the 

When one day after another passed without the 
island s hopes being realized, the concessions occasionally 
granted by this or that governor being more than can 
celled by his successor; when bad officials and a worse ad 
ministration of justice aggravated the existing disorders; 
when the provincial governorships, continually growing 
more corrupt, fell at last into the hands of men without 
training or education, petty tyrants who could practise 
their thefts, and sometimes their oppressions, because of 
their distance from the supreme authority; then public 
opinion began urgently to desire those liberties which, if 
they bring much good, contain also some evil, especially 
when applied to a country that has so peculiar a life of 
its own, and is not prepared for them. 

Seeing that pacification by the sword was im 
possible, and that to prolong the war meant ruin 
to Cuba and disastrous loss to Spain, 
The compro- Campos resolved to attempt concilia- 

mise of Zanjon, . * TT . ~ c f ., , , 

Feb. jo, 1878. tlon - His first negotiation failed be 
cause the insurgent leaders to whom 
he made overtures, and who expressed a desire for 
peace, were murdered by the irreconcilables who 
had decreed death to any one treating with the 
Spaniards except on the basis of independence. In 
spite of this outrage he succeeded in communicat 
ing with Vicente Garcia, who had recently been 
named to succeed Cisneros as head of the insur 
gent government, and on the 7th of February, 
1878, the two commanders had a seven hours in 
terview at Chorrilla, near Las Tunas. On the 
loth there was a second meeting, at Zanjon, be 
tween Campos and ten Cuban commissioners, of 
whom Garcia was one and Maximo Gomez an 
other ; and here was signed the document, variously 
called the treaty or compromise of Zanjon, which 
ended the Ten Years War. These were its terms : 


ARTICLE I. Concessions to the island of Cuba of the 
political, organic, and administrative privileges accorded 
to the island of Porto Rico.* 

ART. II. Forgetfulness of the past as regards political 
offences committed from 1868 to the present time, and 
amnesty for all now under sentence for such offences in or 
put of the island; full pardon to deserters from the Span 
ish army, irrespective of nationality, including all who had 
taken part in revolutionary movements. 

ART. III. Freedom to the Asiatic coolies and the 
slaves who are now in the revolutionary ranks. 

ART. IV. No one who by virtue of this convention rec 
ognises and remains under protection of the Spanish Gov 
ernment shall be compelled to render any military service 
until peace be established throughout the island. 

ART. V. All persons affected by these provisions who 
desire to leave the island without stopping in any town 
shall receive the aid of the Spanish Government to that end. 

ART. VI. The capitulation of the forces shall take 
place in the open field, where, preferably, the arms and 
military equipments shall be surrendered. 

ART. VII. The commander-in-chief of the Spanish 
army, in order to facilitate the disbanding of the several 
sections of the Cuban army, will place at their disposal 
the railway and steamship facilities at his command. 

ART. VIII. This agreement with the central committee 
shall be considered general and without special restric 
tions, extending to all departments of the island accept 
ing these conditions. 

To the terms of this treaty the signature of 
Campos morally though perhaps not technically, 
as there seems to have been a convenient vagueness 
about his authority to treat with the insurgents 
committed the Spanish Government ; and after 
provisionally establishing a system for the election 
of Cuban deputies to the Cortes, he went back to 
Madrid to secure the execution of the agreement. 
The premier, Canovas del Castillo, declared that 
Spain could accept nothing but the complete sub 
jection of Cuba, and resigned office to avoid sub 
mitting a compromise to the legislature. Campos 

* These were substantially identical with the concessions demanded 
by the Cubans before the outbreak of the Ten Years War, and enu 
merated on page 28 (footnote). 


took the vacant place, but found himself unable to 
form a cabinet that would accept his plans, and 
gave up the attempt in despair. Canovas returned 
to the premiership, and the promises of Zanjon 
were laid aside. 

Cuba still had her right of representation at 
Madrid, but even that was speedily rendered little 
more than a mockery. The Pcninsulares regarded 
themselves as entitled to a political domination over 
the Insulares as natural as that exercised by the 
white men of the Southern States over their seven 
million negro fellow-citizens ; and their methods 
of insuring their supremacy were as ingenious and 
as unscrupulous as anything yet devised in Louisi 
ana or Mississippi. The franchise was limited to 
those paying a tax of twenty-five dollars annually 
a provision which excluded all but the richer Cu 
bans, many of whom, especially in former years, 
were loyal to the Spanish connection, mainly 
through dread of the disorders of civil war. But 
to prevent the disfranchisement of Spaniards, all 
government employees, and all persons recognised 
as belonging to any mercantile company, were 
registered as voters without taxation. 

The result was that the Peninsular es, number 
ing not more than one sixth of the total population, 
were enabled to carry most of the election districts. 
In 1 879," of forty delegates, ten were Cuban autono 
mists, thirty Spanish or Cuban conservatives, and 
the disproportion grew still more marked at later 
elections. In 1886, of thirty-eight delegates, eight 
were autonomists, thirty conservatives, all but four 
of the latter being Spanish born ; in 1896, of thirty 
delegates, all but four were Spaniards. Some of 
the Spanish candidates were men who had never 

/The Ten Years War was followed by seventeen 
years of comparative quietude in Cuba. There was 
official friction with the United States, but not so 


serious as to create an alarm of war, though in 1880 
Mr. Evarts, then Secretary of State, sent an urgent 
protest to Madrid against a " grave 
affront to the honour and dignity of 
our flag " in the overhauling of four 
Amencan vessels by Spanish gunboats 
off the Cuban coas*t7 There were minor internal dis 
orders banditry in the hills, the legacy of years 
of guerrilla warfare, and plots, or suspicions of 
plots, in the cities ; but no disturbance loud enough 
to reach the ears of the outside world. The diary 
of Captain-General Polavieja, subsequently pub 
lished in Madrid, records that in 1892 he executed 
no less than sixty-three prisoners accused of trea 
sonable conspiracy against the existing regime. 
During the following year there were two more 
attempts at insurrection one under the Sartorius 
brothers in the province of Santiago, the other un 
der Esquirre in Santa Clara; but both were feeble 
and futile. 

It would not be fair to say that the Spanish 
Government made no attempt whatever to improve 
the condition of Cuba. The burden of taxation, 
which had been mercilessly extortionate, was made 
less crushing. The Cuban budget for 1878 79 was 
more than forty-six million dollars ; that of 1882, 
a little less than thirty-six millions ; that of 1893, 
twenty-three millions. Of the other reforms, or 
pretended reforms, some were farcical in their 
worthlessness ; others, perhaps well meant by their 
authors at Madrid, were frustrated by the official 
dom of Cuba, whose morale was hinted at in Cam- 
pos s report, already quoted. 

Under the changes effected in the Spanish con 
stitution in 1876, the government of Cuba, hitherto 
regarded as an appanage of the crown, was trans 
ferred to the Cortes. This was not proclaimed in 
the island until five years later, and then proved to 
be a reform only in name. In 1892 the qualifica- 


tion for the franchise was reduced from twenty-five 
dollars a year in taxes to five dollars ; but the 
extension of the suffrage had no apparent influ 
ence upon the result of the elections, as re 
turned by the Spanish authorities in control of the 
polls. In 1895 it was announced that the mili 
tary power of the captain-general was to be tem 
pered by a council of thirty members, but the 
constitution of the advisory body was character 
istic. Of its thirty members, fifteen were to be ap 
pointed by the crown, fifteen elected in Cuba, and 
to muzzle any champion of popular rights who 
might slip into it, the captain-general was empow 
ered to suspend at will any fourteen councillors, 
and with the consent of certain officials all pretty 
sure to be Peninsula-res to dismiss the entire body. 

Spaniards who recount these efforts at concilia 
tion, and bewail the ingratitude of the colony that 
is now lost to them, add that taxes are proportion 
ately higher in the Peninsula than they were in 
Cuba ; that the Cubans have had the privilege of 
exemption from the conscription ; and that the 
long maintenance of slavery, in the face of strenu 
ous opposition, was a special favour to the indus 
tries of the island. They do not add* that it may 
have been because Spain dared not arm and train 
the Cubans that she asked no military service from 
them ; or that the connivance at human servitude 
suited the interests of peculating Spanish office 
holders rather than the public sentiment of Cuba. 
None of these excuses can palliate the fact that the 
island was utterly, hopelessly, and shamelessly mis 
governed, under a vicious system badly adminis 
tered by corrupt officials. 

Under such conditions, the recurrence of dis 
order was inevitable. It is idle to discuss whether 
those who began the latest rebellion were justified 
in drawing the sword. They were men who saw 
the Ten Years War, and who must have foreseen, 



if they foresaw anything, that in raising the stand 
ard of revolt they were dooming the island they 
professed to love to years of blood and ruin, of an 
archy and starvation. Revolt is justified only when 
it has the prospect of military success ; and could 
these leaders of small guerrilla bands expect to cope 
with Spain s army and navy? Events brought 
them a mighty ally, but Gomez and Maceo and 
their comrades have much to answer for besides the 
ending of Spanish rule in the West Indies. And 
yet we think of the " embattled farmers " who 
defied the power of George III, and sympathy 
silences criticism. 

The 24th of February, 1895, was a day of ex 
citement in Havana, and of consternation in the 

palace of the captain-general, Don 
of h i e 89 5 ebe Emilio Calleja. There were tidings 

of new revolts both in the east 
and in the west. Juan Gomez had taken the field, 
near Matanzas, with a small band of followers; at 
Manzanillo, Bartolome Masso was at the head of 
two hundred men ; and at several points in the 
province of Santiago there were risings tinder Jesus 
Rabi, Guillermo Mon^ada, and other rebel leaders. 
Calleja at once proclaimed a state of siege, and tele 
graphed to Madrid for assistance. There were 
about eighteen thousand Spanish troops in the 
island, besides the volunteers, but, as is quite usual 
with Spanish troops, they were poorly supplied and 
equipped. Little had been done to modernize the 
mediseval fortifications of the chief cities ; the cap 
tain-general had scarcely any artillery, and only 
eleven small cruisers and gunboats to patrol a coast 
line of two thousand miles. The neglect and in 
efficiency of the Spanish military administration 
was a powerful ally to the rebels. 

The revolutionists in Matanzas, or a part of 
them, were speedily forced to surrender to the gov 
ernor of the province, who thereupon reported his 



district as " pacified " ; but further east the Span 
iards were practically powerless, and the rebellion 
spread like a prairie fire. In the province of Santi 
ago, within three weeks several thousand men, 
armed with rifles or machetes, had flocked to its 
standard, and the Spanish troops found themselves 
unable to leave their fortified posts without subject 
ing themselves to guerrilla attacks. The gravity of 
the situation was appreciated both at Havana and 
at Madrid, for on the 2/th of March Captain-Gen 
eral Calleja resigned, and next day the cabinet of 
Premier Canovas del Castillo met to decide upon 
heroic measures. 

Campos, who had once pacified Cuba with 
promises which he had not been allowed to fulfil, 
was again summoned to save for Spain the Pearl 
of the Antilles. He can scarcely have approached 
the task with confidence, or without reluctance ; 
but he accepted the commission, and sailed 
promptly not to Havana, but to the troubled east, 
the headquarters of the rebellion, landing at Guan- 
tanamo on the i6th of April, 1895. Three gun 
boats were sent at the same time to Cuban waters, 
twelve thousand additional troops were ordered 
from Spain, and an unlimited credit was voted by 
the Cortes for the expenses of the war. 

Meanwhile the rebels had received important 
accessions, for the chieftains of the Ten Years War, 
who had sought safety in exile, now returned to 
strike another blow at Spain. On the ist of April 
the two negro leaders, Antonio and Jose Maceo, 
landed near Baracoa, easily avoiding the Spanish 
gunboats; and on the nth they were followed by 
Jose Marti, who assumed the provisional headship 
of the government nominally established by the in 
surgents, and by Maximo Gomez, who was recog 
nised as commander-in-chief of the scattered and 
scantily equipped " army of liberation." 

Campos s first plan of campaign was to confine 


the insurrection to the Santiago province, and he 
posted ten thousand troops along the Puerto Prin 
cipe border. Marti was killed in attempting to 
break through the cordon, but Gomez made his way 
into Puerto Principe ; and during the summer, 
when hostilities slackened, he remained there, or 
ganizing the rebellion, threatening the Spanish posi 
tions, and beginning his work of destruction among 
the plantations and the railroads. At the approach 
of the dry season he moved westward again, in con 
cert with Antonio Maceo. 

During the Ten Years War a main feature of 

the Spanish military policy was the maintenance of 

the trocha, or fortified line running 

Campos^ aCr SS thC islaild fl " 0m M r0n t0 J U - 

caro, near the western boundary of 
Puerto Principe ; and this line Campos now at 
tempted to hold against Gomez and Maceo. As a 
question of strategy, his judgment was of doubtful 
wisdom. Although he massed along the trocha 
troops that might have been better employed in 
attacking and following up the enemy, it was im 
possible to guard its fifty miles of length effectually. 
Gomez and Maceo had little difficulty in crossing 
the barrier when hostilities reopened in the autumn 
of 1895. 

With fire and sword the rebel leaders continued 
their westward advance. Campos marched in pur 
suit, but their rapid movements and better knowl 
edge of the country baffled him. Their forces were 
usually split into small commands, which engaged 
the Spaniards only when they could intercept a 
convoy or ambush a detachment. In spite of 
Spain s determined efforts to crush the revolt fifty 
thousand soldiers were sent to Cuba during the 
summer and autumn, and in November General 
Pando sailed from Cadiz with thirty thousand more 
her ablest commander, when he entered Havana 
on the day before Christmas, appeared there as a 

OF TltS 



defeated general, while Gomez followed him with 
impunity almost within sight of the capital. The 
smoke of burning villages and plantations could be 
seen from the suburbs, and the railroads running 
out of the city were paralyzed by the destruction of 
bridges and trains. 

Unsuccessful in the field, and assailed by a fierce 
storm of criticism both in Havana and from Spain, 
Campos resigned his command, and on January 17, 
1896, it was announced from Madrid that General 
Valeriano Weyler had been selected to succeed 
him. This appointment, which was regarded as 
foreshadowing a stringent and vigorous prosecu 
tion of the war, was received with delight by the 
Peninsular es, with bitter resentment by the Cubans 
and their sympathizers. As an officer in the Ten 
Years War Weyler was accused of numerous and 
shocking cruelties. The charges may have been 
false, as were many of those brought against him 
later; but he speedily proved himself truculent 

Weyler reached Havana on the loth of Feb 
ruary. On the I7th he issued a sweeping proclama 
tion ordering a summary military 

conviction, for fourteen specified of 
fences, including the furnishing of 
arms, provisions, horses, or any other assistance to 
the rebels ; the disclosing of telegraph messages to 
any but the proper official ; the invention or circu 
lation of any news directly or indirectly favouring 
the rebellion ; the speaking or writing of anything 
that might belittle the prestige of Spain or of the 
Spanish army. He further ordered that in the two 
eastern provinces, Puerto Principe and Santiago, 
all stores in country districts should be vacated by 
their owners, and that no person should go abroad 
without a passport issued by the military com 



It would be useless to attempt to follow in detail 
the campaigns of 1896 and 1897. The struggle 
continued to be a confused series of guerrilla com 
bats, destructive yet indecisive, uninteresting to 
the historian and utterly valueless to the student of 
tactics. The facts of the situation were constantly 
obscured by a cloud of false statements. The offi 
cial bulletins, chronicling nothing but Spanish 
successes, were manifestly unreliable. Reports 
from insurgent sources were still more irresponsi 
ble and imaginative. 

It may be regarded as strange that the Ameri 
can newspaper press, with its record of almost 
invincible enterprise, should have 
allowed years of civil strife in Cuba, 
an island so close to the shores of 
the great republic, and bound to it by so many 
ties of interest, to pass without a more earnest and 
successful effort to record the exact facts of the 
case. While Campos was in command, corre 
spondents were free to go and come throughout 
the island, and to investigate the character and 
progress of the struggle; but little or nothing was 
done in this direction. Certainly not one of 
them went afield with the Spanish forces. Wey- 
ler, from the first, was less accommodating to 
newspaper men ; few soldiers regard them with 
special affection witness Kitchener in the Sou 
dan, Otis at Manila, and sundry generals in the 
civil war ; but he did not begin to expel them until 
he had received very serious provocation. A corre 
spondent is always held responsible for the news 
that appears in the periodical he represents, and 
any commander might well resent the utterly un 
scrupulous fakes if that expressive term may be 
employed continually published by certain sheets 
which loudly proclaim themselves the leaders of 
American journalism, and which the foreigner may 
be pardoned for accepting as such. 


An exposure which apparently stands uncon- 
tradicted and imcontroverted of this long series 
of misstatements has been published by Mr. George 
Bronson Rea, one of the very few American corre 
spondents who witnessed any considerable amount 
of righting in Cuba. According to Mr. Rea s Facts 
and Fakes About Cuba, there were only three, or 
possibly four, who can truthfully claim to have done 
so. Of the dozens of others who started for the 
seat of war in 1896 and 1897, many seem to have 
gone no farther south than Florida, where they 
found abundant material for sensational stories in 
the information they gathered from Cuban labor- 
antes a class with whom the invention of news 
favourable to the insurgents may be said to have 
been a recognised duty. 

! It is from this source that American newspapers 
received the imaginative tales that only need to be 
collected and compared, as they are in Mr. Rea s 
book, to make evident their reckless inconsistencies 
and extreme improbabilities the stories of desper 
ate battles, when in the whole war there was 
scarcely an action that deserved the name ; of the 
capture of fortified towns, of terrible machete 
charges, of dynamite guns that mowed down whole 
Spanish battalions, of the marvellous prowess of 
regiments of Cuban Amazons all equally ficti 
tious ; of the thorough organization, civil and mili 
tary, of the rebel government ; of its " capital " at 
Cubitas, of its school system and postal service 
almost all of which were mere figments of the im 
agination. Spanish atrocities, which may have oc 
curred, but which were established solely by hear 
say evidence, were contrasted with the miraculous 
and incredible clemency said to distinguish the in 
surgent chiefs.] 

/As a typical instance, out of scores that might 

given, take the case of the alleged outrage upon 
a Cuban woman, a passenger on the American 


steamer Olivette, who in February, 1897, was 
charged with carrying documents for the insurgents, 
and was searched before being allowed 

to leave Havana - A New York 
newspaper * paraded this as a sensa 
tion, and published a large engraving showing 
the woman stripped naked, standing before three 
Spanish officials. The not unnatural result was a 
burst of public indignation at what appeared to be , 
a very shocking incident until the correspondent 
who had furnished the story emphatically dis 
claimed it in any such guise as that in which his 
paper presented it. The woman had been searched 
only by a female inspector, privately, in a state 
room ; the sensational picture had been drawn by 
an artist who was not present, and who very care 
lessly and culpably relied upon his imagination. ! 

fThe newspaper press possesses much less prac 
tical and direct political influence in the United /Jj 
States than unthinking observers suppose. All V 
this journalistic misrepresentation was unfortunate, 
but it had no effect upon the policy of either the 
Cleveland or the McKinley Administration] ^It 
aroused Spanish resentment, created false impres 
sions in America, and led to utterances in Congress / 
that were unwise and regrettable ; but it could never ^ 
have brought on a war. That came, primarily, from ^ 
the inevitable logic of an age-long situation, and " 
was immediately precipitated by the terxlble and un 
foreseen disaster of the Maine explosion./ 

As a matter of fact, during the last two months 
of Campos s command the Cuban rebellion reached 
its high-water mark, and from the 
fam nfa^d^ arrival of Weyler it steadily declined, 
death. " To the Spaniards, indeed, the cost of 

the war, in men and money, con 
tinued to be frightful, and even ruinous ; nor was 

* The New York Journal, February 12, 1897. The reporter was 
Mr. Richard Harding Davis, the artist Mr. Frederic Remington. 


there any apparent prospect of restoring peace and 
order in Cuba so long as the last of the native in 
habitants remained alive to face the starvation that 
was closing in upon them ; but it became more and 
more clear that the insurgents were hopeless of 
military success. Antonio Maceo, by general testi 
mony the most soldierly of the Cuban leaders, was 
hemmed in in Pinar del Rio, the trocha that 
stretched from Mariel to Majana cutting him off 
from Gomez, who seems to have made no effort to 
succour him ; and when he made his way across the 
trocha with a few followers, in December, 1896, he 
was killed in a chance encounter with Spanish 
troops. His successor in command of the insur 
gents in the west, Rius Rivera, was captured in 
March, 1897, and deported. His brother, Jose 
Maceo, had fallen in the preceding July. The 
operations of Gomez, of whom so much was heard 
in the first year of the war, seem to have degener 
ated into mere guerrilla tactics if, indeed, they 
ever were anything else. 

Seldom caring to take the offensive, the insur 
gents were constantly aided in eluding the Span 
iards by the fact that most of the rural population 
were ready to serve as spies, carrying information 
of every movement attempted by the Spanish com 
manders. \ It was to prevent this, and to render it 
more difficult for the enemy to obtain food, that 
Weyler issued his reconcentration order an order 
that brought detestation upon his name, that was 
rightly denounced by President McKinley as 
"brutal" and "horrible," and that^ proved disas 
trous to both parties in the struggle.! It may have 
been as much of a military necessity as Sheridan s 
devastation of the Shenandoah Valley, but its effects 
were so cruel that it proved to be one of those blun 
ders that are worse than crimes. 

Yet it is easy to show not as any excuse for its 
author that reconcentration was not the only nor 


indeed the main cause of famine and death in Cuba. 
The sufferings of the pacificos began before it was 
inaugurated and continued after it ended. Weyler s 
first bando directing the country people to assemble 
in the fortified towns was issued October 21, 1896, 
and the new policy was not in general operation 
before February, 1.897, to be revoked by Blanco s 
decree of November I3th in that year; but as far 
back as December, 1895, there were reports of thou 
sands of refugees flying to the cities from the dev 
astated rural districts. In his report presented at 
the meeting of Congress in 1896, Mr. Olney, then 
Secretary of State, said : 

It is officially reported that there are in one provin 
cial city alone some four thousand necessitous refugees 
from the surrounding country, to whom the municipal au 
thorities can afford little or no relief. 

It would be easy to multiply evidence of this 
state of affairs, and it is equally easy to discover 
reasons for it. How could there but be destitution 
and suffering when all the industries of the island 
were practically suspended when plantations were 
burned on every hand, factories razed and railroads 
destroyed, while a considerable part of the able- 
bodied male population, instead of working to sup 
port their families, took to the woods 
as guerrilla warriors? 

General Gomez, in the letter he 
sent to President McKinley in February, 1898, had 
the effrontery to assert : 

The revolution, as master of the country, has never 
prohibited any citizen, whatever his nationality, from 
earning his living. 

This was the same commander who issued the 
following proclamation under date of November 
6, 1895: 

ARTICLE I. All plantations shall be totally destroyed, 
their sugar cane and outbuildings burned, and railroad 
connections destroyed. 


ART. II. All labourers who shall aid the sugar fac 
tories shall be considered as traitors to their country. 

ART. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose vio 
lation of Article II shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all 
officers of the army of liberty comply with this order, de 
termined to unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, 
the flag of the Republic of Cuba. 

Such, as a matter of fact, was the deliberate pol 
icy of the insurgents throughout the war. As early 
as March, 1895, an American traveller who was in 
eastern Cuba during the first two weeks of the re 
bellion, said that 4k the most deplorable feature of 
the warfare is the pillaging and burning done by 
the insurgents " ; and so it continued to the end. 
Gomez s order was frequently and emphatically re 
iterated by those of other chieftains ; witness one 
of Antonio Maceo s, dated June 9, 1896: 

Allow me to impress on you the necessity of employ 
ing all means to destroy the railroads in your district, and 
to blow up trains and bridges with dynamite. 

It is also advisable to destroy all houses that may 
offer refuge or shelter to the Spanish troops, and to ren 
der useless all corn and tobacco found deposited in your 

Here is another signed by " Jose B. Aleman, 
Secretary of War," and dated December 2, 1897 : 

Considering that the working of the sugar estates fa 
vours the plans of our enemies, as shown by the marked 
interest in their last winter campaign, thus injuring the 
steady headway of the revolution: 

It has been ordered by our government ... to abso 
lutely prohibit the realization of the sugar crop of 1897- 
98. . . . Violators will suffer the punishment prescribed 
by our laws. 

The practical working of these ruthless edicts, 
and their effect upon the starving plantation hands 
of Cuba, may be illustrated by a few quotations 
from the official reports of the American consuls in 
Cuba authorities unlikely to be unduly favourable 
to the Spaniards. Mr. Barker wrote from Sagua la 
Grande, December 28, 1897 : 



This (Santa Clara) province is capable this season of 
producing perhaps two thirds of whatever cane might be 
made in the entire island. To grind this cane without in 
terruption would be the means of saving the lives of thou 
sands who, without this or outside aid within the next 
thirty to fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a 
month since the planters were officially advised of Spain s 
inability to provide protection in order to operate their 
mills. This leaves the sugar-growers entirely in the hands 
of the Cubans in revolt. I know that strict orders have 
been given that under no circumstances must mills be 
permitted to grind. 

A month later January 31, 1898 the same 
official reported : 

One sugar mill is running, not without interruption, 
with chances of making one fourth of a crop. Another, 
just started up, was attacked yesterday by a band of in 
surgents, killing fourteen and wounding five of the guer 
rillas paid by the estate to protect the operatives. Seven 
labourers were killed. 

An adjoining estate, the property of the British con 
sul, was also attacked, the growing cane burned. This 
precludes further attempts to grind, as men can not be 
induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over 
the country. 

Such was the humane warfare of which Gomez 
boasted ! 

Mr. Brice wrote from Matanzas, November 17, 
1897 after the reconcentrados had received official 
permission to return to the country : 

Only those who can obtain employment on sugar plan 
tations can live. . . . Several plantations report cane 
burned by insurgents, and the general opinion is little or 
no sugar will be made this season. 

On December 5, 1897, Mr. Hyatt reported from 
Santiago de Cuba : 

Mr. Rigney, an American sugar planter near Manza- 
nillo, was preparing to grind during the coming season. 
A few nights since, the insurgents fired seven cannon shots 
among his buildings, one ball passing through the roof of 
his house. 


On January 12, 1898, the same consul added: 

I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from 
present appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop, but 
coffee and other agricultural crops fall under the same 
ban. . . . All of the benefits that should have accrued to 
our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insurgents, 
who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee, 
and other estates. The Pompo manganese mines, owned 
by Americans, are also being held up by the same power. 

It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the 
situation in Eastern Cuba. 

On the other hand, where the insurgents were 
unable to carry out their policy of destruction, 
somewhat better conditions prevailed. Mr. Mc- 
Garr, American consul at Cienfuegos, reported on 
January 10, 1898: 

All the sugar mills in this consular jurisdiction, twen 
ty-three in number, have been grinding since the first of 
the month. . . . The demand for labour has drawn from 
the towns a great portion of the unemployed labourers 
and given employment to the male concentrados, many 
of whom were in a state of enforced idleness and destitu 
tion. As a consequence, few of them are now seen here, 
and the labour congestion has been relieved. 

Small predatory parties of insurgents make frequent 
attempts to fire the cane fields, and it requires constant 
and active vigilance to prevent their destruction. The dry 
weather and the high winds prevailing at this season ren 
der it a simple matter for one person (who can easily 
conceal himself in the tall cane) to start a conflagration 
that will, unless promptly extinguished, destroy hundreds 
of acres in a few hours. 

The sugar crop is the support of all classes, and espe 
cially of the labouring class, and should it be in large 
part destroyed a famine in reality would be inevitable. 

This letter explains the extreme difficulty the 
Spanish commanders experienced in preventing the 
destruction of the industries by which, in time of 
peace, the island supported itself. That their efforts 
to do so were sincere as they naturally would be, 
if only from motives of self-interest is attested by 
General Fitzhugh Lee, who reported under date of 
November 23, 1897: 

( UNr 


The Spanish authorities are sincere in doing all in 
their power to encourage, protect, and promote the grind 
ing of sugar. The insurgents leaders have given instruc 
tions to prevent grinding wherever it can be done, because 
by diminishing the export of Sugar the Spanish Gov 
ernment revenues are decreased. It will be very difficult 
for the Spanish authorities to prevent cane burning, be 
cause one man at night can start a fire which will burn 
hundreds of acres, just as a single individual could ignite 
a prairie by throwing a match into the dry grass. 

Nor is it true that the Spanish authorities, mili 
tary and civil, made no effort whatever to relieve 
the victims of the cruel war. The 
measures taken were indeed inade 
quate and futile ; when Spain could 
not pay her own officials and feed her own troops, 
how could she provide for half a million hungry 
Cubans? She was powerless before the hideous 
spectre of famine that arose in the island which she 
had so long misruled, and whose doom was now 
sealed by its own sons. Yet there were attempts 
at relief, besides the three million pesetas (six hun 
dred thousand dollars) voted by the Cortes in 
March, 1898, but never sent to Cuba the outbreak 
of war with the United States being a good excuse 
for its retention. While Campos was at Havana he 
raised a fund for the destitute, himself heading the 
list with two thousand dollars, and the entire Span 
ish army subscribing a day s pay. In many cities a 
junta dc socorros was formed, which distributed 
such money or provisions as could be obtained. 
In November, 1897, General Lee reported that 
" charitable committees " were caring for " large 
numbers " of refugees. General Blanco gave one 
hundred thousand dollars in Spanish silver to feed 
the destitute, and the city of Havana raised eighty 
thousand dollars by a special tax for the same pur 

Elsewhere municipal relief failed because public 
and private resources were exhausted. Consul 



Brice wrote from Matanzas, also in November, 
1897, that " several days ago an order from captain- 
general * was given municipal authorities to issue 
rations and clothing, but no attention is paid the 
order " lack of funds being, no doubt, one reason 
for the neglect. Later, in the same city, " two thou 
sand rations were given out, for a few days only, 
to eight thousand persons." But by this time the 
situation almost everywhere was that described by 
Consul Barker, of Sagua la Grande : " The authori 
ties are utterly helpless to extend any relief to those 
who have thus far survived the pangs of hunger." 
Truly General Sherman s saying that " war is hell " 
was never more frightfully verified than in Cuba. 
There was no hope of relief from within. The situa 
tion was one that cried to Heaven for the merciful 
intervention of a foreign power, more loudly than 
ever Bulgaria cried, or Armenia, or Crete. 

But terrible as was the island s plight, it was 

exceedingly difficult to formulate any proper and 

practical plan of ameliorating it. (it 

The movement s not stran gr e t h at w hi] e intervention 

for interven- - 1 1 A 

tion was so eagerly urged by American 

sympathy, two successive administra 
tions were so reluctant to undertake it. For more 
than two years the United States witnessed the 
spectacle not an entirely pleasant one to the 
friends of popular government of periodical 
scenes of excitement in Congress, which, vehement 
and even disorderly in debate, yet failing to agree 
upon any definite and consistent line of action ; 
making inflammatory speeches and passing belli 
cose resolutions, yet continuing its neglect of the 
national defences stood in more or less direct op 
position to an executive policy, which, though criti 
cised as unduly conservative, was firm, prudent, 

* This word appears in consular reports (Senate document No. 230, 
Fifty-fifth Congress, second session) as "Captain Gin" no doubt a 
typographical error. 

and based upon a better understanding of the situ- - 

question first came to the front in the na 
tional legislature when the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee reported, on January 20. jjfafi. ,a curi 
ously worded resolution instructing President 
Cleveland to 

use in a friendly spirit the good offices of this Government, 
to the end that Spain shall be requested to accord to the 
armies with which it is engaged in war the rights of 

After a month s debate, during which the reso 
lution went through several changes, the Senate 
finally passed it in the form of a recognition of the 
insurgents as a belligerent power, with the further 

that the friendly offices of the United States should be 
offered by the President to the Spanish Govejnment for 
the recognition of the independence of Cuba. "J 

The House of Representatives adopted a much 
less pacific resolution, declaring that the only per 
manent solution of the conflict was the establish- J v^, 
ment of a government by the choice of the Cuban \/ 
people ; that American interests were seriously in 
jured by the struggle, and should be protected by 
intervention if necessaryTTjThere were conferences 
and further debates, in one of which Senator Mills, \/ 
of Texas, offered a motion calling on the President 
to seize the island and hold it by military force until 
the Cuban people could organize a republic ; but 
finally, on April 6th, the House accepted the Senate 
resolution. The President took no action upon it. / 
It could hardly have been expected that the 
" friendly offices " thus proffered had the slightest 
chance of acceptance by what Senator Sherman 
termed the " sensitive, proud, and gallant nation " 
of the Iberian peninsula, whose temper was indi 
cated, during the debate in Congress, by an attack 


on the United States consulate in Barcelona, and 
by riotous anti-American demonstrations in other 
Spanish cities. Two days before the final passage 
of the resolution April 4, 1896 Secretary Olney 
had sent to Madrid a frank and full statement of the 
position of the Washington Administration. He 
pointed out that Spain s promises of a speedy res 
toration of order had signally failed; that the 
anarchy existing in Cuba had greatly damaged 
American commerce, and threatened the " absolute 
impoverishment " of the island s inhabitants ; that 
while not suggesting intervention at the time in 
deed, he expressl-y declared that " the United States 
has no designs upon Cuba, and no designs against 
the sovereignty of Spain " yet he hoped 

to find a way of co-operating with Spain in the imme 
diate pacification of the island on such a plan as, leaving 
Spain her rights of sovereignty, shall yet secure to the 
people of the island all such rights and powers of local 
self-government as they can reasonably ask. 

The Spanish reply, not received until June, was 
a refusal of Mr. Olney s rather vague offer; and 
there the matter ended for a time. 

When Congress met in the following December, 
President Cleveland s message contained a brief re 
view of the situation in Cuba, which 
congress versus remained unchanged, and a carefully 
president cieve- g uarc led yet distinct warning of pos- 

land, Dec., 1896. & .., , , J . , , fe 

sible future interference : 


* When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with 
the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demon 
strated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all pur 
poses of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless strug 
gle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife 
which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of 
human life and the utter destruction of the very subject- 
matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in 
which our obligation to the sovereignty of Spain will be 
superseded by higher obligations which we can hardly 
hesitate to recognise and discharge. 



This cautions utterance was severely criticised 
in Congress, and several motions were made with 
a view to Administration to take some 
more decided stepT/The most important was a reso 
lution offered by Senator Cameron, of Pennsyl 
vania : 

That the independence of the Republic of Cuba be and 
the same hereby is acknowledged by the United States of 

That the United States should use its friendly offices 
with the Government of Spain to bring to a close the 
war between Spain and Cuba. 

This resolution was reported favourably by the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee (December 18, 
1896), in spite of the fact that Secretary Olney ap 
peared before that body and strongly opposed it. 
On the day after the committee s decision the sec 
retary publicly stated that if it passed both houses, 
as was then generally expected, it would be noth 
ing more than " an expression of opinion by the 
eminent gentlemen who might vote for it. The 
power," he added, " to recognise the so-called re 
public of Cuba as an independent state rests exclu 
sively with the Executive " thereby raising an 
interesting point of constitutional law which still 
remains in doubt. fT or a time it seemed as if a 
conflict between the national legislature and the Ex 
ecutive was imminent, but a more conservative feel 
ing arose in Congress, created partly by the alarm 
of various commercial interests at what appeared 
to be a threat of war, and partly by the general will 
ingness to leave the whole question to be dealt with 
by the incoming Administration, and the Cameron 
resolution was never pressed to a voteT^I 

It soon became clear that under President Mc- 
Kinley and Secretary Sherman the Administration s 
Cuban policy was to be a continuation of the mas 
terly inactivity of Messrs. Cleveland and Olney; 
Mr. McKinley s position being that domestic prob- 


lems of the currency, the tariff, the deficit in the 
government revenue, and the long-continued in 
dustrial depression were paramount 
president ^ o a ca jj f rO m beyond the repub- 

McKinley and r /-\ ir o 

Cuba lies frontiers. On May 17, 1897, 

however, the tidings of increasing 
distress in Cuba, and Consul-General Lee s report 
that from six hundred to eight hundred American 
citizens were among the destitute, led him to send 
to Congress, which he had called together in special 
session, a message asking for an appropriation of 
fifty thousand dollars for their relief. The money 
was voted, not without some delay in the House, 
caused by an attempt to attach to the grant a recog 
nition of the insurgents. 

Seven months later (December 24, 1897), the 
President issued a public appeal for charity to 
Cuba s famine-stricken people. There was a gen 
erous response, about two hundred thousand dollars 
being speedily contributed. The Red Cross So 
ciety gave valuable aid, and its president, Miss 
Clara Barton, went to Havana to distribute the 
supplies, which Captain-General Blanco admitted 
free of duty, and which proved at least a temporary 
assistance to thousands of sufferers until the coming 
of w#r ended the relief work. 

Meanwhile the Senate (May 20, 1897), by forty- 
one votes to fourteen, passed a joint resolution ac- 
/ cording belligerent rights to " the government pro 
claimed and for some time maintained by force of 
arms by the people of Cuba."; This was done in 
spite of the well-understood objections to such a 
recognition. It was not warranted by the known 
status of the rebellion ; it might have encouraged 
the insurgents, but it would have been of much 
greater practical aid to Spain, by giving her ships 
the right of searching neutral vessels on the high 
seas ; it would have tied the hands of the United 
States Government in its later dealings with the 


island, and it would have precluded all claims from 
American citizens for damages caused by the war. 
The Senate s declaration, however, was entirely 
fruitless, fit never came before the House, as tX 
Speaker Reed, who was no less strong! v opposed to 
hasty intervention than was the President] had 
named no committees for the special session, and 
there was no medium for receiving and transmit- 
tinga joint resolution. 

(Throughout this critical period of American re 
lations with Spain, constant friction was caused by 

the activity of Cuban agents and 
^il^tfon 10 " s y m P atmzers in tne United States, by 
1896 1897 expeditions carrying arms to the in- . / \ 

surgents, and by questions of the ^ 
rights of American citizens involved in the strug 
gle all of which had been such sinister factors in 
the situation during the Ten Years War, and were 
certain to remain so while Spanish sovereignty in 
Cuba should lasO The list of individuals on whose 
behalf the Washington Government was called 
upon to intervene was a long one, the most im 
portant cases being those of Julio Sanguilly, who 
was liberated at its request by the Spanish Govern 
ment ; of Ricardo Ruiz, whose death in prison was 
never satisfactorily explained ; and of Alfredo La- 
borde and four others, captured on the filibustering 
schooner Competitor. These names will suggest 
what was undoubtedly the case that American 
citizenship was acquired, or claimed, by many Cu 
bans with the deliberate intention of invoking its 
protection in case of conflict with the Spanish au 
thorities ; but the Federal Government was none 
the less bound to defend their rights, and it did so 
in one instance, that of the Competitor prisoners, 
to the point of threatening the most serious conse 
quences had not their death sentence been re 

On their side, the United States authorities ex- 


ercised great vigilance in the fulfilment of neutral 
obligations and the suppression of filibustering. 
On the 30th of July, 1896, President Cleveland 
issued a special and very stringent proclamation 
against such illegal attempts " to make war upon a 
foreign country." Several arrests were made, in 
American ports and on the seas, and a diligent 
patrol was maintained by revenue cutters and naval 
vessels, at a cost said to amount to rfearly a million 
dollars annually; yet many expeditions succeeded 
in reaching Cuba, and the Spaniards found it im 
possible to believe that the United States was not 
deliberately giving aid and comfort to the rebels. 

The assassination of the Spanish premier, Cano- 

vas del Castillo, on the 8th of August, 1897, again 

delayed action from Washington 

The recall of upon the Cuban question ; and when, 

Weyler, Oct. 6. T ,1 , r A 

I8g7> after the stopgap ministry of Azcar- 

raga, Sagasta, leader of the Liberal 
party at Madrid, came into power, the new Govern 
ment made a genuine effort to forestall the demands 
which the United States, in the name of civiliza 
tion, must inevitably sooner or later formulate. At 
a meeting held on the 6th of October the Spanish 
cabinet decided upon the recall of Captain-General 
Weyler, and announced a new constitution for 
Cuba, giving the island a local parliament of its 
own, and a fairly liberal measure of autonomy. In 
timations were made at Washington that Sagasta s 
ministry would be willing to negotiate a treaty 
abolishing the differential duties which had given 
Spanish manufacturers a practical monopoly of the 
Cuban market a system very unfair to Cuba and 
detrimental to American commercial interests. To 
succeed Weyler, General Blanco was sent to Ha 
vana, where his earliest official actions were a form 
al revocation of his predecessor s reconcentration 
order, a proclamation offering amnesty to all po 
litical offenders, and the release of the Competitor 


prisoners, whom Weyler had held for eighteen 

rvVhen Congress met, in December, President 
McKinley s message reviewed the Cuban question 
at some length. With regard to the demand for a 
recognition of the insurgents, either as a govern 
ment or as belligerents, the President recited Gen 
eral Grant s arguments against such a step, and re- ; 
peated the conclusion that it was " now unwise, 
and therefore inadmissible," adding a sentence 
which reads a little curiously in the light of later 
events : 

I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be 
thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be 
criminal aggressionT? 

Continuing, the message hailed Spain s new 
policy with somewhat optimistic gratification : 

That the Government of Sagasta has entered upon a 
course from which recession with honour is impossible 
can hardly be questioned; that in the few weeks it has 
existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its profes 
sions is undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor 
should impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task 
it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain, and to 
our friendly relations with Spain, that she should be 
given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations, and 
to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things 
to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has re 
called the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the 
American mind and shocked the civilized world. She has 
modified the horrible order of concentration, and has un 
dertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who de 
sire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so, and 
assures them the protection of the Spanish Government 
in their lawful occupations. Not a single American citi 
zen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba, of whom this 
Government has any knowledge. 

Had Sagasta s move been made two years 
earlier, it is possible, though not probable, that it 
might have succeeded ; but now it came far too 
late. Indeed, by a curious train of events, and 


with the ill luck that seems to be the historical at 
tendant of weakness and unwisdom, it was Spain s 
most earnest attempt at conciliation that brought 
about the catastrophe which was to lose her the 
remnant of her empire in the new world. 

It speedily became clear that the offer of auton 
omy was an absolute failure. Years before there 
had been an organized political party 

The failure of f autonomists in Cuba but ft had 

autonomy. . / 

practically ceased to exist. Enough 
of its adherents could not be found to fill the offices 
in which the Spanish Government now desired their 
services.* There \vas no possibility of any com 
promise with the insurgents the single exception 
reported being the surrender of Juan Masso, in the 
province of Santiago, with one hundred and ten 
men. Colonel Joaquin Ruiz, of the Spanish army, 
commissioned by Blanco to treat with the rebel 
leader Aranguren, was seized and shot, in spite of 
his flag of truce a brutal murder that was excused 
as an " execution " under the insurgents decree 
against all dealings with the enemy. 

On the other hand, the new constitution pro 
voked furious opposition from the Peninsular party 
in Cuba. There were violent outbreaks in Havana, 
and on January 12, 1898, a mob led by officers of the 
Spanish garrison attacked the offices of three au 
tonomist newspapers the Diario de la Marina, the 
Discusion, and the Reconcentrado. Soldiers sent 
to restore order fraternized with the rioters, and 
though little damage was done there was great ex- 

* Consul Hyatt reported from Santiago, January 8, 1898: "That 
the Spanish Government has made a most energetic and thorough 
campaign to make autonomy successful there is no room for doubt. . . . 
Wholesale removals of Spanish officers from civil positions are made 
by sweeping orders, with instructions to fill their places with Cuban 
autonomists. About a week since there came an order dismissing 
every employee of the custom house in this city, to take effect as soon 
as proper autonomists could be found to fill their places. As yet only 
two have been named ths collector and first deputy." 


citemcnt. The crowds shouted threats against 
Blanco, and there was alarm among the Americans 
in the city. On the following day Consul-General 
Lee telegraphed to Washington : 

Uncertainty exists whether he [Blanco] can control 
the situation. If demonstrated he can not maintain order, 
preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans and their 
interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that 
end should be prepared to move promptly. 

For a month the second-class battleship Maine 
had been lying at Key West, with orders to answer 
any call that might come from General Lee. She 
was now instructed to go at once to Havana, her 
mission being announced as a " friendly naval visit." 
General Lee was informed of her despatch on Janu 
ary 24th, and at once replied : 

Advise visit be postponed six or seven days, to give 
last excitement more time to disappear. 

Secretary Day s immediate answer was: 
Maine has been ordered. 

And on the following morning, January 25, 
1898, at eleven o clock, the white battle ship, flying 
the Stars and Stripes, exchanged salutes with the 
Spanish batteries and steamed into the harbour, 
where so terrible a fate awaited her. 



WHILE the Maine lay in Havana harbour the 
s tension of the situation was greatly increased by an 
incident which at another time might have pos 
sessed little significance! On February 9, 1898, 
there was published a letter written by Senor 
Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister to the 
United States, whose tactfulness and influential per 
sonal friendships had made him a valuable agent 
for his country at Washington. It was a private 
letter to Senor Jose Canalejas, the editor of a Mad 
rid newspaper, the Heraldo, who had recently 
visited America and had gone thence to Cuba, and 
it had come into the hands of Cuban sympathizers, 
presumably, through theft in the Havana post 
office. It was an astounding indiscretion on the 
part of a man regarded as_an accomplished and ex 
perienced diplomatist, fit condemned Sagasta s 
policy of attempted conciliation as " a loss of time 
and a step in the wrong direction," and went on to 
record the writer s private opinion of President 
McKinley and his statesmanship : 

The message has undeceived the insurgents, who ex 
pected something different, and has paralyzed the action 
of Congress, but I consider it bad. Besides the natural 
and inevitable coarseness with which it repeats what the 
press and public opinion in Spain has said of Weyler, it 
shows once more what McKinley is weak and catering 
to the mob, and moreover a small politician \polto\ccahr9\ 


6 7 

who wishes to leave a door open and to stand well with 
the jingoes of his party .""] 

Self-respect compelled the Administration to 
take action, but the Spanish Government, instead of 
recalling the offending minister, allowed him to re 
sign, appointing Senor Luis Pplo y Bernabe to 
take his place at Washington. ^The incident had a 
very unfortunate effect upon public feeling in the 
United States."? If the suave and courtly Dupuy de 
Lome in private held this cynical estimate of the 
men with whom he had been dealing, what Spanish 
professions could be trusted? /No wonder that 
there was an instant cry of treachery a few days 
later, when news came of the fearful tragedy of 
February I5th77 

The Maine had been at Havana for three weeks, 
lying at the buoy assigned her by the authorities of 
the port. The usual formal courtesies 
The Maine were exchanged between her corn- 

destroyed, Feb. t /* A /"-i 1 T-\ r" t_ 

15,1898. mancler, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, 

and the local officials. Her errand was 
announced as a friendly visit, and her presence 
evoked practically no demonstration of hostility 
the only exceptions being a few derisive calls from a 
passing ferryboat crowded with people returning 
from the bullfight at Regla, and a circular, copies of 
which were sent to Sigsbee, denouncing the cochinos 
yankces (Yankee pigs) and their podrida escuadra 
(rotten squadron). As was natural and proper, the 
captain had enjoined an extra degree of watchful 
ness upon all those responsible for the care of the 
ship, but there was no alarm of any sort until 
twenty minutes to ten o clock on the night of Tues 
day, February I5th. Then, without a moment s 
warning, from deep down in the bowels of the ves 
sel there came the shock and roar of a tremendous 
explosion or rather of two explosions with a brief 
but distinct interval instantly transforming the en 
tire forward part of the Maine into a shattered 


wreck, scattering debris over other vessels an 
chored in the harbour, and breaking windows and 
extinguishing lights along the water front of 
the city. 

Captain Sigsbee was sitting in his cabin writing 
a letter when the upheaval came. As he reached 
the door an orderly, from whom no explosion could 
shock the habit of discipline, stumbled against him 
in the darkness the ship s lights had gone out 
and reported that the Maine had been blown 
up. The captain ran on deck and ordered that 
the magazines should be flooded ; but the maga 
zines, partly exploded, were already filled by the 
water that rushed through the rent frame of the 

The Maine was blazing fiercely and sinking fast. 
In a few minutes* she had settled down in about 
thirty feet of water, her upper works, a mass of 
wreckage, remaining above the surface, and con 
tinuing to burn, with occasional explosions of am 
munition, for four hours more. Three of her boats, 
which hung aft, were intact, and were launched 
before she sank; and in these, and in boats from 
two neighbouring vessels the Spanish cruiser 
Alfonso XII and the American steamer City of 
Washington, of the Ward line the survivors were 
carried ashore. Most of the crew, whose quarters 
were directly above the seat of the explosion, were 
instantly killed, or were drowned with the sinking 
ship, the total loss being two hundred and sixty 
men, including two officers, Lieutenant Jenkins 
and Engineer Merritt. A third officer, Lieutenant 
Blandin, died some months later from causes at 
tributed to the shock of the disaster. 

To his brief announcement of the loss of his 
ship, cabled as soon as he went ashore, Captain 
Sigsbee added the sentence : 

Public opinion should be suspended until further 


I The circumstances were such that a suspension 
of the popular judgment was impossible. The 
case was one that decided itself. The 
5im P le fact that an American man-of- 
war had gone to a Spanish port, and 
there, moored in the spot assigned by Spanish 
officials, had been destroyed by a nocturnal explo 
sion, led inevitably to one conclusion. / 

At another time it might have been possible to 
consider, as was urged by a technical journal,* 
that " the combination of steam, electricity, high 
explosives, and coal that may become self-igniting, 
is not a happy one, and the most exact precau 
tions against accidents may fail at times, as they 
have in the case of other vessels." There had been 
narrow escapes from disastrous explosions on at 
least three others of the new American steel war 
ships, due to the escape, in the coal bunkers, of the 
gas that causes " fire-damp " explosions in mines a 
gas which, innocuous in the open air, is a very 
dangerous explosive when it accumulates in a con 
fined space. About two years before, while she was 
stationed at Key West, some of the Cincinnati s 
coal was fired by spontaneous combustion, and the 
steel bulkhead which just as in the Maine sepa 
rated the bunker from a magazine full of projectiles 
and ammunition became red hot. The imminent 
peril was revealed only by a tiny curl of smoke, and 
the magazine was flooded in time to prevent dis 
aster, although some of the shells it contained had 
actually been charred by the heat. Among other 
cases cited was that of the British man-of-war 
Dotterel, destroyed in the Straits of Magellan, in 
1 8?3, by an explosion which remained a mystery 
until it was traced to the paint room, where a dan 
gerous inflammable gas had generated. 
) But no technical plea of the possibility of acci- 

* The Army and Navy Journal, February 19, 1898. 



dent to the Maine could avail against the over 
whelming suspicion nay, the practical certainty 
engendered by the broad facts of the case. She had 
been destroyed, by deliberate and fiendish treach 
ery, and her destroyers must be brought to account. 
That was the verdict rendered by a public opinion 
so strong, so unanimous, so earnest, that no official 
authority, however anxious to avoid a conflict so 
long as an honourable way of escaping it was to be 
found, could restrain the voice of national indigna 

- The sinking of the Maine meant war between 
the United States and Spain? That soon became 
evident even to those who least desired hostilities. 
But war was not to be proclaimed without proper 
formalities, and these could not proceed with undig 
nified haste. They might have moved faster had 
the great republic s armed forces been better pre 
pared. The game was in its hands, but it was not 
ready to play the trump card that its vast and un 
doubted superiority of strength gave it. Every 
day s delay enabled it to organize that strength 
for action, and much effective work was accom 
plished during those eight weeks of suspense, when 
impatient critics were denouncing the Administra 
tion for its supposedly timid and half-hearted policy. 
The President s first step was the natural and 
regular one of appointing a commission of inquiry 
to make a formal report on the disaster. Four 
naval officers of ability and experience were se 
lected Captain Sampson, Captain Chadwick, 
Lieutenant-Commander Marix, and Lieutenant- 
Commander Potter. Their sessions began in Ha 
vana harbour, on board the lighthouse tender 
Mangrove, which brought them from Key West, 
on the 2 ist of February. Divers and wrecking 
apparatus had already been sent from the United 
States, but it was soon determined that the Maine 
could not be raised. About a hundred of her dead 


were never recovered from the wreck ; the rest were 
buried in the Cristobal Colon cemetery, the funeral 
(February I7th) of those first found being attended 
by a great demonstration of public sympathy. 

The commission of inquiry sat for twenty-three 
days in Havana harbour and at Key West, closely 
following the work of the divers, and 
examining officers and men of the 
Maine and a few others who had been 
near the scene of the disaster. No Spanish witnesses 
were summoned, and suggestions for a joint inquiry 
were declined ; but no objection was made to the in 
spection of the wreck by Havana divers, whose evi 
dence was taken by a Spanish board appointed on 
the night of the explosion. During the inquiry the 
Montgomery, which had been ordered to Cuban 
waters with the Maine, arrived at Havana from 
Matanzas (March pth). The Spanish cruiser Viz- 
caya entered the harbour a few days earlier. To 
keep up the polite fiction of the Maine s " friend 
ly visit " to Havana, the Vizcaya had been de 
spatched to New York, to return the courtesy. She 
had arrived there in time to hear of the destruc 
tion of the American vessel (February i8th), and 
had spent a week in the port, watchfully guarded 
by the metropolitan police, before sailing for Ha 
vana, where she was joined on March 5th by her 
sister ship, the Almirante Oquendo doomed to 
share her fate in Sampson s marine graveyard oft 

A\vaited with intense eagerness by Congress 
and the country at large, the commission s report 
signed by Captain Sampson as president and Lieu 
tenant-Commander Marix as judge advocate was 
delivered to the President on the 2ist of March, 
but was not transmitted to Congress until the 28th. 
The message that accompanied it was brief, formal, 
and non-committal, reciting the facts ascertained by 
the court, and concluding : 


I have directed that the finding of the court of inquiry 
and the views of this Government thereon be communi 
cated to the Government of her Majesty the Queen Re 
gent, and I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense 
of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of 
action suggested by honour and the friendly relations of 
the two Governments. 

It will be the duty of the Executive to advise Congress 
of the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration 
is invoked. 

This W 7 as highly unsatisfactory to that portion 
of the American public which retains its old-time 
appetite for flamboyant oratory. The 
country s lack of preparation for 
hostilities was not generally appre 
ciated, ev<en by those who should have under 
stood it ; and fiery spirits in Congress and in 
journalism continued^ to talk war with the " light 
heart " with which Emile Ollivier, in 1870, sent 
the unready legions of France against the per 
fectly organized armies of Germany. " I do not 
think," declared a senator, on the 28th of March 
and his easy confidence was by no means excep 
tional " that any war measure will be necessary, 
except to blockade two or three Cuban ports and 
compel their capitulation."/ The President s utter 
ances and actions were in a different spirit. As be 
fitted his vastly greater responsibilities as the official 
head of the nation, he moved with a dignified 
deliberation ; as commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces of the United States he was preparing for 
the decisive moment with the whole energies and 
resources of the Government. 

It is a familiar fact that the United States was 
not ready for war. It was afterward stated by the 
American minister to Spain * that on February 
1 8th, three days after the destruction of the Maine, 
he was warned, by departments other than the State 

* General Woodford s speech at the Army and Navy Club in New 
York, January 28, 1899. 



Department, to defer decisive action as long as pos 
sible, because " there were not on American ships 
or in the ordnance depots of the United States two 
rounds of powder per gun." He also spoke of the 
hasty despatch of a sealed express train across the 
continent, loaded with ammunition which the Bal 
timore carried to Dewey, at Hong-Kong, in the 
nick of time. As a matter of fact, if such infor 
mation was sent to General Woodford, it was in 
correct. Such a shortage could exist only by a 
flagrant and inexcusable neglect of the standing 
regulations of the Navy Department, which prescribe 
forty rounds per gun as the minimum supply that 
every war ship must maintain while at sea ; and the 
Bureau of Ordnance emphatically denied * that any 
American vessel carried less than that allowance. 
Ammunition had been shipped to the Asiatic sta 
tion on the Concord, which left San Francisco on 
January 8th, and on the Mohican, which left on 
March nth and met the Baltimore at Honolulu. 
The only trainload sent West was one made up at 
Harrisburg on June 3Oth, to replenish the supply 
at the Mare Island navy yard. 

But though it was by no means entirely unready 
for service, the American navy was an untried 
weapon. Some of its ships had never been under 
forced draft since their first trial, f Owing to the 
refusal of Congress to vote the necessary money in 
time, it had no guns ready to arm the merchant 
vessels purchased as auxiliaries. 

With a mere handful of standing army, and with 
very inadequate coast defences, there was much to 
do at the eleventh hour, and both War and Navy 
Departments the latter, as appeared in the light 
of later revelations, working with the greater fore 
sight and efficiency were busily making ready for 

* Statement of Captain O Neill, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 
January 30, 1899. 

t Chief Engineer Melville s report for 1898. 


hostilities. Enlistments were hastened, the navy 
yards and arsenals toiled day and night, guns and 
ammunition were hurried to strategic points, orders 
were placed for all kinds of military material. Had 
all this, which of course was done as quietly as pos 
sible, been more widely known at the time, it 
might have silenced the popular impatience. 

O n the 2th of March, as the result of a confer 
ence at the White House the most important 
participants being Secretaries Day and Long, 
Senator Hale, chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs, and Representative Dingley, 
chairman of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means /Representative Cannon introduced a 
briefly worded bill appropriating fifty million dol- 
lars " for the national defence, and for each and 
every purpose connected therewith, to be expended 
at the discretion of the President. J More might 
have been voted, for the Treasury had an avail 
able cash balance of more than two hundred mil 
lion dollars. Vine appropriation was passed by 
the House, on the 8th, by a vote of three hun- 
dred and eleven to none a signal demon- 
stration of the fact that all political parties were 
united in support of a firm policy and by the 
Senate, on the Qth, without change or debate?"? 
This placed ample funds at the disposal of the War 
and Navy Departments, and, besides employing 
almost all the available industrial forces at home, a 
trusted agent, Commander Brownson, was imme 
diately sent to Europe to purchase anything that 
might be in the market. 

Another valuable preparatory measure was the 
Hawley bill, passed by the Senate on the 22d of 
February, and approved by the House on the /th 
of March, adding to the army two regiments of 
artillery, urgently needed to man the coast defences. 

A bill providing for a much larger increase, re 
organizing the regular forces and augmenting them 



to one hundred and four thousand six hundred 
men four times their existing number failed of 
Failure of the P assa g^> meeting with an opposition 
H un^ui! ^ at m ight seem unaccountable were 

it not of a piece with the historical 
policy of Congress. Ever since the ending of the 
Revolutionary War, when it reduced the Conti 
nental Army to eighty men, and refused to send 
garrisons to the frontier posts surrendered by the 
British,* the national legislature has shown an ex 
traordinary jealousy of a standing force. The 
statesmen of 1784 may be excused for fearing that 
such a body might one day subvert their hardly 
won popular liberties, as it had done in ancient 
Rome ; but in 1898 prudence seems to have degen 
erated into prejudice. In the debate upon the Hull 
bill so named after the chairman of the Com 
mittee on Military Affairs, who fathered it in the 
House Representative Lewis, of Washington, is 
reported as describing the regular army as consist 
ing of " gilded military satraps on the one hand and 
tasselled society sapheads on the other." Mr. Hep 
burn, of Iowa, voiced the traditional sentiment of 
Congress when he said, in the same debate 
(April 6th) : 

If the country enters upon war, we want that war to 
be a popular one. To make it so, the patriots of the land 
must be invited to take part in it, as they have done in 
all previous wars. 

" Ignorance and prejudice held high carnival," 
Mr. Hull afterward said, and his description of the 
debate is not an unjust one, " and the bill was de 
feated by sheer force of the lung power of members 
who have since confessed that they knew nothing 
of the subject." f 

* McMaster s History of the People of the United States, vol. i, 
p. i 86. 

t North American Review, April, 1899. "An army can be raised 
in a day, and be drilled and disciplined in a month," Senator Foraker 

7 6 


Had the Hull bill been passed, the United States 
would have had, even at the eleventh hour, a regu 
lar army large enough to conquer the Spanish 
colonies, while the militia could have been relied 
on for service as a home guard. The sufferings of 
the volunteers in the field and in camp would have 
been minimized or avoided, and the nation would 
have escaped most of the unpleasant developments 
that tarnished the glory of its victory. If the les 
sons of the war with Spain are heeded, as those 
of previous wars have not been, it will have an 
adequate force of trained regulars for the next 
emergency, instead of depending upon a hasty 
" invitation " to the " patriots of the land." 

The proceedings of the Maine commission had 

been carefully kept from the public until the report 

was published on the 28th of March. 

Report of the j t was ano ther comparatively brief 

Maine commis- , r , , . L . . 

sioni and formal document, giving a gen 

eral description of the condition and 
discipline of the ship and crew previous to the ex 
plosion, a technical summary of the injuries she had 
received, and the following momentous verdict : 

The court finds that the loss of the Maine was not in 
any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any 
of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel, 
x / In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed 
by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the 
partial explosion of two or more of her forward maga 

The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing 
the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon 
any person or persons. / 

The commission had been able to gather com 
paratively little definite and positive evidence; and 
no ray of light has since been thrown upon the sub 
ject. Only one of the Maine survivors was actually 

said in an article published in Munsey s Magazine, December, 1897, and 
that extraordinary statement may be taken as the keynote of the mili 
tary policy of Congress. 



an eye-witness of the explosion Marine William 
Anthony, the orderly who reported it to Captain 
Sigsbee. He testified that he saw " an immense 
shoot of flame " and " debris going up with it," 
but did not notice any column of water, such as 
might have been expected to be thrown into the 
air by a submarine mine. Captain Teasdale, of the 
British bark Deva, anchored near the destroyed 
battleship, " saw no wave after the explosion "- 
another negative piece of testimony. On the other 
hand, the divers whose work was accomplished 
under great difficulties, owing to the shattered 
condition of the wreck and its rapid settling in the 
soft bottom of the harbour testified positively to 
finding a hole in the mud under the Maine s bow, 
and some of her bottom plates bent inward and 
thrust upward; and this testimony, no doubt, was 
conclusive with the board of inquiry. One diver 
spoke of wires and pieces of plate, not belonging 
to the ship, lying near her in the mud not a very 
suspicious circumstance in so frequented a harbour. 
A large piece of cement found on the deck of the 
City of Washington after the explosion, and at first 
supposed to have come from the Maine s bottom 
which would have been striking evidence was 
afterward identified as part of the floor of a wash 
room on the berth deck. 

The proceedings of the Spanish board of in 
quiry were belittled by the American correspond 
ents in Havana, but they resulted in a voluminous 
report it fills more than seventy pages as a Con 
gressional document ^-which at least made a dis 
play of careful examination of such slight evidence 
as was procurable. The Spanish divers flatly con 
tradicted the American divers. Witnesses from the 
Alfonso XII, moored only about a hundred and 
fifty yards from the Maine, and from the Legazpi, 
which lay at twice that distance, testified that there 
was no disturbance of the water, as from the 


explosion of a mine. One of these witnesses 
was Ensign Guillermo Farragut, said to be nearly 
connected by blood with the famous Ameri 
can admiral, whose father was a Spaniard, a native 
of the island of Minorca. There had been an 
official search of the harbour early in the morning 
after the disaster, and no dead fish had been found 
a point on which the Spaniards laid much stress, 
but which was, at best, negative and inconclusive. 
Their conclusion, of course, was that the catas 
trophe was due to internal causes ; and this was 
confirmed by the statement, officially made through 
the Spanish legation at Washington, that no mines 
had ever been placed in the harbour of Havana. 
It is pointed out by Captain Sigsbee * that no 
demonstration of the truth of this statement was 
made or suggested. On the other hand, in an in 
terview published in the Madrid Heraldo (April 6, 
1898), Admiral Beranger, Secretary of the Navy 
under Canovas, declared that he had shipped one 
hundred and ninety electrical and contact torpedoes 
to Cuba, and arranged for their installation at Ha 
vana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and Nuevitas. 

There is much about the destruction of the 
Maine that still remains unexplained. The Span 
iards have only themselves to blame if their official 
reports are disbelieved and disregarded. The in 
vestigation by the American naval officers was to a 
certain extent an ex parte inquiry. Those who vir 
tually stood before it as men accused of a frightful 
crime the official authorities of Havana were 
not and could not be represented by counsel. Had 
they been so represented, it is at least conceivable 
that the evidence on which the court based its find 
ings might have been modified at material points. 
Those findings suggest interesting and important 
questions. A submarine mine powerful enough to 

* The Maine, p. 188. 



destroy a war ship is no ordinary article of com 
merce. It costs hundreds, or even thousands, of 
dollars ; it weighs several hundred pounds ; it is not 
likely to be possessed or operated except with 
official authority and by expert hands. Who set so 
mighty an engine of destruction under the keel of 
the Maine? Was it exploded there exploded with 
such fatal precision, such a maximum of destruc- 
tiveness by some accident of criminal careless 
ness, or by the foulest act of deliberate treachery 
that ever blotted the name of Spain? How was it 
all accomplished without leaving behind any ap 
parent trace of telltale evidence ? If no later revela 
tions answer these questions, the loss of the Maine 
will go down in history as one of the most ex 
traordinary and mysterious events ever recorded. 

Although the Government at Washington was 
actively making ready for the foreseen event of 
war, diplomatic dealings with Madrid 
were not abandoned. On the 2 ;th 
of March General Woodford, the 
United States minister to Spain, was instructed to 
submit a proposition for a six months armistice in 
Cuba, to give time " for the negotiation of peace 
with the good offices of the President " ; and to ask 
for the immediate and final revocation of the order 
of reconcentration. In reply, on the 3ist, Sagasta s 
cabinet offered to intrust the preparation of peace 
to the island s newly constituted parliament, which 
was to convene on the 4th of May ; meanwhile, the 
insurgents might ask the captain-general for an 
armistice, to which the home Government would 
raise no objection. As for the reconcentration sys 
tem which, nominally ended by the decree of 
November 10, 1897, had practically continued, 
chiefly owing to the absolute helplessness both of 
the refugees and of the local authorities Blanco at 
once (March 30) issued a proclamation declaring it 
abolished throughout the island, without any limita- 


tion or condition, and ordering all civil and mili 
tary officials to assist the destitute in finding means 
of livelihood. 

Sagasta s counter proposal, it will be seen, was 
carefully framed so as to avoid the humiliating ap 
pearance of accepting American intervention. It 
was largely, perhaps, in consequence of this exi 
gency somewhat indefinite and dilatory ; yet in 
conjunction with the grant of three million pesetas 
for the relief of Cuban distress, voted a few days 
before, and with the free field allowed to American 
charitable effort, it certainly showed a conciliatory 
disposition. It might have led to further negotia 
tion but for the prevalent fatal distrust of Spanish 
official sincerity. President McKinley, however, 
regarded it as so disappointing that he let the mat 
ter drop, and made no further pretence of amicable 
dealing with Madrid. 

The last interlude in the drama, before the Gov 
ernment at Washington took the decisive and irrev 
ocable step for which it was preparing, came on 
the 7th of April, when the representatives of the 
six great powers of Europe, headed by the senior 
ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, called at the 
White House to present a joint note urging fur 
ther negotiations for the maintenance of peace. 
Whether undertaken at the request of Spain, or at 
the suggestion of one of the powers, the proceed 
ing which might have carried an unpleasant 
meaning as a hint of possible intervention in the 
coming struggle was treated as simply a humane 
formality. The President s reply was perfectly 
courteous, but showed no sign of stirring from the 
policy upon which he had now fully determined, 
and which he was to announce to the country and 
to the world four days later : 

The Government of the United States recognises the 
good will which has prompted the friendly communica 
tion of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 


France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in 
the address of your excellencies, and shares the .hope 
therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in 
Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the 
United States and Spain by affording the necessary guar 
antees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so 
terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there 
which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the 
tranquility of the American nation by the character and 
consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, 
besides shocking its sentiment of humanity. 

The Government of the United States appreciates the 
humanitarian and disinterested character of the communi 
cation now made on behalf of the powers named, and for 
its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown 
for its own earnest and unselfish endeavours to fulfil a 
duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite pro 
longation of which has become insufferable. 

The Spanish answer to the communication of 

the verdict of the Maine board was a proposal " that 

the facts be ascertained by an impar- 

President ^ a j investigation by experts, whose 

McKinley swar dedsion 5 {n accepts in advance . 

April 11/1898. To this no reply was made. [On the 
nth of April the President sent to 
Congress his message reviewing the whole situa 
tion, recapitulating the position of the Government 
during Cuba s years of agony, and declaring that 
at last the hour for intervention had struck. It was 
an able and dignified state paper, and of such im 
portance as defining the issues upon which America 
stood ready to dcaw the sword, that it deserves ex 
tended quotation. The opening paragraphs de 
scribe the intolerable conditions existing so close to 
the southern shores of the United States : 

The present revolution is but the successor of other 
similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against 
the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly 
half a century, each of which, during its progress, has sub 
jected the United States to great effort and expense in 
enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to 
American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoy 
ance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the ex- 


ercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of war 
fare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane 
sympathies of our people. 

Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, 
this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold 
ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle un 
equalled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as 
to the numbers of the combatants and the bitterness of the 
contest by any revolution of modern times where a de 
pendent people struggling to be free have been opposed 
by the power of the sovereign state. 

Our people have beheld a once prosperous community 
reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce vir 
tually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness dimin 
ished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people 
perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitu 
tion. We have found ourselves constrained, in the obser 
vance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and 
which the law of nations commands, to police our own 
waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any 
unlawful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade has suf 
fered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has 
been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our 
people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous 
unrest among our own citizens which has inevitably 
found its expression from time to time in the national 

The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of sub 
jugation or extermination a final military victory for 
either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in 
the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or 
perhaps of both a condition which in effect ended the 
Ten Years War by the truce of Zanjon. The prospect of 
such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife is 
a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity 
by the civilized world, and least of all by the United 
States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and inti 
mately, by its very existence. 

The President then recounted his offers of 
friendly mediation, which Spain had uniformly de 
clined, and discussed an alternative course which 
had been so frequently urged in Congress the 
recognition of the insurgents either as belligerents 
or as an independent power. He pointed out that 
in avoiding this step he had followed the prece 
dents clearly established by Jackson and other chief 


magistrates, and had continued the policy consist 
ently maintained by his more recent predecessors 
before whom the same question had come Presi 
dents Grant and Cleveland ; and he added, in a pas 
sage whose foresight will now be admitted : 

Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable 
the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To 
commit this country now to the recognition of any par 
ticular government in Cuba might subject us to embar 
rassing conditions of international obligation toward the 
organization so recognised. In case of intervention our 
conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval 
of such government. We would be required to submit to 
its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a 
friendly ally. 

When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the 
island a government capable of performing the duties and 
discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, 
as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of na 
tionality, such government can be promptly and readily 

Recognition of the insurgents being inadmis- 
sible and inexpedient, and mediation being de 
clined, nothing but intervention remained/ That 
the time would come for the United States to take 
action, Spain had long ago been warned. President 
Grant had declared that " the agency of others, 
either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be 
the only alternative which must sooner or later be 
invoked." President Cleveland had repeated the 
warning, in a passage already quoted, and JVtr. 
McKinley s earlier messages had reiterated it. I And 
as to the moral right to intervene : 

The forcible intervention of the United States as a 
neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of 
humanity, and following many historical precedents where 
neighbouring states have interfered to check the hopeless 
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their 
borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves 
hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as 
well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settle 


The grounds for such intervention may be briefly sum 
marized as follows: 

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to 
the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible mis 
eries now existing there, and which the parties to the con 
flict are either unable or unwilling- to stop or mitigate. 
It is no answer to say this is all in another country, be 
longing to another nation, and is therefore none of our 
business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our 

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford 
them that protection and indemnity for life and property 
which no government there can or will afford, and to that 
end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal 

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the 
very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business 
of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property 
and devastation of the island. 

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The 
present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace 
to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enor 
mous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in 
an island so near us, and with which our people have such 
trade and business relations; where the lives and liberty 
of our citizens are in constant danger and their property 
destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading ves 
sels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door 
by war ships of a foreign nation; the expeditions of fili 
bustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, 
and the irritating questions and entanglements thus aris 
ing all these and others that I need not mention, with the 
resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our 
peace, and compel us to keep on a semi war-footing with 
a nation with which we are at peace. 

All these sinister conditions had been patiently 
endured until there came the crowning and intoler 
able outrage of the destruction of an American 
battle ship, while " reposing in the fancied security 
of a friendly harbour."! 

The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to 
say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Govern 
ment, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruc 
tion of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, 
that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the 
responsibility. That remains to be fixed. 


In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by what 
ever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a 
state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition 
is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government 
can not assure safety and security to a vessel of the Ameri 
can navy in the harbour of Havana on a mission of peace, 
and rightfully there. 

On all these convincing and carefully stated \f 
premises the President based his concluding call for 
immediate and decisive action"!") 

The only hope of relief and repose from a condition 
which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification 
of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civili 
zation, in behalf of endangered American interests which 
give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the 
war in Cuba must stop. 

.... I ask the Congress to authorize and empower 
the President to take measures to secure a full and final 
termination of hostilities between the Government of 
Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island 
the establishment of a stable government, capable of 
maintaining order and observing its international obliga 
tions, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of 
its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and 
naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for 
these purposes. 

The issue is now with the Congress. . . . Prepared to 
execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Consti 
tution and the law, I await your action. 

I The message was received with a marked and 
rather curious absence of enthusiasm?) The im 
pression it made in Congress was one of disappoint 
ment. In the House, where it was read to crowded 
galleries, it was greeted with only two faint out 
bursts of applause. /It was not regarded as a call * 
to arms, though it certainly seems such as we read 
it in the light of its consequences. 1 Many in Wash 
ington had expected a direct and unqualified dec 
laration of war with Spain jljtliey were dissatisfied 
with a policy of intervention, seeing a possible loop 
hole in the fact that no date for action was fixed. 
It is difficult to see how they expected Spain to re- 


gard the announcement of forcible interposition 
" hostile constraint upon both the parties to the 
contest," the message said as anything else but a 
virtual declaration of hostilities. 

Two days later (April I3th) the Senate Com 
mittee on Foreign Affairs, to which the President s 
two messages had been referred, with 
The Davis several resolutions, most of them in 

AprTi a, 1898. favour of recognising the Cuban in 
surgents, presented its report. This, 
written by the chairman of the committee, Senator 
Davis, was another document of such historical im 
portance that its salient points must be cited here. 
It first dealt with the situation created by the 
destruction of the Maine, a catastrophe which 

excited to an unprecedented degree the compassion and 
resentment of the American people. 

The event itself, though in a certain sense a distinct 
occurrence, was linked with a series of precedent tran 
sactions which can not in reason be disconnected from 
it. It was the catastrophe of a unity of events extend 
ing over more than three years of momentous his 
tory. Standing by itself it would be, perhaps, merely 
an ominous calamity; considered, as it must be, with 
the events with which reason and common sense must 
connect it, and with animus by Spain so plainly appar 
ent that no one can even plausibly deny its existence, 
it is merely one reason for the conclusion to which the in 
vestigating mind must come in considering the entire sub 
ject of the relations of the United States with that Gov 

Coming, then, to the policy proper in these un 
toward circumstances, the report took issue with 
the President s opposition to any recognition of the 
insurgents, and defended the constant moves all 
of them fruitless that Congress had made in this 
direction : 

The United States ought at once to recognise the in 
dependence of the people of Cuba. . . . 

It is believed that recognition of the belligerency of 
the insurgents in Cuba, if it had been given seasonably, 


when it was suggested by concurrent resolutions to that 
effect passed by Congress, would have insured the speedy 
termination of the war without involving the United 
States in the contest. 

The recognition of the independence of the people of 
Cuba is justified and demanded by the highest considera 
tions of duty, right, and policy. 

This very positive assertion was supported by a 
description of the " Cuban Republic " and its sup 
posed established control of the eastern half of the 

The insurgents hold the eastern portion of the island, 
to the practical exclusion of Spain. This possession ex 
tends over one body of territory comprising fully one 
half of the area of Cuba. 

.... The insurgents comprise in the eastern half 
nearly one third of the population of the island. That 
third of the population pays taxes to them, serves in their 
armies, and in every way supports and is loyal to them. 

The cause of Spain has continually grown weaker, 
and that of the insurgents has grown stronger. The 
former is making no substantial effort for the recovery of 
these lost provinces. Their people are secure from in 
vasion and cruel administration. Spain has never been 
able to subject them to her unprecedented and murderous 
policy of concentration and extermination. 

Her control over the western portion of the island is 
dominance over a desolation which she herself has cre 
ated. Even there she controls only the territory occupied 
by her cantonments and camps. 

This description accorded with the prevalent 
impression of the existing state of affairs in Cuba, 
but it was quite at variance with the facts given 
in the reports quoted on an earlier page,* and 
with the conditions which our forces found con 
fronting them when the war began. The Presi 
dent s view was, as has been said before, the 
better informed one. It was strange that the 
Senate committee should speak of the eastern 
provinces as having escaped the horrors of the 
war when the American consular agents were 

* Page 54. 


giving such frightful pictures of their sufferings 
sufferings far more severe than the distress of the 
western provinces, serious as that was. " I do not 
believe," Consul Hyatt wrote from Santiago, Feb 
ruary i, 1898, " that the western continent has 
ever witnessed death by starvation equal to that 
which now exists in eastern Cuba." 

The plea for recognition of the insurgents was 
little more than a thrashing of old straw. The re 
port touched a more vital point in its justification of 
intervention by sufficient precedents, and by the 
opinions of authorities on international law. It 
pointed out that the great political principles which 
guide national policies in the old world and in the 
new the " balance of power " in Europe and the 
Monroe Doctrine in America are distinct asser 
tions of the right of intervention in certain contin 
gencies. Under those principles, in 1878, united 
Europe intervened between Turkey and Russia 
which latter power had itself forcibly intervened in 
Turkey to put a stop to flagrant misgovernment 
and in 1867 the United States, " by threat and show 
of force " compelled France to evacuate Mexico. 
Egypt, Crete, and Greece have furnished further 
instances in point. 

After a final summary of the injuries suffered by 
American interests, already stated in the Presi 
dent s message, Senator Davis s report concluded 
by submitting the following resolution : 

Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed 
for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near 
our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the 
people of the United States, have been a disgrace to 
Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the 
destruction of a United States battle ship, with two hun 
dred and sixty-six of its officers and crew,* while on a 
friendly visit in the harbour of Havana, and can not longer 
be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the 

* This seems to have been a slight inaccuracy. The figures given 
by the Navy Department are 260. 


8 9 

United States in his message to Congress of April n, 
1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; 

Therefore, Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep 
resentatives of the United States of America in Congress 

First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and 
of right ought to be, free and independent. 

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to de 
mand, and the Government of the United States does 
hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once re 
linquish its authority and government in the island of 
Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
and Cuban waters. 

Third. That the President of the United States be,- 
and hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire 
land and naval forces of the United States and to call 
into the actual service of the United States the militia of 
the several States to such an extent as may be necessary 
to carry these resolutions into effect. 

/A week of vehement debate followed in both 

branches of Congress. The House was the quicker 

to act, passing a resolution, framed 

TheHousevotes b { ^ Foreign Affairs Committee, 

for intervention, J , , - A M - .. 

April 13, 1898. on the J 3th of April, after a dis 
cussion in which the strained feel 
ings of the hour found expression in passages of 
violent disorder. The lie was passed between the 
two sides of the House ; there was much shouting 
and shaking of fists ; one Southern member hurled 
a heavy book at an opponent, and another ran along 
the top of a line of desks to plunge into the fray, 
which was finally quieted by the sergeant-at-arnisT) 
The resolution adopted amid such scenes of ex 
citement was couched in terms that were certainly 
sweeping and vigorous, lit declared that for three 
years Spain had waged war upon the inhabitants of 
Cuba without making any substantial progress to 
ward suppressing the revolution ; that she had con 
ducted her warfare in a manner contrary to the laws 
of nations, had caused the death by starvation of 
more than two hundred thousand non-combatants, 
and had destroyed the lives and property of many 


American citizens ; that the long series of losses, in- 
/ juries, and murders for which Spain was responsible 
had culminated in the destruction of the Maine]! 
With all this as a preamble, it authorized the Presi 
dent to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, 
" with the purpose of establishing, by the free 
action of the people thereof, a stable and inde 
pendent government of their own." It passed the 
House by 322 votes to 19, Representative Boutelle, 
of Maine, being the most prominent member of the 

fThe debate in the Senate was also marked by 

. an excitement rare in that dignified body, and the 

lie was passed when one speaker al- 

The senate hided to another Senator s visit to 

resolution, / i .1 a r 

April 16, 1898. Cuba as the commissioner of a 
sensational New York newspaper.! 
It ended in the adoption of the resolution submitted 
by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and al 
ready quoted at the conclusion of Senator Davis s 
report, with two notable amendments. One was the 
addition suggested by a minority of the com 
mittee, including Senators Foraker and Turpie 
of the following words to the first paragraph : 

And that the Government of the United States hereby 
recognises the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful 
government of that island. 

This was in direct opposition to the President s 
message and reaffirmed the Congressional antago 
nism to his policy of non-recognition. As Mr. Mc- 
Kinley had very justly pointed out, it would have 
ended his freedom of action in Cuba. Having once 
acknowledged the authority of the insurgents, the 
United States could not have appeared in the island 
without their permission, nor have acted except at 
their direction. 

The other amendment, moved by Senator Davis, 
was the addition of a fourth paragraph to the reso 
lution : 


Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any 
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic 
tion, or control over said island, except for the pacification 
thereof, and asserts its determination when that is ac 
complished to leave the government and control of the 
island to its people. 

With these amendments the Senate passed the 
resolution by a vote of sixty-seven to twenty-one, 
on the night of April i6th, after a continuous ses 
sion of eleven hours. 

The difference between the House and Senate 
resolutions necessitating a conference, the repre 
sentatives of the former branch agreed to the fourth 
paragraph, but refused to accept the recognition of 
the insurgents. The refusal, in spite of the strong 
feeling in favour of recognition that had always ex 
isted in the House, was a fortunate and patriotic 
concession to the judgment of the President, as well 
as a remarkable tribute to the influence of Speaker 
Reed. It is to be regretted that the other Senate 
amendment could not also have been left off the 
record. Well intentioned as was the disclaimer of 
desire for aggrandizement, and correctly as it ex 
pressed the feeling in which the United States 
entered upon the war, it is easy to see now that its 
wisdom was doubtful. History moves rapidly in 
war time, and it is difficult to predict, before draw 
ing the sword, what policy will best meet the prob 
lems that may have arisen when it is sheathed again. 
It would have been better to follow more strictly the 
lines laid down in the President s message, and 
avoid all the " embarrassing conditions " of which 
he spoke in warning. 

The final debate took place on the i8th, lasting 
beyond midnight and ending at half past one in 
the morning of the iQth, when the 
to h s U a 1 i t ^ matum conference report was adopted by the 
April ao^iigi. House. The President held the reso 
lution for a day, adding his signature 
on the 2Oth, at 11.24 A. M., in the presence of most 


of his cabinet. In accordance with its terms, in 
structions were immediately sent to General Wood- 
ford, United States minister at Madrid, to present 
to the Spanish Government a formal demand that 
it should " at once relinquish its authority and gov 
ernment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its 
land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban 
waters." For a " full and satisfactory response," 
the American ultimatum continued, the President 
would wait till noon on April 23d ; in default of such 
reply, he would use the power of the nation to carry 
it into effect. 

That Spain would comply with the demand was 
not to be expected. Although diplomatically she 
had admitted that the conduct of the United States 
during the Cuban civil war had been correct, she 
bitterly resented the fact that the insurrection had 
been to a great extent organized and directed from 
that country, and assisted by illegal expeditions re 
cruited there. She had been the subject of constant 
abuse, both just and unjust, in its newspapers and 
in Congress. Her proud and sensitive people, 
ignorant of the real character and resources of the 
American republic, would not have suffered her 
statesmen to accept the proffered terms even had 
they themselves desired to do so. Such a conces 
sion would have unseated Sagasta s ministry and 
might have upset little Alfonso s throne. 

Senor Polo, the Spanish minister at Washing 
ton, was notified by a messenger from the State 
Department, on the morning of the 

Diplomatic rela- 2Qth Q | the s {or n { nj r Q f t h e joint rCSO- 
tions broken off, , , 9 , te . J . , 

April 20 1898. lution, and of the instructions that 
had gone to General Woodford. He 
at once replied with a request for his passports. 
;< The resolution," he wrote, " is of such a character 
that my permanence in Washington becomes im 
possible." At seven o clock after an interview 
with the ubiquitous newspaper correspondents, to 


whom he foretold victory for Spain in the coming 
struggle he took a train for the north. Police 
guarded the station to prevent any hostile demon 
stration, but none was attempted. His destination 
was Niagara Falls, just over the Canadian fron 
tier, whither Seiior du Bosc, first secretary of the 
legation, followed him a day later, leaving the 
affairs of the Spanish Government in the hands of 
the French ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Aus 
trian minister, Baron Hengelmuller. 

Meanwhile, there was great excitement in 
Madrid. On the iQth Seiior Sagasta addressed a 
meeting of his supporters in the Cortes which had 
been summoned in special session and called on 
" all sons of Spain " to " repel with the whole might 
of the nation a most odious outrage, the like of 
which has never been seen in history." On the fol 
lowing day the boy king and his mother, the queen 
regent, went in person to open the legislature, and 
their appearance was the signal for a great demon 
stration of enthusiasm. Maria Cristina herself 
read the opening speech to the Cortes, which body, 
she declared, would " undoubtedly indorse the 
invincible resolution which inspires my Govern 
ment to defend our rights with whatever sacrifices 
may be required from us." It is impossible not to 
feel a touch of personal sympathy for this hapless 
princess, a pathetic figure amid the troubles of her 
adopted country, and never, perhaps, more pathetic 
than when, on the eve of a disastrous war that was 
Spain s just punishment, she told the Cortes that 
" with the self-devotion which always guided our 
ancestors in the great emergencies of our history, 
we will surmount the present crisis without loss of 

The American ultimatum was never officially 
presented, for on the morning of April 21 st, before 
General Woodford had handed it to the Spanish 
Government, he received a note from Pio Gullon, 


the minister for foreign affairs, informing him that 
diplomatic relations were at an end. Congress, 
said Senor Gullon, had passed a resolution which 
" denies the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and 
threatens immediate armed intervention in Cuba 
which is equivalent to a declaration of war." 
American newspapers saw in this another piece of 
Spanish treachery, and declared that the President s 
despatch to General Woodford must have been sur 
reptitiously copied at the telegraph office in 
Madrid ; but the supposition is unnecessary. As al 
ready stated, the ultimatum had been communi 
cated to the Spanish legation in Washington 
twenty-four hours before, and Senor Polo had no 
doubt promptly informed the home Government of 
so momentous a piece of news. 

General Woodford at once asked for his pass 
ports, and on the afternoon of the 2ist he started 
for the French frontier, leaving the affairs of his 
legation in the hands of the British ambassador, 
and instructing the American consuls in other 
Spanish cities to take similar steps. He was 
escorted to the station by Senor Aguilera, the gov 
ernor of Madrid, who preserved an attitude of grave 
Castilian courtesy till the train was moving away, 
when he led the bystanders in cheering for Spain. 
There was an unpleasant incident as the departing 
minister passed through Valladolid, where a mob 
yelled " Death to the Yankees ! " and threw stones 
at the train, in spite of the efforts of the local police. 
In Madrid, that same evening, excited crowds 
thronged the streets, and there was some disorder, 
a gilded eagle being pulled down from the office of 
an American life insurance company. 

Such were some of the incidents of the day that 
was to be memorable in history as the first of the 
war ; but its great and decisive event was the flash 
ing of a brief message along the wire from Wash 
ington to Key West, where the most powerful fleet 



of war ships that ever floated in American waters 
lay waiting with intense eagerness for the word 
for action. Before entering upon the battle 
drama that ensued, it may be well to give a brief 
review of the forces that the combatants had mar 
shalled for the struggle thus signalled to begin. 




FOUR hundred years ago Spain rose suddenly 
to the foremost place among the nations; but she 
fell almost as speedily, and in the present century 
she has not been reckoned as one of the great 
powers of Europe. At the beginning of 1898 her 
population was estimated at eighteen millions 
about a quarter of that of the United States ; and 
in other respects the disproportion of resources was 
still greater. Her one point of advantage on 
paper, at least lay in the fact that she had the 
greater number of trained soldiers. The issue of 
the conflict depended on the command of the sea, 
and her navy was weaker than her adversary s, 
though the tremendous inferiority it was to display 
under the guns of Dewey and Sampson did not 
appear in the navy lists. Almost overwhelmingly 
burdened with debt, her Government had neither 
ready money nor credit the sinews of modern war. 
Her financial condition, indeed, was in itself a 
handicap that predetermined the result of her strug 
gle against her rich and powerful enemy from the 
day it began. 

There is no boastfulness in saying that the 
American is a better fighter than the Spaniard. 
Napoleon stigmatized the British as a nation of 
shopkeepers, and in that historical epigram he un 
intentionally phrased the strength of the peoples 
whom we classify by the oft-abused term of Anglo- 
Saxon. The qualities that win in the arts of peace 


will also win in the arts of war, and the greater 
energy, intelligence, and organizing power in a 
word, the superior business ability of the men 
who speak the English language is setting them 
further and further ahead of the Latin races in the 
struggle for worldwide dominion. 

Of all the Latin countries, Spain is probably the 
least advanced, the most mediaeval. Her people 
live primitively by agriculture ; her manufactures 
are utterly insignificant in comparison to the vast 
industrial forces of the United States. In 1889 
sixty-eight per cent of her inhabitants were re 
turned as illiterate. In such a soil good govern 
ment does not thrive, and she has suffered sorely 
from misrule and civil disorder. Her lack of great 
men is sufficiently shown by the disastrous inepti 
tude with which her foremost soldiers and states 
men have met the military and political emergencies 
of the last few years. 

The Spaniard can fight bravely, but modern 
war, especially at sea, is not won by personal brav 
ery. It is a matter of engineering, of the skilful 
use of ponderous and intricate machinery. In this 
the Spaniard is specially deficient, and the Ameri 
can conspicuously strong. As has been said by Hi 
ram S. Maxim : "The complication of modern imple 
ments of destruction gives to the highly scientific and 
mechanical races a marked advantage over the un 
trained and unscientific nations " ; * and the war of 
1898 was a signal demonstration of this principle. 

As in practically all the countries of continental 

Europe, Spain s army is raised by conscription, 

80,000 recruits being levied annually. 

The^Span .j,^ term Q{ service j s twdve years 

three in the line, three in the first 
reserve, six in the second reserve. The full force 
of the army is nominally 1,083,595 men, but this 

* The Engineering Magazine, September, 1898. 

9 8 


is on paper only, as nothing like that number could 
be equipped for service. The standing army is 
stated at 128,183 on a peace footing, 183,972 on a 
war footing. The infantry is equipped with the 
Mauser, a good modern rifle that is also used by the 
German and other armies. It is of German make, 
a magazine rifle of small calibre and great range 
and power, using smokeless powder, and shooting 
five bullets without reloading. 

Of the morale of the Spanish soldiers, their ill 
success in Cuba had created an unfavourable a 
much too unfavourable opinion in the United 
States. Americans who saw them there described 
them as not lacking in courage, but undisciplined, 
undrilled, and badly officered criticisms that agree 
with those made by Wellington during the Penin 
sular war. They were wretched marksmen, the cor 
respondents said, never doing target practice, and 
so careless in action that they seldom raised their 
rifles to the shoulder, finding it easier to fire with 
the butt held under the arm. They spoiled their 
weapons by ignorant misuse, knocking off the 
sight, for instance, because they complained that it 
tore their clothes. 

In the face of the American navy Spain had 
little prospect of sending any further reinforcement 
to her army in Cuba. The strength of her garrison 
there at the outbreak of the war was not known 
with anything like exactitude. According to Mr. 
Springer, vice-consul at Havana, official records 
showed that since February, 1895, she had de 
spatched 237,000 men across the Atlantic; a few of 
these had been killed in action, many thousands had 
died of disease, many more thousands had been in 
valided home. Consul-General Lee testified before 
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, on April 
1 2th, that there were probably 97,000 or 98,000 
Spanish troops then in the island, of whom only 
about 55,000 were capable of bearing arms. This 



was far too low an estimate; the figures given by 
General Miles 150,000 men with 183 guns were 
much nearer the truth. At the end of the war, 
after some 23,000 troops had left Santiago, the 
American commissioners in Cuba Admiral Samp 
son and Generals Wade and Butler reported that 
there were in the island about 118,000 Spanish 
regulars, 21,000 volunteers on duty, and 52,000 vol 
unteers armed but not on duty. 

It has been repeatedly stated that Spain s naval 

power, on paper, was quite equal to that of the 

United States ; but the navy lists do 

Iav e y Span not bear this out Her total number 

of vessels in service was given as 137, 
against 86 in the American navy ; but such figures 
mean nothing. Of armoured men-of-war the 
ships that win sea fights she had in commission 
six, against seven, and her vessels were individually 
inferior. In its second line the United States had 
thirteen good modern steel cruisers besides the 
New Orleans, bought just in time for the war ; Spain 
had only five that could be classed as such. The rest 
of her navy consisted mainly of old iron and wooden 
vessels and of small gunboats used in patrolling the 
Cuban coast. Of her six first-rates, only one was a 
battle ship the Pelayo, a steel vessel of 9,900 tons, 
launched at La Seyne (Toulon) in 1887 and since 
fitted with new boilers. Another battle ship, the Em- 
perador Carlos V, launched at Cadiz in 1895, was at 
Havre taking her armament aboard when the war 
began. In June she was hurried off with Camara s 
squadron, her equipment still incomplete. Spain had 
no other ship of this class in service or building. 

The fighting strength of the Spanish navy lay in 
its armoured cruisers. Nine of these were listed, 
but two of the nine were unfinished, and two the 
Numancia and the Vittoria were iron ships more 
than thirty years old, very slow, and practically use 
less for distant work. The other five cruisers were 


fine modern vessels. Four theAlmiranteOquendo, 
the Infanta Maria Teresa, the Princesa de Asturias, 
and the Vizcaya were sister ships, built in the 
Spanish yards, mainly by British constructors, dur 
ing the last eight years. Each was of 7,000 tons, 
with a speed stated at twenty knots an hour, and 
costing three million dollars. The fifth was the 
Cristobal Colon, built at Sestri, Italy, as the 
Giuseppe Garibaldi II, the purchase of which was 
reported by the American newspapers, in March, 
1898, as part of Spain s hostile preparations. As a 
matter of fact the Colon was bought in 1897, an 
order being placed with the same builders for a 
sister ship, which has never been delivered. 

At the Spanish yards the most important are 
those at Cartagena, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Bilbao 
some other ships were building. Two were the un 
finished cruisers Cardinal Cisneros and Cataluna, 
similar to the Vizcaya class. Another, the Isabel 
la Catolica, a 3,ooo-ton cruiser, was to be paid for 
by a fund raised in Mexico ; a third small cruiser, 
the Rio de la Plata, was building at Havre, as a 
gift from the Spaniards of South America. None 
of these could be made ready for service, but two 
swift torpedo cruisers had just been completed in 
Thomson s yard, at Glasgow. In bringing them 
south their Spanish crews ran afoul of the Irish 
coast, and one was badly damaged. 

Never, since the days of the Armada, has 
Spain s navy been famed for good seamanship. 
Her people, as has been said, do not possess the 
mechanical ability that is proverbially an American 
characteristic ; and in handling so complicated a 
piece of machinery as the modern war ship a lack 
of intelligent care is speedily ruinous to efficiency. 
During the last three years her vessels had suffered 
many mishaps, and four had actually been lost 
one being the cruiser Reina Regente, which went 
down with all on board off Cape Trafalgar in 1895. 



The personnel of the Spanish navy recruited 
mainly by conscription in the coast districts was 
thus stated for 1898: 

Officers 1,002 

Sailors 14,000 

Marines 9,000 

Mechanics, etc 725 

Total 24,727 

For fourteen years the United States had been 
busily at work upon the construction of its new 
navy, but for about two years there 
The united i iac j b een something of a lull in the 
fs^ 63 work. During that time the Iowa 

and the Brooklyn were the only im 
portant additions to the list, and no large vessels 
were under construction until, in 1897, five new 
battle ships were ordered. These the Illinois, the 
Kearsarge, the Kentucky, the Alabama, and the 
Wisconsin will be powerful vessels of 11,525 tons 
each, and will practically double the fighting 
strength of the navy s first line. None of them had 
been launched at the outbreak of war with Spain. 

At the head of the list of ships in actual service 
there stood seven great engines of warfare which 
in speed, armament, and general efficiency were 
well prepared to meet anything of their inches on 
the sea. These included the four first-class battle 
ships four floating fortresses, carrying twelve- and 
thirteen-inch guns, making from fifteen and a half 
to seventeen knots an hour, and costing more than 
three million dollars each : 



When launched. 

1 1 4.IO 

Philadelphia, 1896. 


10 288 

Philadelphia, 1893. 

Massachusetts .... 


Philadelphia, 1893. 

Oregon . . 

10 288 

San Francisco, 1893. 



Spain had nothing to pit against this quartette 
of bulldogs of the sea. Next came one second-class 
battle ship, a vessel very similar to the lost Maine, 
and classed by some authorities as an armoured 



When launched. 


6.^ 1C 

Norfolk 1892 

Then the two great armoured cruisers : 



When launched. 


Q 21 ^ 

Philadelphia 1805 

New York 

8 2OO 

Philadelphia 1891 

These carried eight-inch guns, with a good sec 
ondary rapid-fire battery, and had a rated speed 
of 21 and 21.9 knots respectively. After them, in 
a class by themselves, came two large and swift 
protected cruisers : 



When launched. 


Philadelphia, 1892. 

Minneapolis . . 


Philadelphia. 180^. 

These two, generally designated as " commerce 
destroyers," were built for speed, carrying no 
armour and a comparatively light armament one 
eight-inch gun apiece, with batteries of four-inch 
rapid-firers. They did not play any very promi 
nent part in the war with Spain. 

Of smaller protected cruisers the United States 
had eleven of three thousand tons or more, all of 
them good modern steel vessels : 





When launched. 


; 800 

San Francisco 1802 


4 ^OO 

Chester 1885 


Philadelphia, 1888 


A 724 

Philadelphia 1889 

San Francisco 


San Francisco 1880 



Philadelphia, 1890 


1 730 

San Francisco 1889 


3.21 ? 

Brooklyn, 1892 



Norfolk, 1892. 


3 OCO 

Chester 1884 


3 OOO 

Chester, 1884 

The heaviest weapons carried on these vessels 
were eight- and six-inch rifles, supplemented by 
rapid-fire batteries usually of six-pounders, but in 
the Olympia, the Raleigh, and the Cincinnati of 
five-inch guns. A valuable addition to their class 
was made by the purchase, in March, of the cruisers 
Amazonas and Almirante Abru (rechristened New 
Orleans and Albany) built by the Armstrongs, at 
Elswick, for the Brazilian Government. The 
Albany * was still unfinished ; the New Orleans, a 
fine vessel of 3,600 tons, twenty knots, and armed 
with a powerful battery of 6-inch and 4./-inch 
rapid-fire guns using smokeless powder, had just 
been completed, and left the Thames for New York 
on the 27th of March. 

In the remainder of the navy list the more im 
portant items were the six double-turreted monitors 
Puritan, Monterey, Amphitrite, Monadnock, 
Miantonomoh, and Terror vessels of low speed, 
armed with heavy guns (ten- and twelve-inch 
rifles), and designed for coast and port defence, 
though the voyage of the Monterey and the Mo 
nadnock to Manila proved their availability for dis 
tant service in an emergency ; the trio of small 
cruisers, each displacing 2,089 tons the Detroit, 

* The Albany was launched January 14, 1899. 



the Marblehead, and the Montgomery ; that unique 
naval type, the Vesuvius, with her three fifteen-inch 
dynamite guns; and a dozen gunboats. Of these 
last the largest were the i,7io-ton Bennington, 
Concord, and Yorktown, armed with six-inch guns ; 
next came the Wilmington and the Helena, 1,392 
tons apiece, carrying four-inch rapid-fire guns ; the 
Nashville, 1,371 tons; the Castine and the Machias 
of 1,177 tons; the Annapolis, the Marietta, the New 
port, the Vicksburg, the Wheeling, and the Prince 
ton, each of 1,000 tons the last named not quite 
ready for service ; and the Petrel, 892 tons. 

The personnel of the navy was thus stated at the 
beginning of the year : 

Officers (line) 1,031 

Engineers 226 

Paymasters, surgeons, and chaplains . . . 262 

Warrant officers 143 

Seamen 1 1 , 750 

Marines, officers 74 

Marines, men JJ939 

Total 15,425 

The naval militia, which had been organized in 
fifteen seaboard and lake States, constituted an 
auxiliary force of 200 officers and 3,703 men vol 
unteers who, though not experienced sailors, had 
had some training in seamanship and gunnery. 

The corresponding figures for the army were: 



Infantry 25 regiments 


jq I2 

Cavalry 10 " 


6 T7O 


A O2^ 

General and staff officers 


Ordnance department . . 





Hospital corps 


Miscellaneous . . 






To this force the Hawley bill had added two 
regiments of artillery. The adjutant general s re 
turns (February, 1898) showed 114,632 4iien en 
rolled in the militia of the States, and estimated the 
total number of men available for service in case of 
necessity at 10,301,339. 

The meaning of this brief array of figures was 

that the United States had gone to war, practically 

speaking, without an army. To create 

The call for Q the first st must be a call for 

volunteers, , , . f , . 

April 23 volunteers, and to provide tor this 

Congressman Hull, chairman of the 
House Military Affairs Committee, introduced a 
bill (April 2oth) framed by the War Department. 
It declared that all able-bodied male citizens from 
eighteen to forty-five years old constituted the na 
tional forces, and were liable to military duty ; that 
troops might be called out by the President, to be 
supplied by each State and Territory in proportion 
to its population ; that the regimental and company 
officers should be named by the Governors of the 
States, the general and staff officers by the Presi 
dent. The bill was hurried through House and 
Senate, and received Executive approval April 22d ; 
and on the following day a call for 125,000 men was 

By an act that became law four days later Con 
gress partially retrieved its failure to pass the orig 
inal Hull bill for the reorganization of the regular 
army. This later measure, also named after Mr. 
Hull, who fathered it in the House, authorized addi 
tional enlistments up to a total of 62,597 men, 
doubling the rank and file of each of the existing 
regiments. It was carefully provided that the in 
crease should be only temporary, and that the army 
should be reduced to its former strength or rather 
weakness at the end of the war. 

The first plans of the War Department were to 
concentrate the regular troops, scattered in small 


detachments at the army posts, at three Southern 
ports New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa in 
readiness for an immediate move upon the Spanish 
West Indies. Like a great many other plans made 
during the war, this was changed before it had been 
carried out. It was decided to form a great central 
camp in the national park on the battlefield of 
Chickamauga, to whose poignant memories of 
warfare a new chapter was to be added by the great 
host that gathered there the North and the South 
in arms together. 

The first regiment to move southward was the 
Seventeenth Infantry, which left its post at Colum 
bus Barracks, Ohio, on the i8th of April, bound for 
Camp Thomas, as the point of concentration at 
Chickamauga had been named, in honour of the 
general who stemmed the tide of Federal defeat 
there in 1863. Later, another great instruction 
camp Camp Alger was formed at Falls Church, 
Virginia ; and troops were sent to three points in 
Florida Tampa, Jacksonville, and Fernandina 
selected for their healthfulness, real or supposed, 
and for their convenience as ports of embarkation. 
At Tampa a powerful train of siege artillery was or 
ganized as rapidly as possible, under General John 
I. Rodgers only one battery of it being destined 
to see active service. 

Such were the army s chief offensive prepara 
tions. It had also to care for the defence of the 
coast, which, except at a few points, 
fn ^ 01 was ver y inadequately protected. In 

1886, at a time when the ports of 
the United States were practically devoid of de 
fences, a commission of officers, generally known 
as the Endicott Board, drew up a comprehensive 
scheme of fortification ; but Congress dealt out 
the necessary money so grudgingly only $50,000 
was appropriated in 1893, and no more than 
$3,521,000 from 1890 to 1895 inclusive that only 



a small part of the work had been completed. 
Plans had been prepared for batteries at thirty 
ports, to consist of about five hundred heavy guns, 
seven hundred smaller rapid-fire weapons, and a 
thousand mortars. Of these, at the beginning of 
the fiscal year (July I, 1897) only one hundred 
and six less than five per cent had actually been 
mounted. The supply of powder and projectiles 
was entirely inadequate, only about one fifth of the 
quantity needed being on hand.* Many important 
points were in a condition of defencelessness which, 
in the face of a more powerful and active enemy, 
might have proved disastrous. To remedy this 
the ordnance and engineer departments, as far back 
as the preceding February, had been making spe 
cial efforts, and though the work is of the sort that 
moves slowly, much had been accomplished. At 
the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1898), 630 em 
placements were reported as completed or under 
construction, 291 guns and mortars were mounted, 
and it was promised that within three months 156 
more would be in place. Besides these, 1,500 sub 
marine mines had been planted in twenty-nine har 

The navy s preparations were much farther ad 
vanced than those of the army. It was the service 

upon which the first brunt of the 
preparation.. struggle was expected to fall ; nor had 

it, like the army, been kept in time 
of peace at merely skeleton strength. Roughly 
speaking, its personnel was doubled during the 
war; that of the army was multiplied by ten. Its 
problems of organization and equipment were easy 
ones compared to the overwhelming task that con 
fronted the army staff. This, however, does not 
detract from the credit due to Secretary Long s 
department for the remarkable record it made 

* Annual report of General Flagler, Chief of Ordnance. 


throughout the conflict, administering the affairs of 
the American fleets in two hemispheres without a 
breakdown, a hitch, or a complaint. 

For months the navy had been holding itself in 
readiness to strike at short notice. In January, 
Admiral Sicard, commanding the North Atlantic 
squadron, rendezvoused at Key West the strongest 
fleet that ever went to sea under the American 
flag, its chief vessels being the Iowa, the Massa 
chusetts, the Indiana, the Maine, the Texas, the 
Brooklyn, and the New York. It was from this 
squadron that the Maine was detached for her fatal 
cruise to Havana. The rest of the fleet was still in 
Southern waters, from Hampton Roads to the West 
Indies, and the Cincinnati (brought up from the 
South Atlantic station), the Detroit, the Marble- 
head, the Montgomery, the monitors Amphitrite, 
Miantonomoh, Puritan, and Terror, and several 
other vessels, much more than replaced the lost 
battle ship. 

On the European station, at the beginning of 
the year, there were only the cruiser San Francisco 
and the gunboats Helena and Bancroft. These 
were ordered home, the San Francisco crossing the 
Atlantic in company with the newly purchased New 
Orleans, and reaching New York on the I4th of 

Of the eleven second-class cruisers, four the 
Philadelphia, the Newark, the Chicago, and the 
Atlanta were undergoing repairs or alterations. 
The Newark went into commission in June; the 
Philadelphia was ready for sea in July, when she 
was ordered to Hawaii ; the two latter were not 
available during the war. Three more the 
Olympia, the Raleigh, and the Boston were on 
the Asiatic station, commanded by Commodore 
George Dewey. A fourth cruiser, the Baltimore, 
had been ordered from the Pacific station to 
strengthen Dewey s squadron, for which fighting 



was foreseen ; and she joined him at Hong-Kong 
on the second day of the war (April 22d). 

On the Pacific coast were the battle ship 
Oregon, the cruiser Charleston, and the monitors 
Monadnock and Monterey, besides the cruiser 
Philadelphia, laid up for repairs, and the gunboat 
Marietta, which had been showing the flag in the 
Pacific ports of Central America. The Oregon, of 
little service where she was, would make a splendid 
addition to the navy s fighting strength in the main 
theatre of war, and immediately after the Maine ex 
plosion she had been dry-docked and prepared for 
the fifteen-thousand-mile journey around Cape Horn. 
It was an object lesson upon the strategic value of a 
canal through the Central American isthmus. 

The Oregon s voyage from Puget Sound to 
Florida was a remarkable one, far surpassing all 

previous records made by men-of-war 
voyage over anything like so great a dis- 

MMcht"* 00 tance.* Leaving the Bremerton dry 
Mayas. dock on March 6th, she sailed from 

San Francisco, under command of 
Captain Charles E. Clark, on the iQth, and reached 
Callao on April 4th. Here coal ordered by 
the Marietta, which had preceded her, having 
started from Panama March 24th was waiting in 
lighters, and was hurried aboard. The Marietta 
had gone on to Punta Arenas, the southernmost 
Chilian port, to arrange for another supply of fuel ; 
but the Oregon, leaving Callao on April 7th, passed 
her in the Straits of Magellan, after weathering one 
of the fierce squalls of those stormy seas. The gun 
boat overtook the battle ship at Punta Arenas, and 
the two coaled together. 

* When the cruiser Columbia made her speed trial across the At 
lantic, in July and August, 1895, she recorded a considerably higher 
average speed (18.41 knots an hour from Southampton to Sandy 
Hook) ; but her journey was only one fifth as long as the Oregon s 
great voyage. 


From this point which they left on April 2ist, 
of course unaware that it was the first day of the 
war the run was an exciting one. It was expected 
that hostilities might be declared at any time, and 
it w y as known that a Spanish torpedo cruiser, the 
Temerario, was in their track, off the South Ameri 
can coast. The American ships were kept in con 
stant readiness for action, and no lights were shown 
at night. On the 3Oth they reached Rio de Janeiro, 
where they heard the news of war, and learned that 
the Temerario had sailed from Montevideo, proba 
bly for Rio. Expecting that she might appear at 
any moment, and fearing that in the neutral har 
bour his costly ship might not be safe from treach 
erous attack, Captain Clark sent word to the port 
authorities that if the Spanish torpedo cruiser en 
tered the bay and came too near him he would 
sink her. 

The Temerario did not appear, and on May 4th 
the Oregon and the Marietta put to sea, followed 
by the Nictheroy, which the United States had pur 
chased from the Brazilian Government. The Nic 
theroy, renamed the Buffalo, had originally been 
El Cid, of the Morgan line, and had since been 
fitted as a cruiser and armed with a dynamite gun. 
She was a vessel of nearly five thousand tons, but 
proved an unsatisfactory purchase, her machinery 
being in very poor condition. Her first perform 
ance was to break down, shortly after starting from 
Rio, and the Oregon pushed on alone, leaving the 
Marietta to convoy the crippled ship. The engineers 
repaired her, but at Para she broke down again, and 
the Marietta left her, making for Key West, where 
she arrived on June 4th. The Buffalo reached 
Norfolk only three days later. 

Meanwhile the Oregon, straining every nerve 
for speed, had called at Bahia to inquire for news 
of Cervera s movements. Later acquaintance with 
the Spaniards seamanship and gunnery showed 


that she need scarcely have feared an encounter 
with the enemy s squadron, overwhelmingly supe 
rior as it was on paper. Captain Clark was quite 
prepared to fight if necessary, and telegraphed to 
the Navy Department from Bahia (May 9th) his 
opinion that his vessel " in a running fight might 
beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet." Secre 
tary Long s reply was cautious but confident: 
" Avoid if possible we believe that you will defeat 
it if met." On the I2th the naval war board dis 
cussed the question of sending him assistance, but 
it was decided not to do so, as the Oregon could 
probably take care of herself, and it was not desired 
to weaken Sampson s fleet. 

There was no definite news of Cervera till Cap 
tain Clark put in at Barbadoes (May i8th), where 
he learned that seven Spanish men-of-war were at 
Martinique, just to the north of him. Leaving the 
little British island at sunset that day, he steamed 
to the northwest, as if direct for Cuba, but as soon 
as darkness fell he turned about, went south of 
Barbadoes, and eastward into the ocean, before 
again heading toward the United States. On the 
25th he put into Jupiter Inlet, Florida, for instruc 
tions, with the Oregon in as fine condition as when 
she left the dry dock, and needing only a supply of 
coal to be in complete readiness for instant action. 

During the civil war, when the Federal Govern 
ment, with but little naval strength at its command, 
found itself compelled to blockade 

auxiliaries the lon ? COaSt lmC f the Southern 

States, it bought almost everything 
that Northern shipmasters had to sell. More than 
four hundred vessels, from ocean steamers to coast 
ing schooners and New York ferryboats, were 
purchased, and it was one of the latter unwarlike 
craft a boat taken from daily duty on the Fulton 
Ferry that captured, in Cuban waters, one of the 
most valuable prizes of the war. There was less 


need of indiscriminate purchases in 1898, but aux 
iliaries and supply ships of all sorts were wanted, 
and immediately after the voting of fifty million dol 
lars for military preparations a board, with Captain 
Frederick Rodgers at its head, was appointed to 
buy or lease the most available vessels. 

The most important accessions were the four 
swift passenger steamers of the American line the 
St. Paul, the St. Louis, the New York (rechristened 
Harvard), and the Paris (rechristened Yale), for 
whose services the Government paid nine thousand 
dollars a day, and whose great speed (twenty to 
twenty-two knots) and carrying capacity made 
them valuable as scouts and transports. The St. 
Paul, armed with eight five-inch rapid-fire guns, 
was to show that she could fight, too. A number 
of smaller steamers were bought from other com 
mercial lines, some of which had their business sus 
pended by the war. A flotilla of small and speedy 
auxiliary cruisers and despatch boats was formed 
by the purchase of twenty-five private steam yachts, 
and two more were lent to the Government, without 
charge, by their public-spirited owners Messrs. 
Augustus Schermerhorn and William R. Hearst, 
of New York. The city of Philadelphia gave the 
use of an ice-boat, the Arctic or, to be precise, 
rented it for the nominal sum of one dollar. The 
total cost of one hundred and two vessels added to 
the navy before the war ended was nearly eighteen 
million dollars. 

Of the ships bought abroad, the New Orleans, 
the Albany, and the Buffalo have already been 
mentioned. Another was the i,8oo-ton cruiser 
Diogenes, built in Germany, in 1884, for Peru, but 
never delivered. In 1896 she was rebuilt by the 
Thames Iron Works, which firm now sold her to 
the United States for $175,000 a low price, even 
though her machinery was not in first-rate condi 
tion. The one other armed vessel that the Ameri- 


can agents succeeded in finding in the market was 
the torpedo boat Somers, which Lieutenant Knapp 
purchased in Germany from the Schichau Com 
pany, of Elbing. The lieutenant took her to Wey- 
mouth, where she met the Diogenes (renamed the 
Topeka), and crews were picked up to take the 
two vessels across the Atlantic ; but the Somers 
proved to be unseaworthy, and had to put in at 
Falmouth, where she was dismantled and laid up.* 
The Topeka went on without her, and reached New 
York on May ist. 

The Treasury Department also turned over to 
the navy fifteen revenue cutters and four lighthouse 
tenders. Four of the former, by courtesy of the 
British and Canadian authorities, were brought 
down by way of the St. Lawrence from the great 
lakes to the Atlantic. Another, the Hugh McCul- 
loch, was on its way from New York to the Pacific 
Coast, via the Suez Canal, when it was ordered to 
join Dewey, who afterward acknowledged its use 
fulness in a special despatch. 

Another imposing fleet was created by the War 
Department, as need arose for transports, f More 
than fifty troop ships were required 
for the expeditions to Manila, Cuba, 
and Porto Rico, besides water boats, 
lighters, barges, and such prosaic but useful 
craft. High rates were paid for some of them 
for instance, a Plant line steamer of 5,018 tons 
was rented to the Government for $1,200 a 
day. In the Pacific the transport service was still 
more expensive, the Pacific Mail receiving $1,500 
daily for the 5,ooo-ton China, and steamers of no 
more than 2,400 tons being rated at $1,000 a day. 

* The Somers was finally brought across the Atlantic on board an 
ocean liner in April, 1890. 

t Transports are under the sole charge of the War Department. 
When the St. Louis and other American liners were used to transport 
troops, they had been turned over to the army service by the navy. 


In all, the War Department chartered seventy-seven 
vessels and bought sixteen. 

Each service had a hospital ship, the two ves 
sels (the Solace for the navy, and the Relief for the 
army) being purchased for $600,000 and $450,000 
respectively, besides the cost of equipment. They 
were a new feature in warfare, as was also another 
experiment which proved its value, the naval re 
pair ship Vulcan. 

A rich government can buy ships, but it can not 
buy experienced naval officers ; and the great in 
crease in the number of vessels in service proved 
a heavy strain upon the personnel of the navy. In 
other words, there were just enough officers to go 
around, and none to spare. Had the struggle 
proved a long and severe one, with many casual 
ties on both sides, the American navy would have 
suffered seriously for want of a reserve of trained 
men. Coming through the war, as it did, with the 
marvellous record of only eighteen men killed, it 
escaped this difficulty ; but the lesson is one that 
should not be forgotten. 

It was evident that Key West, lying in the Gulf 
of Mexico, opposite Havana, and only a hundred 
miles from the Cuban capital, would be a very im 
portant point in the naval strategy of the war. 
Early in March a great depot of supplies was estab 
lished there, and the building of a repair plant 
long planned, but never undertaken owing to lack 
of the necessary appropriation was begun. In the 
latter part of April the War Department erected a 
hospital and a distilling plant the latter made 
necessary by the lack of water on the island for 
the benefit of troops using Key West as a base of 
operations for the invasion of Cuba. 



THE preparatory moves outlined in the preced 
ing chapter were forming the effective force of the 
United States navy into two fleets, on opposite 
sides of the globe, ready to strike at Spain in the 
two remaining strongholds of her colonial empire. 
One was the North Atlantic squadron, in which 
were all the first-rate men-of-war; the other the 
fleet of cruisers at Hong-Kong. Their chief officers 
were two men destined to win the brightest laurels 
of the war, and to prove themselves worthy to rank 
among the heroic figures of American naval annals 
Commodore George Dewey, commanding the 
Asiatic station ; and Captain William T. Sampson, 
acting rear admiral, promoted from the captaincy 
of the Iowa to succeed Rear-Admiral Sicard, who 
was relieved on account of ill health. 

Admiral Sicard relinquished his command to 

Captain Sampson on March 26th. On the first day 

of the war (April 2ist) Sampson was 

Rear-Admiral appointed an acting rear admiral, and 

Sampson, l , r ,, . *5 , , * * 

April 21. on the lollowing day he hoisted his 

admiral s pennant on his flagship, the 
cruiser New York. He owed his selection for the 
most important and responsible post in the entire 
service to the fact that he was the senior officer 
present with the squadron, that he knew its vessels 
and their capabilities, and that his record had been 
an excellent one ever since the days when, as a 
young lieutenant, he narrowly escaped death in the 



Patapsco s daring run into Charleston -harbour, in 
January, 1865. 

The great fleet under Sampson s orders was di 
vided into two main bodies one, under his per 
sonal command, with its base at Key West; the 
other, under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, 
held in reserve at Newport News as a " flying 
squadron " to meet any move that might be made 
by the Spanish fleet lying at St. Vincent, in the 
Cape Verde Islands. The " flying squadron " con 
sisted, at the date of the outbreak of hostilities, of 
the armoured cruiser Brooklyn (Commodore 
Schley s flagship, Captain Cook), the battle ships 
Massachusetts (Captain Higginson) and Texas 
(Captain Philip), the cruisers Columbia (Captain 
Sands) and Minneapolis (Captain Jewell), and the 
collier Merrimac (Commander Miller). Sampson s 
own fleet, at the same date, when he first moved 
upon Cuba, comprised twenty-two men-of-war 
the armoured cruiser New York (Admiral Samp 
son s flagship, Captain Chadwick) ; the two battle 
ships Iowa (Captain Evans) and Indiana (Captain 
Taylor) ; the three monitors Amphitrite (Captain 
Barclay), Puritan (Captain Harrington), and Ter 
ror (Captain Ludlow) ; the four cruisers Cincinnati 
(Captain Chester), Marblehead (Commander Mc- 
Calla), Detroit (Commander Dayton), and Mont 
gomery (Commander Converse) ; the six gunboats 
Wilmington (Commander Todd), Nashville (Com 
mander Maynard), Castine (Commander Berry), 
Machias (Commander Merry), Newport (Com 
mander Tilley), and Helena (Commander Swin 
burne) ; the despatch boat Dolphin (Commander 
Lyon), the converted yacht Mayflower (Com 
mander Mackenzie), and the four torpedo boats 
Dupont (Lieutenant Wood), Foote (Lieutenant 
Rodgers), Porter (Lieutenant Fremont), and Wins- 
low (Lieutenant Bernadou). 

Besides these two fleets, a " northern patrol 



squadron " was hastily organized for the protection 
of the Atlantic coast from the capes of the Delaware 
northward. It was commanded by Commodore 
John A. Howell, and consisted, in the first days of 
the war, of his flagship, the cruiser San Francisco 
(Captain Leary), and four auxiliary cruisers 
manned by naval reserve men the Yankee (Com 
mander Brownson), the Dixie (Commander Davis), 
the Prairie (Commander Train), and the Yosemite 
(Commander Emory). In May the Columbia and 
the Minneapolis were detached from the Flying 
Squadron, and served for a time under Howell, the 
latter being posted at Newport News to guard the 
battle ships building there ; but as Spain s navy 
demonstrated its impotence, and the fear of an at 
tack upon the northern coast dwindled to the van 
ishing point, one after another of the commodore s 
ships was detached for more active service in Cuban 
waters, till on the 25th of June he was ordered to 
Key West with all his remaining force except the 

But in the early days of hostilities there were 
many alarms of mysterious Spanish war ships. On 
the 27th of April, for instance, it was very positively 
reported that a Spanish battle ship and three tor 
pedo boats had been seen in the North Atlantic, in 
the track of the ocean liners ; and some uneasiness 
was felt for the Paris, which had left Southampton 
on the 22d, to take her place in the navy as an aux 
iliary cruiser. On the 3Oth, however, she reached 
New York in safety, having seen nothing of the 
phantom foe. 

To all the warlike preparations of the United 
States Spain had made but little answer chiefly, 
no doubt, through her lack of means, 
but P artl y because her statesmen 
seem to have been strangely blind to 
the crisis that was upon them. There is a charac 
teristic Spanish proverb which says that " it is a 


long way from said to done, and from talking war 
to making war " ; and Sagasta s Government appar 
ently acted upon it to the last moment. Their de 
fensive moves were few. Just before hostilities be 
gan they purchased three German Atlantic liners 
and an English yacht as auxiliary cruisers. On the 
day when General Woodford left Madrid, a call was 
issued for eighty thousand men of the reserves. 
The most important move was the concentration oi 
a squadron at St. Vincent. A small flotilla of tor 
pedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, com 
manded by Captain Fernando Villamil, had left 
Cadiz early in March, going to the Canaries, and 
thence (March 24th) to the Cape Verde Islands. 
Here they were joined on April I4th by the 
Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera s flagship, and the 
Cristobal Colon, which had followed them from 
Cadiz, and on the I9th by the Vizcaya and the 
Almirante Oquendo, from Havana. With a 
couple of transports the Ciudad Cadiz and the 
San Francisco the squadron remained at St. Vin 
cent, a Portuguese port, awaiting the outbreak 
of war. 

It was in no condition to meet the powerful 
fleet that was waiting for it across the Atlantic. 
The Colon had never received the 
heavy guns that should have been in 
her turrets. On the three other 
cruisers, the batteries of fourteen centimetre (five- 
and-a-half-inch) artillery their chief power of of 
fence were disabled by defective breech mechan 
ism and inferior ammunition. The Vizcaya urgent 
ly needed docking and cleaning, and was far below 
her speed. Cervera had repeatedly reported the 
deficiencies of his ships, but the authorities at 
Madrid took no notice of either recommendations 
or protests. Just before leaving Cadiz he frankly 
declared that he was going upon a desperate, not to 
say a suicidal, errand : 


It seems to me a most risky adventure, which may 
cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat 
of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea entails a great 
danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment 
of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the 
island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago. 

In spite of this, on the 22cl of April, orders came 
from Madrid that the squadron should sail for 
Cuba at once. Cervera acknowledged their receipt 
thus : 

It is impossible for me to give an idea of the sur 
prise and astonishment experienced by all on the receipt 
of the order to sail. Nothing can be expected for this 
expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its 
hasty and demoralizing return. . . . This is already a dis 
aster, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful 
one before long. 

And Captain Villamil, his second in command, 
added in a private telegram to Sagasta a pathetic 
message from the brave sailor who was to lose his 
life off Santiago : 

I deem it expedient you should know, through a friend 
who does not fear censure, that while as seamen we are 
all ready to meet honourable death in the performance of 
duty, I think it certain that the sacrifice of these naval 
forces will be as sure as it will be fruitless and useless. 

The fleet did not put to sea until April 29th, and 
then it separated the torpedo boats Rayo, Ariete, 
and Azor, and the two transports, putting back to 
the Canaries, while Cervera, with the four cruisers 
and three torpedo-boat destroyers, headed west 
ward. The subsequent career of his squadron a ca 
reer neither long nor glorious will be traced later. 

As Havana was the great seat of Spanish power 

in the West Indies, it was natural that the first plan 

of attack should look toward the 

Cuban ca P itaL Admiral Sampson 
was anxious to begin the war by 
striking direct at it with the full power of his 
squadron, and at least three of his leading officers 


Captains Evans of the Iowa, Taylor of the Indiana, 
and Chadwick of the New York strongly sup 
ported him. The matter was fully discussed before 
hostilities began. On April 6th Secretary Long in 
structed him : 

The department does not wish the vessels of your 
squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at 
Havana, Santiago de Cuba,* or other strongly fortified 
ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish ves 
sels should take refuge in those harbours. Even in this 
case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade 
and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish 
the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy s 
vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of- 
war to the fire of the land batteries. 

There are two reasons for this: 

First. There may be no United States troops to oc 
cupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and 
arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of 

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particu 
larly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled be 
fore the capture or destruction of Spain s most formidable 

On April Qth Sampson replied with a long letter 
in which he pleaded hard for permission to carry 
out his aggressive policy. He described the shore 
batteries at Havana, all of which face seaward, with 
little protection for their gunners, and explained 
his plan of attack : 

These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet 
from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate dis 
tance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are 
well placed to resist an attack (for instance, the western 
batteries) from the westward and close inshore, where 
the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the 
fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary 
batteries would have full effect. Even under these cir 
cumstances the ships must have such a heavy fire that the 
men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. 
Before the Puritan and Amphitrite arrived I was not en- 

* The strength of the batteries at Santiago de Cuba was greatly 
overestimated at this time. 


tirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since 
their arrival yesterday I have little doubt of its success.* 

Having silenced the western batteries, it would be 
quite practicable to shell the city, which I would do only 
after warning given twenty-four hours in advance. 

I see the force of your reasoning that we would have 
no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr. 
Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss 
of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. 
Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble 
before October. 

Captain Chadwick, Sampson s chief of staff, 
records that an order of battle for an assault upon 
Havana was drawn up and placed in the hands of 
each officer whose ship was to take part in it. An 
other plan discussed at the naval council was that of 
forming three squadrons one to bombard Ha 
vana ; a second to be held at Cape Haitien in readi 
ness to attack San Juan, Porto Rico, as soon as war 
was declared; and a third, consisting of swift 
cruisers, to move upon the coast of Spain itself. 

In spite of Sampson s plea, it was decided f to 
defer the blow till an army could be organized to 
follow it up, and the first mobilization of troops was 
made with this object in view. But when the War 
Department, a few days before hostilities began, 
ordered the regulars to the Gulf ports (April I5th), 
it does not seem to have realized how ill prepared 
its forces were for an active campaign, and how 
tremendous the task before the commissary, quar 
termaster, medical, and other bureaus. The camp 

* After the expedition to San Juan, Admiral Sampson s opinion of 
the monitors was less favourable. In a report dated May 2oth, he de 
scribed them as "very inefficient." 

t Instructions to the commanding officers of the United States fleets 
and armies issue from the President, as commander in chief of the land 
and sea forces of the nation, through the Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of the Navy. In planning the grand strategy of the late war, 
the President and Secretary Long were assisted by a specially appointed 
naval war board, which at first consisted of Rear-Admiral Sicard, Cap 
tain Barker, Captain Crowninshield, and Theodore Roosevelt, Assist 
ant Secretary of the Navy. In May Mr. Roosevelt and Captain Barker 
left the board, and Captain Mahan joined it. 


at Chickamauga was formed to give time for the 
work of equipment ; and from this point men were 
to be moved as rapidly as possible to Tampa, or 
other Southern ports. 

On the 2 ist of April, as was said at the end of 
Chapter IV, Admiral Sampson, at Key West, re 
ceived the orders for which he had 
been waiting for weeks. What they 
were the world knew on the fol 
lowing day, when President McKinley issued a 
proclamation declaring a blockade of " the north 
coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast be 
tween Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of 
Cienfuegos on the south coast." This meant a 
blockade covering Havana and extending some 
forty miles westward and fifty miles eastward. 
Cienfuegos, on the other side of the island, was 
closed because it had railroad communication with 
the Cuban capital. 

The instructions sent to Sampson on the 2ist 
informed him that a plan was under consideration 
for an expedition to Matanzas, where a sufficient 
force might be landed to hold the place and open 
communication with the insurgents. Meanwhile, 
an attack upon the defences of Havana was defi 
nitely forbidden. 

It is possible that the admiral s plan of imme 
diate and vigorous aggression might have ended the 
war more summarily, but the policy that prevailed 
at Washington was an eminently safe one. The 
first move made Blanco s position in Cuba unten 
able, unless Spain should make some effective coun 
ter stroke which, with her weaker navy, and with 
all the disadvantages of fighting from a base four 
thousand miles distant, was practically impossible. 
The American fleet at once took undisputed com 
mand of Cuban waters. A number of armed vessels 
lay in the harbours of the island the cruisers Al 
fonso XII and Conde de Venadito, with one or 


more torpedo boats, at Havana; the Reina Mer 
cedes at Santiago, the Jorge Juan in Nipe Bay, and 
smaller gunboats at Manzanillo, Cienfuegos, and 
other ports ; but they made no serious attempt to 
attack the American ships. The first prize, the 
Spanish steamer Buena Ventura, was taken by the 
Nashville early on the morning of April 22d, shortly 
after Sampson s squadron left Key West; and in 
the afternoon of the same day the New York over 
hauled a larger vessel, the Pedro, coming out of 

The seizure of ships owned by citizens of a hos 
tile country is a survival from the days when might 
was right, and a successful battle 
private prop- t indiscriminate loot. In war- 

erty at sea. . , 

fare on land, private property has 
long been respected by civilized armies, and it is a 
curious anomaly that the same principle should not 
obtain on the sea. It was partially recognised, 
forty years ago, in the Declaration of Paris, by 
which the leading European powers agreed to abol 
ish privateering, and to respect neutral flags and 
neutral goods. Spain did not sign that agreement, 
nor did the United States, though President Pierce 
offered to go further, and to join in a declaration ex 
empting all private property, except contraband of 
war, from seizure, whether by privateers or by naval 
vessels. It has been suggested that the Washing 
ton Government, with the prestige of a victorious 
war, should propose to add such a rule to the 
canons of international law, and the suggestion com 
mends itself to all respecters of the eighth com 
mandment.* Overhauling some helpless mer 
chantman, which may have had no notice of the 

* In his annual message of December 5, 1898, President McKinley 
recommended " that the Executive be authorized to correspond with the 
Governments of the principal maritime powers with a view of incorpo 
rating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the 
exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from 
capture or destruction by belligerent powers." 



existence of war ; making prisoners of its crew ; de 
priving its skipper of the ship that is perhaps his 
only property and source of livelihood ; and con 
fiscating its cargo, which may be of no possible 
service to the enemy s forces the Buena Ventura, 
for instance, was a small steamer carrying American 
lumber this is a poor business for the navy of a 
great power. 

At the same time, it is so profitable that naval 
officers can not be expected to oppose its continu 
ance. During the civil war, for instance, Admiral 
Farragut besides the fifty thousand dollars pre 
sented to him by a subscription raised in New 
York received no less than one hundred and forty 
thousand dollars in prize and bounty money, and 
several other Federal officers drew an amount not 
much less. In the United States army, which has 
no such perquisite, the pay of all ranks is increased 
twenty per cent during war. It would be more con 
sonant with the advance of civilization to give the 
navy a similar allowance, and to end the seizure of 
private property on the sea. 

It was announced by the State Department, on 
the day before the war began, that the United States 
would commission no privateers ; but 

as S P ain had not si S ned th , e .ec- 
laration of Paris, she was technically 

at liberty to do so. There is reason to believe that 
an inquiry which implied a warning against a 
policy that might work serious damage to neutral 
commercial interests was sent to Madrid from 
London. On April 24th Sagasta s Government re 
plied by issuing a decree which declared a state of 
war to exist between Spain and the United States, 
and added : 

The Spanish Government, reserving its right to grant 
letters of marque, will at present confine itself to organiz 
ing, with the vessels of the mercantile marine, a force of 
auxiliary cruisers, which will co-operate with the navy, 


according to the needs of the campaign, and will be under 
naval control. 

The threatened force of auxiliary cruisers did 
not figure in the war, though the Government, in 
addition to its few purchases abroad, took over sev 
eral steamers from the Compania Transatlantica 
Espaiiola, whose traffic to West Indian ports was 
cut off by the blockade. Only one American ves 
sel was taken during the struggle the bark Sara- 
nac, which, not knowing that hostilities were in 
progress, entered the port of Iloilo, in the Philip 
pines, and was captured by a Spanish gunboat. 
She was subsequently released, as her owners had 
transferred her to a British subject while she was 
at sea. On the other hand, the American men-of- 
war took no less than fifty-six prizes.* 

The United States was a day behind Spain in 
its formal announcement of war. On the 25th of 
April the President requested Congress to give 
legal status to the operations of the country s armed 
forces, and a brief bill stating that " war has existed 
since the 2ist day of April, 1898, including said day, 
between the United States of America and the king 
dom of Spain " was passed without a dissenting 
vote in either House. The State Department at 
once notified all the foreign powers, who promptly 
responded with proclamations of neutrality. 

The American squadron in Cuban waters had 

before it plenty of nobler and more serious work 

than the taking of prizes. It first 

First shots at exchanged shots with the enemy at 

April"** Matanzas, on April 27th. On that 

morning Captain Harrington, of the 

monitor Puritan, reported to Admiral Sampson that 

a new battery was being constructed at Punta 

* According to the Attorney- General s annual report for 1898. The 
amount realized by the sale of these vessels and their cargoes, up to the 
date of the report (November, 1898), with several ships still to be sold, 
was $701,034. 


Gorda (Broad Point) on the west side of the en 
trance to Matanzas harbour. Deciding that his in 
structions * would permit him to give his gunners 
some target practice, the admiral steamed eastward 
from his blockading station off Havana, and, in 
company with the Puritan and the cruiser Cincin 
nati, opened fire on the Spaniards, bombarding both 
the Punta Gorda battery and another on the east 
side of the harbour. The range was long from 
two to four miles but the shells seemed to reach 
their mark, and the batteries replied with only a 
few shots, which did no damage. The three ships 
had discharged about three hundred projectiles in 
half an hour when the admiral signalled to " cease 
firing." The Spaniards reported that their loss was 
" one mule " which, whether true or not, was dis 
tinctly humorous, and caused much mirth in Ha 
vana and Madrid. 

* On April 26th Secretary Long telegraphed to Sampson : " While 
the department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by 
heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries 
which may protect vessels you desire to attack, if you can do so without 
exposure to heavy guns." 



VERY different news was to come a few days 
later, from a widely distant point. It was strange 
that the first battle of a war waged for the liberation 
of an island almost in sight of the American shores 
should be fought on the opposite side of the globe ; 
but it was a perfectly logical indeed, an inevitable 
train of action that led to the attack on Manila, 
with all the new and unforeseen chapter of history 
of which that was to be the beginning. War con 
sists in striking at the enemy s forces wherever they 
are to be found; and a blow at the Spanish power 
in the Philippines was not only a telling offensive 
move, but also a defensive necessity for the protec 
tion of American commerce in eastern seas, and 
even for the security of the Pacific coast. 

The Philippines were Spain s, like the rest of her 
once vast empire, by right of discovery. Fernao de 
Magalhaes, better known as Magellan, 


and was slain there by hostile natives. 
In 1565 Spaniards from Mexico, under Legazpi, 
crossed the Pacific to plant colonies in these eastern 
islands, which they named after the reigning sover 
eign, the Philip of the Armada. Manila was 
founded in 1571, on the finest harbour on the west 
coast of Luzon ; and from that date to 1898 the 
Philippines have had very little history. In the six 
teenth and seventeenth centuries there were hos- 



tilitics with Chinese pirates, and with the Dutch, 
who harried the Spanish commerce, but were de 
feated in an attack on Manila. 

In 1762 the city was taken by the British. A 
fleet under Admiral Cornish, with twenty-five hun 
dred men commanded by Sir William Draper, en 
tered the bay on September 23d of that year ; and on 
October 6th the defences of Manila were stormed, 
except the citadel, which the Spanish governor, the 
Marquis de Medina, surrendered a few days later, 
together with the entire archipelago. A ransom of 
four million dollars was demanded, and was paid in 
drafts on Madrid, which were afterward repudiated ; 
and in 1763 the Philippines were returned to Spain, 
together with Havana, captured in the same year. 

Under Spain s colonial rule the development of 
the islands was extraordinarily slow. Manila was 
almost fifty years old when the Pilgrims landed at 
Plymouth, yet the Philippines are to-day in great 
part a terra incognita. Compare what the Span 
iards have done for them with the achievements 
of the Anglo-Saxon race in Australia, whose coloni 
zation began in 1788, and in South Africa, British 
only since 1806; or with the changes wrought in 
India by her present rulers, whose power dates from 
Clive s victory at Plassey in 1757. While civiliza 
tion has fought its battles and won its triumphs in 
America, in Asia, in Africa, in the isles of the sea, 
the greater part of this richly endowed archipelago 
has progressed little since the days when the pagan 
king of Cebu came to meet Magellan. 

The ruinous disorders of Cuba, too, have had 

their counterpart in Spain s eastern possessions. 

Throughout this century the natives 

flections. have rown more and " more discon 
tented with the domination of the 

monastic orders, the corrupt and oppressive admin 
istration of the courts, the burden of compulsory 
military service, and above all the intolerably ex- 


tortionate system of taxation. One revolt followed 
another, but the Spaniards suppressed them usu 
ally with little difficulty, always with great cruelty. 
The insurrection of 1896 was more formidable 
than any that preceded it. Blanco, then captain- 
general at Manila, could do little to suppress it. He 
had only a handful of regular soldiers, and his na 
tive auxiliaries could not be trusted ; and when 
he left the islands, in December of that year, the 
insurgents controlled all the southern part of Luzon, 
close up to the capital. His successor, General 
Polavieja, came out with strong reinforcements, and 
inaugurated an active campaign. More than twenty 
thousand Spanish troops, commanded in the field 
by General Lachambre, made a clean sweep of the 
revolted territory, and drove the remnants of the 
Filipino forces into the mountains of the north. 
But Polavieja, irritated at the failure of the Madrid 
Government to support him with the men and sup 
plies he needed, resigned after four months in office ; 
and under the next captain-general, Primo de Rivera, 
the rebels continued to hold their own. Finally, 
Rivera succeeded in effecting a pacification, osten 
sibly by liberal promises of political concessions, 
but secretly, it is understood, by the more effectual 
method of bribing the Filipino leaders.* The na 
tives disbanded, and seven thousand of Rivera s 
troops were returned to Spain ; but the promised 
reforms were not made, and in the early months of 
1898, when Rivera was succeeded by Basilio Au- 
gustin, there were renewed risings on several of the 

* Oscar F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, reported to 
the State Department (February 22, 1898) that " certain rebel leaders 
were given a cash bribe of $1,650,000 to consent to public deportation 
to China." Mr. Wildman, consul-general at Hong-Kong, gave a dif 
ferent version in a report dated July 18, 1898 : " I was in Hong-Kong 
in September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under con 
tract with the Spanish Government. They waited until the ist of No 
vember for the payment of the money promised for the widows and 
orphans of the insurgents and the fulfilment of promised reforms. 
Only $400,000 Mexican was ever placed to their credit." 



islands. Meanwhile Emilio Aguinaldo, who had 
been the head and front of the rebellion in Luzon, 
had gone to Singapore, where he met Mr. Pratt, 
the United States consul, and through him opened 
relations with the American forces which were to 

have an important bearing on the 

Manila campaign. 

On April 24th Commodore 
Dewey, at Hong-Kong, received the following 
despatch from the Navy Department at Wash 
ington : 

War has commenced between the United States and 
Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence 
operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. 
You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost en 

This, of course, was not his first notification of 
the task before him. For several weeks he had been 
preparing his squadron for it. He had dismantled 
the one unserviceable vessel in his command, the 
old wooden corvette Monocacy, and had distributed 
her crew among his other men-of-war, leaving her 
at Woosung. At the beginning of April he was 
instructed to secure two auxiliary ships to carry 
coal and supplies ; he accordingly bought the Nan- 
shan and the Zafiro, with ten thousand tons of 
Welsh coal, besides filling up the bunkers of the 
cruisers. His fuel bill for the month was $81,872. 

At Manila, Governor-General Augustin pre 
pared for the coming fray by issuing, on April 23d, 
a proclamation which, if the published version of it 
be correct, was so ridiculously bombastic that it is 
worth quoting as a curiosity : 

The North American people, constituted of all the so 
cial excrescences, have exhausted our patience and pro 
voked war with their perfidious machinations, with their 
acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of 
nations and international conventions. 

The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of 


victories will give us one as brilliant as the justice of our 
cause demands. Spain, which counts upon the sympathies 
of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly from this 
new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from 
those States which, without cohesion and without a his 
tory, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the 
ungrateful spectacle of a legislature in which appear united 
insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism. 

A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither 
instruction nor discipline is preparing to come to this 
archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of 
all that means life, honour, and liberty. 

Filipinos, prepare for the struggle, and united under 
the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with 
laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will 
crown our efforts, and to the challenge of our enemies 
let us oppose, with the decision of the Christian and the 
patriot, the cry of "Viva Espafia! " 
Your General, 


This was as fine a piece of vituperation as any 
thing that Napoleon ever launched at his foes. 

Dewey was still at Hong-Kong completing his 

preparations, and awaiting the arrival of Oscar F. 

Williams, the American consul at 

Dewey leaves Manila, f who was expected to bring 

Hong-Kong, . . r . ^ 

April 25. important information when, on 

April 25th, the governor of the colony 
requested him to leave the harbour, to prevent any 
breach of British neutrality. The squadron now 
reinforced by the Baltimore, which reached Hong- 
Kong on the 22d accordingly withdrew to Mirs 
Bay, in Chinese territory, about thirty miles dis 
tant. Mr. Williams arrived on the 27th, and in the 

* This is an instance of the Spanish custom of adding the maiden 
name of a man s mother to his own surname, to distinguish him from 
others of the same name. 

t Mr. Williams left Manila on April 23d, turning over the affairs of 
his office to E. H. Rawson Walker, the British consul, whose services 
were afterward acknowledged by Dewey as "of invaluable assistance," 
Mr. Walker being his "only means of communicating with the Span 
ish authorities, and the chief agent in the protection of foreign resi 
dents." The Belgian consul, M. Andre, also did valuable work of 
the sort. 


afternoon of that day the start for Manila was made. 
Besides the Olympia (flagship, Captain C. V. Grid- 
ley commanding ; Commander Lamberton, chief of 
the commodore s staff), the Baltimore (Captain N. 
M. Dyer), the Raleigh (Captain J. B. Coghlan), 
and the Boston (Captain Frank Wildes), the fleet 
included the small cruiser Concord (1,700 tons, 
Commander Asa Walker), the gunboat Petrel (890 
tons, Commander E. P. Wood), the two colliers, 
and the revenue cutter Hugh McCulloch, now 
serving as a despatch boat. 

Accommodating its speed to that of the heavy 
colliers, the squadron crossed the China Sea to 
gether. On the morning of the 3Oth, when the 
shore of Luzon was sighted, the ships were cleared 
for action, nets were stretched around the boats to 
lessen the danger from flying splinters, and on some 
of the cruisers chain cables were coiled around the 
ammunition hoists. The ingenuity of this last de 
vice for increasing the protection of a vulnerable 
point was afterward warmly commended by an 
English naval critic, who apparently did not know 
that it was used on board the Kearsarge when she 
fought and won her famous duel with the Alabama. 
Captain Winslow went into action with his engines 
protected by sheet chains hung over the side of his 

Steaming southward, in the afternoon of the 
3Oth the American ships reached Subig Bay, an in 
dentation of the coast about forty miles north of 
Manila. Dewey had information that Montojo, the 
Spanish admiral, intended to meet the attacking 
squadron at this point, and he sent the Boston and 
the Concord into the bay, which is about seven 
miles deep, in search of the enemy; but the 
Spaniards plans had been changed, and they 
were not there. During the reconnaissance, the 
Baltimore, lying in the entrance of the bay, fired the 
first shot of the campaign in overhauling a Spanish 



schooner of which, however, it was not thought 
worth while to make a prize. Late in the afternoon 
the commodore ordered the fleet to lie to, to avoid 
appearing before Manila by daylight, and sum 
moned his commanding officers to a council on 
board the flagship. He informed them that he 
meant to enter Manila Bay during the night. 

The bay is a large sheet of water, running inland 
for thirty miles, and the same distance in average 
width, though much narrower at the 
Dewey reaches mout h. In the entrance are two high 
Apriilo*** rock y islands, Corregidor and Ca- 
ballo, dividing the waterway into two 
channels, the Boca Chica (Little Mouth) on the 
north, and the Boca Grande (Great Mouth) on the 
south. In the latter, which is about six miles wide, 
rises the isolated rock of El Fraile (The Friar) ; 
in the former are La Monja (The Nun) and sev 
eral other islets. Corregidor was fortified and 
garrisoned by the Spaniards ; there were small bat 
teries on Caballo and El Fraile, and on the main 
land at Punta Restinga, south of the entrance, and 
at Mariveles, Punta Gorda, and Punta Lasisi, north 
of it. None of them contained guns of more than 
fifteen-centimetre (six-inch) calibre. 

An hour before midnight the American fleet 
reached the mouth of the bay and turned into the 
Boca Grande, steaming at eight knots. The ships 
were in column, the Olympia leading, and the Bal 
timore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston fol 
lowing in order. No lights were shown except one 
at the stern, to guide the vessel next in line. There 
was a half moon, and the night was light enough 
to make it a risky matter to run through a channel 
that was commanded by batteries and might be laid 
with mines. In a published narrative by Lieu 
tenant Fiske,* of the Petrel, it is stated that not an 

* The Century Magazine, November, 1898. 



officer in the squadron had been in the bay before, 
but this is not quite correct, for Captain Gridley 
was at Manila in 1894, when he commanded the 
Marion. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Calkins, the 
navigator of the Olympia, who piloted the fleet, had 
a very difficult and responsible task. 

Commodore Dewey had been perfectly correct 
in his belief that the Spaniards would not dream of 
his forcing an entrance into the bay before day 
break. Their watch was not a very sharp one, for 
half of the ships had passed Corregidor before any 
alarm was given. Then a rocket went up from the 
island, and a little later the guns on El Fraile 
opened fire. The Raleigh and the Concord replied, 
and the rear-guard ship, the Boston, turned aside to 
pass close to the battery, not a formidable one, and 
hammered it until it was silenced. 

The McCulloch and the two colliers formed a 
separate column to the right of the war ships. As 
they passed into the bay the former signalled that 
her chief engineer had been disabled by sudden ill 
ness. It was a stroke of heat prostration or of 
apoplexy, and in twenty minutes Engineer Randall 
was dead the only life lost in the attack on Manila. 

Past the batteries, and untouched by a hostile 
shot, the fleet advanced at its leisure toward the 
Philippine capital, still about twenty miles distant. 
There was time to spare, as it was useless to arrive 
there before daybreak, and the crews, who had 
stood to their guns since nightfall, had three or four 
hours for such rest as they could get. At four 
o clock coffee and hardtack were served out. At 
five the ships were opposite Jihe city, and it was 
light enough to see that there were no men-of-war 
in the port. Turning southward again, the squad 
ron moved toward the peninsula of Cavite, which 
projects into the bay a few miles below Manila, and 
on which the Spaniards had their naval arsenal; 
and here Montojo s fleet was speedily descried. As 


the American ships circled toward Cavite, a few 
shots were exchanged with a shore battery in 
Manila that of the Luneta, consisting of twenty- 
five-centimetre (ten-inch) Krupp guns but at too 
great a range to be effective. 

Montojo had only one vessel that could be 
ranked as high as the second class his flagship, 
the Reina Cristina, a steel cruiser of 
3 5 tons > launched at Ferrol in 
1886, and armed with six six-inch and 
fourteen smaller guns. Her consorts were two 
small English-built cruisers, the Isla de Cuba and 
the Isla de Luzon, 1,030 tons each, and two others, 
old iron ships, slightly larger but less efficient, the 
Don Antonio de Ulloa, which was under repair, 
and the Don Juan de Austria; a still more an 
cient wooden vessel, whose engines were disabled 
the Castilla, 3,342 tons ; two 5ooton gunboats, 
the General Lezo and the Marques del Duero ; and 
four small torpedo boats. There were also two 
transports, the Manila and the Isla de Mindanao, 
and the Velasco, another obsolete iron ship which 
was undergoing repairs. In offensive and defen 
sive power the squadron was far inferior to Dewey s 
fine quartette of cruisers, but it had a great ad 
vantage in position, fighting in its own waters, 
where it knew the ranges, and had the aid of bat 
teries on shore. 

Montojo had abandoned his plan of meeting 
Dewey in Subig Bay only two days before, having 
found the fortifications there to be worthless. In 
Manila Bay he had a stronger base, but he had 
not had time to complete his preparations. What 
ever may have been the case elsewhere, at Cavite 
the Spaniards had an abundant store of war ma 
terial. When the American marines occupied the 
arsenal, they found it well supplied and apparently 
well kept. The most serious defect in the Spanish 
defences was the lack of mines. It was believed on 



the Olympia that as she approached Montojo s 
squadron two mines were exploded in the bay, 
ahead of her. Captain Gridley reported so, and in 
Dewey s first detailed account of the action he also 
said that " while advancing to the attack, two mines 
were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be 
effective." In a statement given by one of the 
Olympia s engineers it is asserted that a mine went 
off twelve hundred yards in front of the ship. At 
such a distance, in the dim light of dawn, it would 
be easy to mistake the splash of a shell, which some 
times throws the water masthead high, for the ex 
plosion of a torpedo. Spanish projectiles frequently 
fell as much as twelve hundred yards short of their 
mark, but it would be an extraordinary mis 
calculation to discharge an electric mine nearly 
three quarters of a mile away from its intended 

On the other hand, the reports of Dewey s other 
captains, and the narratives of Lieutenant Fiske, of 
Engineer Ford of the Baltimore,* and of several 
other eye-witnesses, do not record any explosion 
of mines. The official report of Admiral Montojo, 
in which he details his preparations for defence, 
mentions no mines ; nor does the account published 
in the Diario de Manila of May 4th. Lieutenant 
Fiske expressly states that the Spaniards had none 
in place, though some mine cases lay in the arsenal, 
unfinished. This is confirmed by Montojo s state 
ment f that he had repeatedly asked for torpedoes 

* An American Cruiser in the Far East. 

t Reported by the China Mail s correspondent in Manila shortly 
after the battle. 

A comparison of Gridley s report with Montojo s confirms the sug 
gestion that the splash of shells was mistaken for the explosion of 
mines. The captain of the Olympia says : " At 5.06 two submarine 
mines were exploded near. At 5.15 batteiy on Shangly Point opened 
fire." Montojo records that "at q the batteries on Sanp-lev Point 
opened fire. The two first shots fell short and to the left of the lead 
ing- vessel. These shots were not answered by the enemy. ... At 
5.15 I made signal that our squadron open fire." 


from Madrid, but had received none, and his at 
tempts to make them had been failures. 

The peninsula of Cavite is shaped like a two- 
pronged fork, with the small bay of Canacao be 
tween the prongs, and the larger bay 
of Bakoor between the peninsula and 
the mainland of Luzon. Montojo s 
ships were drawn up in line across Bakoor Bay, 
their left resting on the Cavite arsenal, their right 
on the shore near the village of Bakoor. The two 
disabled vessels, the Castilla and the Ulloa, were 
moored close to Sangley Point, the former having 
a row of lighters, filled with sand, to protect her 
water line. The Velasco was tied up at the arsenal, 
and was not in the action. The six other cruisers 
and gunboats were at anchor, with steam up. In 
spite of the warning sounded by the firing at the 
mouth of the harbour, Dewey s attack apparently 
took the Spaniards by surprise, for many of the 
officers and men were ashore, and came hurrying 
out in boats as the battle began. 

The American ships came on in the same order 
as before, attacking in column, as Nelson did at the 
Nile and at Trafalgar, but veering to the right, so 
as to turn their port broadsides to the enemy. The 
Spanish batteries and men-of-war had been firing 
for about half an hour when at twenty minutes to 
six, and at a distance of three miles, Dewey gave 
the order for the Olympia to reply. The engage 
ment soon became general. Every ship in both 
fleets was using every gun it could bring to bear, 
and the Spaniards had the assistance of five shore 
batteries. None of the five, however, proved dan 
gerous to the American vessels, the most formida 
ble being that on Sangley Point, consisting of two 
fifteen-centimetre (six-inch) Ordonez guns, of 
which Montojo reported that only one could be 
used. A mile southward, at Canacao, was another 
battery of a single twelve-centimetre (five-inch) 


gun, and a totally ineffective fire, at long range, 
was kept up from three points in Manila by the 
heavy cannon of the Luneta, by some smaller guns 
on the mole at the mouth of the Pasig River, and 
by the old fort in the southern suburb of Malate. 

To render them a more difficult mark, Dewey 
kept his ships passing slowly up and down in front 
of the Spanish line. Early in the action Montojo 
ordered all of his vessels that could do so to slip 
their anchors and get under way. Two of the tor 
pedo boats boldly dashed out to attack the 
Olympia, but the American gunners did not allow 
them to get within striking distance. One was 
sunk, the other driven ashore disabled. The 
Reina Cristina also steamed out to attack at close 
quarters, but she too had to retreat, and the Span 
iards made no further move until at the end of the 
battle they went inshore to sink, as a dog crawls 
into his kennel to die. 

There being no armoured ships on either side, 
the result was simply a question of gunnery; and 
here the Americans had a great advantage in their 
more powerful batteries, and a still greater one in 
their vastly superior marksmanship. Whether from 
lack of training or from inability to preserve, in 
the stress and strain of battle, the steadiness of hand 
and eye that is needed for accurate gun practice, 
the Spaniards fire was extraordinarily wild and in 
effective. With about seventy guns firing for two 
hours at an enemy within easy range, they did prac 
tically no damage. Only one of their shells a 4.7- 
inch projectile from the Isla de Cuba injured a 
gun or a man in the American fleet, striking a six- 
inch gun on the Baltimore, disabling it, and sending 
out a shower of splinters that wounded Lieutenant 
Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and six seamen, none of 
them seriously. Besides this the Baltimore was hit 
or grazed by four other shots, the Olympia by eight, 
the Boston by four, the Raleigh by one, the Petrel 



by one, but none of them left more than a slight 
mark. The Concord was not struck. Indeed, the 
chief injury received by Dewey s ships was the 
shattering of boats and skylights, the starting of 
planks, and the breaking of wires by the concus 
sion of their own artillery. 

On the other hand, the American fire was ex 
ceedingly accurate and destructive. As they passed 
along the Spanish line Dewey s gunners paid spe 
cial attention to the Reina Cristina, their only an 
tagonist that could be considered formidable, and 
Montojo s flagship suffered terribly. Early in the 
action a shell exploded in the forecastle, and killed 
or disabled the crews of four of her rapid-fire guns. 
The helmsman on the bridge being wounded by 
splinters struck from the foremast, Lieutenant 
Nunez took the wheel and kept it, amid the hail of 
shot, until another shell destroyed the steering gear. 
The admiral s flag was shot from the mizzenmast, 
one gun after another was put out of action, the 
smokestack was riddled, the engines were struck 
and damaged. A shell burst in the hospital, kill 
ing wounded men who were being treated there ; 
another set fire to the crews quarters, and another 
caused a serious blaze close to one of the maga 
zines. Altogether, as reported by Montojo, the 
flagship was struck seventy times. 

Both here and on the other ships, the Spaniards 
fought with great bravery. The Cristina s guns 
were fired until only two gunners remained unhurt. 
Finally, with his ship hopelessly disabled and burn 
ing in half a dozen places, with more than half her 
crew killed or wounded, with her boilers and maga 
zines likely to explode at any moment, the admiral, 
who had himself been wounded by a splinter from 
a shell, ordered her abandoned. The boats were 
launched, and Montojo was rowed over to the Isla 
de Cuba. Many of the crew jumped overboard and 
swam to other vessels or to the shore. Captain 



Cadarso, the Cristina s chief officer, stayed on the 
ship to the last, and was killed by a shell as he was 
about to leave her. 

The rest of the Spanish vessels had suffered 
almost as severely. The wooden Castilla was no 
better than a floating coffin under the fire of the 
American guns, and she had burned and sunk 
where she lay. As Lieutenant Fiske remarks, 
Montojo would have been wiser to dismantle her 
before the battle, and mount her guns on shore. 
The whole fleet was practically silenced and 
wrecked when, at twenty-five minutes to eight, after 
passing five times along the Spanish line, and 
gradually drawing closer until he was within two 
thousand yards of it, Dewey ordered his squadron 
to cease firing. It had been reported to him that 
the Olympia s ammunition was running low, only 
fifteen rounds remaining for her five-inch rapid-fire 
battery ; and he drew out of range, to communicate 
with his other ships and redistribute his supply of 
shot and shell. It was soon discovered that the 
report of a shortage was a mistake, but the commo 
dore remained out in the bay for three hours and 
a half, receiving reports of casualties or, rather, of 
the extraordinary absence of casualties from his 
captains, and giving his men time for rest and re 
freshment. During this interval he sent in a mes 
sage to the governor-general, informing him that if 
the city batteries continued to fire the American 
fleet would bombard Manila. The warning silenced 

At sixteen minutes past eleven Dewey gave the 
signal for returning to the attack, and the squadron 
moved inshore again, the Baltimore now leading 
the way. Montojo had moved his ships all that 
could be moved close to the point of Cavite. 
Only one of them the Antonio de Ulloa was still 
able to fire a gun. Most of them were in flames, 
and one of them after another was scuttled and 



abandoned. The admiral himself had been carried 
to a convent in the town. A few more rounds from 
the American cruisers completed the work of de 
struction, and at twenty minutes to one, the Span 
ish ships being wrecked and sunk, the shore bat 
teries silenced, and the arsenal having hauled down 
its flag, Dewey steamed northward again to Manila, 

Sangley Pt 

Sketch map showing position of the sunken Spanish ships 
after the battle of Manila Bay, May I, 1898. 

1. Reina Cristina. 

2. Don Antonio de Ulloa. 

3. Castilla. 

4. Velasco. 

5. Don Juan de Austria. 

6. Isla de Cuba. 

7. Isla de Luzon. 

8. Marques del Duero. 

9. General Lezo. 

10. Isla de Mindanao. 

leaving the Petrel whose light draught enabled her 
to go into the shallow water inshore to destroy 
or capture anything that might still remain afloat. 
Commander Wood carried out his commission 
effectually, sending his executive officer, Lieuten 
ant Hughes, with a boat s crew to set fire to the 
scuttled gunboats, while his navigator, Lieutenant 
Fiske, seized and brought out the tugs Rapido and 



Hercules and three steam launches, without any at 
tempt at resistance by the Spanish soldiers and 
seamen on the beach at Cavite. The coast-survey 
vessel Manila, which had been run ashore at 
Bakoor, was afterward hauled off uninjured and 
added to the list of prizes. 

Thus was executed one of the most brilliant and 
completely successful naval operations in history. 
The morning s work of Dewey s squadron had ob 
literated Spain s naval power in the East, and had 
given him command of the great Philippine archi 
pelago. All this had been done without losing a 
single man in a battle in which the enemy s loss, 
as reported to Madrid by Montojo, was three hun 
dred and eighty-one killed and wounded besides 
the destruction of a fleet and the ruin of a colonial 

In the afternoon, while the victorious squadron 
was anchored off Manila, which lay at the mercy 
of its guns, Mr. Rawson Walker, the British con 
sul, came out to the Olympia and requested, on 
behalf of resident foreigners of twenty-one nation 
alities, that the city should not be shelled. Dewey 
consented on certain conditions, which included a 
supply of coal for his ships, and control of the cable 
to Hong-Kong. Governor-General Augustin re 
fused his terms, but there was no further firing. A 
bombardment would have caused frightful destruc 
tion, and would have been of no equivalent mili 
tary advantage, as Dewey could not land a force 
sufficient to hold the city against the insurgents who 
would have swarmed in to loot it. 

On the following day (May 2d) the commodore 
moved his ships back to Cavite, where they took 
up a position which they were to hold 

f ay3. for ma "y weeks - the 3d the 
arsenal, which the Spaniards had 

evacuated, was occupied not in time to prevent 
some plundering by the rebels, who also despoiled 


the neighbouring villages of Cavite and San Roque. 
On the same day the Baltimore and the Raleigh 
went over to Corregidor Island and received the 
surrender of its garrison, which was released on 

During the battle, General Augustin had sent to 
Madrid a vaguely worded despatch which, though 
it admitted the loss of two ships, gave the impres 
sion that the Spaniards had the best of the fight. 
It created momentary jubilation in the Spanish 
capital, which was gradually changed to sorrow 
and indignation as later reports, though still very 
indefinite, left no doubt of a disaster. On the 3d 
of May, when the Cortes met, Sefior Salmeron, the 
republican leader, demanded an explanation, and 
declared that it would be necessary to establish the 
responsibility attaching to the existing Govern 
ment. Sagasta replied by appealing to the house 
to subordinate partisanship to patriotism. Com 
munication between Madrid and Manila had ended 
on the previous day, when Dewey cut the cable of 
which Augustin had refused him the use. 

In America, meanwhile, there was intense sus 
pense, in the absence of definite news. Dewey s 
success was not doubted, but no one dreamed that 
it could have been won without serious loss. Not 
until May 4th did the commodore send the McCul- 
loch speeding off to Hong-Kong, the nearest 
cable station, with despatches for the Navy Depart 
ment, and on the 7th the country was thrilled by his 
laconic announcement of his magnificent and blood 
less victory. 

Five more weeks were to pass before a detailed 
story of the battle was received. By that time an 
army was on its way across the Pacific to reap for 
America the fruit of the fleet s great achievement 
of the ist of May. 



THE course of events in the chief theatre of war 
during the months of May and June may be thus 
briefly summed up : 

1. Plans for the immediate invasion of Cuba, 
which were abandoned or postponed ; the blockade, 
meanwhile, being maintained and extended. 

2. The coming of Cervera s fleet, and the move 
ments of the squadrons under Sampson and Schley 
to intercept it. 

3. The "bottling" of Cervera at Santiago, 
which thereupon became the centre of naval and 
military operations, and the scene of the chief sea 
fight and the only land battle of the war. 

The first army of invasion was formed by mov 
ing men from Camp Thomas, at Chickamauga, to 
Tampa, where in the early days of May a corps was 
organized, designated as the Fifth Corps, and com 
manded by General William R. Shafter a briga 
dier in the regular army,* appointed a major-gen 
eral of volunteers. On May 2d it was decided, at 
a White House conference in which General Miles 
and Admiral Sicard took part, as well as the Presi 
dent and Secretaries Alger and Long to move 
forty or fifty thousand men to some point near Ha 
vana, and attack or besiege the capital on the land 

* The general officers of the regular army, just before the war, were 
Major-Generals Miles (commanding the army), Merritt, and Brooke; 
Brigadier-Generals , Otis, Coppinger, Shafter, Graham, Wade, and 
Merriam ; and the heads of the staff bureaus, Brigadier-Generals 
Greely (chief signal officer), Breckinridge (inspector-general), Flagler 




side. On May Qth Shafter was instructed by Sec 
retary Alger to " move his command, under pro 
tection of navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most 
important point on north coast of Cuba and where 
territory is ample to land and deploy army." 

Mariel is twenty-six miles from Havana, and is 
the nearest harbour west of the city. General 
Wade, in command at Tampa, was to send reinforce 
ments as fast as they could be brought from Chicka- 
mauga and other points. He was directed to " have 
troops fully equipped ; send abundance of ammuni 
tion, and ship with them food for men and animals 
for sixty days, to be followed by four months sup 

It was vastly easier to issue these instructions 
than to execute them. There was a great deficiency 
of ammunition and of supplies and equipments of 
all sorts, and on the loth orders came from Wash 
ington to defer sailing until May i6th. Meanwhile, 
to get the army in motion, twelve thousand men 
were to be transported from Tampa to Key West, 
as a halfway station on the route to Cuba. This 

(chief of ordnance), Sternberg (surgeon-general), Lieber (judge-advo 
cate-general), Stanton (paymaster-general), Wilson (chief of engi 
neers), Ludington (quartermaster-general), Corbin (adjutant-general), 
and Eagan (commissary-general). 

The following army corps were organized during the war : 



Where organized. 

June soth. 

First . . 
Third . 
Sixth . 

Major-General Brooke ) 
Major-General Wade j 
Major-General Graham . . . 
Major-General Coppinger . 
Major-General Shafter .... 
Major-Genera] Wilson 

Camp Thomas. 

Camp Alger. . . . 




Major-General Lee 

Tampa (moved 


Eighth . . . 

Major-General Merritt . 

to Jacksonville) 
San Francisco 
and Manila. 


The Sixth Corps was never organized ; General Wilson was as 
signed to command a division of the First Corps. 



also was speedily found to be impracticable, as there 
was no adequate supply of water on the island, 
and nothing had been done to provide it. 

Finally the idea of attacking Havana with a 
large army was given up, and Shafter was ordered 
to take five thousand men for a " reconnaissance in 
force." The plan was to effect a landing on the 
south coast, in Santiago or Puerto Principe prov 
ince, and open up communications with Gomez; 
but this, too, fell through. Besides the difficulty of 
equipping an adequate force, the wet season was 
beginning in Cuba, with its terrible menace to the 
health of unacclimated invaders; the fortifications 
of Havana had been greatly strengthened; there 
was risk in sending transports to sea while there 
existed the possibility of an attack by Cervera s 
fleet; and when the blockade of Santiago ended 
this latter danger, the whole plan of campaign was 

What may be called legalized filibustering ex 
peditions were a feature of these early days of 
the war, when the assistance of the 
Cuban insurgents was valued much 
more highly than it came to be upon 
closer acquaintance. Official relations with them 
were first opened by Lieutenant A. S. Rowan, of the 
military information bureau. Charged with mes 
sages to General Calixto Garcia, the exact nature 
of which has not been disclosed, Lieutenant Rowan 
was ordered to Jamaica early in April, to await 
the inevitable outbreak of war. When it came, he 
crossed to the south coast of Cuba in a fishing 
smack, in company with agents of the insurgent 
junta in Jamaica, and landed between .Santiago and 
Cape Cruz, on April 25th. On May 1st, after an 
arduous journey through mountains and forests, he 
met Garcia at the town of Bayamo, which had just 
been evacuated by its Spanish garrison and occu 
pied by the insurgents. He delivered his de- 


spatches, rode on across the province of Santiago, 
which he found to be a desolated wilderness, to the 
north coast, and on the 5th sailed from the harbour 
of Manati, with five companions, in an open row- 
boat,, which was so small that its occupants were 
forced to sit upright with their provisions between 
their knees. They were picked up by a Bahama 
sponging steamer, and on May nth Lieutenant 
Rowan s adventurous journey ended at Key West, 
whence he hurried to Washington to report. 

The first expedition with arms and supplies for 
the insurgents had left Key West a few days be 
fore, under the command of Colonel R. H. Hall, of 
the Fourth Infantry. Its purpose was accom 
plished, and the honour of being the first American 
officer to set foot on Cuban soil during the war was 
^claimed for one of its members, Lieutenant W. M. 
Crofton, of the First Infantry ; but Lieutenant 
Rowan would seem to possess a prior title to this 
particular distinction. 

Another expedition, which left Key West May 
nth on the transport Gussie, with a cargo of arms 
and ammunition, and a hundred men of the First 
Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Dorst, 
was less successful. At Puerto Cabanas (about 
forty miles west of Havana), where she attempted 
to make a landing, she found herself confronted by 
a strong force of Spaniards. Even with the assist 
ance of the gunboats Wasp and Manning, the 
enemy could not be dislodged, and the Gussie had 
to withdraw. Much of the blame for her failure 
was charged to the newspapers, which had openly 
advertised the starting of the expedition two days 
before it sailed; and as a result, the military censor 
ship of press despatches became more strict.* 

* The chief signal officer, Brigadier-General A. W. Greely, speaks 
of this most responsible as well as most delicate duty " in his annual 
report : " The great daily journals of the country not only held up the 
hands of the chief signal officer, but also refrained at critical times 



No news was published of an expedition which 
started from Tampa a week later. For this eight 
hundred Cubans had been recruited an ill- 
equipped, undisciplined regiment ; so undisciplined 
that on the night of embarkation nearly half of 
them straggled down to the pier too late for their 
steamer, the Florida, which took the rest to the 
harbour of Banes, on the north coast of the prov 
ince of Santiago. 

There were a few other similar expeditions, but 
their movements were kept so quiet that their his 
tory can not now be written fully ; and, indeed, it 
would scarcely be worth while to write it, as they 
had little or no effect upon the course of the war. 
One was diverted into a filibustering attack upon 
Santo Domingo.* What was probably the last 
went from Key West on the transports Florida and 
Fanita, June 25th, with two hundred Cubans, and 
fifty coloured troopers of the Tenth Cavalry, 
escorted by the auxiliary cruiser Peoria. After an 
unsuccessful attempt to land near Trinidad, and 

from publishing; information detrimental to the public interests. All 
messages to the West Indies were carefully supervised. Through the 
signal-corps censorship a rich harvest of information was gained from 
the telegrams of newspaper correspondents, blockade runners, personal 
despatches, etc. 

" While hundreds of improper messages were quietly deposited in 
the waste-basket, others were allowed to pass freely as leading up to 
other and more valuable information." 

The War and Navy Departments, of course, were from the first 
very sparing of information for the press, and on April 2qth Secretary 
Alger issued an order absolutely forbidding his subordinates to answer 
any questions from reporters. The New York Sun said on May ist : 
" The system inaugurated yesterday is more stringent than a press cen 
sorship. A query in regard to the most inconsequential matter con 
nected with the routine work of the department was treated in the 
same way as a query in reference to the next important strategic move ; 
a refusal to answer given in all cases. The department believes 
that some recent publications have caused embarrassment to the plans 
of the Government in its campaign against Spain." 

* Commander Clover, of the Bancroft, reported overhauling this 
expedition, on board the Fanita, off Key West, on May 2yth, and 
allowing it to proceed, not without some misgiving as to its purpose. 
Its leader was a "General Rodriguez," who seems to have been the 
Dominican revolutionist Timinez. A full account of the incident was 
published in the New York Herald, August 6, 1899. 



another at Tunas, a little farther east where the 
Cubans were repulsed with some loss by a Spanish 
detachment the men were put ashore at Palo Alto, 
in Puerto Principe province, and joined Maximo 
Gomez, who, according to the story told by a vol 
unteer member of the expedition, gave them a 
somewhat chilly reception, declaring that he needed 
arms and supplies, not recruits. During July they 
took part in some minor engagements with the 
Cuban general s nephew, Miguel Gomez, who hor 
rified his American allies by shooting prisoners and 
looting a captured town (Arroyo Blanco). At the 
close of the war, after suffering much hardship, 
they made their way to the north coast. 

It was naturally desired that the Cuban coast 
should be more effectively patrolled, but during the 

month of May, with the limited num- 
in May C ^ er ^ sm p s available, it was not 

found possible to watch any ports 
except those covered by the proclamation of April 
2 1 st. Indeed, it was not until the end of June, 
when Sampson s fleet had grown from twenty ves 
sels to almost a hundred, that an extension of the 
blockade was declared. The whole coast of Cuba 
was a line of two thousand miles " greater in ex 
tent," as Sampson said, " than that patrolled by 
nearly six hundred ships during the civil war, and 
one in many respects offering greater difficulties." 
To watch even a small part of it was a tedious and 
exhausting service for the American ships and 
sailors, without many exciting incidents. 

Sampson s bombardment of the Matanzas bat 
teries (April 27th), already chronicled, was followed 
by a series of small brushes with the enemy, the 
first occurring two days later off Cienfuegos. At 
this point, owing to its distance from a coaling base 
(it is six hundred miles from Key West by way of 
Cape San Antonio), and to Sampson s lack of ships, 
it was impossible, in the early weeks of the war, to 


maintain a strict blockade. The first American 
ships to appear there were the cruiser Marblehead, 
the gunboat Nashville, and the converted yacht 
Eagle, on April 29th. Sampson had detached this 
little squadron, whose senior officer was Com 
mander McCalla, of the Marblehead, with orders to 
intercept two Spanish transports which had been 
reported as bound for Cienfuegos. Unfortunately 
the Marblehead and the Eagle ran aground, losing 
twelve hours ; and McCalla was too late to catch 
the intended prizes. He was off the port, and had 
captured the coasting steamer Argonauta, when the 
torpedo boat Gallicia and two other small armed 
vessels came out and fired on the Eagle, seconded 
by batteries on shore. The American ships replied 
in kind, and drove the Spaniards off, disabling the 
Gallicia, which limped back into port with a shot 
through her boilers. Immediately after the brief 
engagement McCalla was obliged to withdraw, as 
his coal was running low. 

On the same day the New York fired upon forts 
and a company of cavalry at Puerto Cabanas, the 
scene of the Gussie s repulse. The Spaniards main 
tained a cavalry patrol along many parts of the 
blockaded coast, and on May 2d the gunboat Wil 
mington and the torpedo boat Ericsson had some 
target practice of the same sort. On the 6th and 
7th the torpedo boats Dupont and Winslow and 
the yacht Hornet fired upon the shore batteries near 
Matanzas, where the Spanish engineers had re 
sumed work since Sampson s visit. On the 7th the 
gunboat Vicksburg and the revenue cutter Morrill 
chased a schooner under the Havana fortifications 
and exchanged shots with them. 

The most serious engagements of the blockade, 
and the first in which American lives were lost, 
were fought on May nth, at Cardenas and Cien 
fuegos. At the former port which lies on one of 
those deep indentations so characteristic of the 



Cuban coast, with an entrance barred by a chain 
of keys were three Spanish gunboats, which con 
stantly showed themselves at the mouth of the har 
bour, and one day repelled an attack 
The fight at car- , h torpedo boat Foote. Early on 

denas, May n. / . , _. . J . 

the morning of May nth, when the 
gunboats Machias and Wilmington, the revenue 
cutter Hudson, and the torpedo boat Winslow were 
off the port, Commander Merry, of the Machias, the 
senior officer present, after a consultation with 
Commander Todd, of the Wilmington, ordered an 
attack, in hope of capturing the daring Spaniards. 

The bay of Cardenas is shallow, and the main 
entrance was believed to be laid with mines oper 
ated from a station on Diana Key, one of the ob 
structing islands. The Machias stayed outside to 
attack this point, while the three other vessels 
picked their way into the harbour by another chan 
nel through the keys, and moved across the wide 
bay toward the town. The Winslow, leading the 
way, was within a mile of the wharves, which were 
lined with small craft, when a hot fire suddenly 
opened upon her, apparently coming from a battery 
at the water s edge, as well as from the Spanish 
gunboats. She made a spirited reply with her puny 
armament of three one-pounder rapid-fire guns, 
and the Wilmington and Hudson joined in the 
bombardment, doing serious damage to the enemy s 
vessels and some to the town, but failing to silence 
the Spaniards fire, which was concentrated on the 
Winslow, and fairly riddled her. One of her en 
gines was struck and injured, her steering gear was 
shot away, a shell exploded in one of her boilers, 
another started a fire in her paint room, and an 
other disabled one of her guns ; and she was drift 
ing helplessly toward the shore when her com 
manding officer, Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou, sig 
nalled for help, and the Hudson steamed up to tow 
her out of her imminent peril. Lieutenant Berna- 



dou had been wounded in the thigh by a splinter, 
but had stuck to his post, stopping the How of 
blood by means of a tourniquet improvised with 
a towel and an empty shell case. 

A line was thrown from the Hudson to the 
Winslow, but fell short. At the second attempt, as 
the torpedo-boat s crew stood ready to grasp the 
rope, a shell exploded among a group of them, 
instantly killing the second officer, Ensign Bagley, 
and two seamen, and mortally wounding two 
others. Ensign Bagley, a very promising young 
North Carolinian, was the only officer of the United 
States navy killed in action during the war. Finally 
the line was made fast, and the Winslow was taken 
out of the bay and to Key West. 

The skirmish at Cardenas, which was more like 
a defeat than anything else that the American arms 
encountered during the war, showed that to pit 
such unprotected vessels as torpedo boats against 
even mediocre shore batteries may be magnificent, 
but is not war. Even for the routine work of the 
blockade these frail craft were ill adapted, and 
probably they would not have been ordered to this 
duty but for the urgent need of all the ships that 
could be mustered into service. They are, of 
course, designed for a special purpose, armament, 
protection, and seagoing ability being sacrificed to 
the power to make a lightninglike dash at the 
enemy in battle. Of their condition after the four 
months campaign Engineer-in-Chief Melville said 
in his official report : " Nearly every one has had 
some accident, and the machinery of some at the 
close of the war was in a condition that can only 
be described as horrible." 

It has been charged, or at least hinted, that in 
taking the Winslow so close to an enemy whose 
strength was imperfectly known, Lieutenant Ber- 
nadou was guilty of the rashness to which young 
commanders are naturally prone. The charge is 


answered, as far as the lieutenant is concerned, by 
the fact that he was acting throughout under the 
orders of superior officers. 

As it was, the American loss five killed and 
three wounded was small, and the Winslow s in 
juries, though numerous, were so slight that she 
was ready for sea again a few hours after reaching 
Key West. The Spaniards, on the other hand, had 
suffered considerably. They reported one of their 
gunboats, the Antonio Lopez, a total wreck, and 
much damage along the water front of the town. 
The Machias, moreover, had shelled and demol 
ished the station on Diana Key. A boat s crew, 
commanded by Ensign A. L. Willard, went ashore 
on the key and hoisted the Stars and Stripes above 
the Spanish barracks the first appearance of the 
American flag as an emblem of conquest on Cuban 

On the same day, soon after sunrise, four boats 
the steam and sailing launches of the Marblehead and 
the Nashville, commanded by Lieu- 

tCnant Winsl W > f the latter VeSSel > 

May ii a son f Captain Winslow of the old 

Kearsarge made a daring and partly 
successful attempt to cut the telegraph cables that 
connected Cienfuegos with Havana and with Eu 
rope. For more than three hours the boats crews 
grappled for the submarine wires, going within 
sixty feet of the beach, in a heavy sea, and work 
ing with the utmost coolness under a constant rifle 
fire from troops on shore. Two lines were brought 
up and cut, and another small one had been found 
when the Spanish fire became so heavy that Lieu 
tenant Winslow, who had been shot through the 
hand, was obliged to order the launches to with 
draw from their perilous position. The Marble- 
head and the Nashville, together with the revenue 
cutter Windom, though they had not been able to 
drive the Spaniards from their cover on the beach, 



had wrecked the cable station ; and as the boats had 
been fired on from the lighthouse at the harbour 
mouth, it was also demolished. The Eagle, mean 
while, destroyed an outlying lighthouse (Piedras 
Key) and lightship (Diego Perez Island), and sent 
ashore their keepers who had not been paid for 
months, and in one case had had no food for three 
days. The American loss in the launches was 
twelve men wounded, of whom two died. 

The severing of the ocean cables landing in 
Cuba was part of the plan for a complete blockade 
of the island.* A specially fitted steamer, the Adria, 
was commissioned for this difficult and frequently 
dangerous work, but she proved a failure. Better 
results were gained by the St. Louis and the Wom- 
patuck. The big liner and her small consort, a tug 
bought from the Standard Oil Company, had little 
equipment for fighting, but Captain Goodrich and 
Lieutenant Jungen, their commanding officers, on 
May 1 8th took them under the batteries at the 
mouth of the harbour of Santiago de Cuba and 
severed the cable running to Jamaica. On the fol 
lowing day they were repulsed in an attempt to 
cut the French line near its landing at Guanta- 
namo ; but on the 2oth Captain Goodrich found and 
broke it off the Haitian coast, f and a few days later 
he reported to the Navy Department his belief that 

* This step was decided upon only after much hesitation in Wash 
ington. Sampson s first orders were to cut no cables, and on April 
27th Secretary Long: telegraphed : " We are considering the advantage 
of declaring telegraph cables neutral." Three days later, when it was 
known that Cervera had sailed from the Cape Verde Islands, Sampson 
was authorized to destroy the cables on the south coast of Cuba. Of 
course it was unnecessary to cut those that ran northward to the 
United States 

f It was claimed by the Spaniards and correctly, it appears that 
this was a breach of international law. A neutral cable within the 
enemy s territorial waters must take the chances of war ; in neutral 
waters, or in the high seas, it is protected by the rights of neutrals 
(The Spanish- American War, by Captain Severe Gomez Nunez, trans 
lated and published by the United States Office of Naval Intelligence, 
page 58). 


I 5 6 


" the island of Cuba is now isolated, telegraphically 
speaking." This same announcement was made 
more than once, but always prematurely,* for when 
Santiago fell it still had its cables to Havana and 
Madrid. It was fortunate for the American forces, 
and perhaps for the Spaniards, too, that such was 
the case, for these wires carried to Cervera the 
orders that sent his squadron from its stronghold in 
Santiago harbour to destruction under Sampson s 
guns, precipitating the fall of the Cuban city and 
bringing near the end of the war. 

* The mistake may have been due to the fact (reported by Admiral 
Sampson, July igth) that the Spaniards had laid dummy cables, so 
that it was almost impossible to know when a "live wire" had been 



MEANWHILE, in the early days of May, the 
situation in the West Indies was changed by the 
appearance of Cervera s fleet as a factor indeed, as 
the central factor in the campaign. Although its 
strength was small in comparison with the whole 
American naval force in the Atlantic, the Spanish 
squadron was powerful enough, with Sampson s 
ships scattered in Cuban waters, and a long stretch 
of scantily protected coast before it, to threaten 
grave danger at almost any point at which it might 
strike. To insure the command of the sea, and to 
make feasible the invasion of Cuba, it must be met 
and vanquished. 

Cervera s departure from St. Vincent on April 
29th with the four cruisers, Maria Teresa (flagship ; 
Captain Concas), Cristobal Colon (Captain Moreu), 
Vizcaya (Captain Eulate), and Almirante Oquendo 
(Captain Lagaza), and the three torpedo-boat de 
stroyers, Furor (flagship of Captain Villamil, com 
manding the flotilla ; the Furor commanded by 
Lieutenant Carlier), Pluton (Lieutenant Vazquez), 
and Terror (Lieutenant de la Rocha), was re 
ported to the Navy Department on the same 
day. Secretary Long immediately informed Samp 
son that the Spanish fleet had sailed westward, 
probably for Cuba, but possibly to strike at the 
coast of the United States or to intercept the 
Oregon. With equal promptitude he despatched 


the Harvard and St. Louis, which were at New 
York, waiting for orders, to cruise off Martinique 
and Guadeloupe to watch for the Spaniards and 
cable the earliest news of their movements. Two 
days later (May ist) another of the American liners, 
the Yale, was sent out to circle about Porto Rico. 
It was not thought likely that Cervera would make 
direct for Cuba without calling at some of the in 
tervening islands, either for coal, for communica 
tion with Madrid, or for news of the military situa 
tion ; and it was fully expected that one of these 
speedy scouts would be able to give ample warn 
ing of his approach. 

Behind this first line of the American naval de 
fences was Sampson s fleet, which was now called 
upon to present a double front to the enemy. To 
meet the emergency it was divided into two bodies. 
With the most powerful fighting ships the admiral 
faced westward to meet Cervera, leaving Commo 
dore Watson * to maintain the blockade with a 
squadron consisting mainly of auxiliaries and 
" mosquito " craft. A thousand miles to the north, 
at Hampton Roads, the central point of the eastern 
coast, was Schley, with the Flying Squadron, ready 
to sally forth against the Spaniards if they should 
make any attempt to strike at American seaports. 

It was calculated that Cervera would reach West 

Indian waters about May 8th a reckoning that 

proved to be based upon an overesti- 

sampson moves mate Q f his S q Uac iron s speed. Dur- 

in g the first three da y s of the month 
Sampson was at Key West with his 
flagship, the New York, and his two battle ships, 
the Iowa and Indiana, taking on coal and supplies 
and making preparations for the expected fight. In 

* To relieve Admiral Sampson of part of his tremendous burden of 
work and responsibility, Commodore J. Crittenden Watson, who had 
been serving as governor of the United States Naval Home, was ap 
pointed (May 6th) to command the blockading squadron, under the 



the early morning of the 4th the three great war 
ships slipped out singly, to rendezvous a few hours 
later at Juruco Cove, a dozen miles east of Havana. 
The small cruiser Detroit also met them here, and 
the four vessels steamed eastward toward San Juan, 
Porto Rico, which both Sampson and the Navy 
Department regarded as the admiral s probable 
meeting place with the Spaniards. On their way, 
in the Nicholas Channel, they picked up the moni 
tors Terror and Amphitrite, the small cruiser 
Montgomery, the torpedo boat Porter, the tug 
Wompatuck, and the collier Niagara. It was a 
heavily armed but not a swiftly moving squadron. 
It could, of course, go no faster than its slowest 
vessels, and the monitors were credited, at their 
best pace, with only ten knots an hour. Every one 
of Cervera s vessels was rated at fully twice that 
speed. That a slow fleet should set out in search 
of a swift one was an anomaly which the Navy 
Department would doubtless have avoided had it 
been possible. Had the United States possessed 
only two or three more battle ships or good ar 
moured cruisers, it would not have been necessary 
to undertake an offensive movement with vessels 
designed, as the monitors were, for coast defence. 

As a matter of fact, Sampson could not make 
anything like ten knots an hour, even by taking the 
monitors in tow of the New York and the Iowa. 
He had expected to reach San Juan in five days 
steaming; it took him more than seven. On his 
way (May 6th) he sent the Montgomery in to Cape 
Haitien, on the north coast of Haiti, where she 
found a despatch from Secretary Long : 

admiral s orders. His "broad pennant" was hoisted successively on 
the Cincinnati, the Dolphin, and other vessels. At the same time 
Commodore George C. Remey was sent from the Portsmouth (New 
Hampshire) navy yard to take charge of the station at Key West, the 
great naval base of the war. Later (June 2ist) his command was ex 
tended to include " all vessels within signalling distance " being still, 
of course, subordinate to Sampson. 


Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifica 
tions as to prevent trom soon afterward successfully 
righting Spanish fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos V,* 
Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four 
deep-sea torpedo boats, if they should appear on this side. 

Sampson replied with a request that the Ameri 
can liners should be ordered to meet him at St. 
Thomas. " Lacking the services of these vessels," 
he told the Navy Department, " I will have to re 
turn to the west immediately. I shall await answer 
to this request at Cape Haitien, and if granted I 
will proceed to San Juan, probably destroying for 
tifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra 
Island, to the east of Porto Rico, as entrance to San 
Juan is obstructed." f 

Secretary Long replied that the scouts had been 
ordered to St. Thomas to await Sampson s instruc 
tions, and on May nth the squadron left Cape Hai 
tien, moving slowly eastward, and sighting the 
lights of San Juan at three o clock the next morn 
ing. At half past three breakfast was served ; at 
four " all hands " was sounded for the final clearing 
for action. All this time the ships were slowly mov 
ing in toward the sleeping city. " One who was 
there," said a correspondent who was with the fleet, 
" knows how the tiger feels as it creeps up on its 

The harbour of San Juan is a wide bay sheltered 
from the Atlantic by a long, narrow island, which 
at its eastern end approaches the mainland of Porto 
Rico so closely that it is practically a peninsula. 
The city, a place of about thirty thousand people, 
lies at the western end of the island, facing toward 

* The whereabouts of the Spanish battle ships Pelayo and Empera- 
dor Carlos V was not positively known at this date. It was several 
times reported that they had sailed or were about to sail for American 
waters. Secretary Lone: was stating Cervera s squadron at its maxi 
mum of possible strength. 

f Admiral Sampson had been notified by Secretary Long (April 
2gth) of a reoort, which seems to have been correct, that the Spaniards 
had sunk hulks loaded with stones at the entrance of San Juan harbour. 


the bay, and partly screened from the ocean by a 
ridge of high ground that rises abruptly along the 
beach some sixty feet above high tide. On the 
westernmost point of the ridge, directly overlooking 
the harbour entrance, stands the Morro Castle, an 
extensive but antiquated stone fortress. The other 
gate-post of the harbour is Cabras Island, and just 
inside of this is Fort Canuelo, a small work built 
on a sand bar. 

Admiral Sampson had carefully formulated his 

plan of attack, and had sent detailed instructions, 

in writing, to each of his captains on 

Bombardment the previous day> His fiye armoU r- 
of San Juan, 111 1 i 111 1 

May I2> clads advanced in column, led by the 

Iowa, the most powerful vessel in the 
fleet, to which the admiral, in expectation of heavy 
fighting, had temporarily transferred his flag. The 
Indiana, the New York, the Amphitrite, and the 
Terror followed in order. In advance of all, a thou 
sand yards ahead of the Iowa, the Detroit sounded 
her way across the harbour mouth and under the 
Morro, with orders to signal when she found the 
water shoaling to ten fathoms. Five hundred yards 
to starboard of the column, the little Wompatuck 
steamed inshore, off Cabras Island, to anchor a boat 
at the ten-fathom mark this to serve as a " turning 
stake " for the steersmen of the fighting ships when 
shore marks might be hidden by smoke. The 
Montgomery, bringing up the rear of the squadron, 
was instructed to take her station east of the har 
bour entrance and silence Fort Canuelo if its guns 
were fired. Both the small cruisers, and the Por 
ter which came up close alongside of the Iowa, 
screened by the big battle ship were to watch for 
any of Cervera s vessels that might sally out of the 
bay. If one of the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers 
should make a dash at Sampson s ironclads, the De 
troit and the Montgomery were to sink it or drive it 
back ; if a cruiser should come out, the Porter was 


to rush in and torpedo it at the imminent risk, of 
course, of her own destruction. 

At sixteen minutes past five, when the Iowa was 
about a mile and a quarter from the Morro, now 
clearly visible in the dawning light, with the De 
troit halfway between the flagship and the shore, 
the first shot of the action was fired from a six- 
inch gun in the battle ship s bows, and her whole 
starboard battery immediately followed it up. She 
was now opposite the mouth of the bay, and the 
officers on her deck all the American officers 
scorned the protection of the conning towers 
could see, to their great disappointment, that Cer- 
vera s squadron was not inside. No Spanish flags 
were in sight in the harbour or on the fortifications, 
and the garrison was apparently taken wholly by 
surprise. Eight minutes passed before there was 
any reply to the attack ; then the old muzzle-loading 
guns in the Morro opened fire, seconded by the 
more formidable weapons six-inch Krupp guns 
in some newly built batteries farther east on the 
shore bluff. 

In the absence of Cervera s fleet, Sampson s ex 
pedition had failed of its main purpose, but he did 
not countermand his orders for an attack upon the 
San Juan batteries. To use the words of his report 
to the Navy Department, he had determined " to 
develop their position and strength, and then, with 
out waiting to reduce the city or subject it to a 
regular bombardment which would require due 
notice turn to the west," toward Cuba or Key 

At a speed of four knots an hour, the five ar- 
mourclads steamed in front of the Morro, each ship 
pouring in her full fire as she passed. Then, led 
by the Iowa, the column turned seaward and out 
of range. From the flagship s opening shot to the 
last discharged by the Terror, the first round of the 
engagement had lasted nearly an hour. The enemy 


had not suffered severely; although the breeze was 
very light, there was a long, rolling swell that made 
Sampson s vessels, especially the monitors, poor 
gun platforms, and the American gunners scarcely 
got the proper distance and elevation in their brief 
turn in the firing line. The Spaniards marksman 
ship was very much worse still, and not a ship had 
been touched, though the three small vessels in par 
ticular had been subject to a heavy fire at such close 
range that the admiral was alarmed for their safety 
especially for that of the Detroit, which kept her 
place in front of the Morro. After the first round 
he ordered them out to sea, where they remained 
to the end of the battle, in company with the Wom- 
patuck, the collier Niagara, and two newspaper 
tugs. These last had accompanied the fleet from 
Key West uninvited and not wholly welcome 
companions, whose presence was a novel feature in 
naval warfare. 

Circling around at four or five miles distance 
from shore, the armourclads passed a second and 
then a third time before the fortifications, which 
Sampson found to be much stronger than he had 
expected. In these rounds, using the heavy guns 
only their gunners had complained that the smoke 
from the rapid-fire batteries made it difficult to 
aim the American fire was much more accurate, 
while the enemy s shooting improved little. The 
Spaniards scored only three hits in the three hours 
artillery duel. Two shells struck the Iowa, one 
doing no damage, the other, which exploded on the 
battle ship s deck as she withdrew after the second 
round, wounding three men ; a third reached the 
New York at nearly three miles range, as the 
action ended, destroying a boat, and killing one and 
wounding four of a gun crew. 

The five American armourclads fired, in all, 
eight hundred and ninety-four shells, and the exe 
cution they did was considerable. The stone walls 


of the Morro were riddled, and during the latter 
part of the battle the old fortress was veiled in a 
cloud of dust from its shattered masonry, as well 
as smoke from its own guns ; yet these were served 
to the last, their fire diminishing under the hail 
of shot, but never being silenced. As the fleet with 
drew they sent shells after it almost as long as it 
was in sight. Many of the American projectiles 
wasted themselves on the sea wall below the Morro, 
which was built with embrasures that made it look 
like part of the fort. Many others passed over the 
batteries into the town, where they did great dam 
age. This bombardment of noncombatants, with 
out the " due notice " of which Sampson had 
spoken, must be set down as one of the shocking 
but inevitable incidents of war. It can not be 
termed purely an accident, for the Terror deliber 
ately fired some of her ten-inch shells over the bluff, 
" hoping," Captain Ludlow said in his official re 
port, " to strike any vessel in the inner harbour "- 
which would scarcely seem to have been necessary, 
when it was known that Cervera s ships were not 
there ; and missiles fired in this somewhat random 
fashion were as likely to fall in the city as in the 
port. . Of twenty persons killed in San Juan, it is 
stated that fourteen were civilians. 

At a quarter to eight o clock Sampson signalled 
" Form column, course northwest," and the fleet 
slowly steamed away from land, reluctantly ceasing 
its fire as it drew out of range. Its last shot came 
from the after turret of the rear-guard ship, the 
Terror, at 8. 1 5 ; and the action was over, though 
the Spanish gunners continued to waste their am 
munition for a quarter of an hour. 

Viewed as the sole achievement of a two-weeks 
cruise by a fairly powerful fleet, the bombardment 
of San Juan was a disappointment. Had Cervera s 
squadron been there, the case would have been 
entirely different ; and Sampson, of course, was no 


whit blamable for his failure to encounter the Span 
iards where both the admiral and the strategists at 
Washington had expected to find them. In itself, 
though the manoeuvres of the attacking fleet were 
well planned and efficiently executed, the action was 
resultless and indecisive. It gave the captain-gen 
eral of Porto Rico, Macias, an opportunity to issue 
one of the usual Spanish bulletins, optimistic be 
yond the verge of mendacity, declaring that his 
redoubtable gunners had repulsed the Yankee 

Sampson could no doubt have forced the sur 
render of the Porto Rican capital not, perhaps, 
without loss but there was no adequate military 
advantage to be gained by doing so. He could hold 
the place only by keeping his squadron there, leaving 
Havana open to entry by a force as strong as Cer- 
vera s. As it was, he had not fulfilled his announced 
intention of destroying the fortifications. His 
ships, though practically unscathed by the enemy s 
fire, had suffered many slight injuries from the con 
cussion of their own heavy guns ; the Indiana s en 
gines were out of order; the monitors had proved 
themselves a drag upon the squadron s move 
ments ; he would soon be in need of coal ; and with 
no clew to Cervera s whereabouts it was useless, as 
well as scarcely practicable, to prolong the cruise. 
That afternoon he informed Secretary Long : 

Have received no information of Spanish armed ves 
sels. The Spanish fleet is not here. The United States 
fleet in great need of repairs; was seven days from Ha 
vana to San Juan. If I can not obtain information of the 
Spanish squadron by Yale at St. Thomas, I will leave to 
morrow for blockade, Cuba. 

This despatch was cabled to Washington from 
St. Thomas by the Yale, which fell in with Samp 
son s fleet as it left San Juan. She had been on her 
cruising station off Porto Rico since May 6th, and 
had several times reconnoitred San Juan harbour, 


where she had observed two small gunboats and a 

There was no news of Cervera at the Danish 
island, and Sampson moved westward. On the 
I4th he was off Puerto Plata, in Santo Domingo, 
when a newspaper despatch boat brought him the 
unexpected report that Cervera, instead of making 
for American waters, had taken his squadron back 
to Spain, and was in the harbour of Cadiz. The ad 
miral immediately sent the Porter speeding into 
Puerto Plata, with despatches requesting that if this 
latest intelligence were confirmed, the Navy De 
partment should send a collier to San Juan, and 
that Commodore Remey, at Key West, should 
order the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius to the same 
rendezvous. With the Spanish fleet out of the 
West Indies, he had resolved to return to the Porto 
Rican capital, to complete his work there and cap 
ture the place. But Secretary Long s reply in 
formed him that the elusive squadron had at length 
been sighted, and ordered him to " proceed with all 
possible despatch to Key West." 

Cervera left St. Vincent with orders to sail for 
the Antilles, calling at some neutral port for in 
formation ; then to make for either 

Cuba r P rt Ric > aS hi . S " skill > dis ~ 

cretion, and courage " might suggest. 
Besides the poor condition of some of his ships, he 
was heavily handicapped, in setting forth to face an 
enemy whose strength was greatly superior to his 
own, by the fact that no adequate provision had 
been made for furnishing him with coal. No sup 
ply ships accompanied his fleet. The torpedo-boat 
destroyers, with their small coal capacity, were de 
pendent upon the cruisers. A British steamer 
which cleared for the Cape Verde Islands from 
Norfolk, Virginia, on April 15, with three thousand 
tons of coal, may have been intended for his use, 
but she was stopped by the United States Govern- 


ment as she left port. About the time of his start 
from St. Vincent a quantity of coal was purchased 
in England and shipped to the West Indies on 
three British ocean tramps, in the somewhat vague 
hope that it would escape the American blockaders 
and reach Cervera. These colliers did get to San 
Juan, whence one, the Restormel, was sent on to 
Curasao, and thence to Santiago de Cuba, where 
it was captured (May 25th) by the St. Paul, 
almost within gunshot of the harbour in which 
the Spanish fleet lay. Another, the Twicken 
ham, appeared at Martinique with four thousand 
tons of coal consigned to the Spanish consul. Per 
mission to land her contraband cargo being re 
fused, she sailed for Kingston, Jamaica, and on her 
way was captured by the St. Louis, on June loth. 
Crossing the Atlantic the three torpedo-boat 
destroyers were taken in tow by the Teresa, Oquen- 
do, and Colon, the Vizcaya having all she could do 
to propel herself. Slow progress was made, the 
best day s run recorded in the Colon s log, which 
has been published by the United States Navy 
Department, being two hundred and eighteen 
knots. On the evening of May loth, nearly twelve 
days from St. Vincent, the squadron was approach 
ing the lesser Antilles, and that night the ships 
were cleared for action and the men stood at their 
guns. No American vessels were sighted, how 
ever. On the afternoon of the nth Martinique was 
reached, and the Furor went into the port of Fort 
de France, in order, no doubt, to communicate 
with Madrid and collect any information that might 
be useful. The cruisers lay in the offing till she 
rejoined them, when Cervera shaped his course for 
Curagao either in obedience to orders from Mad 
rid, or for the reason that he had not coal enough 
to take him to Havana, and that the Dutch island, 
lying south of the direct route to Cuba, offered a 
safe and convenient stopping place. He probably 



heard, at Martinique, of Sampson s eastward cruise, 
news of which would come from Cape Haitien. 

On leaving Martinique the Terror was sent back 
to Fort de France, apparently owing to an accident 
to her boilers.* She was repaired there, and sub 
sequently (May 25th) left for San Juan, where we 
shall hear of her again. 

At Willemstadt, the port of Curasao, which he 
reached on the morning of May Hth, Cervera re 
quested permission to coal his ships. The Dutch 
officials insisted upon a strict observance of the 
rules of neutrality, which allow a belligerent only 
so much fuel as is necessary to carry him to the 
nearest port on his route; and they would permit 
only two of the cruisers to enter the harbour. The 
Teresa and the Vizcaya went in, the rest of the 
squadron waiting outside. On the night of the I5th 
the fleet was again in motion, steering northwest, 
toward Cuba. It made slower progress than ever, 
the condition of the Vizcaya s engines necessitating 
a stop for repairs ; and Cervera found it impossible 
to reach Havana with the coal he had. On the 
morning of the i8th the flagship signalled : " Ad 
miral intends making port of Santiago de Cuba " ; 
and soon after sunrise on the I9th the Teresa led 
the way into the harbour about which 

Cervera reaches the war wag tQ centre f Qr the next t Q 
Santiago, , ., , . . , 

May 19. eventful months. At night, in cross 

ing the Caribbean, the gun crews had 
again stood at their stations in readiness for an en 
counter, but again no enemy had been sighted. 
Meanwhile, the movements of the Spanish ad- 

* The Colon s log, as published by the Navy Department, states 
that she coaled the Terror at Curasao on May i5th, but apparentlv the 
name " Terror" must be a misprint or mistake for " Furor." All the 
other evidence is that the Terror did not go beyond Martinique with 
Cervera. For instance, Lieutenant Muller, who as second in command 
of the port of Santiago had abundant opportunity of ascertaining the 
facts he recorded from the officers of Cervera s squadron, states that 
she was left behind at Martinique. Captain Cotton of the Harvard 
reported her to be lying disabled at Fort de France on May i4th. 


miral, simple and straightforward as they were, had 
caused an extraordinary amount of perplexity to 
the American strategists. There were all sorts of 
rumours and conjectures, to which the newspapers 
gave wide circulation, but there was a singular ab 
sence of authentic news. The first American ves 
sel to report Cervera s squadron was the Harvard, 
which put in at St. Pierre, Martinique, on May 
nth, and learned that the Furor had called that 
day at Fort de France, a dozen miles away. Cap 
tain Cotton, the Harvard s commander, was in 
formed by the governor of Martinique that he could 
riot leave port until twenty-four hours after the 
Spanish vessel s departure. On the following 
morning he was warned by some American sympa 
thizers who were a small minority in the little 
French colony that the Spaniards were lying off 
St. Pierre in readiness to catch him, and that his 
departure would be signalled to them from the hills. 
" That we were expected to go to sea last night," 
he says in a report dated May I3th, " was evidenced 
by the lively signalling going on on shore ; and that 
the Spanish squadron was so distributed as to give 
us the least possible chance of escape I have no 
doubt." It appears that the captain or his inform 
ants had an overactive imagination, as Cervera, at 
the time, was under way for Curasao. 

To guard against his supposed peril, Captain 
Cotton applied for permission to remain seven days 
at St. Pierre, to make " necessary repairs to boilers 
and engines " another exhibition of imaginative 
powers. The request was granted, but on the 
morning of the I5th a despatch from Washington 
informed him that the Spaniards had reached Cu- 
raqao, and ordered him to follow and endeavour to 
overtake them whereupon he notified the gov 
ernor that his repairs, " not having required as long 
a time as was anticipated, were completed," and that 
he proposed to sail the next day. Before he got 



off, however, orders came from Sampson to cruise 
in the Mona Passage, between Haiti and Porto 

Cervera being reported from the southeastern 
end of the Caribbean, making it clear that his des 
tination was Cuba and not the United States coast, 
Secretary Long at once ordered Schley s flying 
squadron from Hampton Roads to Charleston 
(May 1 3th), and thence, on May ijjth, to Key West. 
The cruiser Minneapolis and the liner St. Paul, also 
lying at Hampton Roads, were hurried southward, 
and on the I5th, when the American consul at 
Curagao had sent word of Cervera s arrival, these 
two swift scouts were ordered to follow the Spanish 
fleet, which was now supposed, on the strength of 
a report from London, to be bound for the Gulf 
of Venezuela, to take coal from colliers that might 
meet it there. Similar instructions were sent to the 
Harvard, as has been stated. 

Before these latter orders could be carried out, 
Sampson, on his way back from San Juan, had 
issued another set. The admiral s plan was to 
patrol the passages by which Cervera might make 
his way northward through the island chain of the 
Antilles. He assigned the Yale and the St. Paul to 
the waters between Jamaica, Cuba, and Haiti ; the 
Harvard to the Mona Passage ; and the St. Louis 
to cruise south of Porto Rico to St. Thomas. The 
conflict of orders naturally caused some confusion, 
and suggested allusions to Dewey s go od fortune 
in being ten thousand miles from Washington, at 
the end of a severed cable ; but such criticism was 
superfluous. It was entirely proper that the Navy 
Department should direct the movements of vessels 
which, as frequently happened, were in touch with 
it but not with the admiral. That it had entire con 
fidence in Sampson was shown by such despatches 
as that sent to Captain Cotton at Martinique, on 
May i6th, authorizing him to obey the admiral s 



orders rather than the department s, if conflicting 
instructions had been received. 

The consul at Curasao reported the Spanish 
fleet on May I4th, and Secretary Long ordered him 
to protest against its being allowed to coal. On the 
1 6th, apparently from a European agent, the secre 
tary was informed that it carried munitions essen 
tial to the defence of Havana, and had imperative 
orders to reach either the Cuban capital or some 
harbour connected with it by railroad. Cienfuegos 
was the port best fulfilling this condition, and it was 
thought so probable that Cervera would make for it 
that as soon as Schley was ready to leave Key 
West he was instructed to go there at once. 

On his way back from San Juan Sampson left 
his squadron off the north coast of Cuba and hur 
ried on to Key West, where he found 
schicy starts Schley on his arrival (May i8th). On 

for Cienfuegos, jt . r _, ... ^ . 

May 19. tne morning of the iQth at the very 

hour when Cervera was entering San 
tiago Schley started for Cienfuegos with the 
cruiser Brooklyn (flagship), the battle ships Massa 
chusetts and Texas, and the yacht Scorpion. Near- 
ing his destination on the afternoon of the 2ist, the 
commodore heard guns which he took for a salute 
fired in welcome to the Spanish fleet ; and on the 
next morning, standing in close to reconnoitre, he 
saw so much smoke rising from the harbour that he 
was confirmed in his belief that he had trapped the 
enemy a belief which, it is said, was not shared by 
many of his officers.* To verify it by observation 
from the ships was impossible, the port, like that 
of Santiago, being a deep bay screened from the 
sea by fortified heights ; and no attempt was made 
at communication with the insurgents, or at such 
a feat of scouting as was afterward accomplished at 

* So reported by Lieutenant Hood, the commanding officer of the 



Santiago by Lieutenant Blue. It was at this point 
that Commodore Schley first displayed that lack of 
push and energy which was so disappointing in 
view of his previous record of admirable service. 
For three days he lay off the harbour mouth. The 
Scorpion had been detached to cruise eastward, but 
on the 22d and 23d the squadron was joined by the 
battle ship Iowa, the gunboat Castine, the torpedo 
boat Dupont, and the collier Merrimac. 

A few hours after Schley left Key West it was 
learned at Washington that Cervera had that morn 
ing (May 1 9th) arrived at Santiago. The news 
came through Colonel James Allen, of the signal 
corps, who received it from an agent in Havana ; 
and the prompt reporting of this most crucial piece 
of intelligence in the entire campaign is a feat for 
which the signal service deserves full credit.* The 
information transmitted was not entirely correct. 
The first despatch stated : " Five f Spanish vessels 
arrived at Santiago de Cuba " ; the second, received 
on the 2oth : " Pelayo and four cruisers in San 
tiago. No destroyers or torpedo boats arrived 
there " ; but these were errors of detail only. 

On the assurance of General Greely, the chief 
signal officer, that his information from Santiago 
was trustworthy, it was at once credited at Wash 
ington and recognised as the key to the whole situa 
tion. It was less easy for Sampson and Schley 
especially, as it proved, the latter to accept it. On 
the 2oth, in reply to a despatch from Secretary 
Long, " strongly advising " him to order Schley 
to Santiago immediately, Sampson telegraphed 
from Key West that he was in favour of the commo- 

* Cervera s arrival was bulletined in Madrid on the same day (May 
ioth\ but in America no reliance was placed in an announcement that 
might be inaccurate or intentionally falsified. 

t This was the truth, but not quite the whole truth. Cervera had 
only five ships actually with him when he reached Santiago. The 
Furor had dropped behind, and arrived three hours later than the rest 
of the squadron. 



dore remaining at Cienfuegos for the present, but 
had instructed him to communicate with the Min 
neapolis and the Harvard, which were ordered to 
reconnoitre Santiago. These instructions went to 
Schley in duplicate by the Iowa and the Dupont, 
reached him on the 22d, and were at once carried 
out, the Scorpion being detached to inquire for 
news from the scouting ships. 

Sampson also sent a private letter to the com 
modore on the 2oth, in which he thus stated the 
situation : 

DEAR SCHLEY: The Iowa leaves this morning at n 
o clock, bound for Cienfuegos. The Marblehead and the 
Eagle will both be ready to depart to-night and join you. 

Enclosed is a telegram * received at Key West, May 
igth, marked " A." After duly considering this telegram 
I have decided to make no change in the present plan 
that is, that you hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. 

If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago they must 
come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the muni 
tions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. 
I, therefore, am of the opinion that our best chance of 
success in capturing these ships will be to hold the two 
points Cienfuegos and Havana with all the force we 
can muster. 

If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at 
Santiago, we could then assemble off that port the ships 
best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it. 

Meanwhile there had been more correspond 
ence between Key West and Washington, and early 
in the morning of the 2ist Sampson, now fully ac 
cepting the signal-service news, sent the following 
despatch to Schley, by the Marblehead : 

Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba, four 
ships and three torpedo destroyers. If you are satisfied 
that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, 
but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is 
there blockade him in port. 

The admiral was so anxious to insure the 
prompt delivery of these instructions that a few 

* This was the despatch reporting Cervera s arrival at Santiago. 


hours later he sent a duplicate of them by the 
Hawk, adding as an indorsement : 

It is thought the inclosed instructions will reach you 
by two o clock A. M., May 23d. This will enable you to 
leave before daylight (regarded very important) so that 
your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago 
A. M., May 24th. 

This second despatch * was sent by the Hawk, 
whose commander, Lieutenant Hood, was specially 
and emphatically urged to get it into Schley s 
hands at the earliest possible moment. He reached 
Cienfuegos on the morning of the 23d, having 
passed the Marblehead, which came up early the 
next day in company with the yachts Vixen and 
Eagle, and was sent back to Sampson with letters 
in which the commodore gave it as his opinion that 

it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a 
probability at Santiago de Cuba reported via Havana, 
no doubt as a ruse. I shall therefore remain off this port 
with this squadron. . . . 

I think I have them here almost to a certainty. 

In the afternoon of the 24th, in answer to sig 
nals displayed on shore, Commander McCalla, of 
the Marblehead, landed and commu- 
schiey moves n i cate d with some Cuban insurgents. 

on Santiago, TT , , , & . . 

May 24. He gave them needed ammunition, 

and clothing, probably no less needed, 
and learned from them that the Spanish fleet was 
not in the harbour. His report at last convinced 
the commodore that he was blockading the wrong 
port, and at sunset he started his squadron east 
ward, leaving the Castine to watch Cienfuegos, and 
sending the Dupont to Key West to report his 

* Later in the day Sampson telegraphed to Washington : " Schley 
has been ordered to Santiago de Cuba." It will be seen, however, that 
the order, though it made the admiral s wishes tolerably plain, was 
only a conditional one, and left the commodore at liberty to prefer his 
own judgment. 


Notwithstanding the urgency of its errand, 
Schley s fleet now consisting of the Brooklyn, the 
Iowa, the Massachusetts, the Texas, the Marble- 
head, the Vixen, the Eagle, and the collier Mer- 
rimac made slow progress. The sea was rough, 
and the Eagle could make no more than six knots 
an hour; and though his fighting force would not 
have been perceptibly diminished by leaving her 
behind, the commodore held back the other ships 
to her speed. On the 26th, however, as her coal 
ran short, he ordered her to Port Antonio, Jamaica, 
and late that afternoon the rest of the squadron 
arrived off Santiago. 

It found there the Minneapolis, the St. Paul, 
and the Yale. None of them had seen the Span 
iards, and Schley afterward asserted * that Cap 
tain Sigsbee expressed his belief that the hostile 
fleet was not in the harbour. This the captain 
denied, saying that " every officer on board the St. 
Paul knew that I believed Cervera to be at San 
tiago." The capture of the collier Restormel on 
the previous day certainly indicated that such was 
the case. But without attempting to institute a 
blockade, as Sampson had ordered, or even to 
ascertain whether the Spaniards were there or not, 
Commodore Schley signalled to his squadron the 
unexpected order that it should make for Key 
West, going by the southern side of Cuba. 

Schlev s reason for his withdrawal, as explained 
in his official report, was that some of his ships 
were short of coal, and that he believed he could 
still block any attempt of Cervera s to reach Ha 
vana through the Yucatan Channel, while Samp 
son was on guard on the other side of Cuba. The 
explanation is a very unsatisfactory one. There 
were then on board the Brooklyn 940 tons of coal ; 

* Rear-Admiral Schley s statement of February 20, 1890, to the 
Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, and Captain Sigsbee s reply to it. 


the Iowa had 762 tons, the Massachusetts 789, the 
Texas 394, the Marblehead 116; and there were 
4,300 tons on the Merrimac. The rough sea made 
it difficult to transfer fuel from the collier to the 
men-of-war, but there were sheltered spots within 
reach where it could have been done without trou 
ble. As was afterward stated in a communication 
from the Navy Department to the United States 
Senate, " there was coal enough to return to Key 
West, and therefore to remain at Santiago till fur 
ther supplies came. He [Schley] could have 
counted on the department s sending him a further 
coal supply." * His position was no doubt diffi 
cult, but nothing short of an imperative necessity 
should have led him to abandon it. He has been 
criticised for wasting three days at Cienfuegos ; but 
the commodore, hitherto reputed an able and gal 
lant officer, made a much graver error of judgment, 
and one that might have had the most serious con 
sequences, in failing to strain every nerve to hold 
his station off Santiago. 

Schley s westward start was delayed by an acci 
dent to the Merrimac, which disabled her machin 
ery. The Yale was ordered to take the collier in 
tow, but this proved a difficult operation, the tow- 
line breaking again and again ; and the squadron had 
moved only a few miles when the Harvard over 
took it, on the morning of the 27th. She brought 
from the Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, an urgent de 
spatch from Secretary Long, informing Schley that 

* This statement was drawn up in answer to the Senate s request 
(January 23, 1899) for the facts on which nominations for promotion 
were made. It was signed by Secretary Long, and verified by a board 
consisting of Captain Evans, Captain Taylor, Lieutenant Sears, Schley s 
flag lieutenant on the Brooklyn, and Ensign Ward. 

The quantity of coal on board the vessels of the Flying Squadron 
on May 26th is given above as it appears in this same official statement. 
Slightly different figures are furnished to the writer by the Bureau of 
Steam Engineering, which states the amount thus : Brooklyn, i,coo 
tons ; Iowa, 858 tons ; Texas, 468 tons ; Massachusetts, 878 tons ; Mar 
blehead, 184 tons. 


all reports indicated that Cervera was at Santiago, 
and begging him to secure positive information 
which, the secretary suggested, could be done by 
communicating with the insurgents, or by sending 
a scout to one of the hills overlooking the harbour. 
Still the commodore did not change his mind. 
He signalled his captains : " Can you fetch into the 
port of Key West with coal remaining?" and re 
plied to Washington, by the Harvard : 

Can not remain off Santiago present state squadron 
coal account. . . . Much to be regretted, can not obey 
orders of the department. Have striven earnestly; forced 
to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan Pas 
sage. Can not ascertain anything respecting enemy 

During the 27th, however, the sea moderated, 
and it was found possible for the Texas and the 
Marblehead to take fuel from the Merrimac, the 
squadron lying that night about forty miles west 
of Santiago. On the 28th the Vixen also coaled, 
and at one o clock in the afternoon Schley signalled 
an order to return to the harbour mouth. Arriv 
ing there at dusk, the Vixen and the Marblehead 
were sent in close to watch the entrance, the other 
ships lying about ten miles out. Next morning 
they circled in nearer, and saw the Colon and 
two other Spanish cruisers lying in the channel. 
There could be no further question as to Cervera s 
whereabouts though it was not until June 3d that 
all his six vessels were positively known to be with 
him and the St. Paul was sent off to take the 
news to Sampson. 

The admiral had left Key West on May 2ist, 
and gathered, off Havana, a squadron that included 
the New York, the Indiana, the monitors Puritan 
and Miantonomoh, the cruisers New Orleans, De 
troit, and Montgomery, and several gunboats and 
torpedo boats besides the monitor Amphitrite, 
the cruiser Cincinnati, and the dynamite gunboat 


Vesuvius, which joined him on the 25th. He 
cruised slowly backward and forward in the 
Nicholas Channel,* expecting to meet Cervera, 
who, according to Sampson s calculations, was 
likely to leave Santiago before Schley could inter 
cept him, and to make for Havana by the north 
coast of Cuba. At the same time, as it was pos 
sible that the Spaniards might go south of the 
island, and through the Yucatan Channel, he was 
prepared to fall back at short notice and cover 
Havana from the west as well as from the east. 
No lights were shown at night, and three different 
" orders of battle " had been given to the com 
mander of each ship, to be used according to the 
circumstances of the expected encounter. De 
spatches passed frequently between the admiral and 
Washington, but it was less easy to keep in touch 
with Schley whose command, hitherto rated as an 
independent one, by an order dated May 24th 
was directly subordinated to Sampson s instruc 
tions. The change was no mark of censure to 
Schley, who had been informed by Secretary Long, 
at the time of his appointment to the Flying Squad 
ron, that if his ships should join Sampson s the lat 
ter would have command of the whole fleet. 

On May 26th Sampson despatched the Vesu 
vius to Schley with another message, assuring him 
that Cervera was at Santiago ; and next day, when 
the Wasp brought the commodore s letter of May 
23d, the same courier was sent back with an urgent 
order that he should " proceed with all possible 
despatch to Santiago to blockade the port." f 
Later that day the admiral heard from Wash 
ington that Schley had informed the Navy Depart 
ment that he was about to start from Cienfuegos, 

* This is the passage between the Cuban keys, off Cardenas and 
Sagua, and Salt Key Bank. It is the narrowest part of the wide chan 
nel along: the north coast of Cuba. 

t Schley had already started when this reached Cienfuegos. 


but could not blockade the Spaniards for lack 
of coal. 

It is easy to understand that with the situation 
in so critical and uncertain a state it was a time 
of great anxiety for Sampson. This last news de 
cided him to cut loose from Havana, and go with 
his own ships to the central point of the campaign 
the spot where the enemy s naval power lay. To 
do so he must first return to Key West for coal ; 
but he sent on the New Orleans and the collier 
Sterling direct to Santiago, with a message to 
Schley instructing him " to remain on the blockade 
at all hazards," and adding an order that the collier 
should be sunk in the mouth of the harbour so as 
to close the entrance. 

From Key West Sampson telegraphed to 

Washington that " the failure of Schley to continue 

blockade must be remedied at once 

Sampson moves jf possible," and on the evening of the 

on Santiago, -11 , 1 -,i 

May 29. 2gt\\ he was at sea again, taking with 

him the battle ship Oregon, the 
yacht Mayflower, and the torpedo boat Porter. To 
the former, fresh from her great voyage around 
Cape Horn, he signalled : " Can you make thirteen 
knots an hour? " " Fourteen if necessary," replied 
the Oregon, and the squadron speeded off. On 
the 3Oth it met the St. Paul, with the news that 
Schley had seen Cervera s ships. This same wel 
come intelligence had reached Washington the day 
before, shortly after Secretary Long, in his extreme 
anxiety about the situation at Santiago, had sent 
Schley the following despatch in triplicate, address 
ing it to each of the three nearest cable stations 
Port Antonio and Kingston, in Jamaica, and the 
Mole St. Nicholas, in Haiti : 

It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Span 
ish fleet is in Santiago, and report. Would be discredit 
able to the navy if that fact were not ascertained immedi 
ately. All military and naval movements depend upon 
that point. 



SANTIAGO DE CUBA * is almost the most ancient 
European settlement in America. Founded in 1514 
by Spanish colonists sent from Santo Domingo by 
Diego Columbus, it was for a time the capital of 
Cuba. In 1873 it was the scene of the shooting 
of the Virginius prisoners. Other notable names in 
its annals are those of Antommarchi, Napoleon s 
physician and biographer at St. Helena, who set 
tled here after the emperor s death ; of Adelina 
Patti, who is said to have made her first public 
appearance in Santiago, shortly before her, recorded 
debut in New York ; and of the notorious " Boss " 
Tweed, who made it his first hiding place after his 
flight from the United States. But the old city 
was destined to have more history between May 
and August of 1898 than it had had in its four cen 
turies of previous existence. 

No American war ships appeared off Santiago 
until May i8th, when the St. Louis and the Wom- 
patuck cut the cable to Jamaica. Cervera s squad 
ron arrived on the I9th. During the following 
week the St. Paul watched the harbour entrance, 
and her commander, Captain Sigsbee, formerly of 
the Maine, made sketches of it. On the 26th 
Schley came up, withdrew at once, and returned on 

* Santiago de Cuba commonly abbreviated to "Santiago" by 
Americans, to " Cuba" by its own citizens is named after the patron 
saint of old Spain, St. James the elder, whose body is supposed to lie 
at Santiago de Compostella, near Corunna. 


the 28th ; but even yet there was no close block 
ade of the port. The Spaniards had plenty of time 
to continue their voyage unmolested, had they 
been able to fill their empty bunkers.* 

There was coal at Santiago. The navy depot 

had twenty-three hundred tons of Welsh steam 

coal, and fuel was requisitioned from 

cervera coals the j ura g ua mines (owned by an 

at Santiago, A 1 r 1 

May 19-25 American company), and from the 

little local railway ; but there were no 
proper appliances for getting it aboard. The 
cruisers could not come up to the coaling piers, 
which were in such shallow water that only light 
ers could lie at them, and not more than two 
boats could be loaded at once. When baskets 
were ordered for carrying the coal, very few could 
be found in the city. It was almost equally dif 
ficult to supply the fleet with the fresh water it 

Work went on day and night, and some of the 
ships were able to move on the morning of May 
25th, when the Colon went down to a position in 
side the harbour mouth. She was just in time to 
witness the St. Paul s capture of the collier Re- 
stormel a disaster which it would seem that she 
might have prevented. Lieutenant Miiller f ex 
plains that she could not, in his opinion, have 
reached the scene in time ; that she could not spare 
the fuel that would have been burned in a chase ; 
and that the sea was so rough that she might have 

* For some days after Sampson s arrival, with good luck, they 
might have escaped with little loss. As late as June \$ih the admiral 
warned his captains that through carelessness in maintaining positions 
there were times when "the fleet is so scattered that it would be per 
fectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbour and meet with 
very little opposition." Gradually, however, the blockade became 
more and more perfect, especially at night. 

t Combates y Capitulation de Santiago de Cuba, by Lieutenant 
Jose Muller y Tejeiro, who was second in command of the local naval 
office during the siege. The United States Navy Department has pub 
lished a translation of most of this interesting record. 


grounded in going down the channel. All this 
would scarcely have prevented most of the Ameri 
can captains from an effort to reach the enemy, 
had the case been reversed. 

In the afternoon of that day (May 25th) the 
Vizcaya joined the Colon, both ships anchoring 
where their broadsides commanded the channel, 
but neither vessel, it appears, being sighted by the 
St. Paul. Coal was still coming out to them in 
lighters. The Pluton had reconnoitred outside 
on the 24th ; on the 29th both of the destroyers 
went out, but attempted no attack, though Schley s 
squadron was in sight. 

That morning (May 29th) the lookouts of the 
Flying Squadron saw the Colon and the Vizcaya, 
and observed the masts of a third cruiser farther up 
the channel. Here was Schley s opportunity. Two, 
at least, of the Spanish ships the ships whose de 
struction was the grand object of the American 
strategy, the ships which the strength of the Ameri 
can navy had been vainly seeking for weeks lay 
in plain sight, within easy range, and probably 
without sufficient steam to manoeuvre. It can 
hardly be doubted how Nelson, or Dewey, or 
Sampson, would have followed up such a discovery. 
They would have struck at the enemy at once, and 
with all their strength. Unfortunately, Schley did 
nothing of the sort. Captain Evans records that 
in expectation of an immediate attack he cleared 
the Iowa s decks for action; but the commodore 
gave no signal to engage. Throughout the 2o,th 
and the 3oth he lay off the harbour mouth main 
taining a close blockade, as he subsequently re 
ported ; but his idea of a close blockade seems to 
have differed materially from Sampson s. Captain 
Evans states that the squadron which cruised in 
column, following the movements of the flagship 
remained from five to ten miles off shore, and 
a meeting place was appointed, in case the ves- 


sels should become separated, twenty-five miles 

Not until the afternoon of May 3ist did Schley 
attempt an offensive movement. Transferring his 
pennant to the Massachusetts, he moved in to 
within five miles of the harbour entrance, followed 
by the New Orleans, which had joined him on the 
3Oth, and by the Iowa. Only a few shots were 
exchanged, at too long range for damage on either 
side, though the Spaniards too easily elated, as 
usual believed that they had hit two of the Ameri 
can ships, and the officer who wrote the Colon s 
log cheerfully recorded that the assailants " retired 
in disorder." Schley reported to Washington that 
his reconnaissance " was intended principally to 
injure or destroy the Colon." This makes it dif 
ficult to understand why the commodore s order 
was to engage at a distance of seven thousand 
yards, and why the firing, which lasted only about 
ten minutes, was actually done at a still greater 
range from eight thousand to eleven thousand 
yards, f The elevating gear of some of the Iowa s 
guns was strained by firing at so high an angle/ 
Next morning (June ist) Sampson arrived, and, 

* In the chapter contributed by Captain Evans to W. A. M. Goode s 
With Sampson through the War. 

Lieutenant Miiller, the Spanish historian, thus chronicles Schley s 
movements : 

"May 28. At 4.30 P. M. six large ships were signalled, disappear 
ing to the south at nightfall. 

"May 29. At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted, reconnoitring 
the coast at a distance of about eight miles ; they withdrew to the south 
before dark. 

"May 30. At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signalled approaching to 
within nine miles of the harbour. 

"May 31. The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before 

After Sampson s arrival, on June ist, Lieutenant Muller notes that 
"from that time on the hostile ships, which were afterward increased 
in number, established day and night a constant watch, without with 
drawing at nightfall, as they used to do." 

t So stated by Captain Evans and Captain Higginson, who add 
that with their gun sights set at these ranges most of their shots fell 
short. " Do not go in any closer" was signalled to the squadron. 


probably in expectation that the enemy, thus rein 
forced, would make a more persistent attack, the 
two Spanish cruisers withdrew further into the har 
bour, out of sight from the sea. 

The admiral, on his arrival off Santiago, found 
Schley s squadron cruising in column west of the 
harbour entrance. The commodore had not car 
ried out his instructions regarding the Sterling, 
which had joined him on May 3Oth ; and Sampson 
decided to use the other collier, the Merrimac, 
which was a larger ship and more likely to block 
the channel. He had discussed the manoeuvre, on 
the way from Key West, with Naval Constructor 
Richmond P. Hobson,* and the young officer had 
shown so enthusiastic an interest in it that at his 
urgent request the admiral intrusted him with its 
execution, though this involved the removal of the 
captain of the Merrimac, Commander J. M. Miller, 
from his ship. 

As worked out by Lieutenant Hobson, the plan 
was to steam into the channel just before day 
light, and at the narrowest point 

which is Onl y a sh rt distanCC in ~ 

side the entrance, a little more than 
a hundred yards from the nose of the Morro to 
swing the big collier round, drop anchors at stern 
and bow, and sink her by opening her sea valves 
and exploding torpedoes along her sides. He 
needed six assistants two in the engine and boiler 
rooms, one at each anchor, one at the wheel, and 

* It has been popularly supposed that Lieutenant Hobson originated 
the Merrimac adventure, but such was not the case. He has himself 
recorded the fact that Admiral Sampson first discussed the subject with 
him on May 2gth, the day on which the New York left Key West. 
The admiral s despatch to Commodore Schley, dated May 2yth, when 
he ordered the Sterling to Santiago, contains an accurate outline of the 
manoeuvre : " I believe it would be perfectly practicable to steam this 
vessel into position and drop all her anchors, allow her to swing across 
the channel, then sink her either by opening the valves or whatever 
means may be best in his [Schley s] judgment." It is said that the 
idea was first suggested to Sampson by Commander Converse of the 



one to help with the torpedoes. The men on deck 
were to lie on their faces at their stations, with a 

Sketch map of the harbour of Santiago de Cuba. 

cord tied to their wrists, with which Hobson, on 
the bridge, was to signal the moment for action. 
Then the anchors, lashed over the side, were to be 

m \ 



cut loose, and the men were to jump overboard and 
swim to a lifeboat towing behind. As the ship 
swung athwart the channel she was three hundred 
and thirty-three feet long,* and the charts showed a 
point at which the deep water was only about three 
hundred and fifty feet wide the lieutenant was to 
fire the torpedoes, which were connected with the 
bridge by electric cables, and then follow his men 
overboard. The details were carefully arranged, 
even to the specification that the crew s uniform 
was to consist of one suit of woollen underwear, two 
pairs of socks, a life preserver, and a revolver belt, 
with revolver and cartridges. 

To take an unarmed vessel close under the 
enemy s batteries and sink her there, trusting for 
escape to luck and a lifeboat, was an undertaking 
of such manifest peril that to man the Merrimac a 
signal was made for volunteers. In the American 
navy " the danger s self is lure alone," and hun 
dreds of officers and men at once proffered their 
services. The six selected were Daniel Montague, 
chief master at arms of the New York ; Gunner s 
Mate Charette, of the New York; and Boatswain 
Mullen, Coxswain Deignan, Machinist Phillips, and 
Water-Tender Kelly, all of the Merrimac. 

It took so long to get the collier ready that it 
was after four o clock in the morning of June 2d 
when Sampson, who had gone on board to say fare 
well to her brave crew, left her, and she started 
for the harbour mouth. As she steamed in it grew 
so light that the admiral sent the Porter speeding 
after her to order her back, thinking it wiser to 
postpone the attempt till the following night. 

The day (June 2d) passed uneventfully, and at 
night the Merrimac was ready for a second attempt. 
A few changes had been made in her equipment. 

* The Merrimac was a five-thousand-ton ship, the largest of the 
Navy Department s fleet of colliers. She had about twenty-three hun 
dred tons of coal in her hold when she sank. 



To minimize the chance of failure in the apparatus 
for igniting the torpedoes, it was arranged that each 
should be fired with a separate battery. As this 
necessitated the services of another pair of hands, 
Coxswain Clausen, of the New York, was added 
to the ship s company ; * and as one of the original 
six, Mullen, was exhausted by the mental and 
physical strain, Coxswain Murphy, of the Iowa, 
took his place. A lifeboat and a catamaran were 
slung over the side of the vessel, and Cadet Joseph 
W. Powell, of the New York, was ordered to follow 
her to the harbour mouth with the flagship s steam 
launch, and wait there on the chance of picking up 
her crew should they succeed in escaping. 

Mr. Crank, the assistant engineer of the Mer- 
rimac, took the ship to the starting point of her 
run, and left her, very reluctantly, at the last mo 
ment, being taken off by Cadet Powell s launch. 
It was about half past three o clock, with the moon 
shining brightly above the western horizon. Lieu 
tenant Hobson steered straight for the Morro, and 
was within five hundred yards of the point when 
the first shot came from a picket boat that lay 
under the west bank of the channel. It was a 
plucky challenge, for the Spaniards in the little 
craft could hardly have guessed that the big vessel 
that came driving right up to them was unarmed. 
In a few minutes there was a heavy fire on both 
sides, while the Merrimac passed in, her engines 
stopped, but her own momentum and a strong tide 
carrying her on. 

As she reached the spot that had been picked 
out, on the chart, as the place to sink her, the sea 
valves were thrown open, and Hobson gave the 
order to explode the torpedoes. Only two of them 
could be discharged ; the others had had their wires 
or batteries broken by the enemy s fire. The ship 

* The newspaper storv of the Merrimac represented Clausen as a 
stowaway a picturesque bit of fiction. 


was not sinking fast enough, nor could she be 
swung fairly across the channel ; her steering gear 
was shot away, and her stern anchor had been pre 
maturely cut loose by a shell. The tide swept her 
steadily in. A tremendous fire came 
sinking of the rom t j ie batteries and troops on 

Mernmac, . , ^. , 

, une shore ; eight * electric mines were 

fired in the channel; torpedoes were 
discharged by two Spanish vessels the Pluton and 
the cruiser Reina Mercedes ; and finally the Mer- 
rimac went down between Soldados Point and 
Smith Key, where she lay with her masts and 
smokestack out of the water, obstructing but by no 
means blocking the fairway. 

Her lifeboat had disappeared, but the catamaran 
floated, and all the crew reached it and clung to 
it. Boats came out to the wreck with lanterns, but 
the men were not discovered ; and Hobson ordered 
silence, fearing that even an offer to surrender 
might be answered with bullets, and expecting that 
at daylight a responsible officer would come out to 
reconnoitre. The catamaran was fastened to the 
sunken hulk by a rope; and with only their heads 
above water and their teeth chattering with cold, 
the refugees had held their position for an hour, 
when, just after sunrise, a steam launch came down 
the harbour. As it passed, thirty yards away, Lieu 
tenant Hobson hailed, inquiring if any Spanish 
officer was aboard, and saying that an American 
officer wished to surrender himself and seamen as 
prisoners of war. A Spaniard, who proved to be 
Admiral Cervera himself, stepped forward and 

* So Lieutenant Hobson asserts. Lieutenant Mailer, who gives the 
Spanish side of the story, says that only three mines were fired. 

During the day (June ?d\ two of the Spanish torpedoes were found 
outside the harbour by the Porter, having drifted out with the tide. 
One was taken aboard as a trophy, the other sank. 

The Merrimac s lifeboat was picked up by men from the Colon, on 
June 6th. The Spanish cruiser s log for that day says : " Secured the 
Marymak s boat, repaired it, and supplied it with a new rudder." 



helped Hobson to board the launch ; and the lieu 
tenant and his men, who were very courteously 
treated by their captors, were taken to the Reina 
Mercedes and thence to the Morro. They were 
afterward moved to the Reina Mercedes Barracks 
in Santiago, where they were confined till released 
on July 5th. 

It is easy to say, after the event, that it would 
have been almost a miracle had the Merrimac 
manoeuvre proved successful. To block a chan 
nel has never, even under the most favourable cir 
cumstances, proved an easy operation. In the civil 
war, for instance, it was again and again attempted 
unsuccessfully notably at Charleston, in Decem 
ber, 1 86 r. The work there was done by an officer 
who knew the harbour well, having spent four 
years, shortly before the war, in improving it ; there 
was no hindrance from the enemy ; no less than 
sixteen ships, loaded with stone, were carefully 
towed into position and scuttled ; and yet the chan 
nel remained navigable. 

The sinking of the Merrimac was the most pic 
turesque exploit of personal courage performed 
during the war, and as such it has brought its re 
ward to the brave men who undertook it. At the 
same time, it is no detraction of their achievement 
to say that other soldiers and sailors performed 
deeds that were less showy but no less truly heroic. 
Many of these, no doubt, will never be chronicled ; 
others are to be found in the formal records of the 
official reports. Among the many instances that 
might be given, here is one that occurred off San 
tiago just four days earlier : 

Assistant-Engineer J. P. Morton of the Vixen 
officially reports the conduct of P. Johnson and G. 
Mahoney, two of the Vixen s firemen, on the night 
of May 28, 1898, when " the lower front manhole 
gasket of boiler A blew out, sending out a large 
stream of boiling water and steam into the fire- 


room, driving the men from the fireroom and low 
ering the water in the boiler below the gauge glass. 
Upon calling for volunteers to haul the fires the 
two men above mentioned responded, went below, 
and with the scalding water blowing into their 
faces, and subject to the most intense heat, suc 
ceeded in hauling the fires and thereby saving the 
boiler from injury and the ship from great damage." 
And Lieutenant Sharp, commanding officer of 
the Vixen, in forwarding the report, adds : " Assist- 

| Brooklyn. Porter t 

Texas I | tNewYork 

Massachusetts 1 I * 

Sampson s first order of blockade off Santiago de Cuba. 

ant-Engineer Morton says nothing of his own 
conduct; when the gasket, having been refitted, 
again blew out, he, with Johnson, hauled the fires 
a second time." 

Sampson s first order of blockade, issued June 
2d, arranged his fleet in two squadrons, the first 
consisting of the New York, the 
Iowa > the Oregon, the New Orleans, 
the Mayflower, and the Porter, under 
the admiral s direct command; the second, under 
Commodore Schley, including the Brooklyn, the 

I 9 2 


Massachusetts, the Texas, the Marblehead, and the 
Vixen. Both squadrons formed a single line, drawn 
in a semicircle off the harbour mouth, Sampson s 
ships on the east and Schley s on the west, the 
battle ships in the centre of the line, and the 
swifter cruisers on the flanks. In the daytime the 
distance from the Morro was to be six miles; at 
night the blockaders were to draw in closer. 

This simple plan was soon modified, Sampson 
devoting much care and thought to its elaboration, 

Sampson s final arrangement of the night blockade off 
Santiago de Cuba. 

and finally evolving a remarkably effective forma 
tion. In this perfected arrangement the night 
watch was drawn up in three lines. The first, a 
mile from the Morro, consisted of three picket 
boats steam launches from the men-of-war; the 
second, two miles out, of three videttes, chosen 
from the smaller vessels of the fleet ; the third, from 
three to four miles from shore, of the battle ships 
and cruisers. The novel and ingenious feature of 


the blockade was the advancing of one battle ship 
to the line of videttes, where it held a searchlight 
steadily upon the entrance of the harbour, making 
it impossible for even a small boat to slip out un 
seen; while one of her sister ships lay close at 
hand, ready to use her guns in case of fire from the 

Throughout the blockade, with the exception of 
an occasional rifle shot at the picket boats, the 
Spaniards never fired upon the American ships at 
night, though the latter constantly lay within a 
moderate range. This fact, which caused no little 
wonderment at the time for, as was said by Cap 
tain Chadwick, of the New York, " we, had the 
case been reversed, would not have been so for 
bearing " was due in part, perhaps, to that dis 
inclination for the offensive which seems to be a 
traditional and characteristic trait of the Spanish 
military genius ; but it may probably be explained 
more directly by their lack of good guns and 
shortage of ammunition. The Morro battery, 
just east of the Morro Castle which latter was 
armed with ancient bronze cannon had only five 
guns as large as sixteen-centimetre (six-inch) cali 
bre, and these were muzzle-loaders. The Socapa 
battery, on the other side of the entrance, had two 
good sixteen-centimetre Hontoria guns, taken 
from the cruiser Reina Mercedes. Two similar 
weapons, together with two howitzers of fifteen 
centimetres, and two nine-centimetre Krupp guns, 
were mounted at Punta Gorda, nearly a mile up the 
harbour. There were other small batteries along 
the channel, at Estrella Point and along the hill 
side under the Socapa, but these had no heavy 
guns. The guns from the Mercedes were set in 
place during the first two weeks of June ; later in 
the month three twenty-one-centimetre howitzers 
were mounted at the Socapa and two in the Morro 



After his brief and cautious bombardment of 
May 3 ist, Schley had reported that the Spanish 
fortifications were " well provided with long-range 
guns of large calibre." Sampson estimated their 
strength more accurately when he said, in the in 
structions he issued on the day after his arrival 
(June 2d) : " It is not considered that the shore baf- 
teries are of sufficient power to do any material 
injury to battle ships." But for the certainty that 
the channel was mined, it may be taken for granted 
that the admiral would speedily have forced an en 
trance into the bay, and would have destroyed or 
captured Cervera s fleet without waiting for the 
army. No doubt he remembered Farragut s 
tk Damn the torpedoes ! " but he also remembered 
the fate of the Maine a fate that probably awaited 
the first ship to enter. 

It is noteworthy, too, that the Spaniards never 
made an attempt at attacking with their torpedo 
cruisers. In bolder hands these might have proved 
dangerous weapons, and in the early days of the 
blockade they caused much anxiety. The end 
to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, 
and that risk must be taken," Sampson said in an 
order dated June 7th. There were several false 
alarms. The first was on the night of May 2Qth, 
when the Vixen signalled, " Enemy s torpedo boat 
sighted," and after some random firing it was dis 
covered that the supposed torpedo boat was a train 
on the narrow-gauge railway that runs along the 
beach near Fort Aguadores.* A few nights later 
the New Orleans gave the alarm, and a stream of 
shot was hurled at a mysterious dark object, which 
proved, when the valorous Yankee dashed in to 
cut off its retreat, to be a floating mass of sea 
weed. After this, Sampson s perfecting of the 
blockade, and especially his effective use of search- 

* Reported by Captain Higginson of the Massachusetts, August 5th. 



lights, lessened the danger, and greatly relieved the 
strain upon his crews. 

On the morning of the Merrimac s dramatic 
suicide (June 3d) Cadet Powell s steam launch, 
though it was observed and fired at, waited off the 
Morro until hope for the escape of Hobson and his 
men was abandoned. Their fate was not known to 
the fleet till the afternoon, when a Spanish tug 
came out flying a flag of truce, and the Vixen, 
which Sampson sent to meet her, found that she 
carried Cervera s chief of staff, Captain Busta- 
mente, with a message announcing that the collier s 
crew were prisoners. The message, sent in recog 
nition of the dramatic bravery of their exploit, was 
a fine piece of courtesy on the part of the Spanish 

With the powerful fleet now under his com 
mand, Sampson was not content with merely lying 
off Santiago and waiting for the Spanish ships to 
come out. His next moves against the enemy were 
his bombardment of the harbour defences on June 
6th, and the attack on Guantanamo Bay on the 7th. 

The former was intended to destroy the Span 
ish batteries, or at least to injure and weaken them 
enough to make it safe for the block- 

adin g s q uadron to close in around the 
entrance of the harbour. The admiral 
issued an order of battle on the 5th, and after sun 
rise the next morning his two divisions formed in 
a double column, heading inshore. At twenty 
minutes to eight a tremendous fire was opened with 
every gun that could be brought to bear, Samp 
son s ships, on the east, bombarding the Morro and 
Fort Aguadores, about three miles further east; 
Schley s, on the west, devoting their attention to 
the Socapa. 

The hail of projectiles hurled upon the Spanish 
batteries during the next three hours was probably 
the heaviest ever fired from the guns of a fleet, not 


excepting the British bombardment of Alexandria 
in 1882. Beginning at three miles distance, the 
ships worked in until they were within two thou 
sand yards of the forts, where they used their rapid- 
fire weapons as well as their big rifles, about two 
thousand shots being fired in all. It was a still, 
misty morning, with no swell to disconcert the 
American gunners, though , heavy showers occa 
sionally obscured their aim. 

In the afternoon Sampson reported to Wash 
ington * that he had " silenced the works quickly 
without injury of any kind." " Silenced," in the 
report of a bombardment, is, of course, a very in 
definite word. It may merely mean that the gun 
ners have been driven to shelter, to return when the 
enemy s fire ceases ; and such seems to have been the 
case in this instance. The batteries were frequently 
hit they had three men killed and forty wounded, 
principally in the Morro ; but little or no injury was 
done to the guns. It was a signal proof of the 
difficulty of firing effectively from shipboard upon 
fortifications that stand high above the water. 
Most of the American shells shattered themselves 
against the rocks of the Morro and the Socapa. 
Many passed over the heights, and fell inland, or 
in the waters of the inner bay. Here, indeed, the 
principal damage was done. Most of the village on 
Smith Key was destroyed, some of its inhabitants 
only escaping by standing waist deep in the water. 
The Reina Mercedes, moored near the key, was 
struck by thirty-five shells, and was twice set on 
fire; her second officer, Commander Acosta, and 
five seamen were killed, and twelve wounded. 

The reply of the batteries was feeble and ineffec- 

* Until he had a cable station at Playa del Este, on Guantanamo 
Bay, Sampson s usual method of communicating with Washington, 
while off Santiago, was by sending a despatch boat which sometimes, 
as in the present case, was a newspaper tug to the Mole St. Nicholas, 
Haiti. The station at Playa del Este was opened on June 2ist. 


I 9 7 

tive. The six-inch guns in the Socapa fired forty- 
seven shots, those at Punta Gorda, which seldom 
had a ship in line, only seven. None of the 
American vessels was injured, though the Massa 
chusetts was hit once, and another shot went 
through her flag. 

During the bombardment the Suwanee entered 
the mouth of the small harbour of Cabanas, about a 
mile and a half west of the Socapa, and silenced 
a battery there. In the afternoon she made a land 
ing further west, at Aserraderos, where for three 
days she lay landing arms and ammunition for a 
Cuban force under Colonel Cebreco, a part of Gen 
eral Jesus Rabi s brigade. 

This communication with the insurgents led 
to one of the notable individual exploits of the war. 
Commander Delehanty of the Su- 
Lieutenant wance, being ordered by Sampson to 
fxpioit* C< ting et positive- assurance of the presence 
June u , i2. of Cervera s ships in the blockaded 
harbour,* and believing, as he after 
ward reported, that " reliable information could not 
be secured through the insurgent forces, assigned 
the task to his second officer, Lieutenant Victor 
Blue, who had been ashore, only a few days be 
fore, on a mission to the Cubans in Matanzas prov 
ince. Wearing his uniform and side-arms, Lieu 
tenant Blue landed at Aserraderos on the nth and 
went inland to the camp of General Rabi, who fur 
nished him with a guide and a mule, and sent him 
on to an insurgent post nearer Santiago. Here he 
found three other guides, with whom he made his 
way through the Spanish lines to a hilltop over 
looking the bay, where he could see vessels that 
were unmistakably Cervera s. He was back at Rabi s 
camp on the evening of the I2th, and reported on 

* The information was urgently needed to disprove the report that 
some of the Spanish ships had escaped, and had been sighted off the 
north coast of Cuba. See p. 210. 


the Suwanee next morning, after a daring journey 
of seventy miles through the enemy s country. 

A fortnight later (June 25th) the same officer 
went ashore again, as Sampson desired once more 
to verify the position of the enemy s squadron. 
Again he accomplished his mission successfully, 
though his journey was more dangerous than be 
fore, the Spaniards having occupied the hills west 
of Santiago in force, with intrenched lines at sev 
eral points, in expectation of an attack from that 
direction by American troops. 

The operations in Guantanamo Bay, which be 
gan on June 7th, marked a step of cardinal impor 
tance in the naval campaign the 
operations in securing of the first American foot- 

Guantanamo 1 i 1 i /--- i A 

Bay, June 7. nold on the Cuban coast. As a sta 
tion for coaling, cable communica 
tion, and refitting, it proved to be of the greatest 
value to Sampson s ships. The admiral might in 
deed have found it difficult, or even impossible, to 
maintain an effective blockade of Santiago had Key 
West, nearly a thousand miles away, remained his 
only available base. Especially would it have been 
so in case of stormy weather. It was only by the 
good fortune which seemed to follow the American 
forces throughout the war that Sampson s fleet, 
in waters notorious for their hurricanes, encoun 
tered few rough seas and no serious gale. 

The seizure of the bay had figured, no doubt, 
in the war plans discussed at Washington before 
hostilities began ; and when Cervera was shut in 
at Santiago the American strategists naturally 
turned their attention to the convenient harbour 
that lies some thirty-five miles farther east.* On 
May 28th Secretary Long suggested its capture, 

* Guantanamo Bay (then called Walthenham Bay) was the base of 
the British attack upon Santiago in 1741, under General Wentworth 
and Admiral Vernon. The expedition failed because Wentworth 
found it impossible to move his troops, who suffered terribly from sick 
ness, through the difficult country between the bay and Santiago. 


I 99 

both to Sampson then at Key West and to 
Schley ; and on the 29th he telegraphed the former 
that Captain Goodrich, who had reconnoitred the 
place on his cable-cutting expedition (May I9th), 
reported the Spanish position there to be very weak. 
" The seizure of, immediately, is recommended," 
the secretary added. 

Nor was it necessary to call upon the army to 
supply a garrison ; the navy had at hand a suf 
ficient force of its own. As long ago as April i6th 
five days before war began an order was sent 
to New York to organize a marine battalion imme 
diately. Just six days later the battalion started 
southward on the transport Panther six hundred 
and forty-seven officers and men, commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, and divided 
into five companies of infantry and one of artillery, 
with four small rapid-fire guns. On April 29th it 
reached Key West, where it was held in readiness 
for just such service as was now in prospect at 

The bay of Guantanamo consists of an outer 
and an inner basin, connected by a narrow channel 
running through a cluster of islands. When the 
Marblehead and the Yankee entered the outer 
basin, on the morning of June 7th, they found that 
the Spanish defences consisted of the gunboat 
Sandoval, which, after firing a few shots, retreated 
into the upper harbour; an old fort on Toro Key, 
near the town of Caimanera, which was speedily 
silenced ; and a blockhouse, near the cable station 
at Playa del Este (" Eastern Shore "), which was 
shelled and demolished. The American ships did 
not follow the Sandoval, as the entrance of the 
inner bay was known to be laid with mines, and 
the outer basin afforded the sheltered anchorage 
that Sampson needed. Their task done, the Yankee 
returned to Santiago, while the Marblehead re 
mained to secure possession, which was clinched 



on the loth, when the Panther arrived from Key 
West, by landing the marine battalion. 

The marines pitched their camp which they 
named Camp McCalla, after the commander of the 
Marblehead on the ridge above the cable station, 

Inner Bay 

Sketch map of part of Guantanamo Bay. 

where the demolished blockhouse had stood. The 
site chosen was not an easy one to defend, being 
conspicuously set in a clearing on the brow of the 
ridge, which was commanded by a higher hill a 
little farther inland, while a dense growth of 


manigua scrub, affording perfect cover, came up 
within fifty yards of the tents. Apparently no 
attack was expected ; no trenches were dug, and 
the artillery was not sent ashore. 

Under the fire of the ships the Spaniards had 
withdrawn from the neighbourhood, but in the 
evening of the I2th they returned, and from the 
safe cover of the bushes opened a galling fire that 
never ceased for three days and nights. The 
marines position was a trying one; they had no 
shelter and could get no rest ; and had the enemy s 
marksmanship been better they must have suffered 
severely. Their rapid-fire guns were landed on the 
1 2th, but it was difficult to reply effectively to the 
fire of the Spanish sharpshooters, whose smokeless 
powder gave little sign of their whereabouts. That 
night the enemy came in some force up to the edge 
of the clearing, but did not attempt to rush the 
camp perhaps owing to the furious firing of the 
marines, who, almost exhausted by the strain, ob 
served no fire discipline, and poured away their 
ammunition in a wild fusillade. 

On the next day (June I3th) shelter trenches 
were dug, and some Cubans came into camp with 
useful reports of the enemy s movements. Acting 
on their information, Captain George F. Elliott was 
sent out, on the I4th, with two companies of 
marines and fifty Cubans, to destroy a well from 
which the Spaniards had been drawing their water 
supply. Captain Elliott marched six miles through 
the scrub, in a heat so intense that twenty-three of his 
men were prostrated, though all of them recovered ; 
and not only did he succeed in choking the well, but 
he attacked and routed a Spanish force whose num 
bers were variously reported at from two hundred 
to five hundred, killing forty or more of them, tak 
ing eighteen prisoners, and capturing a heliograph 
signal apparatus. The prisoners, who belonged to 
the Sixty-fourth Regiment of the line, told their 


captors that the soldiers at Guantanamo had only 
rice for rations, and had six months pay due them. 

As the Spaniards were bringing reinforcements 
over the bay from Caimanera, Sampson next day 
(June 1 5th) detached the Texas and the Suwanee 
to join the Marblehead in an attack upon the de 
fences of the inner bay, and if it could be reached 
upon the Sandoval, which had been carrying the 
troops across. The ships bombarded the fort on 
Toro Key till there was nothing left to fire at, but 
did not venture to run over the mines into the 
inner bay, and the gunboat again escaped. In 
passing through the channel west of Hospital 
Key, both the Texas and the Marblehead had 
already risked serious injury or even destruction. 
Each struck her propeller against a contact mine, 
which failed to explode only because it was in- 
crusted with a thick growth of barnacles. Grati 
tude for the vessels escape may fairly be divided 
between " divine care," to which the gallant and 
devout Captain Philip attributed it in his report, 
and the Spaniards neglect to maintain a proper in 
spection of their defences. A number of these tor 
pedoes, which were of French manufacture, and 
contained forty-six and a half kilogrammes (one 
hundred and two pounds) of guncotton, were after 
ward dragged up in the channel. 

Besides destroying the Toro Key fort, the men- 
of-war shelled Point Hicacal, from which some in 
fantry had fired on them. The operation was 
repeated on the I7th, and the point was swept so 
clear of cover that the Spaniards made no further 
attempt to hold it. 

The whole loss of the marines, during ten days 
of more or less constant fighting, was six killed 
and sixteen wounded, among the former being 
Surgeon John Blair Gibbs, a New York physician 
of high professional standing, who had sought serv 
ice from patriotic motives. The first three to lose 



their lives were a sergeant and two privates who 
went into the bush as a scouting party, and when 
their bodies were found it was thought that they 
had been mutilated by the enemy. It was unfor 
tunate that this shocking allegation too shocking 
to be credible in a war with a civilized foe found 
its w r ay into the official reports, being forwarded by 
Commander McCalla to Admiral Sampson, and by 
him to Washington, where of course it aroused 
widespread horror and indignation. The charge 
was afterward retracted, the apparent mutilation 
being attributed to the effect of Mauser bullets at 
short range. The fact, so well established later, 
that the small-calibre projectile fired by the Spanish 
rifle inflicts a remarkably clean wound, makes it 
seem more probable that the ghastly work was done 
by some of those gruesome scavengers of Cuba 
the buzzards or the land crabs. 

The Spanish forces at Guantanamo and Caima- 
nera, numbering some seven thousand men under 
General Felix Pareja, were known to be in great 
straits for food. The stories told by the marines 
prisoners were confirmed by a letter sent by General 
Pareja to Santiago, and intercepted by the Cubans, 
who hanged the messenger. It told how on the 7th 
seven ships the general s enemies multiplied like 
Falstaff s men in buckram had attacked Playa del 
Este ; that his guns were not powerful enough to 
make any effective defence ; and that " the Ameri 
can squadron in possession of the outer bay has 
taken it as if for a harbour of rest, they having 
anchored as if in one of their own ports." As to 
his own situation the general said : 

The forces of the brigade here are in good spirits. 
I continue serving out half rations of everything, and in 
that way I expect to reach only the end of the month, 
above all in bread, as I have no flour of any kind, and 
no way of getting any, on account of there having been 
no corn for some time. Quinine for the hospitals the 
same. Town in needful circumstances. 



UP to this point the navy, on the American side, 
had been practically the sole actor on the stage of 
war. The army missed its chance of an early blow 
at the enemy, as has already been told, by its un 
readiness for immediate action ; but when the plans 
for an attack upon Havana were perforce postponed, 
the organization of an invading force was still 
pushed as energetically as possible. Besides this im 
mediate task, the powers of the War Department 
were tremendously taxed by the rapid increase of 
the volunteer forces, and the necessity for furnishing 
the recruits with equipments. The full nominal 
strength of the army mounted within five weeks 
from less than 30,000 to a little more than 280,000. 
The first call for 125,000 volunteers was followed by 
another (May 25th) for 75,000 more, and Congress 
authorized the enlistment of four special forces ten 
regiments of volunteer infantry composed of " im- 
munes," or men not liable to yellow-fever infection ; 
three regiments of cavalry, one of which was to be 
come famous as the " Rough Riders " ; a volunteer 
signal corps, and an engineer brigade of 3,500 men. 

The actual enlisted strength rose very close to 
the same figure, reaching, in August, a maximum of 
58,688 regulars and 216,029 volunteers, or 274,717 
in all. Less than one fifth of this great army saw 
service in the field a fact which certainly justifies 
the opinion of the commanding general, whose 
plans, submitted shortly before the war began, sug- 



gested the immediate calling out of 50,000 volun 
teers, with 40,000 more to be held in reserve and to 
garrison coast defences. General Miles, to use his 
own words, " deemed it of the first importance to 
well equip such a force, rather than to partly equip 
a much larger number " ; but his views were over 
ruled not for the only time in the campaign. 

At the end of May the War Department began to 
collect its fleet of transports at Tampa, where about 
16,000 troops (the Fifth Corps, com- 
r b F a i S a e manded by Major-General Shafter) 
were encamped, with as many more 
within easy reach at Fernandina and Mobile, be 
sides some 40,000 at Chickamauga. On May 24th 
Sampson was instructed somewhat prematurely 
to be prepared to convoy forty troopships, 
carrying 30,000 men, to Cuba. Three days later 
the estimate of the force prepared to move sud 
denly dropped to 10,000, and Secretary Long cabled 
to Schley, who was supposed to be blockading San 
tiago, that if Cervera s squadron was in the harbour 

immediate movement against it and the town will be 
made by the navy and division of about ten thousand men 
of the American troops, which are ready to embark. 

A similar despatch was sent to Sampson, then at 
Key West : 

If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago 
de Cuba it is the intention of the department to make 
descent immediately upon that port with ten thousand 
men, United States troops. You will be expected to con 
voy transports, probably fifteen or twenty, going in per 
son and taking with you the New York and Indiana and 
the Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good bat 
teries as can possibly be gathered, to guard against pos 
sible attack by Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers, etc. 

Rut Sampson could not wait for the unready expe 
dition, and sailed for Santiago on the 29th,* leaving 
the Indiana for convoy duty. Two days later a de- 

* Page 1 80. 


spatch was sent after him, from Washington, telling 
him that 25,000 men were " now embarking at 
Tampa." On June 3d, however, he was informed 
that " General Shafter expects to start from Tampa 
on June 4th with 18,000 or 20,000 men." 

To these puzzling messages Sampson replied, on 
the 4th, with a telegram giving information of the 
Spanish forces at Santiago,* and continuing : 

With superior force and insurgent forces, which are 
ready, though mostly needing arms, Santiago de Cuba 
must fall, together with ships in port, which can not be 
entered against obstructions and mines. 

To his report of the bombardment of June 6th the 
admiral added (June /th) : 

If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would 
be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration 

* This telegram appears in three different forms in the printed re 
ports of the War and Navy Departments. In Sampson s report the 
estimate of the Spanish force is given thus: "Have received reliable 
information from Cuban officers the Spanish force in this vicinity of 
Santiago consists of 7,000 men, intrenched in Juraguacito and Daiquiri ; 
5,000 men in Santiago de Cuba ; in Morro de Cuba, 400 men ; at other 
points in the bay, 100 men, with small rapid-fire gun and submarine 
mines at various points." 

In the Bureau of Navigation s report on " Operations in Conjunc 
tion with the Army," the figures appear thus : " 7,000 men intrenched 
in Juraguacito and Daiquiri, 5,000 men at Morro de Cuba, 400 men at 
other points in the bay, 500 men with small Hotchkiss 37 mm. rapid- 
fire guns, and submarine mines at various points." 

In the Secretary of War s report they are given as " 7,000 men in 
trenched in Juraquacito and Daiquiri ; 5,000 at Morron de Cuba ; 4,000 
at other points ; in bay 500, with small Hotchkiss gun." 

It would appear that the wording of an official cipher despatch is 
not so fixed and unalterable a thing as might be supposed. Perhaps 
none of these variant versions gives the admiral s estimate exactly as he 
intended it. It seems improbable that 7,000 men would be located in 
Juraguacito and Daiquiri, when the Spanish commander was of course 
unaware that Shafter would land in that quarter, and was preparing, 
as Lieutenant Blue found, to resist an attack on the other side of Santi 
ago. It may perhaps be conjectured that Sampson meant 7,000 to be 
his figure for the whole force of the Spaniards. Other reasons for this 
supposition are, first, that 7,000 was very near their actual strength ; 
second, that it agrees well enough with the admiral s estimate (reported 
June nth) of about 12,000 regulars and 3,000 militia between Santiago 
and Guantanamo ; and third, that in speaking of the American expe 
dition he uses the terms " superior force " in one despatch, and " 10,000 
men " in another, as if synonymous the inference being that he be 
lieved the Spaniards to have less than 10,000. 



demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will 
be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet. 

Sampson has been criticised for this misleading esti 
mate, as it has been termed, of the task Shafter had 
to undertake. It may be answered that " ten thou 
sand men " was not his own suggestion for the 
strength of the expedition; it was the figure given 
him from Washington as far back as May 27th. 
Moreover, the delay that followed strengthened the 
enemy s position, as he had foretold. 

The delay was a disconcerting one to the navy, 
as vessels for the convoy had been withdrawn from 
the blockade, and were lying idle at Key West. On 
the 5th Sampson telegraphed to Washington that it 
was " very important we should know immediately 
whether the army expedition has sailed." The Navy 
Department forwarded the message to the War De 
partment, and suggested " that urgent measures be 
taken to terminate the present delay." 

Affairs at Tampa were in a state of almost inex 
tricable confusion. " The capacity of the place had 
been greatly exceeded," as General Shafter very 
conservatively phrased it. The port was approached 
by a single-track railroad, which proved unequal 
to the demands upon it. For miles the line was 
choked with freight cars, which could not be un 
loaded with any promptitude. Few had labels show 
ing their contents, and consignments could not be 
found when wanted. There were instances of pro 
visions spoiling on the railway while soldiers suf 
fered from insufficient rations, and some of the vol 
unteers were actually seen begging for food in the 
streets. No storage facilities had been provided. 
The little local post office was overwhelmed with 
the sudden increase of business, and could not dis 
tribute the freight bills. At Port Tampa, where 
about thirty transports had been collected by the 
end of May, the docking space was limited, there 
being wharf room for only eight vessels ; the chan- 


nel was narrow and overcrowded, and one ship, the 
Florida, was disabled by a collision while loading. 

It was useless to send urgent messages from 
Washington ; the officers in charge of loading the 
transports toiled day and night, but their best exer 
tions were sorely handicapped by the adverse con 
ditions under which they had to work conditions 
due, primarily, to a lack of systematic and intelligent 
prevision on the part of those responsible -for the 
equipment of the troops. One of the heads of the 
army staff subsequently testified before the commis 
sion that investigated the conduct of the campaign, 
that when, war being imminent, he suggested the 
purchase of supplies for his branch of the service, he 
was informed that " the policy was to wait " a 
policy curiously suggestive of the Spanish motto of 
" mafiana." At the same time, much of the blame 
may fairly be traced to Congress, with its eagerness 
for hostilities, and its persistent refusal to provide a 
military organization adequate to the needs of war. 

On May 3Oth General Miles left Washington to 
give his personal assistance to the task of embark 
ing the expedition. From Tampa he telegraphed to 
the War Department (June 5th) : 

This expedition has been delayed through no fault of 
any one connected with it. It contains the principal part 
of the army,* which for intelligence and efficiency is not 
exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains 
fourteen of the best-conditioned regiments of volunteers, 
the last of which arrived this morning. Yet these have 
never been under fire. Between thirty and forty per cent 
are undrilled, and in one regiment over three hundred 
men had never fired a gun. . . . This enterprise is so 
important that I desire to go with this army corps or to 
immediately organize another and go with it to join this 
and capture position number 2.f 

The answer to General Miles s request for serv 
ice was an inquiry how soon he could have an ex 
peditionary force ready for Porto Rico. It is 

* That is, the regular army. t Porto Rico. 



scarcely strange that there should have been some 
impatience at Washington, as appears in the per 
emptory order transmitted to Shafter by Secretary 
Alger on June 7th : 

The President directs you to sail at once with what 
force you have ready. 

Shafter s reply was : " I will sail to-morrow 
morning. Steam can not be gotten up earlier " ; 
and Miles added : 

From the commanding general down to the drummer 
boys, every one is impatient to go, and annoyed at the 

On the 8th nearly sixteen thousand men were 
on board the transports, and the fleet was actually 
under way for Key West, when there came an un 
expected and unfortunate interruption. 

The converted yacht Eagle, after her brief 

service with the Flying Squadron,* had rejoined 

the north coast blockade. On the 

The Eagle night of June 7th she was cruising 

sights a phan- . t XT ^ . / , , . 6 

tom fleet, June 7. m tne Nicholas Channel, when she 
sighted a strange ship, which did not 
answer her signals. She ran nearer, and made out 
four vessels, two large and two small, heading east 
ward in column, with no lights showing except one 
at the stern of each ship. For more than half an 
hour she watched them, steaming parallel with their 
course, and within a mile of them ; and as the private 
night signal had been made twice without bringing 
a reply " an omission*" says her commander, Lieu 
tenant Southerland, " which would have been almost 
criminal in a United States man-of-war " it was 
concluded that the four vessels were enemies. The 
Eagle was headed for Key West, and Commodore 
Remey, in command there, at once informed Wash 
ington of the news she brought : 

* Page 176. 


Spanish armoured cruiser, Spanish cruiser second- 
class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers seen by Eagle 
near Nicholas Channel, Cuba. Delay convoy. 

It scarcely seemed possible that four of Cervera s 
ships had slipped out and escaped Sampson s vigi 
lant watch, or that another squadron, of whose move 
ments the American strategists had no information, 
had arrived from Spain ; and the Eagle s disturbing 
statement might have been dismissed at once had it 
not been confirmed by the Resolute, which came 
into Key West a few hours later and reported that 
she had been chased by four strange vessels, near 
the scene of Lieutenant Southerland s nocturnal 
adventure. It was manifestly unsafe to send out a 
fleet of unprotected transports loaded with troops, 
when hostile war ships were directly in their path, 
and on receipt of the news from Remey Secretary 
Alger at once telegraphed to Shafter (June 8th) : 

Wait until you get further orders before you sail. 
Answer quick. 

Shafter s answer, sent the same afternoon, was: 

Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will 
be able to stop them before reaching the Gulf. 

The transports were recalled, and the vessels 
waiting at Key West to convoy them were ordered 
out to cruise in search of the mysterious Spanish 
squadron. No trace of it cou^d be found. Sampson, 
when he heard of it, promptly declared it a myth, 
and cabled his opinion to Secretary Long. He 
cited another case of false alarm a double one 
that had just come under his notice. The Yankee, 
returning to Santiago from the Mole St. Nicholas, 
had reported that on the night of the Qth she passed 
" a squadron of eight vessels, one of which was a 
battle ship." The " eight vessels " proved to be the 
Resolute (an Old Dominion liner) and five smaller 
auxiliaries, one of which the Scorpion -had 
sighted the Yankee and fired upon her, mistaking 


her for a Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer. " This/ 
said Sampson, " shows how easily the most experi 
enced may be deceived at night at sea " ; and he 
telegraphed to Washington (June loth) : 

Have no confidence in the report of Eagle as to na 
tionality or character of the vessels, and consider very un 
wise to suspend operations on this account. Armoured 
vessel was probably Talbot [a British cruiser]. . . . De 
lay seems to me most unfortunate. 

And again the following day : 

The vessels seen by the Eagle were the Armeria, 
Scorpion, and Supply. They were in just that position at 
time named. 

On the 1 3th Lieutenant Blue s daring expedition 
enabled the admiral to report positively that Cer- 
vera s six ships were still in Santiago harbour. By 
this time the transports were once more under 
orders to sail, and some of them started that after 
noon, the rest getting under way on the i/j-th. 

Campaigns are not won by commanders who 
never make a mistake and by armies whose organi 
zation is faultless, for such commanders and such 
armies do not exist. Warfare even victorious war 
fare with all its outward show of pomp and glory, 
generally proves on closer acquaintance to be more 
full of blunders and errors than of brilliant achieve 
ments. Shafter s expedition against Santiago was 
successful sweepingly successful not because its 
management was without blot or blemish, but be 
cause it fought with unsurpassed valour against an 
enemy inferior in numbers and weaker in resources. 

Its embarkation was of a piece with the state of 
confusion characteristic of the camp at Tampa. The 
transports, which had been fitted out for the much 
shorter voyage to Havana, proved unable to accom 
modate anything like the number of men for which 
they had been rated.* The degree of system in 

* "The quarter master-general was not told in advance of the pro 
posed size of Shafter s expedition, or its destination. Had it been 


the assignment of troops to the different ships 
may be judged from the statement of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Roosevelt that when the depot quarter 
master allotted a transport to the Rough Riders, 
he found that the same vessel had already been 
allotted to two other regiments ; and when she 
came up to the wharf there was an exciting race to 
seize her. 

The commissary supplies taken with the expedi 
tion were ample in quantity, though the quality of 
some of them has been a subject of controversy. 
There was plenty of ammunition for the small artil 
lery force. The medical stores were found inade 
quate. Only three ambulances were embarked ; the 
surgeon-general s orders prescribed two for each 
regiment, but Colonel Jacobs, chief quartermaster of 
the corps, testified that the commanding general 
ordered them left behind.* Before blaming Shafter 
for what proved to be a serious omission, it must be 
remembered that his orders to hurry were impera 
tive, and that space on the transports was at a pre 
mium. Practically nothing had been done to fit 
the clothing of the troops for service in the tropics, 
and the regulars went to Cuba in the uniforms they 
had perhaps been wearing, two months before, in 
Dakota or Montana. Some of the regiments carried 
overcoats as well as blankets. 

There are discrepancies in different accounts of 
the expedition s equipment, due, apparently, to the 
difficulty of exact knowledge as to what was taken 

done, there would have been a vast difference in the war-transportation 
work." Statement of Colonel Bell, of the transportation division of 
the quartermaster-general s office, before the War Investigation Com 
mission, December 2, 1808. 

* Lieutenant Miley (In Cuba with Shafter, p. 44") states that seven 
ambulances were taken ; so does the report of Quartermaster-General 
Ludington ; but Surgeon -General Sternberg s report gives the number 
as three, and the report of the War Investigation Commission (p. 84^ 
adopts his figure. Shatter s report assorts that " as many were taken 
as was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns." The 
general fails to specify which campaigns justified him in landing an 
army of invasion practically without ambulances. 


and what left behind, and what, after being carried 
to Santiago, was sent north again without being un 
loaded. Even the number of men who sailed is 
variously stated. General Shafter s official report 
puts it at 815 officers and 16,072 men. General 
Miles, who was at Tampa, reported 803 officers and 
14,935 men. The figure given by Secretary Alger 
to the War Investigation Commission was 16,988. 
Lieutenant Miley, of Shafter s staff a careful and 
well-informed statistician says 819 officers and 
15,058 men.* 

The corps consisted of the following com 
mands : 


First Brigade (Brigadier-General Hawkins). 
Sixth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Egbert), Six 
teenth Infantry (Colonel Theaker), and Seventy- 
first New York Volunteers (Colonel Downs). 

Second Brigade (Colonel Pearson). Second In 
fantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Wherry), Tenth Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Kellogg), and Twenty-first In 
fantry (Lieutenant-Colonel McKibbin). 

Third Brigade (Colonel Wikoff). Ninth Infan 
try (Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers), Thirteenth Infan 
try (Lieutenant-Colonel Worth), and Twenty-fourth 
Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum). 


First Brigade (Colonel Van Horn). Eighth In 
fantry (Major Conrad), Twenty-second Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson), and Second Massa 
chusetts Volunteers (Colonel Clark). 

Second Brigade (Colonel Miles). First Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Bisbee), Fourth Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge), and Twenty-fifth 
Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett). 

* In Cuba with Shafter, p. 44. 



Third Brigade (Brigadier-General Chaffee). 
Seventh Infantry (Colonel Benham), Twelfth Infan 
try (Lieutenant-Colonel Comba), and Seventeenth 
Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Haskell). 


First Brigade (Brigadier-General Sumner). 
Third Cavalry (Major Wessels), Sixth Cavalry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll), and Ninth Cavalry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton). 

Second Brigade (Brigadier-General Young). 
First Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Viele), Tenth 
Cavalry (Major Norvell), and First Volunteer Cav 
alry, popularly designated as the Rough Riders 
(Colonel Leonard Wood). 

The cavalry division sailed without horses, be 
cause there was no room for them on the transports, 
and because it was reported, quite correctly, that 
mounted troops would be of little use in the rough 
country around Santiago. The animals were left 
at Tampa, and only two squadrons (about five hun 
dred men) of each regiment went to Cuba. Armed 
with their cavalry carbines, the three thousand men 
of the division fought as infantry throughout the 

There were four light batteries : Batteries E 
(Captain Capron) and K (Captain Best) of the First 
Artillery, and A (Captain Grimes) and F (Captain 
Parkhurst) of the Second Artillery. Each consisted 
of four three-inch guns, and all were under the com 
mand of Major Dillenback, of the Second Artillery. 
There were also Batteries G (Captain Ennis) and H 
(Captain Cummins) of the Fourth Artillery, each 
equipped with two five-inch siege rifles and four 
3. 6-inch mortars ; and two machine-gun detach 
ments, one of four Catlings, commanded by Lieu 
tenant Parker, of the Thirteenth Infantry, and one 
of an equal number of one-pound Hotchkiss guns, 
manned by men of the Tenth Cavalry, under Lieu- 


tenant Hughes. Besides these, the Rough Riders 
had two rapid-fire Colts, presented by members of 
the regiment, and a dynamite gun. 

An engineer battalion, under Captain Burr, ac 
companied the expedition, as did also a signal corps 
and balloon detachment commanded by Major 
Greene. An entire division of infantry Brigadier- 
General Snyder s consisting of volunteer regi 
ments, was left at Tampa for lack of ships to carry 
it and time to embark it. To make up for this, a 
detachment was shipped from Mobile, which in 
cluded the Third Infantry (Colonel Page), the 
Twentieth Infantry (Major McCaskey), and Major 
Rafferty s squadron of the Second Cavalry, 
mounted the only mounted cavalry in the expedi 
tion. It formed an independent brigade, under the 
command of Brigadier-General Bates. 

Two other general officers accompanied the ex 
pedition Major-General Breckinridge, inspector- 
general of the army, and Brigadier-General Ludlow, 
of the engineer department. In the field, the latter 
took command of the first brigade of Lawton s divi 
sion, replacing Colonel Van Horn, who was seri 
ously injured on the day before the landing at Dai 
quiri. The chief commissary of the expedition was 
Colonel Weston, the chief quartermaster Lieuten 
ant-Colonel Humphrey. 

On June I4th the transports rendezvoused at 
Egmont Key, outside of Tampa harbour, where five 
of the smaller men-of-war were wait- 
1 escort them southward. Off 
the lortugas, on the evening ot the 
1 5th, they met the Indiana, whose chief officer, Cap 
tain Taylor, took over the command of the convoy 
from Commander Hunker of the Annapolis. From 
this point the course was to the southeast, toward 
Santiago. The transports moved sjowly ; they had 
two scows and a water boat to tow, and there was 
a good deal of straggling. One or two of them had 


to put in at Great Inagua, in the Bahamas, for 
water. Two the Yucatan, carrying the Rough 
Riders, and the City of Washington fell so far be 
hind that the Bancroft and the Wasp were sent back 
to protect them, and they reached Santiago several 
hours later than the rest of the fleet. Captain Taylor 
had been instructed, if possible, to form a fast divi 
sion and hurry some of the vessels forward, in order 
to reinforce the marines at Playa del Este, who were 
reported as being hard pressed ; but Shafter did not 
wish to divide his army, and Taylor found his hands 
full without reorganizing his unwieldy flotilla. 

The transports had all been freight vessels, and 
their lack of proper ventilation and accommodations 
caused discomfort among the troops ; but the voy 
age was uneventful, no enemy appearing, and the 
most serious mishap being the loss of one of the 
two scows, which was much needed for landing 
Shafter s artillery. 

While waiting for the army, Sampson had been 
reconnoitring possible landing places near San 
tiago, and testing the Spanish defences. To prevent 
any strengthening of the harbour works he bom 
barded them heavily on the i6th. Once more the 
batteries were " quickly silenced," but the injuries 
inflicted again proved slight. The Morro and the 
Socapa reported three men killed and eighteen 
wounded, but no guns dismounted, though one of 
the six-inch weapons in the Socapa was temporarily 
disabled by being buried in debris. On the follow 
ing day two steam cutters from the New York and 
the Massachusetts attempted to enter Cabanas Bay, 
the nearest harbour to the west, but were driven off 
by a heavy fire from shore. 

The Vesuvius, which joined the blockading fleet 
on the 1 3th, was having her first test in warfare at 
this time. Every night she ran in close to the har 
bour mouth and fired three of her dynamite shells. 
Their tremendous explosions undoubtedly had a 


moral effect upon the Spaniards, although largely 
owing to the difficulty of aiming them accurately 
they did very little actual damage.* 

On June i Qth General Calixto Garcia, commander 
of the insurgent forces in eastern Cuba, reached 
Rabi s camp near Aserraderos, and came out to the 
New York to see Sampson. The Cuban leader, 
though the conference was interrupted by his sea 
sickness, made a favourable impression upon the 
American admiral, who describes him as a man " of 
most frank and engaging manners and most sol 
dierly appearance." His arrival was a sequel to 
the negotiations begun by Lieutenant Rowan in 
the first days of the war. One of his officers, 
Colonel Hernandez, who had accompanied Rowan 
to Washington, went back to Cuba with a let 
ter from General Miles (dated June 2cl) informing 
Garcia of the proposed moVement against San 
tiago, and suggesting that he could render valu 
able assistance. Garcia replied through Sampson, 
who cabled his message to Washington that 
" the roads were bad and Cubans scattered " ; but 
he ordered his lieutenants to concentrate their 
forces about the three chief Spanish military posts 
in the province Holguin (where ten thousand 
troops were quartered), Manzanillo, and Guantana- 
mo, in order to prevent reinforcements from going 
to Santiago. He himself mustered some four thou 
sand men near Aserraderos, and readily promised 
their aid in return for the arms, clothing, and rations 

* Lieutenant Muller speaks of " the Vesuvius that gave us so much 
trouble." He says that" "one of her projectiles, which fell on the 
northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a distance 
of twenty metres. Another made an excavation not very deep, hut 
very wide ; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. Still another 
dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroyers, which was 
violently shaken, as also ihe Mercedes, anchored at a short distance." 

Of this last shot, fired on the night of June isth, an officer of the 
Pluton told Mr. Ramsden, the British consul at Santiago, that its ex 
plosion lifted the small vessel out of the water, throwing every one on 
board off his feet. 


given him from the fleet s stores. He had recently 
received a cargo of rifles and ammunition from the 
United States, landed at Banes by the Florida. 

On the morning of the 2oth the Wompatuck, 
which Captain Taylor had sent ahead to herald the 
approach of the army, reached Samp- 
shafter reaches SO n s fleet, and about noon the trans- 
junHo ports came in sight. The admiral sent 

Captain Chadwick, on the Gloucester, 
to invite Shafter up to the blockading line ; and on 
his arrival Sampson went on board of the general s 
headquarters ship, the Seguranga. In the afternoon 
the Seguranga took both commanders to Aserra- 
deros, where they landed Garcia not caring for an 
other experience afloat and conferred with the Cu 
ban leader and Generals Rabi and Castillo. It is 
scarcely probable, if the campaign were to be fought 
over again, that the American admiral and major- 
general would begin it by a visit to an insurgent 
camp, while an American army corps waited off 

It was arranged, at Aserraderos, that at sun 
rise on the 22d a feint of landing should be made at 
Cabanas, while the real debarkation should be be 
gun at Daiquiri ; that a Cuban force under General 
Castillo should engage the Spanish detachment in 
the rear, while Rabi supported the attack at Cabanas. 

On the 2 ist Shafter summoned his division and 
brigade commanders to receive their landing orders, 
and the Bancroft brought them to the Seguranga 
a task which, as Commander Clover reported, meant 
more than twenty miles steaming among the scat 
tered transports. The sea was rough, and the transfer 
of the officers from vessel to vessel was difficult and 
even dangerous. It was in boarding the Bancroft 
that Colonel Van Horn, who was to have led the 
first brigade ashore in the morning, received the in 
jury which disabled him, and from which he died a 
few months later. 



Next day (June 22d) the plan already outlined 
was successfully carried out, except that the Cubans 
entirely failed to intercept the enemy s 
retreat - The fleet bombarded all the 
Spanish defences for nearly twenty 
miles along the coast, from Daiquiri to Cabanas. 
Off this latter point the Texas was struck by a 
shell from the Socapa, which killed one man and 
wounded eight. The landing at Daiquiri was car 
ried out with a good deal of confusion, yet with 
creditable rapidity. Captain Goodrich, of the St. 
Louis, who was in command on behalf of the navy, 
had much to contend with. Half a dozen men-of- 
war had shelled the country about the bay, with a 
fire heavy enough, as the captain said, " to drive out 
the whole Spanish army in Cuba, had it been there," 
but the transports could not be induced to go any 
where near the shore. The navy had no control over 
these marine hirelings, and their captains moved, 
perhaps, by a conscientious regard for their owners 
interest, or possibly by a tender care for their own 
personal safety declined to face any avoidable risk 
in the service of their country. As a result, the 
boats more than fifty of which were furnished by 
the men-of-war, to supply the army s deficiency in 
this respect had to make a voyage of several miles 
to carry the troops ashore. One ship, carrying six 
hundred men who were to have landed in advance 
of the army, did not put in an appearance till the 
afternoon, after four steam launches had spent hours 
in searching for her. 

There were two piers in the little bay of Daiquiri. 
One, a large iron structure owned by an American 
mining company, and used for loading ships with 
iron ore, was too high above the water to serve as a 
landing stage. The troops used the other, a small 
wooden pier which the Spaniards had unsuccessfully 
tried to burn. The pack mules and officers horses 
were thrown overboard and left to swim ashore 


which a few of them failed to do. The first soldier 
landed a few minutes before ten o clock; at sunset 
about six thousand men Lawton s division and 
part of Wheeler s were on Cuban soil. The only 
loss of human life was that of two infantrymen, 
drowned from a capsized boat. There was no moles 
tation from the enemy. General Rubin, who had 
been stationed at Daiquiri with six hundred men 
and two guns, withdrew to Siboney as soon as the 
bombardment began, losing one killed and seven 
wounded ; and from Siboney he continued his retreat 
to a position in front of Sevilla, where he received 
considerable reinforcements. Here the first fight 
ing of the land campaign was to take place. 

On the following day (June 23d), while the de 
barkation at Daiquiri continued, Lawton s and 
Wheeler s troops pushed westward to- 
ward Siboney, which they reached in 
the afternoon. As there was no oppo 
sition from the enemy, Shafter decided to put the 
rest of his men and material ashore in the bay of 
Siboney or the Ensenada de los Altares (" bay of 
the altars."), as the Spaniards called it thus bring 
ing his base several miles nearer Santiago.* At the 
same time he placed the transports under the per 
sonal authority of Captain Goodrich an order 
which enabled that energetic officer to board each 
vessel as it came up to land its men, and take it close 
inshore. There was no pier at Siboney, and the 
soldiers had to go ashore through the surf, but six 
thousand more were landed during the day. 

Shafter s orders for the arrangement of the army 
ashore directed Lawton to lead its advance, occupy 
ing " a strong defensive position " a little way be 
yond Siboney, on the road toward Santiago ; Bates s 

* In General Shafter s report the distance from Daiquiri to Siboney 
is stated at eight miles, in General Wheeler s at eleven, in Captain 
Goodrich s at four which shows how estimates of distance vary, even 
when made by minds trained to accuracy. On the map it measures 
six miles. 



brigade was to be close behind, supporting Law- 
ton ; Kent s division was to be held at Siboney, 
where it landed ; Wheeler s was to bring up the rear, 


taking its station between Siboney and Daiquiri.* 
But Wheeler, who was the senior officer ashore 
Shafter remained on the Seguranga until the 29th 
partly upset this programme. The gallant veteran 
was as eager to get at the enemy as he had ever 
been thirty-five years before, when he was a daring 
young leader of Confederate cavalry. On the even 
ing of the 23d he ordered the commander of his 
second brigade, General Young, who had just 
reached Siboney from Daiquiri, to move forward, in 
the morning, to reconnoitre General Rubin s posi 
tion near Sevilla. He had received information of 
the Spaniards whereabouts from General Castillo, 
whose men had had a skirmish with their rearguard, 
and had been driven off with one killed and nine 

The main road from Siboney to Santiago runs 
inland along a small valley, and then ascends some 
three hundred feet to a gap in the hills, at a point 
called Las Guasimas (" the guasima trees "), where 
it turns westward to Sevilla and thence through an 
undulating country to the capital of the province. 
General Castillo had pointed out another trail, which 
climbs the hillside directly above Siboney, and 
passes along the high ground to join the main road 
at Las Guasimas, about three miles inland. The 
former is an ordinary Cuban highway, rough and 
narrow; the latter a mere footpath through dense 
woods. General Young s plan of attack was to ad 
vance a squadron of the First Cavalry and another 

* On the morning of June 24th Shafter sent the division com 
manders, through Lieutenant Miley, a message repeating and empha 
sizing these instructions : 

" The commanding general begs me to say it is impossible to ad 
vance on Santiago until movements to supply troops can be arranged. 
Take up strong positions where you can get water, and make yourself 
secure from surprise or attack. Lawton s division will be in front, 
Kent s near Siboney, Wheeler s near Daiquiri, and Bates s command 
where it will be in support of Lawton." 

Wheeler had moved out of Siboney before this message reached 



of the Tenth, four hundred and sixty-four men in 
all, with the battery of Hotchkiss guns he had not 
been able to get rations for his other two squadrons 
of regulars along the main road, while his other 
regiment, the Rough Riders, with five hundred men, 
nearly its full strength, moved forward by the hill 
trail to join them. General Castillo was to support 
the attack with eight hundred Cubans, whom he 
promised to bring up at five o clock the next 

At half past five Young s men were ready to 

move, and he sent Lieutenant Rivers, one of his 

aides, to notify Castillo, who had not 

skirmish at p ut j n an appearance. Rivers came 

^uL G * aS back and re P rted that the Cuban gen 
eral was asleep, and his sentries would 
not allow him to be aroused. Young then gave the 
order to march, and the First Cavalry led the way 
forward, followed by the Hotchkiss battery of 
which Captain Watson, Tenth Cavalry, was in tem 
porary command that day and by the negro 
troopers of the Tenth. At half past seven, approach 
ing the enemy s position, the column was halted 
in an open space and scouts were sent forward to 
reconnoitre. They reported the Spaniards in plain 
sight on a hill above the gap through which the road 

Young advanced two of his guns along the road 
to draw the enemy s fire, while he deployed his men, 
keeping them covered in the thick chaparral, for an 
attack upon the left of Rubin s lines. In order to 
allow the Rough Riders, who had a more difficult 
trail to follow, time to reach the Spanish right, he 
waited twenty minutes before opening fire. During 
this delay General Wheeler rode up and joined him, 
but made no change in his arrangements. The two 
commanders were with the guns, in full view of the 
Spaniards, who did not fire until the Hotchkiss 
guns began the fight. The enemy then replied with 


rifle volleys from behind rough breastworks of piled 
stones, and their fire was so hot that Young ordered 
his guns which he had to use sparingly, as they 
had only one box (fifty rounds) of ammunition 
under cover for a time. Wheeler even sent back a 
message to Lawton, saying that he had encountered 
" a bigger force of the enemy than he had antici 
pated," and requesting that reinforcements should 
be hurried forward a circumstance which he neg 
lects to mention in either of his published narratives 
of the campaign. 

Meanwhile his troopers were creeping forward 
through dense undergrowth and w r ire fences till 
they reached a position close under the Spanish 
lines. Here for the first time they opened fire, ad 
vancing upon the enemy s front and left flank, and 
pressing forward with the greatest courage and de 
termination over very difficult ground and up a 
steep slope. 

Colonel Wood s men came in contact with the 
Spaniards just before Young s column got into 
action, meeting them almost face to face in the 
tropical jungle. It has been stated that the Rough 
Riders were ambushed, but the term can not be 
applied to an encounter so deliberately planned. 
The volunteer troopers, knowing that the enemy 
was close in front, were moving cautiously through 
the woods, with Captain Capron s troop as an ad 
vance guard, but without flankers, the jungle beside 
the trail being too dense. Capron had sent back 
word that he thought he had discovered a Spanish 
outpost, and Wood had begun to deploy his men 
into the forest, when they received a sharp fire at 
short range. Several of the Rough Riders fell, one 
of the first men killed being Sergeant Hamilton 
Fish, a member of a well-known New York family. 
A Cuban guide who was at the head of the column 
fled at the first fire ; so did the drivers of the mules 
that carried the Colt guns, leaving the animals to 



stray off into the forest. They were trailed and re 
covered after the fight. 

Deploying both to the right, to get in touch with 
the other column, and to the left, to outflank the 
enemy, the volunteer cavalrymen pushed on as 
bravely as the regulars, driving the Spaniards before 
them through the woods. Rubin s men made a 
brief stand at some ranch buildings, but retreated 
before the advancing Americans came to close quar 
ters, and about an hour and a quarter after the action 
began the brigade had captured the entire position 
of the enemy, who " fled precipitately," according 
to General Young s report ; but as they carried all 
their wounded with them, their disorder may have 
been more apparent than real. 

The Spanish account of the action, as given by 
Lieutenant Miiller, is that General Rubin was at 
tacked by a strong American force, which he drove 
back, but that he withdrew in obedience to orders 
received the day before from General Linares. Two 
days later Linares issued a general order, in which 
he declared : 

Soldiers! We left the mineral region* because I did 
not wish to sacrifice your lives in unequal battle, with 
musket fire, against the pompous superiority of the enemy, 
who was fighting us under cover of his armoured ships, 
armed with the most modern and powerful guns. 

Linares tactics seem to have been weak and un 
decided. Sampson s guns could sooner or later 
have rendered untenable any position within three 
miles of the shore, but a more determined stand at 
Las Guasimas, a position quite as well suited for 
defence as Caney or San Juan, might at least have 
checked Shafter s advance and given time for the 
arrival of reinforcements from Manzanillo. The 
half-hearted resistance that Rubin offered to Young 

* The neighbourhood of Daiquiri and Juragua (near Siboney), 
where there are extensive iron mines owned by three American com 


was worse than useless, and his hasty retreat before 
so small a force was not calculated to encourage the 
defenders of Santiago. 

The Spanish force at Las Guasimas has been 
variously stated, American estimates running from 
twelve hundred to four thousand. Colonel Roose 
velt gives the former figure, which is probably near 
the truth. Wood s official report puts it at twenty- 
five hundred, but commanding officers almost 
always overestimate the numbers opposed to them. 
Lieutenant Miiller asserts that only part of Rubin s 
troops seven companies, under Major Alcaniz, 
together with some engineers and artillery, perhaps 
eight hundred men in all were actually in the 
fight. It is quite possible that Rubin s whole 
force was not engaged, though the Spanish army 
officers from whom Miiller got his information 
were by no means unimpeachable authorities. The 
detailed list they gave of the American regiments 
in the attacking force was highly imaginative, in 
cluding troops that were not within miles of the 

Young s attack was so bold that the Spaniards 
very probably regarded his four squadrons as the 
advance guard of a much larger body. Indeed, 
they must have seen other American troops com 
ing up from Siboney along the valley below them. 
But Young deserves credit for a successful stroke. 
With nine hundred and sixty-four men he had 
driven a force larger than his own from a strong 
position. Bravery is expected of American sol 
diers, but his troops had fought notably well, 
though practically none of them had been under 
fire before, and the Rough Riders had never fired 
a Krag-Jorgensen rifle until that day, having 
received their guns only just before they left 
Tampa. The American loss was sixteen killed 
(eight in each column) and fifty-two wounded, 
the dead including one officer Captain Capron, 


whose troop led the advance of the Rough Riders.* 
As for the enemy s loss, General Young reported 
that forty-two dead bodies were seen ; Colonel 
Wood, that the Rough Riders alone found forty ; 
but Colonel Roosevelt, in his interesting record of 
his regiment s share in the campaign, states that 
these figures are too high, and that after going 
over the ground carefully he counted only eleven 
dead Spaniards, probably missing two or three. The 
Spanish official report nearly agrees with this, ad 
mitting only nine killed and twenty-seven wounded. 
General Wheeler, in his book on the campaign, 
records that General Toral told him that the Spanish 
loss on June 24 was about two hundred and fifty, 
and that General Escario put it at about two hun 
dred ; but these figures are incredible, and must be 
the result of a misunderstanding. 

It has been pointed out that in attacking the 
enemy s position with a divided force, General 
Young violated a rule of tactics. The trails along 
which his command moved, however, were nowhere 
more than a mile and a half apart much less than 
that at the point where fighting was expected ; and 
his two columns were out of touch with each other 
for only a brief time. Moreover, Castillo had 
assured him that the Cuban outposts covered both 
roads. And, like many another move in warfare, the 
plan was vindicated by its complete success. After 
the fight, Young said to Wheeler : " General, if I 
had lost this battle and lived through it, you would 
have had my resignation/ 

The day was an oppressively hot one, and 
Young s men were too much exhausted to pursue 
the Spaniards, even had it been prudent to do so. 
The race to the front for the eagerness of the 

* Captain Allyn K. Capron of the Rough Riders was a son of Cap 
tain Allyn Capron of the First Artillery, who commanded one of Shaf- 
ter s field batteries. Both father and son lost their lives, the former 
dying, after his return to the United States, of a fever contracted in 


American commanders really made it a race was 
now taken up by the Ninth Cavalry, which came 
up an hour after the fight closed, and relieved 
Young s outposts. Chaffee s brigade was close 
behind, and Miles had also been ordered forward 
when Lawton received Wheeler s request for rein 
forcements. Naturally, in view of Shafter s instruc 
tions, Lawton and his brigade commanders had been 
surprised to find that Wheeler was in front of them. 
On the night before, as the Rough Riders dyna 
mite gun was being hurried forward from Daiquiri, 
under Wheeler s orders, to join Young s attacking 
column, its captain, Sergeant Borrowe, was halted 
by one of Lawton s officers, who refused to let him 
pass to the front. 

Shafter, no doubt, was also astonished when he 
heard that his rearguard division had pushed for 
ward and won a sharp fight, but he accepted the 
result with soldierly readiness, and commended 
Wheeler and Young in his official report. At the 
same time, while he remained on the Seguranga 
he sent daily despatches to the veteran cavalry 
man enjoining him not to bring on another en 

Castillo had not appeared during the action at 
Las Guasimas, but after it was over a column of 
Cubans came up, led by a Frenchman, who, accord 
ing to General Young, " was in a very bloodthirsty 
mood. He said that he had orders from Castillo 
to follow up the Spaniards and fight them wherever 
he found them. I ordered him to go back," Young 
adds, " and would not have him near me." From 
this time the insurgents figured less prominently in 
the American plans of campaign. 

If the mobilizing of Shafter s corps brought to 
light serious weaknesses in the organization of the 
United States army, the campaign revealed, on the 
Spanish side, a state of affairs exceedingly dis 
creditable to Spain s military administration in 


22 9 

Cuba. Few or none of the preparations that ordi 
nary foresight would have suggested had been 
made. When Cervera s squadron first lay in San 
tiago harbour, helpless for lack of coal, and the 
American blockaders gathered outside, the least 
accomplished strategist might have seen where the 

war was about to centre ; yet no 
o 11 timel y ste P s were taken to gather men 

and supplies at the threatened point. 
Not until the last days of May were the mediaeval 
batteries at the harbour mouth reinforced with guns 
from the Reina Mercedes. There had been a 
chronic shortage of provisions, and nothing was 
done to remedy it. Had not a German steamer 
come in on May 7th with a cargo of rice,* the 
troops would have fared even worse than they did. 
With more than thirty thousand soldiers in the 
province, and with plenty of time to send reinforce 
ments to the garrison of Santiago, no effort was 
made to do so in season to render effective aid. 

Captain-General Blanco s first defensive move 
was an order issued on June 2oth almost three 
weeks after the beginning of the blockade consti 
tuting the forces of the extreme southeastern dis 
trict, extending from Manzanillo to Baracoa and 
Guantanamo, a separate army corps, under Lieu- 
tenant-General Arsenio Linares. Two days later 
Colonel Frederico Escario left Ma nzanillo for San 
tiago with 3,550 men and two guns. His march 
was a difficult one, and the insurgents constantly 
harassed him, killing or wounding ninety-seven of 
his men, but failing to keep him out of Santiago, 
where he arrived on the evening of July 3d just 
too late for the decisive fight of the campaign. It 

* This vessel, the Polaria, was bound for Havana, but put in at 
Santiago on hearing of the blockade. Lieutenant Miiller states that 
she carried 1,700 sacks of rice; Commander Jacobsen of the German 
cruiser Geier, who visited Santiago during the blockade, and whose ac 
count of his observations has been published by the Navy Department, 
says 14,000 sacks. 


is stated in General Miles s report that another 
body of Spaniards started to Linares s relief from 
Holguin, but was compelled to turn back. Gen 
eral Pareja, whom Shafter left in his rear at Guan- 
tanamo, never attempted a hostile movement, and 
had apparently no orders to do so. 

On withdrawing Rubin s brigade from Sevilla, 
Linares posted his forces along a line beginning on 
the coast at Fort Aguadores, following the railroad 
from that point to its terminus at Las Cruces on 
Santiago Bay, and thence running northeastward, his 
last outpost on the left wing being in the village of 
Caney, four miles northeast of Santiago. This long 
line was thinly held, there being, according to Lieu 
tenant Miiller, 3,000 around the city and as far in 
front of it as San Juan ; 800 on the right wing, from 
Las Cruces to Fort Aguadores ; and 520, under 
General Vara del Rey, at Caney in all 4,320 men, 
of whom about two thirds were Spanish regulars, 
the rest being mobilized troops (Spanish militia), 
volunteers, and sailors from Cervera s fleet. Be 
sides these, there was in Santiago a small reserve 
force of cavalry, police (the guardia civile), and fire 
men ; nearly 1,000 men were stationed in the har 
bour batteries 450 at the Morro, 400 at the So- 
capa, 1 20 at Punta Gorda; and 900 more, under 
Colonel Aldea, were intrenched west of the bay. 
These figures do not include the outlying detach 
ments at Palma Soriano, San Luis, and other inland 

This does not seem to be the best disposition that 
could have been made. Shafter moved straight for 
ward to deliver his attack, not veiling it by feint or 
strategy, and the defending force* might have been 
concentrated more effectively to meet him. It may 
have been necessary to station a regiment west of 
the bay, but the garrison of the harbour forts might 
well have been diminished to strengthen the posi 
tion in front of Shafter s advance. Lieutenant Miil- 


ler accounts for the effort to cover so wide an extent 
of country by the necessity of protecting the aque 
duct that supplied Santiago with water, and of hold 
ing a district that kept the troops supplied with a 
certain amount of fresh food presumably mangoes, 
sweet potatoes, and sugar cane. 



ON the evening of June 24th the day of the 
action at Las Guasimas the last men of Kent s 
division were ashore at Siboney. Six comparatively 
uneventful days followed, during which the corps 
gradually pushed forward and occupied the hilly, 
wooded country about Sevilla, as far as El Pozo. 
The field batteries were disembarked at Daiquiri on 
the 25th and 26th. The first tactical problem, that 
of the landing, had been successfully accomplished ; 
General Shafter was now struggling with the second 
that of getting ashore the supplies that his army 
needed before it could go into battle. It proved an 
exceedingly difficult task, owing to the lack of tugs 
and scows, and for several days the troops lived from 
hand to mouth, provisions being landed no faster 
than they were consumed. Had a storm driven 
the fleet from the coast the result might have been 
serious, or even disastrous. Two weeks passed 
before the corps had three days rations in ad 

On the 25th and 26th Garcia and 2,978 of his 
Cubans were carried on the transports from Aserra- 
deros to Siboney. On the 27th the first reinforce 
ments arrived from the United States, the Thirty- 
third and part of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, form 
ing a brigade under Brigadier-General Duffield, 
being landed at the same point. These regiments 
came from Camp Alger. 


On the 29th Shafter came ashore, and estab 
lished his headquarters about a mile east of El Pozo 
that is, a mile behind his outposts 

Cl Se tO the tKlil alO11 which mOSt f 

the army was encamped. His heavy 
guns were not landed, and the equipment of his 
corps was still far from complete, but he was un 
willing and very properly so to delay a day 
longer than was absolutely necessary. Coming 
into the tropics in the rainy season, his men were 
certain, if the campaign were prolonged, to find the 
fevers of Cuba a more deadly foe than the guns of 
the Spaniards.* " It was to be a dash or nothing," 
as Shafter himself said. 

General Shafter did not attempt any reconnais 
sance in person, beyond overlooking the country 
before him from a hill near his headquarters. He 
has been severely criticised for failing to keep in 
closer touch with his troops, and to foresee more 
exactly the difficulties of the field of battle; but it 
must be remembered that he was a man of sixty-one, 
exceedingly stout, and that his health suffered seri 
ously in the tropical climate and under his tre 
mendous burden of hard work and responsibility. 
Besides the exhaustion of malaria, he was enduring 
great pain from an attack of the gout, which inca 
pacitated him from putting his foot into a stirrup. 

* During: nine weeks, while the Fifth Corps was in Cuba, it lost 318 
men from disease, against 263 who were killed in action or died of 
their wounds. 

In describing the conditions under which he went into battle, Shaf 
ter said in his official report : " These preparations were far from what 
I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly climate ; our supplies had 
to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road which the rains might 
at any time render impassable ; fear was entertained that a storm 
might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us 
from our base of supplies ; and, lastly, it was reported that General 
Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from 
Manzanillo, and might be expected in a few days." The movement of 
Escario s brigade was of course the foundation for this last report. 
General Pando, it afterward appeared, was not in that part of Cuba at 
the time. 



He was absolutely compelled to let other men repre 
sent him at the front. 

Generals Wheeler, Lawton, and Chaffee, Colonel 
Derby of the engineers, and other officers, had been 
active in reconnoitring, and had received pretty 
full information as to the Spanish forces and posi 
tions from Cuban peasants. The enemy s weakness 
in artillery and lack of supplies were also learned, 
and it was concluded that his resistance would not 
be strong. Shafter undoubtedly underestimated the 
task he was about to set his men ; but his mis 
take was shared by his ablest officers, and probably 
by every member of his corps. Wheeler, who had 
been close up to Caney, asked permission to attack 
at that point, his plan being to concentrate a heavy 
artillery fire upon it, and cut off the retreat of its 
garrison, which was known to be small, by placing 
a division between the village and Santiago. Shafter 
agreed with him as to the direction of the first at 
tack, but preferred to intrust it to Lawton. On the 
29th the commanding general telegraphed to Wash 
ington : 

Advance pickets within a mile and a half of Santiago. 
No opposition. Spaniards have evidently withdrawn to 
immediate vicinity of the town. Expect to put division 
on Caney road, between that place and Santiago, day after 
to-morrow, and will also advance on Sevilla road to San 
Juan river, and possibly beyond. General Garcia, with 
three thousand men, will take railroad north of Santiago 
at the same time to prevent Pando reaching city. 

On the afternoon of the 3Oth Shafter summoned 
his division commanders to a council of war, at 
which his plans for an immediate attack were for 
mulated. Lawton s division, supported by Bates s 
brigade and by one battery of artillery (Captain 
Capron s), was to assault Caney at daybreak ; the 
other two divisions were to march straight forward 
toward Santiago by the road through San Juan, 
Kent s deploying to the left, Wheeler s to the right ; 
and Lawton, who promised to take Caney in two 


hours at most, was to come down the high road 
from that village, and bring his left in line with the 
right of the cavalry division in time for the attack 
upon the Spaniards central position. Captain 
Grimes s battery, posted at El Pozo, was to sup 
port the left wing; the other two batteries of light 
artillery, and the Catling guns, were to be held in 
reserve. The only infantry reserve was a battalion 
of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, back at Siboney.* 
General Duffield, who was present at the conference, 
was ordered to move the Thirty-third Michigan 
along the narrow-gauge railroad from that point and 
threaten the Spanish detachment at Fort Agua- 

General Wheeler was not at the council. The 
veteran cavalry commander was lying in his tent, 
exposure to heat and rain having brought on a slight 
fever ; and though he had not reported himself unfit 
for duty, it seems that Shafter, or possibly one of 
Shafter s aids, considered him so, and summoned 
his senior brigade commander, General Sumner, to 
headquarters in his place. 

Lawton s division marched toward Caney during 
the night, and at sunrise next morning (July 1st) 
was in position for the attack. For his plan of action 
Lawton gives credit to General Chaffee, who had 
made a very thorough reconnaissance close up to 
the enemy s lines. Chaffee s own brigade was to 
move upon the village from the east, at daybreak, 
and capture it. Ludlow was to occupy the road 
between Caney and Santiago, cutting off the gar 
rison s retreat. Of Miles s three regiments, the 
First Infantry was to be held in support of Capron s 
battery, together with Troop D of the Second Cav 
alry ; the Fourth and the Twenty-fifth were to follow 
Ludlow. Caney taken, the division was to ren 
dezvous at the Ducrot house, on the Santiago road, 

* The other two battalions of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, and the 
Ninth Massachusetts, reached Siboney on the Harvard on July ist. 


and thence to march forward and join Wheeler and 
Kent in attacking the Spanish lines. 

During the night, Chaffee personally guided 

companies of the Seventh and the Twelfth to points 

where, at dawn, they could seize the 

Battle of Caney, ^^ overlooking the vil l age O n the 

east. The first shot was fired by 
Capron s battery at a quarter past six, with a range 
of about twenty-four hundred yards. The Spaniards 
had no artillery, and there was no reply till Chaffee s 
skirmish line was within half a mile of the trenches, 
when the Spaniards opened fire with unexpected 
spirit and effect, and for three hours the battle was 
a sharp infantry duel. It was soon clear that Law- 
ton s estimate had been far too sanguine, and that 
the garrison of Caney, though greatly outnumbered, 
had heavy odds in the strength of its defences, and 
was prepared to make a desperate resistance. The 
key to the position was a small conical hill at the 
southern end of the village, on the top of which 
stood an old masonry fort. In front of this were 
trenches some of them cut in solid rock and wire 
entanglements. There were also five blockhouses, 
with connecting trenches, dotted around Caney, and 
when the Spaniards were finally driven into the 
village they continued a desperate resistance from 
its houses and its stone church, whose walls were 
loopholed for rifle fire. 

The defence of Caney was the best and bravest 
bit of fighting the Spaniards did in the whole war. 
It was worthy of the finest traditions of a nation 
whose most famous deeds of valour, from the days 
of Saguntum to those of Saragossa, have been done 
in defence of beleaguered towns. For more than 
ten hours General Vara del Key s five hundred men 
kept at bay ten times their number of American 
soldiers. And while the Spanish resistance was 
nothing less than heroic, the action was equally 
creditable to. Lawton s troops, whose attack was 


finally successful only because it was pushed home 
with unfaltering courage and persistence.* 

The fire of the American artillery was disap 
pointingly ineffective,! and the work was done by 
hard fighting on the part of the infantry. The first 
movement to get at close quarters with the enemy 
was made by the Seventeenth Infantry, forming 
Chaffee s extreme right, who advanced along a 
slightly sunken road to seize a low ridge command 
ing the village on the northeast. As they deployed 
through a gap in the hedge that bordered the road, 
they met such a heavy fire that they had to with 
draw, Lieutenant-Colonel Haskell, who was lead 
ing his men, being badly wounded by three bullets. 
The regiment was moved to a less exposed position 
still further to the right. 

The Seventh Infantry, meanwhile, came up 
along the road, deployed behind the ridge, advanced, 
and held it under a heavy fire, which caused seri 
ous losses, and to which they could make little reply, 
the Spaniards being seldom visible. Their loss of 
thirty-three men killed and a hundred and one 
wounded was far heavier than that of any other 
American command. General Chaffee, who was 
with them, had a button shot from his coat, and a 
bullet went through his shoulder strap. 

His other regiment, the Twelfth Infantry, was 
fighting its way forward a little farther to the left, 
along a valley that led close under the Spanish fort. 
Far to the left, Ludlow was gradually closing in on 

* " On the ist of July," says Lieutenant Mxiller, the Spanish histo 
rian of the campaign, "the Americans fought with truly admirable 
courage. . . . Did they think that all they had to do was to attack our 
soldiers en masse to put them to flight ? God knows." 

f General Chaffee reoorted that the fire of Capron s battery was 
" accurate and very effective," but though the guns began at 6.15 A. M. 
it was more than eight hours later when the fort was charged and cap 
tured by the infantry. Other observers agreed with General Ludlow, 
whose report states that " the artillery fire was too distant to reduce the 
blockhouses or destroy the intrenchments, so that the attack was prac 
tically by infantry alone." 


the southwest side of the village; Miles had come 
up in line with him on the south ; and when Bates s 
brigade which had had to march up from Siboney 
during the night arrived and occupied the gap be 
tween Miles and Chaffee, Caney was surrounded on 
three sides with a continuous ring of fire. Ludlow s 
two regiments of regulars, the Eighth and the 
Twenty-second Infantry, were hotly engaged with 
the Spanish riflemen in two blockhouses and be 
hind loopholed walls. His third regiment, the 
Second Massachusetts, took little part in the battle. 
Like all the volunteers except the Rough Riders, 
they carried the old Springfield rifles, with non- 
smokeless cartridges, and when they tried to push 
a line of skirmishers toward the enemy their fire 
drew so heavy a return that they were ordered to 
fall back. 

Capron s battery kept up its fire almost continu 
ously, under the personal direction of General Law- 
ton, until about two o clock ; it was then moved 
forward to a new position south of Caney, a thou 
sand yards from the Spanish lines. Half an hour 
later, judging that the enemy had not strength left 
to resist a charge, Chaffee ordered the Twelfth to 
storm the stone fort. Lawton had authorized him to 
make this decisive movement at his discretion, and 
it was executed with great gallantry, Bates s ad 
vance guard and some of Miles s men coming up 
almost simultaneously on the other side of the hill. 
It was claimed, indeed, by Lieutenant-Colonel Dag- 
gett, of the Twenty-fifth, that the credit of the cap 
ture was due to his regiment, but this Chaffee 
branded as " absurd," stating that the first com 
mand to reach and enter the fort was the Twelfth ; 
next, Bates s two regiments, the Third and the 
Twentieth ; and then the Twenty-fifth. 

This point of vantage captured, the assailants 
commanded the village; but fighting lasted fully 
two hours longer, the Spaniards resisting stubbornly 


as they fell back from house to house. When Caney 
finally became untenable under the overwhelming 
fire poured into it, the surviving defenders fled to 
ward Santiago, suffering terribly from the volleys 
of Ludlow s men especially of the Twenty-second 
as they passed his lines. At five o clock the battle 
was over, and Caney had been taken, at a heavy 
cost to its captors, for the division had lost 453 men 
killed and wounded.* On the Spanish side, Gen 
eral Vara del Rey had been killed at noon ; he was 
wounded in both legs, and as he was being carried 
to the rear on a stretcher another bullet despatched 
him. Two of his sons had fallen with him, and of 
his 520 men about 300 were dead and wounded, 
120 were captured, and 100 escaped to Santiago. 

A considerable body of Garcia s Cubans took 
part in the battle of Caney by making one of their 
characteristic attacks upon an outlying blockhouse 
about a mile from the village. Although they are 

* The following table shows the strength and the losses of the 
American troops at Caney : 

June soth. 

July ist. 

July ist. 


I.udlow s Brigade, staff 


Eighth Infantry 




Twenty-second Infantry 
Second Massachusetts 

49 6 




Miles s Brigade staff 

I 3 

First Infantry 



Fourth Infantry . . . 




Twenty-fifth Infantry 
Chaffee s Brigade staff .... 





Seventh Infantry 




Twelfth Infantry 
Seventeenth Infantry . . . 






Bates s Brigade, staff 
Third Infantry 




Twentieth Infantry 
Capron s Battery 





Second Cavalry (estimated } 







said to have numbered several hundred, while the 
blockhouse was garrisoned by possibly a dozen 
men, they remained about a mile from the enemy, 
at which distance they poured in a hot but harmless 
fire until their ammunition was exhausted and Gen 
eral Chaffee refused them a fresh supply. 

On the other hand, Colonel Miles reported that 
a small Cuban detachment forty men under Cap 
tains Vargas and Bravo fought bravely with his 

Meanwhile the other two divisions had moved 
forward toward the San Juan River, where, accord 
ing to Shafter s plan, Lawton was to 

right, after taking Caney. There was 
only one road for the advance a rough, narrow 
trail, deep in mud from the daily rains, crossing the 
low ground that stretched between the hills about 
El Pozo and the heights of San Juan, about a mile 
in front of Santiago. This basinlike depression is 
traversed by three rivers, or, rather, good-sized 
brooks the Aguadores, flowing westward from El 
Pozo ; its tributary, the creek of Las Guamas, com 
ing down southward from Caney; and a stream 
marked on the maps as the Purgatorio Creek, ris 
ing in the mountains north of Santiago. This last 
passes close under the San Juan ridge, and in the 
southwest corner of the basin it joins the Agua 
dores to form the San Juan River, which runs down 
to the sea at Fort Aguadores. In the reports of the 
battle of July 1st the Aguadores and the San Juan 
are frequently confused. 

The trail from El Pozo ran through dense woods 
to a ford of the Aguadores, just above its junction 
with the western stream ; beyond was a short stretch 
of open country, partly cultivated ; then, beyond 
the second brook, the ground sloped upward to the 
low ridges on which the first Spanish lines were 


General Wheeler was not present when the 
Cavalry Division formed at sunrise. He had not 
reported sick " I was not off duty for a single 
moment during the campaign," he declares * but 
Sumner, the senior brigadier, took command of the 
division by Shafter s order, leaving his own brigade 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll of the Sixth Cavalry. 
The other cavalry brigade was commanded by Colo 
nel Wood, of the Rough Riders, General Young 
being down with a severe attack of fever. About 
nine o clock, when the fighting had scarcely begun, 
Wheeler, ailing as he was, rode to the front ; and it 
is quite clear, from his narrative of the engagement, 
that he regarded himself as being in command of the 
two divisions, as senior officer in the field, f Some, 
at least, of the other officers do not seem to have 
understood so. " The battle was fought by General 
Sumner and by General Kent," says Colonel Roose 
velt, and those generals reports bear out his state 
ment. In the afternoon, when the Spanish position 
had been captured, Wheeler sent Shafter a message 
inquiring whether he should " continue command 
ing and supervising as I am now," or " resume com 
mand of the cavalry division and displace Sumner." 
Shafter ordered him to take the latter course, and 
Wheeler so notified Sumner. 

Kent had his division ready to move at seven 
o clock, when Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, 
Shafter s adjutant-general, gave him the word to ad 
vance. His first brigade (General Hawkins s) was 
leading, followed by the third (Colonel WikofFs) 
and the second (Colonel Pearson s). The head of his 
column formed by the Sixth Infantry was a few 

* The Santiago Campaign, p. 119. 

t " I had been directed by Colonel McClernand, General Shafter s 
adjutant-general, to give directions to General Kent. . . . My former 
instructions and the general custom of the service made it proper that 
I should exercise this control over the whole line. ... I also gave di 
rections to General Sumner. and, through my staff officers, to Colonel 
Carroll and Colonel Wood." The Santiago Campaign, p. 43. 


hundred yards beyond El Pozo when he received 
orders to allow the cavalry division right of way, 
and his troops halted along the trail. There was a 
delay of three quarters of an hour, which Kent and 
Hawkins utilized for reconnoitring. They rode 
down to the river, forded it, and observed the Span 
ish position, from which a sharp fire, both of rifles 
and of artillery, was already coming. The enemy s 
guns were replying to Grimes s battery at El Pozo, 
and a damaging fusillade was attracted by the sig 
nal-corps balloon, which was being slowly drawn 
forward along the crowded trail, revealing to the 
Spaniards the precise line of the American ad 
vance.* The balloon was finally anchored at the 
main ford of the Aguadores, making the passage 
of the stream a bloody one. 

It took the two divisions more than six hours 
to push through the mile and a half of woods be 
tween El Pozo and the river, and to deploy on the 
further bank of the stream. During the continual 
halts and delays along the narrow and crowded trail 
they were under a severe fire, to which they could 
make practically no reply, the enemy s position not 
being in sight. It was impossible to tell from what 
quarter the Mauser bullets, fired with smokeless 
powder, were flying. They came, as General Kent 
said in his report, or seemed to come, " from all 
directions, not only from the front and the dense 
tropical thickets in our flanks, but from sharp 
shooters apparently posted in our rear." 

Much was heard of these Spanish sharpshooters. 
It is probable that they were fewer than was gen- 

* For this costly blunder General Greely s annual report, on behalf 
of the signal corps, emphatically disclaims responsibility: " The forc 
ing of the signal-corps balloon to the skirmish line, where its position 
is reported to have caused serious loss to the troops by disclosing their 
movements and attracting the enemy s fire, was the action of Major- 
General Shafter, through his chief engineer, Colonel G. McC. Derby, 
in the face of professional advice given him by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Maxfield of the United States Volunteer Signal Corps, who was 
charged with the practical operation of the balloon." 


erally supposed, for a reason given by General 
Shafter, who says : " I do not think there were any 
sharpshooters in the rear of our lines. The Mau 
sers have a range of two miles, and it was dropping 
bullets which gave this impression." Some, how 
ever, there undoubtedly were, posted here and there 
in the trees. They were accused of deliberately 
firing on wounded men and Red Cross attendants. 
It is doubtful whether they could be proved guilty 
of this crime against civilization ; but the fact that 
such a form of warfare was used at all was a blemish 
upon Spanish chivalry. " Sniping " of this sort may 
annoy an enemy, and certainly adds to the horrors 
of war, but it could never win a battle or change the 
course of a campaign. 

Kent s and Wheeler s divisions lost nearly a 
thousand men on the ist of July, and most of the 
loss was suffered during their slow and toilsome 
advance into a position where they could begin to 
fight. The movement was one to be commended to 
students of strategy as a warning rather than as 
a model. It would scarcely have been undertaken 
had the ground been more thoroughly studied be 
forehand, and had not the enemy been held in some 
thing very near to contempt. If the defenders of 
San Juan had been stronger in numbers, had their 
marksmanship been more accurate, had they been 
better supported by artillery, or had they not yielded 
and fled at the critical moment of the battle, the 
attacking force might have been annihilated. As 
it was, the two divisions lost thirteen per cent of 
their strength (reported at 362 officers and 7,391 
men) in killed and wounded. 

The spirit of the American troops was signally 
displayed by their unflinching endurance of such 
a trying situation. There were, of course, as always 
happens, individual cases of straggling,* but among 

* About noon Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, stationed at El 
Pozo, sent back this message to Shafter s headquarters : " If you have 



the regiments there was only one partial exception 
to the army s record of heroism an exception 
which any but the most censorious historian might 
have passed over unnoticed had it not been so loudly 
advertised by the bitter controversies subsequently 
waged over it. The facts of the case, though they 
have been hotly denied, are clearly and incontestably 
on record. Besides the official reports and various 
published accounts, the writer has the personal testi 
mony of a correspondent who was an eyewitness. 

The advance was well under way when Colonel 
Derby, who had been reconnoitring from the bal 
loon work that should have been done earlier in 
formed Kent of a narrow wood road that branched 
to the left from the main trail, and led to another 
ford of the San Juan River, a little farther down the 
stream. The general at once went to the forks of 
the road, with his staff. The two leading regiments 
of Hawkins s brigade, the Sixth and Sixteenth, had 
already passed, marching in double or even in single 
file, together with the cavalry troopers. The Sev 
enty-first New York, coming up next, was ordered 
by General Kent to take the left-hand trail. It did 
so, but its first battalion had gone only a short dis 
tance when it fell into confusion under the galling 
fire, and, as the general says in his report, " recoiled 
in disorder." 

Such an incident is nothing exceptional with raw 
troops on first going into battle, especially under 
conditions so trying as those of the advance upon 
San Juan. There were many instances in the civil 
war, some in the case of regiments that afterward 
made notable records as fighters. If there be any 
word of blame, it must be for the officers who failed 

a troop of cavalry or a company of infantry to spare, they can do good 
work out here stopping: stragglers. This does not imply any reverse 
at the front, but the firing was probably hotter than some like." Shaf- 
ter sent him Troop A of the Second Cavalry, and later in the after 
noon, when this command want forward with the artillery, Troop F 
took its place. 


to rally their men. General Kent s staff to a certain 
extent took their place, and, as he states, " formed 
a cordon behind the panic-stricken men," who were 
ordered to lie down in the thicket, leaving the trail 
clear.* The other two battalions of the volunteers 
came forward in better order, but they were halted, 
and were passed by Wikoff s brigade of regular in 
fantry the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth, 
which moved down the left-hand road, crossed the 
river, and deployed into position to the left of the 
lower ford, with the Thirteenth on the right, the 
Ninth on the left. All this was done under a heavy 
fire how heavy may be judged from the fact that 
within half an hour, between twelve and one o clock, 
the brigade had four commanders. Colonel Wikoff 
the ranking American officer killed in the war 
was mortally shot as he stood near the river, per 
sonally directing the deployment of his men, and 
daringly exposing himself. His successor, Lieu 
tenant-Colonel Worth, of the Thirteenth, fell five 
minutes later, severely wounded; in another five 
minutes Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, of the Twenty- 
fourth, the next in command, was also wounded, 
leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, of the Ninth, 
senior officer of the brigade, f 

Farther to the right, the Sixth and the Sixteenth 
were suffering still more severely. General Haw 
kins had directed these regiments to push forward, 
telling them that they would reach a position where 
they could enfilade the enemy s works. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Egbert, commanding the Sixth, made his 
way across both rivers, and after halting for about an 
hour in a partly sheltered position along the bank 
of the second which in his report he calls the San 

* Nevertheless, the regiments that followed were more or less im 
peded by being obliged to "step over prostrate forms of men of the 
Seventy-first," as General Kent and other officers reported. 

t Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers was not aware of this until after the 
taking of the hill. It is a fact that the brigade charged with no officer 
actually in command. 


Juan exchanging shots with the lines on the hill 
above, he boldly moved forward into the open 
ground beyond, within four hundred yards of the 
Spanish trenches. He was greeted with a tremen 
dous fusillade, the whole fire of the heights being 
concentrated upon him. Nearly a quarter of his 
men were killed or wounded within ten minutes. 
To save the rest he ordered them to retreat to the 
river. On his left, at the same time, some men of 
the Sixteenth and of the Thirteenth, who had 
advanced beyond the main bodies of their regi 
ments, also fell back ; and the Tenth Cavalry s 
Hotchkiss gun detachment, which had fired a few 
shots from a position near the ford of the Aguadores, 
had been forced to withdraw. All along the Ameri 
can line there was so much confusion, and the losses 
had been so heavy, that affairs began to look de 
cidedly critical. 

Meanwhile Kent was hurrying his remaining 
brigade the second, Colonel Pearson s forward, 
the Tenth and Second Infantry by the left-hand trail, 
to the left of WikofFs men, the Twenty-first by the 
main road, to support Hawkins ; and about one 
o clock all these regiments were in line beyond the 
river. The cavalry division was already in position 
on the right wing, Colonel Carroll s brigade, which 
led the way across the river, forming the first line. 
Of his regiments, the Third was on the left, next to 
the infantry division ; the Sixth was in the centre, 
the Ninth on the extreme right. Wood s brigade 
formed, or was supposed to form, a second line, with 
the Tenth on the left, the First in the centre, and the 
Rough Riders on the right; but owing to the ex 
ceedingly difficult nature of the ground the cavalry 
kept even less of orderly formation than Kent s 
division, and in the charge the two lines mingled 
and rushed forward together. 

The American lines were now at an average dis 
tance of about six hundred yards from the enemy s 


works. The Spanish position was a strong one, its 
centre being Fort San Juan a large brick block 
house with loopholed walls, on the summit of a ridge 
that rose about a hundred and fifty feet above the 
low ground at its foot. Along the crest ran four 
long trenches and several shorter ones, and the slope 
was partially protected with barbed-wire entangle 
ments. Farther to the American right, in front of 
the cavalry division, a slightly lower hill rose in 
front of the main ridge. On this detached elevation 
which became known as Kettle Hill, from a huge 
iron sugar caldron on its top, belonging to the San 
Juan ranch-house was posted the Spanish advance 
guard, " favourably positioned," as General Wheeler 
says, " but not strongly fortified." 

There is some doubt as to the direct responsibil 
ity for what followed. General Shafter, in his narra 
tive published by the Century Magazine, states that 
about nine o clock he decided to send the main col 
umn forward without waiting for Lawton, as origi 
nally intended. " They understood," he says, " that 
they were to assail the Spanish blockhouses and 
trenches as soon as they could get into position." It 
seems, nevertheless, that some at least of the com 
manders did not so understand their instructions. 
Both in his official report and in his book on the 
campaign, General Wheeler describes the original 
plan of attack in which Lawton was to have joined, 
and adds that after his division crossed the river 
he ordered an assault for the reason that " it was 
quite evident that the enemy had our range very 
accurately established, and that it would not increase 
our casualties to charge." The general does not add 
that his men had already been in position for two 
hours or more, holding their ground under a fire 
from which they had very little shelter. Several 
messages came and went during the day between 
Shafter and Lieutenant Miley, who was representing 
him at the front; but no mention is made of any 



that passed at this critical moment of the battle. 
Communication with the corps commander was by 
no means easy. The field telegraph had been ex 
tended only to El Pozo, nearly two miles from the 
firing line, along a rough and narrow trail blocked 
with wagons and wounded men.* 

General Hawkins is quoted by a correspondent 
as saying, after the fight : " My understanding of the 
orders was that the left wing was to wait at a desig 
nated place on the road to San Juan for Lawton 
to come up, but the fire was so hot that we either 
had to go on and take the ridge or to retire." 

General Kent s report does not locate the re 
sponsibility for his division s assault upon the hill. 
It does state, however, that early in the morning 
Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, Shafter s adjutant- 
general, pointed out a green knoll which was to be 
his objective on the left ; but when his left, formed 
by Pearson s brigade, had crossed the river, it 
" passed over the knoll and ascended the high ridge 
beyond." When it did so, Kent s centre and right 
were already holding the Fort San Juan Hill, for the 
capture of which he gives credit to " the officers of 
my command, whether company, battalion, regi 
mental, or brigade commanders, who admirably 
directed the formation of their troops, unavoidably 
intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the des 
perate rush for the distant and strongly defended 

Most explicit of all and, it must be said, most 
positive in its implied contradiction of General 
Shafter s version is the report of General Sumner. 
So far from setting out with the plain and simple 
order to " assail the Spanish blockhouses and 
trenches as soon as he could get into position," he 

* It may be recalled at this point that in Shafter s despatch of June 
agth, quoted on page 234, he announced his intention of advancing, 
two days later, "on the Sevilla road to the San Juan river, and possi 
bly beyond. 1 


records that his command had advanced only three 
quarters of a mile beyond El Pozo when he had 
to halt it though already under fire for nearly an 
hour to await instructions. Then, after crossing the 
Aguadores, he was directed to move to the right, 
" to connect with Lawton s left." The deployment 
completed, and there being no news of Lawton, 
" the command was so much committed to battle 
that it became necessary either to advance or else 
retreat under fire. Lieutenant Miley, representing 
General Shafter, authorized an advance, which was 
ordered." It appears that to Lieutenant Miley 
whose promising military career was cut short, a 
year later, by a fatal illness at Manila belongs a 
great share of the responsibility for the assault upon 
the San Juan heights, and of the credit for its 

The story of the assault, in brief, was that the 

right half of Sumner s division consisting chiefly 

of the First Cavalrv, the Ninth Cav- 

Storming of the j and th Rough Riders, but with 
San Juan Jt . te . 

heights, July i. man y stragglers from other regi 
ments, charged up Kettle Hill, the 
Spaniards fleeing as they came up the slope. 
Reaching the top, they were in time to see the 
American centre and left move upon the main Span 
ish position an attack of greater difficulty, there 
being a wider intervening space to traverse, and the 
defenders being much stronger in numbers. The 
charge was not a swift rush of cheering regiments, 
sweeping forward in serried ranks, as the popular 
fancy has pictured it. It was a climb up a rough, 
steep slope, covered with tall grass and dotted with 
trees, and the assailants were irregular masses of 
men, now halting to fire, now rushing on, breaking 
down the wire fences or vaulting over them. Of 
the many descriptions given by officers who took 
part in it, perhaps the most graphic is that of Cap 
tain Bigelow, of the Tenth Cavalry, who was at 



about the centre of the American line. He reports 
that after cutting an impeding fence with a sharp 
ened bayonet : 

I struck out as fast as the tall grass would permit me 
toward the common objective of the mass of men which I 
now saw surging forward on my right and left San Juan 
Hill. The men kept up a steady double time, and com 
menced firing of their own accord over one another s 
heads and the heads of the officers, who were well out in 
front of the men. I tried to stop the firing, as I thought 
it would seriously retard the advance, and other officers 
near me tried to stop it; but a constant stream of bullets 
went over our heads, the men halting in an erect position 
to fire. The men covered, I should say, about fifty yards 
from front to rear. They formed a swarm rather than 
a line. 

Close under the ridge there was a considerable 
space sheltered from fire by the steep slope above, 
the Spanish trenches having been located too far 
back upon the crest of the hill. Here, at some 
points, the assailants halted to gather themselves 
together. Captain Kerr, of the Sixth Cavalry, re 
ports that his squadron was half an hour in this 
" dead " space, about sixty yards from the summit, 
not being in sufficient force to charge the trenches, 
and the Spaniards not daring to leave their defences 
and fire down upon him. 

Immediately under the blockhouse the charging 
troops were stopped by the fire of the American 
artillery and machine guns, which just at this time 
began to pour in upon the Spanish lines. Lieu 
tenant Parker, who had been sent forward with the 
somewhat vague order to " make the best use he 
could " of his Catlings, got three of them into action 
about the centre of the firing line, and poured a 
destructive stream of bullets along the top of the 
hill as the assault began. Back at El Pozo, where 
Captain Grimes had been firing intermittently dur 
ing the day, Best s and Parkhurst s batteries had 
gone into position beside him, and had sent one 
round of shells into the Spanish blockhouse and 


trenches. As they saw these projectiles and the 
Catling bullets striking above them, the leaders of 
the charge stopped, although at that very moment 
the Spaniards were running from their defences. 

" At this time," reports Captain Allen, of the 
Sixteenth Infantry, " there arose at the foot of the 
slope and in the field behind us a great cry of Come 
back ! Come back ! The trumpets there sounded 
Cease firing, Report/ and Assembly. The men 
hesitated, stopped, and began drifting down the 
steep slope." 

" We rushed forward almost to the trenches," 
says Captain Byrne, of the Sixth, " when shells from 
our guns in rear commenced to fall a short dis 
tance, probably thirty yards, in front of us, and we 
saw that those in rear had stopped and would not 
follow or support us. In this front party there were 
comparatively very few men, not enough to accom 
plish anything, and we turned reluctantly back." 

Captain McFarland, of the Sixteenth, another of 
the leading officers, was wounded at this point it 
was thought by the fire from the rear. But the 
American batteries now ceased firing ; and a few 
minutes later the time was half past one o clock 
the infantrymen made a final rush, occupied the 
trenches, in which only dead and wounded men were 
left, and poured a brisk fusillade upon the retreating 

When the cavalrymen on Kettle Hill saw the cen 
tre and left charging, they supported the movement 
first by firing volleys into the Spanish lines and then 
by moving on to attack the San Juan ridge. Rush 
ing across the intervening valley and through a 
swampy pond, they climbed the heights north of the 
blockhouse. Here, too, the Spaniards ran before 
the assailants came to close quarters. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Viele, of the First Cavalry, was left to hold 
Kettle Hill with all the men he could gather for a 
reserve force. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, of the 


Ninth Cavalry, had been shot dead on the hill, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll, the brigade com 
mander, was wounded there. 

General Hawkins, who had personally started 
the Sixth and the Sixteenth in their charge, running 
with them and waving his hat, was the first general 
officer to ascend the ridge, about half an hour after 
it was taken ; and shortly afterward, when General 
Kent came up, the gallant brigadier reported to his 
division commander that his two regiments of regu 
lars had captured the Spanish \vorks at Fort San 
Juan. Kent later pronounced this a mistake, and 
attributed an equal share in the exploit to the three 
regiments of Colonel Ewers s brigade, the Ninth, 
Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth. The Spanish flag 
on the blockhouse was captured by a private of the 
Thirteenth.* Nevertheless, it is no more than jus 
tice to say that to the Sixth and the Sixteenth fell 
the very hardest of the fighting the casualty lists 
prove this and that they took the lead in the as 
sault on the key of the enemy s position. 

It appears from Lieutenant Miiller s rather con 
fused account of the battle that the Spaniards " fore 
most echelon," posted on San Juan Hill, consisted 
of three hundred men under Colonel Jose Baquero, 
with two small rapid-fire guns commanded by Colo 
nel Ordonez. The guns were placed behind the 
crest of the first hill, and were withdrawn in time to 
escape capture. Of the two commanding officers, 
Colonel Baquero was killed, Colonel Ordonez 
wounded. The force in the second line, that of Fort 
San Juan, the lieutenant does not specify, beyond 
stating it at three hundred men when the battle 
opened. Several bodies of reinforcements were sent 
forward during the morning, among them being a 
detachment of marines under Captain Bustamente, 

* Captain Noble, of the Sixteenth (afterward major of the Twenty- 
fifth), states in a letter to the author that "the Thirteenth found the 
flag lying on the roof, after our men had gone through the blockhouse." 


Admiral Cervera s chief of staff, who was mortally 
wounded early in the afternoon. About the same 
time Lieutenant-General Linares, who had come 
up from his headquarters at the junction of the roads 
from Santiago to San Juan and to Caney, was shot 
through the arm. He was carried on a stretcher to 
his house in the city, relinquishing his command to 
Major-General Jose Toral. 

Colonel Roosevelt states the Spanish strength at 
San Juan as forty-five hundred, which is merely an 
estimate, arrived at by taking six thousand as the 
total effective force in Santiago and deducting fif 
teen hundred for the outpost at Caney and the gar 
risons of the harbour forts. It is not likely, how 
ever, that General Linares was able to put every 
soldier he had, outside of these detachments, into 
action at any one point. He had men at Fort Agua- 
dores, and others on the north and west of the city.* 
Colonel Aldea s regiment was not withdrawn from 
the other side of the bay until July 2d. 

Lieutenant Miley puts the number defending the 
San Juan intrenchments at 750, adding that behind 
them, close around the city, were 3,500 soldiers, 
sailors, and marines. His figures, apparently, are 
based on those of Lieutenant Miiller. The Spanish 
court of inquiry which tried and acquitted Toral de- 

* Senator Lodge, in his brilliant but highly inaccurate narrative of 
the war, asserts that " the Spaniards had 12,000 to 13,000 men in San 
tiago ; they had over 9,000 along the line of defences on the east side, 
confronting the Americans." Adding 3,500 for Escario s brigade, 
which arrived July 3d, and deducting 1,000 for the naval landing par 
ties, this would make about 15,000 at the time of the surrender a 
great over-statement. Tt must be remembered, too, that at least 1,000 
Spaniards were in the hospitals. More than 2,000 sick and wounded 
men chiefly the former were found there when S s hafter occupied 
the city. 

As another instance of Senator Lodge s misrepresentations, he 
quotes Lieutenant Muller as saying that there were " only 3,000 men 
defending Santiago," and denounces him for so transparent a false 
hood. Lieutenant Muller nowhere states the total Spanish strength at 
any such figure. On the contrary, in one place he catalogues 6,190 
troops and mentions others ; in another, he estimates the entire force 
as " at most, 8,000 men." 


clared in its report that 1,700 men were available 
to meet the attack, but its list of regiments does not 
include the naval detachment. From these per- 
plexingly different statements, and in the absence 
of exact and trustworthy Spanish returns, it does 
not seem probable that the defenders of San Juan 
were more than three thousand at most. The at 
tacking force, undoubtedly, greatly outnumbered 
them ; but allowing for this, their resistance was far 
less tenacious than Vara del Rey s at Caney. They 
replied briskly to the American fire, but, as usual, 
their marksmanship was poor, the great majority 
of their bullets flying too high. Very little of their 
musketry seemed to be aimed at individual objects ; 
when the attacking force came within short range 
of the trenches they put their rifles at arms length 
above their heads, and pulled trigger at a guess. 
When the Americans charged home, they fled with 
out waiting for a hand-to-hand fight. 

Lieutenant Miiller states the Spaniards loss for 
the day, including both Caney and San Juan, as 
being 593 94 killed, 376 wounded, 123 prisoners 
and missing. Elsewhere he gives these same figures 
as the casualty list for the three days, July ist to 3d 
a discrepancy which does not create added confi 
dence in the accuracy of his statistics. Moreover, he 
says that of 520 men at Caney only 80 returned, 
most of them crippled and bruised. Not reckoning 
any of the " crippled and bruised " as wounded, this 
leaves only 153 for all casualties at San Juan an 
incredibly small figure. Probably he does not in 
clude the losses of the naval brigade ; very possibly 
his returns are for the Spanish regulars only. Six 
or seven hundred wounded men were found in the 
hospitals when the city surrendered. It is easy to 
believe, however, that the defenders losses were 
much smaller than those of the assailants. 

On the American side, Kent s division, with a 
strength of 5,206 men, had 93 killed, 492 wounded, 


and 58 missing. Most of the missing were in the 
Seventy-first New York, and nearly all reported 
later. The cavalry division suffered slightly more 
in proportion to its numbers, losing 45 killed and 
313 wounded, with 10 missing, of its total of 2,738 
men. The following table shows the losses by regi 
ments, as reported by the division commanders : * 




Kent s Division : 




Sixth. Infantry . . 


Seventy-first New York 





Tenth Infantry 


Twenty-first Infantry 

* * 

Second Infantry 



" * 

Ninth Infantry 




Thirteenth Infantry 



Twenty-fourth Infantry 



Cavalry Division : 
Third Cavalry 


e T 

Sixth Cavalry 


Ninth Cavalry 




First Cavalry 

I a 




Tenth Cavalry 
First Volunteer Cavalry 



6 9 



The work of Lieutenant Parker and his Catling 
detachment at a critical moment of the battle has 
already been mentioned. After the taking of the 
heights he went forward to the firing line ; so did 
Lieutenant Hughes, with the Hotchkiss guns. The 
field artillery played no great part in the battle. 
General Shafter states that when Grimes s battery 
opened fire, early in the morning, upon the San Juan 
blockhouse, " this fire was effective, and the enemy 
could be seen running away from the vicinity of the 
blockhouse." Evidently, however, they came back 
again when the bombardment, which seems to have 

* The following; table shows the whole American strength at San 
Juan and the losses during the ist, 2d, and 3d of July, as given by the 

R A 



done no noticeable damage, was over. Grimes fired 
for fifteen or twenty minutes and then stopped, prac 
tically silenced by the Spaniards return fire, which 
was fairly spirited and accurate, causing several 
casualties in the battery and in regiments halted 
near it. The Spanish artillery had the great advan 
tage of using smokeless powder, making it a far less 
conspicuous target than the American guns. 

Grimes resumed firing at intervals, but dis 
charged only a hundred and sixty shots during the 
day not a large number for guns calculated to fire 
three shots a minute. When Best and Parkhurst, 
who had been held in reserve, came into action, 

Returns Division of the adjutant-general s office. Ther 
crepancies between its figures and those printed above : 

eral s office. There are slight dis 

Kent s Division, staff u 

Hawkins s Brigade, staff 6 

Sixteenth Infantry 679 

Sixth Infantry. 

Seventy-first New York 969 

Pearson s Brigade, staff 

Second Infantry . 
Tenth Infantry . . 

Twenty-first Infantry 467 

Wikoff s Brigade, staff 5 

Ninth Infantry 466 

Thirteenth Infantry 465 

Twenty-fourth Infantry . . 

Wheeler s Division, staff 13 

Sumner s Brigade, staff. 

Third Cavalry 

Sixth Cavalry 451 

Ninth Cavalry 219 

Wood s Brigade, staff 10 

First Cavalry 523 

Tenth Cavalry 480 

First Volunteer Cavalry 583 

Artillery, three batteries 242 

Second Cavalry (estimated) 

Total 8,336 

June 30th. 

July ist-sd. 

July ist-3d. 






Besides the above casualties, on the 2d and ,-?d Lawton s division 
lost 6 killed and 33 wounded ; Bates s brigade, i killed and 18 wounded. 


Major Dillenback reports that " after a vigorous 
shelling of the enemy s works on the ridge by all 
three batteries, the position was occupied by our 
infantry." As a matter of fact, this " vigorous shell 
ing " consisted in firing just eight shells, one by 
each of Best s and Parkhurst s guns, Grimes s men 
being engaged, at the time, in refilling their ammu 
nition chests. Captain Parkhurst, in his interesting 
account of The Artillery at Santiago, claims that the 
eight shots fell with marvellous accuracy into the 
trenches and blockhouse, and did more to drive the 
Spaniards from their defences than all the rest of the 
American fire. Lieutenant Parker, in his narra 
tive of The Catlings at Santiago, is equally confi 
dent that his machine guns were the more effective 
weapon, and asserts that not a shell hit the block 
house or exploded near it. 

The hill taken, Best s battery was hurried for 
ward, escorted by a troop of the Second Cavalry, 
and took station with the firing line, two hundred 
yards north of the San Juan blockhouse. It stayed 
there for about ten minutes, and then, finding the 
Spanish fire too warm, fell back to Kettle Hill, 
where it was of no further service, the higher ridge 
in front shutting it off from the enemy. 

In the demoralized condition of the Spaniards as 
they fled from their defences, the Americans might 
probably have marched straight forward into San 
tiago ; but after eight hours marching and fighting 
under a blazing sun they were too much exhausted 
to do more than hold what they had won. A few 
men of the Tenth Cavalry, the Rough Riders, and 
other regiments who had pushed on beyond the 
main line, were recalled. There was no available 
reserve, except the Seventy-first New York, some 
of whose men had already joined other commands 
in the assault of the hill, and the rest of which was 
moved forward during the afternoon. Lawton s 
nonarrival left the right of the American line with- 


out support, and along the thinned ranks of the 
cavalry division it was fully expected that the enemy 
would return in force to retake the captured posi 
tion. In response to urgent messages from Sumner 
and Wood, Kent moved tfre Thirteenth Infantry 
over from his centre to support them, but he could 
spare no other troops. 

Viewing the battle from the hill near his head 
quarters, Shafter had naturally felt anxiety at Law- 
ton s failure to finish his work at Caney in the two 
hours allowed him. As the day wore on and Vara 
del Rev s men still held out, he sent one of his 
aids with instructions that Lawton should withdraw 7 
from Caney and march down the Santiago road to 
join Wheeler s right. The movement ordered was 
undoubtedly a correct one. Lawton s division was 
urgently needed at the front, while Caney was not 
a vital point in the American campaign, and would 
in any case become untenable by the Spaniards 
when the hills of San Juan were taken. But to 
abandon an attack in which so many lives had been 
sacrificed would be to admit a defeat, and the order 
was not obeyed. General Shafter, whose reports 
were notably generous to his subordinate officers, 
says that when his messenger reached Lawton, " the 
troops were in the act of making the final charge ; 
nothing could stop them ; and when that charge 
was over, the fight at El Caney was won. It was 
then near evening." Captain Lee, the British mili 
tary attache, in his account of the battle, of which 
he was an eyewitness, records the arrival of Shafter s 
order at half past one at least an hour before the 
storming of the fort. In Lawton s report it is not 
mentioned at all. 

The first American troops to leave Caney were 
the two regiments of Bates s brigade, the Third and 
the Twentieth. General Bates says in his report that 
" after consultation with General Chaffee " he with 
drew at about half past four, hoping to be in time to 


take part in the battle at San Juan. Retracing their 
steps toward El Pozo, his men, who had been 
marching or fighting all day and most of the previ 
ous night, were too much exhausted to move fast, 
and as darkness was coming on Bates halted them 
at the first stream they crossed, and rode to Shafter s 
headquarters for instructions. The general ordered 
him to the left of Kent s line, and at midnight his 
tired troops were in position there. 

It was near sunset before Lawton could get his 
men in motion, marching forward in column along 
the road from Caney to Santiago, which is a good 
macadamized highway, the only good road running 
east from Santiago. He left five companies of the 
Seventh Infantry, and one of the Seventeenth, as a 
guard at Caney. The head of the column had 
passed the Ducrot house the abandoned country 
place of a French resident of Santiago and was 
nearing the right of Wheeler s position, when the 
order was given to halt for supper. The soldiers 
were boiling their coffee when bullets began to fall 
among them. It was impossible to tell just whence 
the fire came, and Lawton, not knowing what might 
be in front of him, and not considering it safe to 
advance further in the darkness, sent back to Shafter 
for orders. The messenger reached headquarters 
half an hour after midnight, and returned with in 
structions that Lawton should turn about face to 
ward Caney, and make his way to the front along 
the El Pozo trail. This long and circuitous march 
took all the rest of the night. At half past seven next 
morning (July 2d) Chaffee s brigade reached San 
Juan and deployed to the right of Wheeler s lines ; 
and the whole division was in position by noon. 

To complete the story of the operations of July 
Duffieid s feint Ist ^ on ly remains to mention Gen- 
at Fort Agua- eral Duffieid s movement against 
dores, juiy i. Fort Aguadores. On the previous 
day Shafter wrote to Sampson : 


I wish you would bombard the works at Aguadores 
in support of a regiment of infantry which I shall send 
there early to-morrow. 

Accordingly, at sunrise on the 1st, the New York, 
the Gloucester, and the Suwanee were lying off the 
shore, ready to use their guns. Three hours later 
the Thirty-third Michigan came up, having been 
brought from Siboney on the narrow-gauge railway, 
and the ships opened fire on the old fort west of the 
San Juan River, and on a couple of rifle pits upon a 
hill behind it. Not more than twenty Spanish sol 
diers were to be seen, and these disappeared when 
the shells began to fly. When the order to cease 
firing was given by the New York, the Suwanee sig 
nalled for permission to knock down the flag on 
the fort. Sampson replied that she might have three . 
shots. Lieutenant Blue, the hero of two venture 
some reconnoitring expeditions, fired them with a 
four-inch gun, at thirteen hundred yards. The first 
tore the Spanish ensign, the second struck near the 
base of the staff and bent it, the third shot staff and 
flag away. 

The Michigan volunteers now advanced as far 
as the bridge over the river, which the enemy had 
broken down, and for some time a few Spaniards 
concealed among the trees on the hill beyond the 
stream exchanged a desultory fire with them. Sev 
eral requests were signalled to the ships to drive the 
enemy off, to which the New York uniformly replied 
that there was no perceptible enemy to drive off. 
About noon the Spaniards brought afield piece along 
the railway from Santiago. It had fired only four or 
five shots when the New York turned her guns upon 
it and silenced it; but General Durfield, who had 
had two men killed and six wounded, withdrew his 
regiment to Siboney. * The New York remained off 
Fort Aguadores another hour. She was joined by 
the Oregon, and both ships slowly fired eight-inch 
shells over the hills in the direction of Santiago. 


General Duffield has been severely criticised 
for his half-hearted and resultless attack, but the 
general, in reply, has shown that he acted in 
precise accordance with Shafter s orders. At the 
conference of June 3Oth, at El Pozo, the corps 
commander cautioned him not to drive the 
Spaniards out of their position, as they might come 
upon the exposed left flank of the American line. 
On the following day Shatter telephoned to Si- 
boney : 

I do not wish you to sacrifice any of your men, but 
to worry the enemy at Aguadores sufficiently to keep 
him there. 

Shatter himself confirms General Duffield s state 
ment. In his official report he states that that officer 
" attacked Aguadores as ordered, but was unable to 
accomplish more than to detain the Spaniards in that 
vicinity." In his Century article, he says that the 
general " was ordered to make a feint at Aguadores, 
to detain the Spanish troops in the vicinity. This 
movement was well executed." In his indorsement 
on General Duffield s report, dated September 30, 
1898, he is still more explicit, saying that the object 
of the manoeuvre was " accomplished perfectly," 
and adding: 

There was no intention of attempting to capture the 
place, as it would naturally fall with Santiago, and, be 
sides, was very strong. I had had the place carefully 
examined by my engineer officers and General Bates, 
besides personal observation of it in passing it, and knew 
it was no place to assault, and not on the true line of 
advances for Santiago. 

As to the strategy of the movement, it would 
appear, at a time when men were so urgently needed 
where real fighting was in progress, that it was a 
mistake to detach a whole regiment, not to men 
tion three war ships, to detain the few Spaniards 
Duffield states them at five hundred, and his esti 
mate is probably much too high who held Fort 


Aguadores.* As much might have been accom 
plished by a single company, or by a boat load of 
marines from the fleet. 

On the following day July 2d the demonstra 
tion was repeated, on a smaller scale, by a bat 
talion of the Thirty-third Michigan under Major 
Webb, who exchanged a few shots with the Span 
iards, and had one man fatally wounded. 

On the evening of July ist the " thin blue line " 

of Wheeler s and Kent s divisions was holding the 

ridge from which it had driven the 

The "thin blue Spaniards, and keeping up a rifle duel 

line " before -.11 i ^1 J 

Santiago. wltn tne enemy posted in their second 

series of trenches, a few hundred yards 
nearer Santiago. The soldiers had won a very gal 
lant victory, but the situation was one of no little 
anxiety. A thousand men had been killed and 
wounded, and many others detailed to find and bury 
the dead and to carry the injured to the rear ; all 
were exhausted, and as most of them, while fighting 
in the tropical heat, had thrown away either of 
their own motion or by order of their officers 
everything but guns and ammunition, there was 
little to eat except the scanty rations the Spaniards 
had left in the captured position. Few men had 
coats, still fewer had blankets. The discomfort of 
the situation was extreme, but its imminent danger 
was the thinness of the American line at such a dis 
tance from its support, and so close in front of a 
considerable force of the enemy. 

General Wheeler records that a number of 
officers urged him to abandon the San Juan heights, 
and take up a more defensible position farther back ; 
but the veteran fighter stoutly refused to withdraw, 
and fearing that the same appeal would be made to 
the commanding general he sent a message to head- 

*A prisoner told General Wheeler that the garrison consisted of 
one hundred men, with three guns, two of which were useless (The 
Santiago Campaign, p. 303). 


quarters that such a movement " would cost us 
much prestige." He had already requested that 
intrenching tools should be hurried forward. As 
soon as it was dark Shafter sent all he had, and 
Wheeler personally set his weary men at work to 
fortify their position, telling General Kent to do 
the same. As with most of the supplies of the corps, 
there were not enough shovels to go around, but 
the deficiency was partly remedied with Spanish 
tools found along the enemy s trenches. 

Shafter also ordered all the field artillery to the 
front, and during the night three batteries 
Grimes s, Best s, and Parkhurst s occupied the 
position which Best had attempted to hold the day 
before, with orders to open, at dawn, on the near 
est part of Santiago, the centre of the Spanish posi 
tion. " We ought to knock that part of the town 
to pieces in a short time," Shafter told Colonel 
McClernand, but this proved too much to ex 
pect of a dozen three-inch field pieces. After fir 
ing for about an hour, greatly hampered by their 
own smoke,* and under a heavy fusillade from 
the enemy s lines, Major Dillenback ordered them 
to withdraw, and they fell back all the way to El 
Pozo, where Capron, returning from Caney, joined 

All day, on the 2d of July, firing was kept up 
between the two armies, with considerable loss on 
both sides, the American casualties being about one 
hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Among the 
wounded was General Hawkins, who was succeeded 
as brigade commander by Colonel Theaker, of the 
Sixteenth. Shafter s line was now extended by the 

* Lieutenant Aultman, who was left in command of Captain Park- 
hurst s battery by the wounding of the latter officer, early in the morn 
ing, reports : " Our fire was unaimed, and the results could neither be 
observed nor ascertained, as our view was absolutely obscured by our 
own smoke " a severe commentary upon the mismanagement that 
sent the artillery into the field equipped with a powder discarded by 
every military power. 


arrival of Bates and Lawton, on the left and on the 
right respectively, but it was as thinly held as ever, 
and another anxious day followed. Lying on their 
arms, at some points only a quarter of a mile from 
the enemy, under a continual fire and in constant 
expectation of an attack in force, the men felt 
the strain of the situation severely. Without shel 
ter, they were alternately drenched with rain and 
scorched by the sun. The trail to El Pozo and 
Siboney had become almost impassable, and so lit 
tle food could be brought up that semistarvation was 
added to physical exhaustion. 

At the rear, the sufferings of the wounded were 
nothing less than shocking. It was not realized at 
first how heavy the American losses had been. 
Shafter telegraphed to Washington,* late on July 
ist, that his casualties were " above four hundred," 
including but few killed. When the four hundred 
grew to be thrice as many, the medical department 
was simply overwhelmed, devotedly as its personnel 
worked to cope with so entirely unexpected a situa 
tion. For the wounded men the journey from the 
chief emergency station, at the ford of the Agua- 
dores River, to the field hospital near El Pozo and 
the general hospital at Siboney was a terrible one. 
There were practically no ambulances, and but a 
limited number of wagons springless vehicles of 
bare and splintered boards that caused frightful 
agony to the ghastly freight they bore over the 
rough trail. They carried only those who could not 
possibly make "their way over the six miles afoot, 
perhaps with a rude crutch cut from a tree. Most 
of the wounded men were half naked, many entirely 
so. There were not enough tents or cots or cover 
ings for them in the hospitals, not enough medi- 

* Shafter was in communication with Washington through a coast 
wise cable from Santiago to Playa del Este, which had been picked up 
and carried ashore at Siboney, where it connected with the field tele 
phone to his headquarters. 


cines,* not enough surgeons, not nearly enough 
nurses, and no better food than canned meat and 
hardtack. A heavy penalty was being paid for the 
failure to bring proper hospital equipments from 
Tampa, but it was not being paid by those respon 
sible for the failure. And yet this was one of the 
strangest facts of the campaign the mortality 
among the wounded was phenomenally small, being 
only about one per cent. 

Though the Spaniards maintained a constant fire 
until fighting was suspended by Shafter s flag of 
truce about noon on the 3d, it does not seem that 
they made any real sortie against the beleaguering 
lines, although there were several alarms of an 
attack, and once, at least, the American troops be 
lieved that they had repelled an assault in force. 
This was between nine and ten o clock on the night 
of July 2d, when a wave of fierce firing swept around 
the trenches. Shafter speaks of it as " the attack 
called the night sortie," and adds that " it did not 
amount to much, though there was wild firing in 
the dark." This is no doubt a more correct account 
than the earlier one he gave in his official report: 
" About ten P. M. the enemy made a vigorous 
assault to break through my lines, but he was re 
pulsed at all points." His authority was probably 
the statement in Kent s report that " at nine p. M. 
a vigorous assault was made all along our lines. 
This was completely repulsed, the enemy again re 
tiring to his trenches." Wheeler makes no mention 
of the supposed sortie. The division commanders, 
at the time, were with Shafter at El Pozo. 

" Suddenly a burst of firing broke out," says 
Lieutenant Parker, who was at the front with the 

* This was admitted even by the army staff. " During and after 
the battles at El Caney and San Juan there was an insufficiency of 
tents, cots, bedding, and medicines," said Surgeon-General Sternberg 
in his annual report for 1898. Unofficial observers with the army- 
George Kennan, for instance, in Campaigning in Cuba describe a 
scene of pitiable misery and gruesome horror. 


cavalry division, " and it was believed by many that 
a serious night attack had been made." The lieu 
tenant tells how two officers near his position tried 
to stop the waste of ammunition in the dark. Lieu 
tenant-Colonel Roosevelt strode along the trenches 
in front of the Rough Riders and told them that 
" he thought cowboys were men who shot only when 
they could see the whites of the other fellow s eyes." 
Captain Ayres, of the Tenth Cavalry, called to his 
negro troopers that they were " no better than the 
Cubans," upon which the men laughed and ceased 
their wild firing.* How wild it was is shown by the 
fact that some American officers reported that they 
were fired upon from their own lines. 

On their side, at the same time, the Spaniards 
believed that they had sustained and repelled an 
attack. " A little before ten P. M.," f says Lieuten 
ant Miiller, " the enemy, who no doubt intended to 
surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was 
repulsed with great loss." 

At six o clock on the evening of the 2d, General 
Shafter summoned his division commanders to meet 
him at El Pozo. The conference began about eight, 
and each of the officers he had sent for Wheeler, 
Lawton, Kent, and Bates beginning with the 
junior, gave his view of the situation. The four men 
were not unanimous upon the question of a with 
drawal ; but after an hour s discussion, Shafter 
stated his intention of making no 
First demand m ove at present. Early the next 
Ju y 3 ler morning he took two steps which may 
at first seem somewhat contradictory, 
but which can readily be reconciled. He tele 
graphed to the Secretary of War : 

* Lieutenant Parker seems to date this incident as occurring "on 
the night of the 3d " (The Catlings at Santiago, p. i6i\ but the night 
of the 2d must be meant, as firing was suspended at noon on July 3d 
until ten A. M. on the 5th. 

t This appears, in the translation published by the Navy Depart 
ment, as " ten A. M." an evident mistake, as it occurs at the end of the 


We have the town well invested on the north and 
east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it 
we find it of such a character and the defences so strong 
it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present 
force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about 
five miles and taking up a new position on the high 
ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with 
our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies to a 
large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, 
having engines and cars at Siboney. 

At the same time he sent a flag of truce into the 
enemy s lines with this message to the u command 
ing general of the Spanish forces " : 

SIR: I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell 
Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign 
countries, and all women and children, that they should 
leave the city before ten o clock to-morrow morning. 

In the fire of criticism, just and unjust, of which 
General Shafter has been the object, his despatch to 
Secretary Alger has been cited in proof of his vacil 
lation and mental and physical debility. In reality, 
the fact that he demanded the enemy s surrender 
while he was warning his Government that he might 
be compelled to move backward, shows his correct 
estimate of the situation, and his promptness and 
resolution in availing himself of it. It was, to a cer 
tain extent, like Grant after the first day of Shiloh. 
His position was bad, and might become untenable, 
but he had reason to believe that that of the enemy 
was much worse. The Spanish troops were neces 
sarily quite as exhausted as his own men; it was 
known that their food was meagre, and it was easy 
to guess that their ammunition was running low. 
The climate was but little less trying to them than 
to the Americans. Blockaded by sea, defeated on 
land, what could Toral see before him but destruc 
tion or surrender? 

day s chronicle, and a few lines farther on the affair is called " a night 



At Washington, where the situation was very 
imperfectly understood Shafter s despatches had 
been few and not specially luminous there was 
some natural anxiety. Secretary Alger had waited 
with the President until four o clock that morning 
(July 3d) for news from the front, one of the last 
despatches they received on the 2d having been a re 
quest for more surgeons. It was nearly noon when 
the telegram telling of a possible retreat reached 
them. The secretary, a politician as well as a sol 
dier, replied : 

Of course you can judge the situation better than we 
can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold 
your present position, especially San Juan heights, the 
effect upon the country would be much better than fall 
ing back. 

Shafter s answer, received at Washington shortly 
after midnight, was brief and decided : 

I shall hold my present position. 

For in the meantime the situation had entirely 
changed. Cervera s squadron had gone out of the 
harbour, leaving the city to its fate. 



DURING the battle of the ist of July Cervera s 
ships threw a few shells in the direction of the Amer 
ican lines, but with little effect, as the intervening 
hills prevented any accurate aim. The Punta Gorda 
battery also joined in the firing, but its heavier guns 
turned seaward, and could not be brought to bear. 

During the day the French consul at Santiago 
wrote to the admiral, inquiring whether he intended 
to bombard the city if the American troops occupied 
it, and requesting that he should not do so without 
giving notice. Cervera replied, next morning, that 
if the enemy entered Santiago he would at once turn 
his guns on the town, without further warning. 
The French official at once informed his country 
men and the other consuls, and there was something 
of a panic. Mr. Ramsden, the British representa 
tive, sent the civil governor of Santiago to see Cer 
vera, who modified his truculent announcement 
for there were more than twenty thousand women 
and children in the city saying that he would 
bombard the place if the Americans took it and the 
inhabitants deserted it.* 

* A detailed account of the incident appeared in the New York Sun, 
December 5, 1898, in which it was stated that Cervera s bloodthirsty 
des gn quite foreign to the character displayed at other times by the 
gallant Spanish admiral was frustrated only by the interference of 
the British Government. According to the Sun s historian, Ramsden 
telegraphed information of it to Sir Alexander Gollan, the British con 
sul-general in Havana, at two o clock A. M., July 2d. Gollan went to 
Blanco, but was rebuffed, Blanco telling him that Cervera was entirely 
at liberty " to take the measures which he should deem best for the suc 
cess of the campaign " ; but a protest to London caused a change of 



On the morning of the 2d the harbour batteries 
were again shelled at close range by the blockading 
ships. This was in answer to a note from Shafter, 
requesting Sampson to keep up his fire upon Santi 
ago. The action lasted two hours, the Spaniards 
making little attempt to reply ; and a shot from the 
Texas accomplished w r hat had not been done in all 
the bombardments of the blockade it dismounted 
one of the six-inch guns in the Socapa, besides kill 
ing three men and wounding six, among the latter 
being Ensign Pifia, the commander of the battery. 

Throughout the day Cervera made preparations 
for leaving the harbour, Blanco having sent him 
imperative orders to make a dash for 
Havana, in spite of the admiral s pro 
test of his inability to cope with the 
blockading fleet.* The marines who had gone 
ashore to reinforce Linares were taken aboard, a 
pilot was sent to each ship, steam was made, and a 
little before half past nine o clock on the morning 
of Sunday, July 3d, the six vessels, cleared for 
action, were moving toward the sea gate of the har 
bour that had sheltered them for forty-five event 
ful days. 

heart, and the captain-general ordered Cervera to leave Santiago in 
stead of bombarding it. 

This version of the affair is not borne out bv Mr. Ramsden s diary ; 
indeed, it is contradicted at an essential point by his statement that it 
was ten o clock on the morning of July ad when he saw Cervera s note 
to the French consul. It must therefore be relegated to the already 
well-filled realm of war fiction. 

* On September 10, 1898, according to a press report, Senor Aunon, 
the Spanish minister of marine, stated in the Cortes that Cervera 
"wanted to blowup his ships in the harbour; but I informed him 
that it would be preferable to leave the port and engage the enemy. 
General Blanco ordered Admiral Cervera to leave Santiago, and fixed 
the day of his departure." 

Cervera s official report to Captain-General Blanco was read to rep 
resentatives of the Madrid press on August 22, 180,8, but no copies of it 
were given out. According to the version published by the Heraldo 
(translated by the Navy Department) it begins : " In obedience to your 
orders, in the face of that which would have happened, and of which 
you were informed, I left the bav of Santiago for sea on the 3d day of 
July." Its account of the battle is very brief. 


Cervera s choice of the daytime, rather than the 
night, for the moment of his sortie, was a paradox 
that is not explained in his official report; but 
officers of his squadron afterward gave what was no 
doubt the true reason that the American ships lay 
so close inshore from sunset to sunrise, and their 
watch with searchlights was so perfect, that the 
Spanish admiral saw no possible hope of a night 
escape.* Mistaken as his judgment probably was, 
it was a remarkable testimony to the effectiveness 
of Sampson s plan of blockade. 

The militant captain of the Iowa is reported as 
saying, some time after the battle, that the Span 
iards " were so thoroughly rattled that they just 
started to run out of the way as fast as they could." 
To show how unfair is such a description of Cer 
vera s sortie, it is worth while to quote the account 
given to Lieutenant Miiller by the pilot of the Maria 
Teresa : 

I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral 
Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at 
anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel 
and the hostile ships, and only said these words: 

" Pilot, when can we shift the helm? " 

He had reference to turning to starboard, which could 
be done only after we had passed Diamante Bank. After 
a few seconds he said: 

" Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm." 

" I will advise you, admiral," I answered. 

* In The Story of the Captains (Century Magazine, May, 1899) Cap 
tain Taylor records his opinion that in coming out by daylight Cervera 
"exhibited a sound tactical sense," and that if he had made his sortie 
at night his ships would have been sunk before passing the Morro. On 
the other hand, Captain Clark, in the same symposium, adduces some 
strong reasons to the contrary ; and Captain Taylor s argument is 
seriously weakened by the fact that on the night of July 4th the Reina 
Mercedes an unarmoured vessel came down the channel, under a 
heavy fire from the blockading fleet, practically uninjured. She went 
down near the harbour mouth, but she was scuttled by the opening of 
her valves, not sunk by the American gun-fire. 

As to the courses open to Cervera when he came out of the harbour 
to go eastward, to go westward, or to scatter his ships while the 
latter might have saved one or possibly more of his cruisers, it can 
hardly be doubted that his decision to steam to the west was strategi 
cally correct. 


A few moments later I said: "Admiral, the helm may 
be shifted now." 

In a moment the admiral, without shouting, without 
becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: * To starboard," 
and the next minute, " Fire! " 

At the same moment the two guns of the turret and 
those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed 
to me to be the Indiana. By this time there were already 
many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had 
been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite 
of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire. 
The admiral said to me: 

" Good-bye, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let 
them pay you, because you have earned it well." 

The Spanish cruisers came down the channel in 
column, Cervera s flagship, the Maria Teresa, in the 
lead, and the Vizcaya, the Cristobal Colon, and the 
Almirante Oquendo following in order, with about 
eight hundred yards distance between each ship 
and the next. Twelve hundred yards behind the 
Oquendo came the torpedo-boat destroyers. As to 
the order in which the destroyers went out, there 
are discrepancies in the reports of the American 
officers, and even in Lieutenant Miiller s narrative, 
in which accuracy might have been expected. Ap 
parently the explanation is that the Furor led down 
the channel, and when just outside the Morro she 
circled to port as if to escape to the eastward, but 
seeing the Gloucester and other vessels in her path, 
she turned west to follow the cruisers thereby los 
ing enough ground to allow the Pluton to overhaul 
and pass her.* 

Cervera s plan was to turn westward as soon as 
he reached the sea, and run for it. His one hope of 
success lay in outrunning the American battle ships 
and beating off Sampson s speediest vessel, the 
Brooklyn not by any means an impossible scheme 
on paper. In the test of action, his ships proved 

* This is based on the detailed account given by Lieutenant Muller 
on the authority of Lieutenants Bustamente of the Furor and Caballero 
of the Pluton. 



much slower than they should have been, the Ameri 
cans faster than he had expected ; while in fighting 
power his four cruisers showed themselves pitiably 
inferior to the five powerful men-of-war four bat 
tle ships and a cruiser of whose guns they had to 
run the gantlet. 

These five the Indiana, the Oregon, the Iowa, 
the Texas, and the Brooklyn, recounting them in 
order from east to west lay at or near their regular 
blockading stations, in a semicircle about the har 
bour mouth, and from two and a half to four miles 
distant from it. The Massachusetts had gone early 
that morning to Guantanamo Bay for coal. The 
New York had signalled, at a quarter to nine, " Dis 
regard movements of the commander-in-chief," and 
had started eastward for Siboney, where Sampson 
intended to land for a conference with Shafter. She 
was nearly ten * miles east of the Morro when the 
Teresa came out, and in company with her were 
the torpedo boat Ericsson and the converted yacht 
Hist. Of the other small vessels, the Gloucester and 
the Vixen lay inside the main blockading line, the 
former to the east of the harbour entrance, the latter 
to the west. The Resolute was farther out, close to 
the Indiana. On all the ships the men were at 
" quarters for inspection," according to the regular 
routine of Sunday morning. 

Suddenly, at almost exactly half past nine, the 
Teresa, with smoke pouring from her funnels, came 
around Smith Key and turned down the channel to 
ward the sea. She was in plain view of several 
American ships, and three or four of them an 
nounced "Enemy s ships escaping " at almost the 
same instant, the Iowa also firing a gun to attract 
attention. The Brooklyn s records show that she 
made the warning signal at 9.35, having received 

* "About seven," Sampson says in his report; but the distance 
measures almost ten miles on the chart drawn up by the board of offi 
cers appointed to make a map of the battle. 


it from the Iowa.* Sampson had prescribed this 
signal in a general order dated June 7th. Elsewhere 
in the carefully prepared instructions with which he 
had sought to insure that there should be no un 
readiness in any emergency that might arise, he had 
directed that whenever the enemy appeared, " the 
ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and 
endeavour to sink his vessels or force them to run 
ashore in the channel." 

Even without this order, there was no doubt of 
what was to be done. The Spaniards simple tactics 
rendered manoeuvring unnecessary, and the re 
markable combat that followed was a gunners and 
engineers rather than a commanders battle. Com 
modore Schley flew from the Brooklyn the signals 
" Clear for action " and " Close up," but apparently 
they were not noticed in the smoke and the excite 
ment, as they are not recorded in the logs of the 
other men-of-war. Sampson, when he saw what 
was happening, put the New York about and sig 
nalled " Close in toward harbour entrance and at 
tack vessels," but his orders could have been visible 
only to the easternmost of his ships. 

* In The Story of the Captains, Captain Philip remarks that " when 
so many eyes must have seen the approach of Cervera at once, it is to 
the credit of all that none claims the distinction of having been the first 
to discover the sally " But Captain Evans asserts that the Iowa was 
the first to discover the Spanish ships," and accounts for it "because of 
her position, by which she was enabled to see farther into the harbour 
than any other ship. All the vessels," he adds, "were most vigilant 
and watchful, as is shown by the fact that no fewer than three claim 
to have been the first to see the Spaniards." For the Oregon, Lieuten 
ant Eberle claims that " at twenty-eight minutes after nine, our sharp- 
eyed chief quartermaster sighted the masthead of a ship coming from 
behind Smith Cay." Captain Cook s view is that "it can not be de 
termined which ship first discovered the enemy. The Iowa was first 
to signal the fact, but the other vessels were in the act of hoisting the 
signal arranged by the admiral." 

In his official report, Captain Philip states that the Texas made the 
signal a moment earlier than the Iowa ; but this must be a mistake. 
Captain Evans s quartermaster had "bent on " those particular flags 
the evening before, when suspicious columns of smoke were seen rising 
from the harbour ; and when the Teresa was sighted they were hoisted 


It has been stated that Cervera s sortie caught 
the blockading fleet napping; that most of the 
American vessels were ready to shoot but not to 
pursue; that with two shining exceptions their 
engineers were " unprepared to make a quick move 
ment of any kind in the face of the enemy." * 
While not wholly untrue, the criticism is decidedly 
unfair. Of course, the ships were not ready to jump 
instantly to their highest speed. To keep them, 
through all the weeks of the blockade, in condition 
to use their full steaming power at a moment s no 
tice, would have been utterly impossible. It would 
have involved an intolerable strain upon the crews, 
and an expenditure of fuel that would have crippled 
the fleet s efficiency by necessitating constant re- 
coaling. The New York had steam in four of her 
six boilers ; the fifth was hot, the sixth was ready for 
lighting fires ; her forward engines were discon 
nected, as they can not be used to advantage except 
with full boiler power. The Brooklyn, which has 
seven boilers, had steam in three, with three more 
full of hot water. If any ships were caught nap 
ping it was the Iowa and the Indiana. Captain 
Evans reports that the former could make only five 
knots at first, quickening later to about ten ; and 
the latter, whose machinery was not in prime con 
dition, did no better. Readiest of all the fleet was 
that naval bulldog, the Oregon. Her engineers, 
who had already distinguished themselves by speed 
ing her from San Francisco to the West Indies, won 
fresh laurels by their ship s fine performance on the 
3d of July a performance that entitles her chief 
engineer, Robert Milligan, to a place among the 
heroes of the war. The other vessel whose readi 
ness for action deserves special mention was the 

* This criticism was made in an article published in the Engineer 
ing Magazine, December, 1898, which attracted some attention at the 


Quickly as the crew sprang to their stations, it 
was some few minutes * before the gunners were 
rea ^y to fire, and they were not in 

. time nor . near en 9 u g h > to prevent Cer- 
vera s ships coming out of the chan 
nel. But when they opened, with every gun that 
could be brought to bear, the hail of shell that rained 
upon the Spaniards was terrific. There was no swell 
to render an accurate aim difficult, and the Ameri 
can marksmanship was deadly. It drove the Span 
ish gunners from their pieces, it made slaughter pens 
of their decks, and, most fatal of all, it set their 
ships on fire. When two of Cervera s cruisers the 
Vizcaya and the Oquendo lay beside the Maine 
in Havana harbour, Captain Sigsbee noticed the 
" long stretch of beautiful woodwork " in their 
cabins, and foresaw their danger of fire in battle, f 
His forecast was verified now. The Teresa and the 
Oquendo were ablaze after fifteen minutes fighting. 
The former had her fire main cut by one of the first 
shots, leaving her powerless to extinguish the flames 
that were devouring her. 

The Spanish cruisers came down the channel at 
a speed of eight or ten knots. When they turned 
westward they used the full power of their engines, 
but only the Colon could quicken materially. Their 
speed was enough, however, to carry them past the 
American ships before the latter could get well 
under way. The five first-rate vessels within range 
headed in directly toward the escaping foe, the only 
exception being a manoeuvre made by the Brooklyn, 
out of which there subsequently grew one of the 
innumerable controversies of the war. 

The westward station of Schley s flagship placed 

* "Within eight minutes," Sampson says in his report. "Within 
five minutes," says Captain Cook. "Within three minutes," says 
Captain Philip. "Not two minutes, it seemed to me," says Captain 
Taylor. Under the circumstances, the discrepancy is not surprising. 

f The Maine, pp. 56, 57. 


her nearest to Cervera s ships when they turned to 
starboard out of the channel ; but their line of flight 
was close along shore, almost a mile from her. 
The Teresa had passed, and the Vizcaya was fol 
lowing, when the Brooklyn, which was heading to 
the northeast, wore around to seaward. As her 
tactical diameter that is, the space in which she 
can go about is eight hundred yards, this move 
ment turned her in the direction taken by the flee 
ing Spaniards, but set her nearly half a mile farther 
away from them. 

His handling of the Brooklyn having been criti 
cised or, perhaps it would be fairer to say, hav 
ing been commented on with much curiosity as 
to its precise purpose Commodore Schley subse 
quently explained that he made his seaward turn, 
at a moment when the other ships were follow 
ing the order to close with the enemy, in order to 
prevent the Brooklyn from cutting off the fire of 
the rest of the fleet. He added that he regarded 
it as " the crucial and deciding feature of the com 
bat," and claimed the sinking of four ships within 
half an hour as the result of it.* In view of this 
it is certainly curious that in his official report of 
the battle he makes no mention of the manoeuvre. 
His flag captain, Captain Cook, merely records that 
" the enemy turned to the westward to close in to 
the land. We then wore around to starboard, bring 
ing the starboard battery into action. The enemy 
hugged the shore to the westward." Before his 
later explanation, Schley s statement that " the 
Spanish admiral s scheme was to concentrate all fire 
for a while on the Brooklyn, and the Vizcaya to 
ram her " was regarded as giving his reason for the 
course he took. The commodore attributes his in 
formation to two of Cervera s captains, but no other 
officer seems to have noticed any threat of ramming 

* Rear-Admiral Schley s statement to the Senate Committee on 
Naval Affairs, February 19, 1899. 


on the part of the Vizcaya.* Cervera s general plan 
was simply to run ; and such a bold offensive stroke 
would have been most uncharacteristic of Spanish 
seamanship. Moreover, had it been attempted, a 
vessel can not ram without risk of being rammed, 
and the Brooklyn was more than two thousand tons 
heavier than any of the Spanish ships, as well as 

The Brooklyn s seaward turn was made, too, at 
very serious risk of collision with the Texas, which 
was coming up outside of her. It appears that when 
Commodore Schley gave the order to port the helm, 
Lieutenant Hodgson, navigating officer of the flag 
ship, who was beside him on the platform around 
the conning tower, pointed out the danger, but his 
suggestion was disregarded.! The officers of the 
Texas had last seen the Brooklyn heading north 
east, toward the Spaniards ; then the smoke hid her, 
till suddenly she appeared, Captain Philip states, 
" bearing toward us and across our bows. She 
seemed so near that it took our breath away. Back 
both engines hard ! went down the tube to the 
astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the old 
ship was racing against herself. The collision which 
seemed imminent, even if it was not, was averted, 
and as the big cruiser glided past all of us on the 
bridge gave a sigh of relief. Had the Brooklyn 
struck us then, it would probably have been an end 
of the Texas and her half thousand men. Had the 
Texas rammed the Brooklyn, it would have been 
equally disastrous ; for the Texas was not built for 

* " No Spanish ship," says Captain Evans, "gave the slightest in 
dication of using either ram or torpedo." 

f An unpleasant controversy afterward arose over this incident, it 
being stated by Lieutenant Heilner, of the Texas, who cited Lieutenant 
Hodgson as his informant, that Schley said " Damn the Texas : let her 
look out for herself ! " The matter being officially investigated by the 
Navy Department, Lieutenant Hodgson testified that the commodore s 
words were " All right ; the Texas must look out for that " or to that 
effect. Schley himself stated (to Lieutenant Hodgson, in June, 1899) 
that he had no recollection of any such conversation. 



ramming, and she would have doubled up like a 
hoop. Few of our ship s company knew of the in 

The Brooklyn was still nearest to the leading 
Spanish ships. The Iowa, the Indiana, and the 
Texas, after pouring in a tremendous fire upon each 
of Cervera s cruisers as it came out of the harbour 
mouth, headed after the fugitives at the best pace 
they could make, their guns still steadily at work. 
The unarmoured Vixen, finding herself between the 
two fleets, prudently turned seaward and ran out 
side of the American ironclads. The Oregon dashed 
forward wifh a splendid burst of speed, and drew 
almost level with the Brooklyn. " It was an inspir 
ing sight," the captain of Schley s flagship gener 
ously says in his report, " to see this battle ship, 
with a large white wave before her, and her smoke 
stacks belching forth continued puffs from her 
forced draught. We were making fourteen knots 
at the time, and the Oregon came up off our star 
board quarter at about six hundred yards and main 
tained her position, though we soon after increased 
our speed to fifteen knots, and just before the Colon 
surrendered were making sixteen." f 

In The Story of the Captains, Captain, Evans 
gives an equally appreciative description. " Clark, 
of the Oregon," he says, " put his helm to starboard, 
and came through the lee of the Iowa with the speed 
of a locomotive. So sudden was his change of posi 
tion in the dense smoke that he had great difficulty, 
as he afterward told me, in preventing his men from 
firing into us, as they took us for one of the enemy s 
ships. As it was, he did not waste much time, and 
as he cleared us on our port side, his thirteen-inch 
guns fairly raised the scalps of those in the conning- 

* Century Magazine, May, 1899, p. qi. 

t Captain Cook s estimate of his ship s speed was a little too high. 
The map plotted by the official board already mentioned shows that 
the Brooklyn s average speed in the long chase of the Colon was a little 
more than thirteen knots, the Oregon s a trifle less. 


tower of the Iowa. We may all live a hundred years, 
and fight fifty naval battles, but we can never hope 
again to see such a sight as the Oregon was on this 
beautiful Sunday morning. We could see her for 
a moment only as she sped on after the Colon, com 
pletely enveloped in the smoke of her own guns 
a great white puffball, decorated every second with 
vicious flashes as her guns spoke out." * 

The Teresa and the Oquendo soon dropped be 
hind the other two cruisers. Their fate had been 
sealed by the terrific fire that met them as they left 
the channel. Both were ablaze, and the hail of shells 
had wrought frightful havoc on their decks. Cap 
tain Concas, of the Teresa, had been wounded, and 
as the second officer could not be found Admiral 
Cervera took command in person. His ship was a 
mass of flame and smoke. It was too late even to 
flood the magazines, and to save her from sinking 
in deep water the admiral ordered her beached. 
" I thought to lower the flag, but that was not pos 
sible, on account of the fire," Cervera says, but sev 
eral American officers report that a white flag was 
shown as she ran ashore. She went aground in a 
small cove at Nima Nima, six and a half miles west 
of the Morro, and lay there, burning fiercely, about 
a hundred yards from the beach. 

This happened at a quarter past ten. The 
Oquendo lived just five minutes longer, and got half 
a mile farther west, before she followed the flag 
ship s example and ran for the shore, hauling down 
her colours. She was on fire fore and aft, and her 
fire pumps were disabled ; her decks were a sham 
bles, and most of her guns had been put out of 
action. Among the dead were her commander, 
Captain Lagaza, who was drowned in attempting to 
reach the shore, and his two chief officers. 

The next victims of the American gunners were 

* The Century Magazine, May, 1899, pp. 54, 55. 


the Pluton and the Furor. The two destroyers 
frail craft, yet dangerous weapons if properly han 
dled were sent to sure destruction by Cervera s 
tactics. In the broad daylight their only chance of 
escaping, or of getting within striking distance of 
the enemy, lay in creeping close beside the cruisers, 
where they would have had at least a partial shel 
ter. Coming out about fifteen minutes later than 
the Teresa, they were doomed. The blockading 
ships had had time to close in, and were ready to 
meet them with a deadly fire. All four of the battle 
ships, while their heavy guns were hammering the 
cruisers, turned their secondary batteries upon the 

The Gloucester, too, steamed in to engage them 
at close quarters. Her attack a bold movement 
for an unprotected yacht, whose heaviest guns were 
six-pounders was a well-planned stroke, as well 
as a brave one, on the part of her captain, Lieuten 
ant-Commander Wainwright, who was executive 
officer of the Maine at the time of the fateful ex 
plosion of February I5th. As the Spanish cruisers 
came out of the harbour he ordered his engines 
slowed, gaining steam, and waiting for the expected 
appearance of the destroyers. When the Pluton 
and the Furor left the channel, he dashed at them 
at full speed. Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, sig 
nalled " Enemy s torpedo boats coming out," but in 
the smoke Wainwright read it as " Gunboats will 
advance," which he interpreted as an assurance that 
he would not be fired on by his own ships ; and 
though he narrowly escaped the fire of both the 
Indiana and the Iowa, he closed in upon the de 
stroyers, training his forward guns upon the Pluton, 
his after guns upon the Furor, and getting within 
six hundred yards range. 

Both were disabled within three miles of the 
Morro. At half past ten the Pluton, with fire and 
smoke bursting from her decks, turned shoreward, 


and ran upon the rocks west of the Cabanas inlet, 
where she blew up and settled in the surf. The Furor, 
also on fire, was circling about help- 

less{ y> and as a white fla s. was waved 

from her deck Wainwright ceased 
firing and launched his boats, to rescue the crews, 
and to see if there was any chance of saving the 
prizes. The boats had taken aboard Lieutenant 
Carlier and eighteen of his men, and were picking 
up the survivors of the Pluton, when there was a 
series of explosions on the Furor; her bow rose 
into the air, and she went down stern first in deep 

The Gloucester s boats saved twenty-six men 
from the Pluton, including her captain, Lieutenant 
Vazquez. Captain Villamil, commanding the two 
destroyers, was on the Furor, and perished with 
her.* A few refugees from both vessels, with some 
from the Teresa and the Oquendo, escaped to the 
shore and made their way back to Santiago, swim 
ming the Cabanas inlet. 

Credit for the destruction of the Pluton and the 
Furor has been claimed as the sole possession of the 
Gloucester. Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of 
the plucky yacht, states in his report that after Cap 
tain Taylor s signal " it appeared that the fight be 
tween this ship and the two apparently uninjured 
destroyers was a thing apart from the battle in which 
the larger ships were engaged." Lieutenant-Com 
mander Wainwright, though he mentions the fact 
that " the Indiana poured in a hot fire from all her 
secondary batteries upon the destroyers," asserts 
that until the Gloucester closed with them " they 
were not seriously injured." 

On the other hand, Captain Taylor s version is 
that when the Teresa and the Oquendo gave up the 
fight, " we (the Indiana) then devoted our special 

* Remains identified as those of Captain Villamil were found among 
the rocks on the beach in March, 1899. 


28 3 

attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, 
which appeared more than a match for the Glou 
cester. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently 
struck by our six-inch and six-pounders." Captain 
Eaton, of the Resolute, corroborates this, testifying 
that he distinctly saw the Furor " struck by an 
eight-inch or thirteen-inch shell from the Indiana, 
which was followed by an explosion and flames." 

Furthermore, Captain Evans asserts that the fire 
of the Iowa, " together with that of the Gloucester 
and another smaller vessel,* proved so . destructive 
that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (Pluton) was 
sunk, and the Furor was so much damaged that she 
was run upon the rocks." Captain Philip claims a 
share of the work for the Texas. " Owing to our 
secondary battery," he says, " together with the 
Iowa and Gloucester, the two destroyers were forced 
to beach and sink." And Captain Clark, of the Ore 
gon, adds that " when it was discovered that the 
enemy s torpedo boats were following their ships, 
we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the six-inch, 
upon them with telling effect." The New York 
also fired some four-inch shells the only shots she 
discharged in the battle at the Furor. 

Other ships, besides the Indiana, claim the shots 
that exploded the two boats. " One of our heavy 
shells," says Captain Taylor, " was seen to strike 
one of the destroyers, an explosion and flames fol 
lowing." In narrating the fate of the Furor, Captain 
Evans writes : " A large projectile, we believed from 
the Iowa, seemed to cut her in two." Captain Philip 
also describes her explosion, and adds : " The men 
of the Texas have always insisted that this was 
caused by a shell from Ensign W. K. Gise s six-inch 
gun." Lieutenant Eberle, of the Oregon, records 
that " the plucky little vessels fought their guns 

* This seems to be an error, as the Gloucester was the only smaller 
vessel engaged. Captain Evans also confuses the Pluton and the 



until a shell which, it is claimed, was fired by our 
after six-inch gun struck the Furor amidships and 
caused an explosion. The torpedo boat was literally 
torn to pieces." 

No doubt none of Sampson s captains had the 
least desire to claim more than his due, but it is 
easy to understand that all of them were, as the 
admiral said, " vitally interested and justly proud 
of their ships." Sampson s report gives what is 
probably a very fair summary of the matter: 

The destroyers probably suffered much injury from 
the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships 
Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas. Yet I think a very consid 
erable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at 
close range, of the Gloucester s battery. 

From the wreck of the Pluton the Gloucester s 
boats went on to the Teresa and the Oquendo. The 
Spanish flagship had lowered a boat, which sank at 
once, and a steam launch, which also went down 
after making one journey to the beach. The admiral 
jumped overboard, and his son, Lieutenant Angel 
Cervera, and two sailors helped him ashore, where 
he surrendered to Lieutenant Norman of the Glou 
cester. The work of rescue was rendered perilous 
by the explosion of guns and ammunition on board 
the burning cruisers. The Teresa s magazines had 
flooded as she filled with water, but one of the 
Oquendo s blew up, shattering the forward part of 
the ship. Farther aft her torpedoes added to the 
destruction, and she was left a hopeless wreck, her 
frame practically broken in two. Her flag, and 
those of the two destroyers, were captured by the 
Gloucester s boats. 

Meanwhile the Colon and the Vizcaya were flee 
ing westward, hotly pursued by the Brooklyn and 
the Oregon, with the Texas following, 

drivwMhwe and the Iowa and the Indiana doin g 

their best to keep up with the chase. 
The Colon passed her consort about half past ten, 


and drew out of range of the American ships ; but 
the Vizcaya was still under fire from all five, 
and in twenty minutes more her race was over. 
Burning, and with a heavy list to port, she 
was headed for the shore, and after veering about 
as if in indecision she was run ashore in the small 
bay of Aserraderos, twenty miles west of the 

The Vixen, which had followed the pursuit, was 
in time to fire a few shots at the Vizcaya before 
her flag went down. The New York, which had 
turned westward at sight of the escaping Spaniards, 
and had passed through the fire of the Morro and 
Socapa batteries without deigning to return it, was 
now coming up, accompanied by the Ericsson and 
the Hist. The Ericsson had her torpedoes ready for 
use, but she was too late to get within striking dis 

As there was now no enemy afloat but the Colon, 
who was too fast for him, and whom the swifter 
ships were pretty sure to overtake, Captain Evans 
sent five of the Iowa s boats to take off the crew of 
the burning Vizcaya. The rescuers, who were rein 
forced from the Ericsson and the Hist, kept up their 
dangerous work in the face of constant explosions 
both of the cruiser s main magazines blew up until 
there were no more living men to save. Captain 
Eulate was taken aboard the Iowa. He had his 
sword, and proffered it, in token of surrender, to 
Captain Evans, who chivalrously declined to re 
ceive it. 

Sampson had already ordered the Indiana to 
return to her blockading station a wise precaution, 
as there were still a couple of armed vessels in San 
tiago harbour, which might have wrought havoc 
among the. transports at Siboney and he now sent 
back the Iowa and the Ericsson, leaving the Hist to 
stand by the Vizcaya. Of Cervera s ships, only the 
Colon was left. At this time she had a lead of six 


miles, but it is evident that Captain Moreu had no 
hope of escape. He kept close along shore, follow 
ing the bends of the coast, while his pursuers steered 
straight forward to cut him off. A little after eleven 
o clock, when the Vizcaya turned shoreward, the 
Brooklyn was three quarters of a mile ahead of the 
Oregon, both ships having now worked up to a speed 
of quite or nearly fifteen knots, and gaining steadily 
on the Colon. The Vixen was nearly abeam of the 
Oregon, but farther seaward ; the Texas was a mile 
and a half from the Oregon, and not quite holding 
her own in the race ; the New York was six miles 
behind the Texas, steaming a little faster than any 
of the other vessels. 

It was an exciting race, but its end was certain. 
At twenty minutes after twelve the Oregon was near 
enough to the quarry to open fire at 

! on g ran & e wit1 } her g reat thirteen- 
inch rifles. A little later the Brook 
lyn began to use her eight-inch guns, but her shots 
fell short. A thirteen-inch shell from the Oregon, 
however, fell just ahead of the Colon, and another 
struck under her stern ; and at a quarter past one 
she turned into the cove at the mouth of the Rio 
Turquino (" Blue River "), fifty-four miles west 
of Santiago harbour, and ran for the shore, haul 
ing down her flag. Commodore Schley sent Cap 
tain Cook on board to receive her surrender. 
Captain Moreu, Cook reports, " surrendered un 
conditionally. He was polite, shook hands, and 
said that his case was hopeless, and that he saw 
we were too much for him." Captain Paredes, 
second in command of the Spanish squadron, was 
also on the Colon. 

As Captain Cook left the Colon the New York 
and the Texas came up, and he went aboard the 
flagship to report to Sampson. The admiral ordered 
Captain Chadwick to take over the prize. After 
transferring the prisoners five hundred and eight 


in number to the Resolute, which had followed the 
chase, he left Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell, of 
the Oregon, in charge, with a crew from the Oregon 
and the New York. But the fine Spanish cruiser 
was not destined to be of service to her captors. 
Her sea valves had been opened, and so broken that 
they could not be closed. Many of her crew were 
drunk, and Lieutenant Eberle, of the Oregon, states 
that they deliberately damaged the vessel s arma 
ment and equipment. It is said that her firemen 
had been ashore without food for thirty-six hours, 
and on their return to the ship brandy was given 
them. Demoralization resulted, and a number of 
men were shot by the officers for abandoning their 
places in the fireroom. The Colon had been run 
upon a steep beach, where the water was seventy 
feet deep at her stern and only eight at her bow ; 
but as she settled she slipped backward, and was 
in danger of going down in deep water. Captain 
Chadwick thereupon placed the New York s stem 
against her, and pushed her bodily up on the beach. 
Here she gradually settled, in spite of all efforts to 
stop her leaks ; and finally, just after the prize crew 
abandoned her, she went over on her starboard 
beam ends. 

An hour before midnight Sampson started the 
New York for Santiago, leaving the Oregon and 
the Texas to stay by the Colon. Except for the 
breaking of her valves, the captured cruiser was 
practically uninjured when she sank, and it was fully 
though, as it proved, mistakenly expected that 
she could be raised. She showed the marks of only 
half a dozen shells, probably received as she left 
the harbour, and some of them had not penetrated 
her armour. Her handling during the battle was not 
creditable to the Spaniards. Rated at twenty knots 
an hour, she allowed the sixteen-knot Oregon to 
overhaul her ; she was surrendered practically with 
out a fight though this is to a great extent excused 


by the fact that she was without her heavy guns 
and most ingloriously scuttled. 

The battle was over, and one of the greatest and 
most complete of naval victories had been won. 
The Spanish squadron was utterly de- 
stroyed. Of its complement of about 
twenty-three hundred men, some 
three hundred and fifty were killed, burned, or 
drowned ; the rest except those who escaped to 
Santiago were prisoners.* The American fleet 
was practically unscathed. It had lost one man 
killed Chief Yeoman Ellis, of the Brooklyn, who 
was struck by a shell and ten wounded, none fatal 
ly, most of the cases being injuries to eardrums from 
the concussion of the guns. The ships were scarcely 
marked by the torrent of ill-aimed fire that had 
come from the fleeing Spaniards. 

The Brooklyn showed most traces of the fight 
chiefly in her rigging and upper works, the Span 
ish gunners having fired high, as seems to be their 
inveterate habit. The flag at her main was shot 
to pieces, and her signal halyards repeatedly cut. 
In all she was struck by twenty shells, besides 
pieces of bursting projectiles and small shot from 
machine guns. Of the other ships, the Oregon was 
hit three times, the Indiana twice, by fragments or 
small-calibre missiles which did no damage. A six- 
inch shell struck the Texas, going through her ash 

* The prisoners captured on July 3d were confined at Annapolis 
and at Portsmouth, N. H., the number being: 93 at the former place 
and 1,681 at the latter, besides a few sick and wounded men sent to the 
Naval Hospital at Norfolk, and 8 who, through a regrettable misunder 
standing, were shot and killed by their guards on board the Harvard, 
during a false alarm of mutiny. The number of those who escaped to 
Santiago is stated by Lieutenant Mullerat about 150. Stories are told, 
both by Spaniards and by Americans, of unarmed refugees being mur 
dered by Cubans ; but it is fair to add that Cervera, who mentions that 
the insurgents temporarily held about 200 prisoners from the Teresa 
and the Oquendo, makes no complaint of ill treatment, and Lieutenant 
Hazeltine, of the Hist, reports that Cubans at Aserraderos helped in 
the rescue of the Vizcaya s crew, and gave " first aid" to some of the 
wounded men. 


hoist and injuring her forced-draught apparatus. 
The Iowa received two of about the same calibre, 
which pierced her hull, but did no material harm, 
though one started a small fire ; and about seven 
minor projectiles, which left only trifling marks. 
The Gloucester, which went nearest to the enemy s 
guns, seemed to bear a charmed life, for not a shot 
touched her. At one moment of the battle she had 
a narrow escape. As she closed with the destroyers, 
her crew could hear, amid the roar of cannon, the 
drumming sound of a machine gun, and could trace 
its fire by a line of splashes, about as long as their 
ship, and steadily drawing nearer as the Spaniards 
gauged the range. It was from a one-pounder 
Maxim on the Furor, and if its stream of shot reached 
the Gloucester, even for a few minutes, it meant ter 
rible slaughter on her decks ; but when the splashes 
were only a few yards away they suddenly ceased 
the gun, no doubt, having been put out of action by 
the American fire. 

The completeness of Cervera s defeat is not ade 
quately explained by his squadron s inferiority to 
the enemy it had to meet. The Span- 
causes of the ish ac i m i ra i states j n his report that 

American (( . . M r , r . 

victory the hostile forces were three times 

as large as ours." Lieutenant Miiller 
calculates that " six ships, if the Pluton and Furor 
may be called such, had to fight against twenty- 
four that were better protected and armed." These 
are utter misrepresentations. The battle was fought, 
on the American side, by six ships the battle ships 
Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and Texas, the cruiser 
Brooklyn, and the converted yacht Gloucester. An 
other auxiliary, the Vixen, must be added to the 
list, as she was present throughout the fight, though 
her part in it was little more than that of a spec 
tator. The New York, though she fired a few shots, 
was practically out of the JDattle. The Hist, the 
Ericsson, the Harvard, and the Resolute came up 


only in time to receive the prisoners. No other 
American ship was present at all. Some of the 
twenty-four vessels listed by Lieutenant Miiller were 
as far away as Manila. 

The comparative gun power of two fleets may 
be stated in various ways. The seven American 
vessels engaged at Santiago had a total of 225 guns 
to Cervera s 146, and they had 14 guns the twelve- 
and thirteen-inch rifles of the battle ships heavier 
than anything the Spaniards carried. In the me 
dium-sized weapons, with which most execution was 
done, the Spanish ships were better off. The Amer 
ican ships had 64 guns of calibres from four to 
eight inches, only 18 of which were rapid-firers; 
Cervera had 46 rapid-fire guns of calibres from four 
and a half to six inches. Not all the guns, of course, 
on either side, could be used. A published calcula 
tion by Lieutenant Wells, of the Brooklyn, esti 
mates that the number actually engaged during the 
battle was 105 on the American ships and 91 on 
the Spanish, and that the weight of metal they could 
throw per minute was respectively 6,720 and 4,827 
pounds. As a summary of all these figures it is 
probably fair to say that on paper the American 
gun fire was superior to the enemy s by fully fifty 
per cent.* In this no account is taken of the shore 
batteries, which maintained a brisk but quite ineffec 
tive fire during the early part of the battle. 

Several of the Spanish cruisers guns, Lieutenant 
Miiller states as Cervera also stated before he left 
the Cape Verde Islands were out of order, and 
some of their ammunition was defective ; but it was 
not so much the better guns as the better gunnery 
that won the sweeping victory. It was the same 
story that was told in Manila Bay two months be- 

* Captain Taylor records that Admiral Cervera, a few hours after 
the battle, said that he had estimated Sampson s force as four times 
stronger than his own. u The odds," adds the commander of the In 
diana, " were surely exaggerated in the mind of this gallant officer." 


2 9 I 

fore. Sampson s men had a special advantage in 
the practice they had had during the blockade. 
Their fire killed the enemy s fire, and would have 
done so had the Spaniards possessed twice the bat 
teries they had. Another very important factor in 
the result was the extensive use of wood in the con 
struction of the Spanish ships. With the possible 
exception of the Furor, none of Cervera s vessels 
was destroyed by the direct effect of shot and shell ; 
all of them but the Colon perished by fire, the flames 
being started by exploding projectiles, and the dis 
abling of pumps and hose leaving them to spread 

There is scarcely a chapter of history, however 
stately or terrible, that has not its footnote of com 
edy ; and such was the case with the 
Adventures of storv o f t } ie Santiago sea fight, bril- 

IndthrReso- liant with trium P h for America, and 
lute, July i. tragic with ruin and death for the 
ships and sailors of Spain. A gleam 
of humour is to be found in the adventures of certain 
minor members of Sampson s fleet. 

When Cervera s ships came out of the harbour, 
the Resolute, as has been said, lay east of the Morro, 
near the Indiana. She had on her decks several tons 
of guncotton, which Sampson intended to use in an 
attempt to explode the channel mines, in order to 
remove the obstructions most to be dreaded in forc 
ing an entrance to the harbour. When the shells 
began to fly, Captain Eaton regarded his position 
as too perilous, and made full speed for Siboney. 
Meeting the New York, he informed Sampson of 
Cervera s sortie a service which the admiral neg 
lects to acknowledge in his report, possibly because 
he could see for himself what had happened and 
was ordered to " proceed to Guantanamo and notify 
the ships there to join the fleet." Passing Siboney 
on this mission, vigorously sounding his whistle, 
and flying a signal which announced that the Span- 


iards " had fled," he caused much natural alarm to 
the transports lying there. Captain Cotton, of the 
Harvard, who was discharging stores in the bay, 
hastily recalled his boats, and stood westward after 
Sampson, his ship cleared for action. 

From Siboney the news, becoming more and 
more alarming as it travelled, was cabled to Playa 
del Este, on Guantanamo Bay. The Suwanee, 
which had been coaling in the bay, was just putting 
to sea, when Commander McCalla of the Marble- 
head, lying at Playa, signalled her to wait for him ; 
and coming within hailing distance, he informed her 
captain, Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty, that 
" the Spanish fleet had escaped from Santiago de 
Cuba, and was in all probability on its way to this 
port to destroy unarmed vessels." On this appalling 
intelligence, Delehanty called his line officers three 
in number about him, and explained the situation. 
A month ago, he told them, the Navy Department 
had stated that if Cervera s squadron escaped the 
service would be disgraced. Apparently that mis 
fortune had come to it; and the four line officers of 
the Suwanee, without a dissenting voice, resolved 
to do all in their power to redeem the reputation of 
the American navy. All this is modestly recorded 
in Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty s report, 
which continues : 

I thereupon directed these officers to draw the com 
mon charges from the guns, to load with armour-piercing 
shell, and to which parts of the enemy s ships they should 
direct their fire. We were in a small gunboat, with a 
maximum speed of ten knots, standing out to meet a 
fleet of heavily armed armoured cruisers with reputed 
speed of double ours. Under other circumstances it would 
have been my duty to avoid so unequal a conflict. I 
felt the full responsibility of making the decision, and I 
record with pride that not a man flinched when it was 
made known. 

Unfortunately for history, the Suwanee did not 
encounter the Spanish fleet, and an hour or so 



later the Dupont brought news of its destruction. 
Meanwhile the Resolute had been spreading a sec 
ond alarm. Off Daiquiri, on the way eastward, she 
sighted a "large, strange man-of-war," whose colours 
Captain Eaton took to be Spanish. He promptly 
faced about, and steamed at full speed to give notice 
of this new and entirely unexpected enemy. After 
warning the transports at Siboney this was an ex 
citing morning for nervous skippers he continued 
westward till he met the Indiana, returning from the 
wrecks of Cervera s cruisers, and informed her that 
a " Spanish battle ship " was approaching. While 
the Resolute passed on to find Sampson, Captain 
Taylor stood for the mysterious stranger with his 
guns ready for use, and found her to be the Aus 
trian cruiser Kaiserin Maria Theresa a name curi 
ously like that of Cervera s flagship which desired 
permission to enter the blockaded harbour. 



ON the morning of July 3d, Lieutenant Allen, 
of the Second Cavalry, stationed on Lawton s ex 
treme right, saw the departure of Cervera s fleet, 
and at once sent word to Shafter s headquarters. 
The scene of the great sea fight was screened from 
the armies ashore by the high hills along the coast, 
and its result was not known till after noon, when 
news came from Siboney that all the Spanish ships 
but one had been destroyed. That the Colon had 
shared the fate of her consorts was not reported 
until the following day. 

To Santiago, too, the news came slowly. Half 
an hour after noon a message from the Morro told 
of the loss of the two destroyers ; but not until 
evening did refugees from the Teresa and the 
Oquendo come in with their story of disaster, and 
the fate of Cervera s other vessels was not known 
until the officers of the Kaiserin Maria Theresa re 
ported it next morning. The Austrian cruiser and 
a small British man-of-war, the Alert, came to take 
away from the doomed city residents claiming the 
protection of their flags. Neither ship entered the 
harbour ; they lay off the Morro, and the refugees 
were taken out to them in boats. 

Toral had already answered the demand for 
capitulation. " It is mv duty to sav to you that this 
city will not surrender," was his reply, which 


reached Shafter at half past six on the 3d. Firing 
which had ceased in the morning, when the flag 
of truce left the American lines was not resumed, 
as four of the foreign consuls in Santiago came out 
with Colonel Dorst, Shafter s messenger, and 
begged for a day s respite. They stated that fifteen 
or twenty thousand people desired to leave the city, 
and begged that the noncombatants should be 
allowed to occupy the village of Caney, and be sup 
plied with food. Shafter at once wrote to Toral that 
he would not bombard until noon of the 5th, if in 
the meantime no move were made against him, and 
requested that the consuls would come out again 
next morning for another interview. 

That same evening (July 3d) Colonel Escario s 
column from Manzanillo marched into Santiago 
from the west, by the Cobre road, 
apparently without resistance from 
Garcia, who had undertaken to stop 
it. Although this added thirty-five hundred soldiers 
to the garrison, it made little change in the situation. 
When Shafter heard of it, on the 4th * Garcia re 
ported that five thousand men had passed in he 
sent a message to Wheeler warning him to be ready 
in case of attack ; but with Cervera s fleet destroyed, 
and with some reinforcements arriving and more 
promised, he felt strong enough to hold his position 
without any difficulty, except, perhaps, in the event 
of a larger body of Spaniards coming up from Hol- 
guin. Escario s advent meant that Toral would have 
more mouths to feed for the newcomers had ex 
hausted their rations during the march from Man 
zanillo and more men to surrender. 

* On the evening of July 3d, Shafter had telegraphed to Washing 
ton : "To-night my lines completely surround the town from the bay 
on the north of the city to a point on the San Juan River on the south. 
General Pando, I find to-night, is some distance away, and will not 
get into Santiago " a despatch that shows imperfect information both 
as to the movements of the enemy and even as to the situation of his 
own troops. 



Of Shafter s reinforcements, the Ninth Massa 
chusetts had come up from Siboney on the 2d, and 
other troops were reported on their way from Tampa 
and Newport News. On the 3d General Miles tele 
graphed from Washington : 

I expect to be with you within one week with strong 

When the consuls came out again on the morn 
ing of the 4th, Lieutenant Miley, representing 
Shafter, conferred with them upon the question of 
quartering and feeding the noncombatants. It was 
a difficult problem, because Caney, a village of three 
hundred houses at most,* had been shelled during 
the battle of July ist, and contained many wounded 
men and some unburied dead ; it was fifteen miles 
from Shafter s base of supplies, and all that he could 
promise to furnish was the simplest food bread, 
bacon, sugar, and coffee for not more than three 
or four thousand. The consuls were advised to keep 
the people in the city as long as possible, unless a 
bombardment should be ordered, and to send them 
out gradually as their provisions became exhausted ; 
and another conference was arranged for the follow 
ing day, the 5th. 

The events of the night, however, precipitated 

Fearing lest the batteries and the mines might 

not avail, without the support of Cervera s fleet, to 

prevent Sampson from forcing an en- 

sinkingofthe trance to the harbour and putting an 

Mercedes, , ,.. ., .,. . . 

juiy 4 . end to all possibility of further resist 

ance, General Toral and the com 
mandant of the port decided upon an attempt to 
block the channel by sinking the Reina Mercedes 
at its narrowest point. It was a repetition of the 
Merrimac manoeuvre, and it proved equally unsuc- 

* Lieutenant Muller gives the number as two hundred ; Mr. Rams- 
den, who was among the refugees, as three hundred. 

^*~~- r "Y 


cessful. The dismantled cruiser her guns had al 
ready been taken ashore was hastily stripped dur 
ing the 4th, and an hour before midnight her com 
mander, Ensign Nardiz, and a few engineers and 
sailors moved her down the harbour, intending to 
drop her bow and stern anchors, swing her across 
the channel, and open her valves. 

Shafter had notified Sampson that fighting on 
land was suspended, but the admiral did not regard 
the truce as applying to the navy, and he still kept 
up the nightly watch with searchlights. As soon 
as the Mercedes came into view the Massachusetts, 
which was the ship on guard duty, and the Texas, 
which lay beside her, opened fire, and the shore 
batteries replied. A mortar shell from the latter 
struck the Indiana, going through her forward 
deck and exploding below, where it did some 
damage but hurt none of her crew. This was the 
only hit the Spanish mortars scored during the 

The Mercedes went down at the intended spot, 
but not in the intended position, a shell so her 
crew reported having cut her stern anchor loose 
prematurely. Next morning (July 5th) the Suwanee 
reconnoitred close in, and reported that the chan 
nel was not closed by the sunken ship, which lay 
with her upper deck partly submerged; but it was 
thought that she would prove a dangerous obstruc 
tion to Sampson s larger ships. 

An immediate result of the midnight firing was 
a panic in Santiago. Fully believing that the Amer 
ican fleet was forcing the harbour, the inhabitants 
poured out of the city, and on the morning of the 
5th the Caney road was thronged with women, chil 
dren, and old men, who during the remaining days 
of the siege, in spite of the efforts of Shafter s com 
missary department and of the Red Cross organiza 
tion, had to endure terrible sufferings. Many fugi 
tives fled to camps in the mountains ; others sought 


refuge along the shores of the bay; and Santiago 
was almost emptied of all but soldiers.* 

During these days of truce, and the week that 
followed, the American lines were gradually ex- 
sie -ofsar tend ed, north of the city, until Lud- 
tia^o 6 , jui y a "-i7. low s brigade, on the extreme right of 
Lawton s division, finally closed the 
gap through which Escario had entered, command 
ing the Cobre road and touching the head of the 
bay.f Two of the field batteries (Capron s and 
Parkhurst s, the latter now commanded by Lieuten 
ant Hinds) were brought up from El Pozo and sta 
tioned with Lawton ; the other two (Grimes s and 
Best s) were also moved forward to a position in 
the rear of Bates s brigade, on the left of the army. 
The field mortars were sent up to San Juan, and 
one of the siege guns was disembarked at Siboney, 
but it was found impossible to carry it over the 
muddy trail to the front. J Besides strengthening 
his own lines, Shafter endeavoured to cripple the 

* Lieutenant M filler gives a striking picture of the desolation of the 
beleaguered city : 

"Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii and Hercula- 
neum must have offered. Not a single store was open, not even the 
drug stores. A few horses were running through the city, pulling up 
the grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs were staying at 
the entrances of the houses, which their masters had abandoned. At 
night they barked incessantly. 

" At night the city was truly impressive. The streets were dark as 
wolves dens. A few guerrillas were breaking into abandoned stores 
and houses, which they ransacked." 

To suppress such robberies General Toral issued a special decree 
fixing death or life imprisonment as the penalty for offences against 
persons cr property. 

f The Spaniards ?eem to have been able to use the Cobre road as 
late as the loth of July, for Garcia reported on that day that he had 
driven in the enemy s outposts at Cobre and Dos Caminos. On the 
afternoon of the nth Ludlow s lines were extended down t the bay. 

% Some of these movements do not seem to have been in strict ac 
cordance with the rather indefinite truce between the two armies. On 
July 1 2th Toral called Shafter s attention to the advance of the Ameri 
can troops north of the city, "of which," the Spanish general said, " I 
suppose you are ignorant," and requested that they should return to 
their former position. It does not appear that any withdrawal resulted, 
but Shafter promised that there should be no further advance, and sent 
the division commanders explicit orders to that effect. 


enemy by cutting the pipe that brought water to 
Santiago from the hills north of the city. In the 
dry season this might have been an effective stroke ; 
but with heavy rain falling daily, the Spaniards had 
an ample supply in cisterns for their immediate 

Shafter s position grew stronger day by day 
he telegraphed to the War Department, on the 8th, 
that it was " impregnable against any force the 
enemy can send "-but the task of storming Toral s 
defences did not promise to be less difficult or less 
costly. At one time, indeed, the idea of abandoning 
the siege occurred to him, as is shown by a despatch 
he sent to Washington on the 4th : 

If we have got to try and reduce the town, now that 
the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief 
object of the expedition, there must be no delay in getting 
large bodies of troops here. 

At Washington, General Miles took up the sug 
gestion of withdrawing from Santiago, and proposed 
that Shafter s corps, with all the reinforcements 
ready to leave the United States, should be sent to 
Porto Rico, the conquest of which he was eager to 
undertake at once. He was overruled, however 
and fortunately, for the withdrawal would have re 
vived the drooping hopes of Spain, while the city s 
fall undoubtedly prompted her Government to sue 
for peace. 

With " take Santiago " the keynote of every 
despatch from Washington, Shafter contemplated an 
assault only as a last resort. He kept up negotiations 
for a surrender, and meanwhile he urged Sampson 
to force his way into the harbour and end the cam 
paign with the great guns of the fleet. His first 

* It seems, however, from Lieutenant M filler s narrative, that in the 
last days of the siege a shortage was beginning to be felt, or at least 
apprehended ; and the immediate repair of the broken pipes was one 
of the concessions requested by the Spanish commissioners who nego 
tiated the surrender. 



note to Toral, written on July 3d, was followed up 
by three letters on the 4th. One offered to parole 
and return the wounded men captured at Caney. 
Another proposed the exchange of a corresponding 
number of Spanish prisoners for Lieutenant Hobson 
and his seven comrades of the Merrimac, who were 
still held in Santiago, Blanco having declined to 
authorize their release. The third announced the 
destruction of Cervera s squadron and the death of 
Vara del Rey at Caney, and concluded : 

In view of the above, I would suggest that, to save 
needless effusion of blood and the distress of many people, 
you may reconsider your determination of yesterday. 
Your men have certainly shown the gallantry which was 
expected of them. 

The return of the wounded Spaniards, besides its 
slight relief to Shafter s overworked hospital serv 
ice, was designed to disprove the idea that the in 
vading army was in the habit of murdering its 
prisoners. The behaviour of the men captured at 
Caney showed that this preposterous myth had 
found wide credence among the Spanish soldiers. 
Many Americans thought that it accounted for the 
unexpectedly stubborn resistance they had offered, 
and that it had been deliberately spread by their 

Toral replied to all three notes with a letter of 
the most formal politeness, thanking Shafter for his 
courtesy, informing him that the proposition for 
Hobson s exchange had been referred to the captain- 
general, and again refusing to surrender. 

Next day (July 5th) twenty-eight wounded pris 
oners four officers, one of whom was Lieutenant- 
Colonel Vara del Rey, a brother of the dead general, 
and twenty-four men were delivered to the Span 
iards ; and word came from Toral that Blanco had 
agreed to the exchange for Hobson, which was car 
ried out on the afternoon of the 6th. Besides the 
four he had paroled, Shafter had three Spanish offi- 



cers among his prisoners. From them Toral chose 
Lieutenant Arias, who was sent into Santiago with 
seven privates ; and the crew of the Merrimac came 
out to the American lines, where they received a 
warm greeting on their way to Siboney and the 
fleet. With these pacific negotiations in progress, 
firing was not resumed, though the limit set for the 
truce had expired at noon on the 5th. 

A conference between Shafter and Sampson 
postponed from the 3d of July, when the admiral, 

on his way to Siboney, was called back 
Misunderstand- by t h e events of that memorable 
L n h K aftTnd n morning had been arranged for the 
Sampson. 6th. A serious misunderstanding had 

arisen between the two commanders, 
dating back to their meeting on the 2Oth of June, the 
day of the arrival of the Fifth Corps off Santiago, 
when the joint plan of campaign was first outlined. 
Of this plan Sampson has stated his idea very clearly 
and positively in a report dated July I5th: 

It was essential . . . that the positions occupied by 
the eastern and western batteries should be carried, and 
this was the scheme of action first proposed by General 
Shafter in his discussion with my chief of staff, who was 
sent by me to meet General Shafter the day of his arrival. 
The chief of staff carried with him a chart of the harbour 
and explained the situation, stating that it was regarded 
by us as a movement of primal importance that these 
points should be carried before any attention was paid to 
the city. The possession of these points insured the de 
struction of the mines by us, the entrance of our heavy 
ships in the harbour, and the assault on Admiral Cervera s 
squadron inside. To this General Shafter gave most cor 
dial assent, and stated that he had no intention of attack 
ing the city proper, that here [pointing to the entrance] 
was the key to the situation, and that when we had this 
we had all. This was repeated in his interview with Gen 
eral Garcia at Aserraderos. 

I do not know why a change of plan occurred, unless 
it was that the troops on being landed advanced them 
selves so far on the roads toward Santiago before any 
specific plan of operations had been decided upon that it 
was found inconvenient to divert them to the other points. 


On the other hand, Shafter s memorandum of 
the conference at Aserraderos which he dictated 
on the spot to Lieutenant Miley, of his staff, and of 
which Lieutenant Staunton, of Sampson s staff, took 
a copy makes no mention of the harbour batteries, 
simply recording the proposal to " land expedition 
at Daiquiri and march on Santiago." In his article 
published in the Century Magazine the general 

Soon after coming on board the Seguranga, some of 
the naval officers suggested that, in their opinion, the 
first thing to do was to drive the Spanish troops from 
the Morro and Socapa batteries, thus enabling the navy 
to remove the mines in the harbour; but after my inter 
view with General Garcia, and having seen the character 
of the shore on my way down to Aserraderos, I regarded 
this as entirely out of the question. . . . There could have 
been no misunderstanding as to my purpose.* 

* This recalls the general s statement that his instructions for the 
battle of July ist were clearly understood by tfte officers who com 
manded in the field (see p. 247). 

In his official report of the campaign, General Shafter says, after 
describing the arrangements for landing at Daiquiri : 

"These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from 
the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a 
trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and mak 
ing attack from that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only 
feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my 

The general has also stated, as his reason for not attacking the 
Morro, that the country along the coast was u rugged, devoid of water, 
and densely covered with a poisonous undergrowth." Could it have 
been more difficult than the jungles through which Wheeler s and 
Kent s divisions made their way, at such heavy cost, on July ist ? 

On the other hand, he would have had the railroad to bring his sup 
plies from Siboney. It will be remembered that on July 3d he wanted 
its aid so much that he was " seriously considering withdrawing about 
five miles, and taking up a new position on the high ground between 
the San Juan river and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero " on the 
coast between Siboney and Fort Aguadores "so as to get our supplies 
to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, having 
engines and cars at Siboney." (See page 267.) He might also have 
received effective assistance from Sampson ; but apparently Shafter 
had a low estimate of the value of a fleet as a factor in land fighting. 
This is shown by his confident assertion that it was "nonsense" to 
suppose that Cervera s squadron could have kept him out of Santiago. 
"We could easily have protected ourselves," he says, "and taken po 
sition to clear his decks with musketry fire." A general who can de 
feat and silence heavily armed ironclads with musketry fire, even when 



It is quite clear, nevertheless, that there was a 
fundamental misunderstanding, and one sure to 
cause friction in the management of the joint cam 
paign. Expecting the troops to strike at the Morro, 
Sampson was disappointed, to use no stronger word, 
when their only move in that direction Duffield s 
feeble demonstration at Fort Aguadores proved 
utterly abortive, in spite of his own co-operation. 
On the following day (July 2d) he told Shatter, by 
telephone from Siboney : 

Impossible to force entrance until we can clear chan 
nel of mines, a work of some time after forts are taken 
possession of by your troops. Nothing was accomplished 
yesterday by the advance on Aguadores. 

the ironclads are Spanish and the riflemen are Americans, is not a man 
to argue with. 

On June 26th, Colonel Pearson, with the Second Infantry, recon 
noitred along the coast, marching six miles westward from Siboney, 
along the railroad, without any special difficulty. He found the bridges 
intact, and no enemy in sight. 

In his book on The Santiago Campaign (pp. 286, 310), General 
Wheeler gives some despatches which are scarcely consistent with 
Shafter s positive and repeated assertion that he regarded an attack on 
the harbour batteries as "entirely out of the question" from the first. 
On July 2d the cavalry commander received this note : 

" MY DEAR GENERAL WHEELER : What do you think of the idea 
of sending a division in rear of the left division to clear out the forts 
along the entrance to the bay so as to let the navy in and have the busi 
ness over. Can it be done ? Very respectfully, 


Wheeler s reply was : " I regret to say that I do not think infantry 
can take the forts along the entrance to the bay. I would like to do it, 
but the effort would be attended with terrible loss." 

Again, on July 6th, Shafter wrote : " If it was possible to get be 
tween the town and the lower bay and try and clear those batteries out 
and let the navy in, the capture of the city would be easy ; but I am at 
a loss how to accomplish it." 

It would appear that but for Wheeler s contrary advice, Shafter 
contemplated ordering an assault upon the Punta Gorda or Morro bat 
tery, or possibly both, as the next step after the battle of July ist. 
Wheeler s belief that the landward defences of the batteries were too 
strong for assault seems to have been based upon observation with " a 
very powerful glass " at several miles distance (The Santiago Cam 
paign, p. 87). 

General Shafter has one triumphant answer to make to all criticisms 
upon his management of the campaign : he was sent to take Santiago, 
and he took it. In war success covers a multitude of mistakes, and 
very properly so. 



Shafter replied : 

It is impossible for me to say when I can take bat 
teries at entrance to harbour. If they are as difficult to 
take as those which we have been pitted against, it will 
be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss 
to see why the navy can not work under a destructive fire 
as well as the army. 

And an hour later he added : 

I urge that you make effort immediately to force the 
entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are 
already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss 
of life than I can. 

Sampson at once wrote a letter in which he reiter 
ated his opinion that it was impracticable to enter 
the harbour while the Spaniards controlled the 
mines, but promised to attempt to remove them by 
countermining. On the following morning (July 
3d) the Resolute brought a quantity of guncotton 
from Guantanamo for this purpose, and the admiral, 
as already recorded, started for the army headquar 
ters, intending to propose the storming of the Morro 
and Socapa batteries by the marines there were 
about a thousand of them at Playa del Este and 
with the fleet and a detachment of Shafter s troops. 
On the 4th, after the great sea fight, Shafter re 
peated his demand that Sampson should force the 
harbour, and twice telegraphed his view of the case 
to Washington, stating in one despatch : 

I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance 
into the harbour of Santiago not later than the 6th instant, 
and assist in the capture of that place. If they do, I be 
lieve the place will surrender without further loss of life. 

And in the other : 

If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet 
to the upper bay of Santiago we can take the city within 
a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town 
will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want 
fifteen thousand troops speedily, and it is not certain that 
they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and 
speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to 
do my part. 


On the 5th the two commanders received orders 
to confer and arrange a joint attack. Shafter was 
unable to ride to Siboney, and Sampson promised 
to come to his headquarters ; but next morning (July 
6th) the admiral was ill, and Captain Chadwick went 
ashore to represent him. At the conference it was 
agreed that another demand should be made for 
Toral s surrender. If this should be refused, at noon 
on the Qth the navy was to bombard Santiago with 
its great guns, lying off Fort Aguadores. Should 
the Spaniards still fail to come to terms, the Socapa 
was to be stormed, and some of Sampson s smaller 
ships were to attempt a dash into the harbour. 

The demand for surrender which Captain Chad- 
wick states that he wrote, though Shafter signed it 
was similar in tenor to Shafter s pre- 
siow progress v i ou s notes to Toral, adding the warn- 

toward sur- , . , 

render ing that unless terms were arranged 

by noon of the Qth the navy would 
open fire the three clays respite giving time for 
communication with Havana and Madrid. The 
Spanish commander replied with a request that the 
English cable operators, who were among the refu 
gees at Caney, should be sent into Santiago. This 
was done, with the result that on the 8th he sent 
an offer to evacuate the city and the eastern part 
of the province the territory subsequently sur 
rendered on condition that he should be allowed 
to withdraw unmolested to Holguin, with his arms, 
ammunition, and baggage. 

Shafter telegraphed this unexpected offer to 
Washington, and after a conference with his division 
commanders he sent a second despatch strongly 
advocating its acceptance. It would, he pointed out, 
at once open the harbour, and relieve him from de 
pendence upon his base at Siboney, which the pos 
sibility of stormy weather made more or less pre 
carious ; it would end the terrible sufferings of the 
refugees who had fled from the city; it would save 


the property, mostly owned by Cubans, which a 
bombardment would destroy ; and it would leave 
his corps ready for service elsewhere, while yet 
in good health which might not be the case much 
longer, for yellow fever had appeared at Siboney. 
All that would be lost, he said, would be some 
prisoners, who were not wanted, and the arms 
they carried. But the reply from Washington, de 
spatched late in the evening of the Qth, was : 

Your message recommending that Spanish troops be 
permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation 
to Holguin is a great surprise, and is not approved. The 
responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants 
rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The Secre 
tary of War orders that when you are strong enough to 
destroy the enemy and take Santiago, you do it. 

Toral was at once informed that his proposal was 
declined, and that unless he surrendered the truce 
would end at four o clock in the afternoon of July 
loth. He repeated his refusal, and at the hour 
named the Spaniards opened fire. They were 
promptly answered from the American lines, and 
late in the day Shafter s message requesting Samp 
son s co-operation having been delayed the 
Brooklyn and the Indiana threw eight-inch shell 
into the city for an hour. Hostilities ceased at 
nightfall, but were renewed early on the nth, the 
New York, the Brooklyn, and the Indiana again 
joining in the bombardment, which was stopped, in 
the afternoon, by a flag of truce from Shafter. 

The principal result of the firing was the dis 
abling of most of Toral s artillery. In men, the 
Spaniards lost seven killed and sixty-five wounded, 
the Americans two killed and thirteen wounded. 
The shells from the fleet destroyed or damaged 
fifty-nine houses, but the city was almost entirely 
deserted, and Lieutenant Muller states that there 
was no loss of life. Many of the projectiles did not 
explode ; those that did so caused no serious fires, 
as Santiago is a stone-built town. 


The message from Shafter to Toral, which ended 
the fighting, gave a new turn to the negotiations. 
It was the result of a telegram from Washington : 

Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and 
wish to return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at 
the expense of the United States Government. 

Informed of this offer, Toral replied that he " con 
firmed his former communication," but added : " I 
have communicated your proposition to the general- 
in-chief [Blanco] " an unmistakable sign of 

Meanwhile, the reinforcements for which Shafter 
had asked had begun to arrive in force. On the 9th 
the First Illinois a Chicago volunteer regiment 
and six batteries of light artillery, under Brigadier- 
General Randolph, had reached Daiquiri; on the 
loth the First District of Columbia and the Eighth 
Ohio had landed at Siboney. The District of 
Columbia men and two battalions of the Illinois 
regiment were at once moved forward, and placed 
between Wheeler and Lawton ; the artillery was 
disembarked, but the roads were now in such im 
passable condition that only two batteries had 
reached the front on the I4th, when the final negotia 
tions for the surrender began. On the nth General 
Miles arrived off the harbour on board 
Miles reaches the Ya le, which, with the Columbia, 
had brou g ht the S . ixth Massachusetts 
and part of the Sixth Illinois, under 
Brigadier-General Henry, from Charleston. 

General Miles had planned to land troops west 
of the harbour, and before going ashore he ordered 
Henry to be ready to disembark at Cabanas. He 
rode to headquarters on the morning of the I2th. 
Shafter at once informed Toral that the command 
ing general of the American army was present, and 
suggested a personal interview. At noon on the 
1 3th the three generals met, and a conversation fol 
lowed of which Shafter reported : " I think it made 



a strong impression on him [Toral]." But pending 
instructions from Havana nothing was finally set 
tled, and another interview was arranged for noon 
of the 1 4th. 

Uncertain of the success of these long-drawn-out 
negotiations, Shafter had again appealed to Wash 
ington that Sampson should be ordered to force the 
harbour. On the I3th Secretary Alger, who appar 
ently took Shafter s view of the matter, wrote to 
the Navy Department formally requesting that the 
necessary instructions should be issued at once. 
Secretary Long, who evidently agreed with Samp 
son, formally acknowledged the receipt of the letter, 
but, instead of issuing the requested order, tele 
graphed to the admiral : 

The commanding general of the army urges, and Secre 
tary of War urgently requests, that navy force harbour. 
Confer with commander of army. Wishing to do all that 
is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy, 
I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the 
United States armoured vessels must not be risked. 

Adjutant-General Corbin sent Shafter a private 
telegram, confidentially informing him : 

The Secretary of War suggests that if the navy will 
not undertake to break through, take a transport, cover 
the pilot house and most exposed points with baled hay 
. . . and call for volunteers, from the army not a large 
number to run into the harbour, thus making a way for 
the navy. 

But the remarkable idea of running ships piled 
up with inflammable hay past batteries of rapid-fire 
guns was never tested. Three hours before noon on 
the i4th Toral informed Shafter that he had heard 
from the captain-general. Blanco said that he had 
referred the question to Madrid; and that mean 
while, if the American commander would continue 
the truce, terms of capitulation might be agreed 
upon provisionally. Here was a distinct step in the 
slow progress toward a surrender. 



That the Spaniards were perfectly aware of the 
hopelessness of their situation was shown by a de 
spatch which General Linares sent to Blanco on 
the 1 2th, in answer to an official suggestion that he 
might break through the American lines by attack 
ing in conjunction with the troops at Holguin : 

Although confined to my bed by great weakness and 
much pain, the situation of the long-suffering troops here 
occupies my mind to such an extent that I deem it my 
duty to address your Excellency and the Minister of War 
that the state of affairs may be explained. 

Enemy s positions very close to precinct of city, fa 
voured by nature of ground; ours spread out over four 
teen kilometres; large number sick; not sent to hospitals 
because necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and 
mules without food and shelter; rain has been pouring into 
the trenches incessantly for twenty hours. Soldiers with 
out permanent shelter; rice the only food; can not change 
or wash clothes. Many casualties; chiefs and officers 
killed; forces without proper command in critical mo 
ments. Under these circumstances impossible to open 
passage, because one third of the men of our contingent 
would be unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces 
still further; result would be great disaster without accom 
plishing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, 
as desired by your Excellency. In order to go out under 
protection of Holguin division it would be necessary for 
the latter to break through the enemy s line, and then with 
combined forces to break through another part of the 
same line. This would mean an eight-days journey for 
Holguin division, bringing with them a quantity of rations 
which they are unable to transport. The situation is hope 
less; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the 
agony. . . . 

Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona. a walled city, on the 
soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her 
own sons, by old men, women, and children, who encour 
aged and assisted the combatants, and risked their lives, 
impelled by the sacred idea of independence and with the 
hope of succour which they received. Here is solitude, 
the complete exodus of the population, insular as well as 
peninsular, including the public officials, with few excep 
tions. Only the clergy remain, and they intend to leave 
to-day, headed by their archbishop. 

The defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full 
of enthusiasm and energy; for three years they have been 
fighting against the climate, privations, and fatigue; and 


now that the most critical time has arrived their courage 
and bodily strength are exhausted. . . . There is a limit 
to the honour of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the 
Government and the whole nation. 

At noon on the I4th, when Miles, Shafter, and 
Toral met again, the latter was told that he must 
surrender immediately and with no conditions be 
yond the return of his troops to Spain. After some 
discussion, carried on through interpreters, the two 
American officers understood that he consented to 
do so, and commissioners were appointed to draw 
up terms Generals Wheeler and Lawton and 
Lieutenant Miley, for the United States ; for Spain, 
General Escario,* Lieutenant-Colonel Fontan, and 
Robert Mason, the British vice-consul. 

Both Miles and Shafter telegraphed to Washing 
ton that Santiago had surrendered, and the welcome 
news went all over the country ; but when the com 
missioners met, at half past two o clock (July I4th), 
it was found that there had been a misunderstand 
ing, and that Toral s representatives had power to 
act only subject to approval from Madrid. This 
was a serious disappointment, but negotiations pro 
ceeded, several questions of detail being raised, and 
the Spaniards making a hard fight for permission 
to retain their arms, so that they could go back to 
their native land with some at least of the honours 
of war. The three American officers could not 
grant such a concession, but they agreed to make 
a strong recommendation to the Government at 
Washington that the surrendered weapons should 
be returned to the prisoners. 

The commissioners sat until after midnight, and 
then adjourned to meet early on the i^th. In the 
morning Shafter sent a telegram correcting his pre 
mature announcement of a surrender, and reporting 

* Colonel Escario was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general by 
cable from Madrid, in recognition of the skill and gallantry of his march 
from Manzanillo to Santiago. 


the negotiations in progress. " It can not be pos 
sible," he added, u that there will be a failure in com 
pleting arrangements " a sentence which inevitably 
created an impression that a failure was by no means 
impossible. Secretary Alger replied with a despatch 
suggesting that Toral might be playing for time, in 
hope that reinforcements would reach him ; and a 
similar misgiving had naturally arisen at the front. 
With this disturbing doubt in the background, the 
presence of Mr. Mason as a member of the joint 
commission proved valuable to the Americans as an 
assurance that the Spaniards, as finally became evi 
dent, were acting in entire good faith throughout 
the negotiations. 

Few of Shafter s officers and men expected that 
Toral would surrender until Santiago was stormed. 
The whole army was prepared to attack at the word. 
The artillery, reinforced by Randolph s batteries, 
and pushed boldly forward one battery, Captain 
Reilly s, was posted in front of the firing line was 
eager for a chance to redeem its comparative failure 
in the battles of the ist of July. At the point where 
the American lines were nearest to the enemy, on 
the extreme right, two of Lawton s brigades, Lud- 
low s and McKibbin s Brigadier-General McKib- 
bin, who came to Cuba as lieutenant-colonel of the 
Twenty-first Infantry, had succeeded Colonel Evan 
Miles were ready to charge the Spanish trenches. 

The attack would probably have been a bloody 
one. In front of the trenches was a double line of 
barbed-wire fences, which would have held the 
assailants under a murderous fire. Farther back 
there were pitfalls and barricaded streets. " Upon 
entering the city," Shafter said in the despatch he 
sent to Washington at the moment of the hoisting 
of the flag, " I discovered a perfect entanglement 
of defences. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first 
day, it would have cost five thousand lives to have 
taken it." 


At three o clock on the I5th the terms of capitu 
lation were signed. They provided for the surrender 
of the whole eastern district of the province of San 
tiago, with all the troops and war material it con 
tained ; the garrison of the city of Santiago to march 
out and deposit their arms, the officers retaining 
their side arms, and both officers and men keeping 
their personal property ; all the Spanish troops to be 
transported to Spain with as little delay as possible, 
any volunteers or guerrillas who wished to remain 
in Cuba being allowed to do so on parole. This 
agreement was only provisional, but all suspense 
was ended next morning (July i6th) when a note 
came from Toral announcing that the Spanish Gov 
ernment had authorized him to capitulate. 

There now remained only the signing of the final 
convention identical in terms with the preliminary 
agreement which took place at six 

July x^ ceremony of the surrender. Shafter 

and Toral met at half past nine in the 
morning of the I7th, under a tall ceiba tree between 
the lines which had been the meeting place of the 
commissioners and when Toral had saluted and 
said : " I yield the city and the military division of 
the province of Santiago de Cuba to the authority 
of the United States of America," the two generals, 
with their escorts, rode into Santiago, and at the 
stroke of noon the American flag went up over 
the Government palace in the centre of the ancient 
Spanish city Spanish no longer. 

The Santiago campaign was over, and Shafter, 
after being brought to the very brink of disaster by 
adverse circumstances and by his own mistakes, had 
won a sweeping and complete success. As he after 
wards said himself,* there had been very little 
strategy in his movements. He certainly had not 

* In his speech at a dinner of the Sons of the Revolution, in New 
York, November 25, 1898. 



proved himself a Napoleon or a Caesar, but he had 
earned the right to say veni, vidi, vici. Bluff and 
untactful in personal intercourse, he was not a man 
to be widely popular among his subordinates. His 
attitude to the press representatives gentry seldom 
beloved of commanding generals involved him in 
some undignified controversies, and brought upon 
him, in retaliation, much unjust censure. But a 
hundred newspaper criticisms are more than offset 
by one such expression as those that have come 
from some of the men who were with him at San 

General Wheeler, who has an ill word for no one, 
calls him " a man of more than ordinary intellect 
and force of character." General Breckinridge, not 
regarded as an especially friendly critic, bears testi 
mony in his official report to " the remarkable 
energy, decision, and self-reliance which character 
ized General Shafter s course during this distin 
guished military adventure throughout its arduous 
course to its most honourable conclusion." More 
valuable still is the judgment of that fine soldier 
General Chaffee, given in his reply to a speaker who 
had complimented him at Shafter s expense : * 

He worked night and day at his duties, and though 
his physical disabilities made his strength unequal to 
mine, and prevented him from doing some of the things 
I was able to do, yet I say there is no more honest, faith 
ful, and conscientious man who ever went out to command 
troops. Let no one decry him in my presence. No man 
ever possessed more iron courage. General Shafter is a 
man. He has my unbounded respect. 

These are strong words of praise, and they are en 
tirely true. 

When the Fifth Corps was preparing to embark 
at Tampa, newspaper prophets were spreading 
abroad detailed forecasts of the marvellous ways in 

* At a dinner of the Commercial Club of Kansas City, Mo., De 
cember 19, 1898. 


which American engineering skill was to be applied 
to military uses. Shafter, we were told, was to in 
vade Cuba with " fortification machines " that would 
throw up breastworks at railroad speed ; with " road 
builders " that would construct macadam highways 
as if by magic ; with powerful searchlights to reveal 
the enemy s movements at night; and with other 
novel paraphernalia destined to make victory swift 
and easy. As a matter of fact, if we except the work 
done by the signal service in establishing telegraph 
and telephone communication, the Santiago cam 
paign was fought out on the most primitive lines, 
with scarcely an attempt at " scientific warfare." 
Shafter s small engineer corps accomplished prac 
tically nothing ;* his weak force of artillery did little 
for him ; of cavalry he had almost none. His battles 
were fought by infantry, and were won by the sheer 
pluck and dash of his men, in spite of the fact that 
to a certain extent they had the disadvantage of 
inferior equipment, f 

Much has been said, in the newspapers and else 
where, upon the question whether Santiago was sur 
rendered to General Miles or to Gen 
eral Shafter. Unlike another question 
that has been raised by sundry war 
critics ignorant of warfare, who have 
debated whether Admiral Sampson or Commodore 
Schley was in command of the fleet that destroyed 
Cervera,t this is not entirely an idle query. It ap- 

* The engineers built a pier for the Cubans at Aserraderos, and 
later one at Siboney, which was not finished until just before the end 
of the campaign. They also did a little scouting and some road re 
pairing, but did not succeed in making even a tolerable trail from Si 
boney to the front. They complained no doubt truly that they were 
seriously handicapped by lack of proper equipment, and especially of 

t There is little to choose between the Mauser rifle and the Krag- 
Jorgensen, but there is no question of the terrible disadvantage under 
which the American volunteers and artillery laboured by reason of their 
lack of smokeless powder. 

% The answer to this question is so self-evident to any one who has 
the slightest understanding of naval affairs that no space has been 


pears that on July 8th, the day after Miles left 
Washington, Adjutant-General Corbin telegraphed 
to Shafter : 

Secretary of War directs me to inform you that Gen 
eral Miles left here at 10.40 last night for Santiago, but 
with instructions not to in any manner supersede you as 
commander of the forces in the field near Santiago so 
long as you are able for duty. 

This not unnaturally led to a certain amount of mis 
understanding. On the day of the surrender, in 
reply to an order directing him to move his troops 
to fresh camps, Shafter telegraphed to Miles : 

Letters and orders in reference to movement of camp 
received and will be carried out. None is more anxious 
than myself to get away from here. It seems from your 
orders given me that you regard my force as a part of 
your command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure 
than serving under you, general, and I shall comply with 
all your requests and directions, but I was told by the 
secretary that you were not to supersede me in command 

To this communication, an entirely creditable and 
soldierly one, Miles, who had gone to Guantanamo 
Bay with the transports carrying Henry s troops, re 
plied (July 1 8th) : 

wasted on it in the present narrative. It may be said here that the at 
tempts which have been made in the press, and even in Congress, to 
deprive Admiral Sampson of the honour justly earned by his splendid 
services to his country are disgraceful to their authors. They must rest 
either upon a total misunderstanding of the facts, or upon some most 
unworthy motive of jealousy. 

As a sample of the methods employed, Sampson s signal, on the 
morning of July 3d, to "disregard the movements of commander-in- 
chief," has been distorted into "disregard the orders of commander- 
in-chief," and paraded as a proof that he had nothing to do with the 
battle of that day. 

The fact that venomous attacks upon Sampson have been coupled 
with extravagant praise of Schley must be most embarrassing to the 
latter officer, who very properly said, in an official despatch written a 
week after the battle with Cervera : " Victory was secured by the forces 
under the command of the commander-in-chief, North Atlantic station, 
and to him the honour is due." 

As has been said by Captain Mahan, the foremost American au 
thority on naval strategy, " the first credit of the battle, as of the cam 
paign, belongs to the man whose dispositions prevailed in both to 
Admiral Sampson." 



Have no desire and have carefully avoided any 
appearance of superseding you. Your command is a 
part of the United States army, which I have the honour 
to command, having been duly assigned thereto, and 
directed by the President to go wherever I thought 
my presence required and give such general directions 
as I thought best concerning military matters, and espe 
cially directed to go to Santiago for a specific purpose. 
You will also notice that the orders of the Secretary 
of War of July I3th left the matter to my discretion. 
I should regret that any event would cause either 
yourself or any part of your command to cease to be 
a part of mine. 

This was unanswerable, and exactly defined the 
position General Miles occupied during his brief stay 
before Santiago. When he landed at Siboney, in 
the afternoon of July n, he had found the place 
in a very unsatisfactory condition. General Duffield, 
in command, was ill, and apparently no one had 
taken his place ; an alarming outbreak of yellow 
fever had begun probably caused, and certainly 
hastened, by the use of infected buildings which 
should have been destroyed ; the medical and trans 
portation services were frightfully inadequate. The 
landing stage was still unfinished, and General Miles 
went on shore through the surf. He began to issue 
orders at once, signing them " Nelson A. Miles, 
major-general commanding " ; * but he counter 
manded no plan of Shafter s, and his part in the con 
clusion of the campaign was limited to his share in 
the conferences with Toral which, on Shafter s own 
statement, Miles allowed to continue when his own 
judgment was in favour of breaking them off and 

* One of his first orders was for the burning of the buildings be 
lieved to be infected with yellow fever, including the army post-office, 
a house used by the newspaper correspondents, and others occupied by 
the Thirty-third Michigan. General Shafter had that morning issued 
instructions to the same effect, but apparently nothing had been done 
toward carrying them out. 

Warnings against the use of buildings likely to be infected had been 
issued before the Fifth Corps landed, and General Miles regarded the 
neglect of proper precautions at Siboney as a distinct violation of 


his preparations, afterward abandoned, to land 
troops at Cabanas. 

It was hardly a secret at the time, and has since 
become notorious, that an unfortunate ill feeling 
had arisen between General Miles and the army staff 
at Washington ; but Secretary Alger s despatches 
distinctly recognize him as in command, notably the 
one mentioned in Miles s note of the i8th to Shafter, 
already quoted. This is dated July I3th, and ad 
dressed to " Major-General Miles, Camp near San 
tiago " : 

You may accept surrender by granting parole to 
officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms. 
The officers and men after parole to be permitted to 
return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not ac 
cepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault 
would fail. Consult with Sampson, and pursue such 
course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter 
should now be settled promptly. 

After such an order, clothing him with com 
plete authority, and therefore with full responsibility, 
it was certainly both tactful and generous on Miles s 
part to leave the formal reception of Toral s sur 
render to Shafter, whom he would necessarily have 
outranked had he been present. At the same time, 
it was a very proper recognition of the fact that to 
the commander of the Fifth Corps belonged the 
honours of a victorious campaign, and especially 
the credit of having secured a capitulation without 
further fighting, thus capturing Santiago at a cost 
which, after all, was small in proportion to the great 
results gained. 

General Miles s report indicates his belief that 
his preparations to land a brigade at Cabanas helped 
to bring Toral to terms : 

The Spanish commander was well aware of our de 
signs, as the position and movements of the fleet had been 
in full view of the officers commanding his troops, and 
they had reported to him having seen fifty-seven vessels, 
some of them loaded with troops, menacing that part of 
his position. 


For the navy, too, a share in the work is claimed 
apart from its victory over Cervera, which was the 
great decisive event of the campaign 
and of the war. A board appointed 
by Sampson to inspect the captured 
city reported, after a detailed account of the damage 
done by the war-ships fire : 

We believe that the bombardment by the ships had 
much to do with the early surrender of the city. 

This is indorsed by the admiral. " The effect of our 
shell," he says, " was undoubtedly one of the prin 
cipal causes of the surrender at this time." 

And in distributing the credit where it is due 
mention should be made of the effective stroke of 
military diplomacy that came from Washington. 
There is no doubt that the offer to return Toral s 
forces to Spain did much toward making the sur 
render possible. 

It was somewhat anomalous that in the cere 
monies marking the successful ending of a joint 
land and sea campaign the American navy w T as not 
represented. On July I3th, when Shafter informed 
Sampson that a surrender was expected, the admiral 
expressed his desire to share in the negotiations, 
which involved questions of importance to both 
branches of the service. The general acquiesced, 
and promised that if possible he would give due 
notice of the final arrangement of terms, in order 
that Sampson might send a representative. Next 
morning (July I4th) Shafter again telephoned to 
Siboney that there was " every prospect of capitula 
tion," and Miles invited the admiral to send an 
officer ashore ; but before this could be done there 
came a message telling him that Santiago had 
already surrendered. 

On the 1 5th Sampson was informed of the hitch 
in the negotiations. On the i6th Shafter tele 
phoned : 



Enemy has surrendered. Will you send some one to 
represent navy in the matter? 

Captain Chadwick, as Sampson s chief of staff, 
landed and went to the front as quickly as he could. 
The convention had already been signed; it con 
tained no reference to the navy, nor to the Spanish 
ships at Santiago. The captain told Shafter that 
these latter the gunboat Alvarado and five mer 
chant steamers, one of which, the Mejico, was armed 
would be regarded by the navy as its prizes. Shaf 
ter said that he would refer the matter to the Secre 
tary of War. 

:< This," Sampson says, " could have no bearing 
upon what I considered my duty in the matter, par 
ticularly in view of our late experience of Spanish 
perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which in my 
opinion made it necessary to look after their safety 
at once." But when he sent in prize crews, they 
found army officers in charge of the vessels, and 
General McKibbin, who had been designated as 
military governor of Santiago, declined to give them 
up until Sampson had sent Shafter an emphatic 
protest. In a joint campaign, the admiral pointed 
out, usage gives captured cities or forts to the 
army, floating property to the navy; he had left the 
harbour batteries to be occupied by the troops, and 
he expected, in return, similar consideration with 
regard to the ships. " My prize crews must remain 
in charge," he concluded, " and I have so directed." 
His action was approved at Washington, but the 
merchant vessels were afterward released, it being 
decided that shipping captured jointly by the army 
and the navy is not liable to seizure as prizes. The 
Alvarado, commanded by Lieutenant Blue, for 
merly of the Suwanee, was added to Sampson s fleet. 

On the day before the surrender (July :6th) 
Shafter personally invited Garcia and his staff to 
witness the ceremony. The Cuban chief asked if 
it was intended to continue the Spanish civil 


officials in power, and on being answered in the 

affirmative he dramatically declared that he could 

not go where Spain ruled. No Cuban 

Garcia leaves troops were allowed to enter the city 

Santiago, L . . J . 

juiyie. a ver y proper precaution against 

disorder, but one that was bitterly re 
sented by the excluded patriots. Garcia was so deep 
ly offended that he marched his men northward into 
the interior, and sent Shatter a letter * reproaching 
the American commander for his ingratitude. On 
July 3Oth he appeared at Gibara, on the north coast, 
which had been evacuated by the Spaniards a few 
days before ; and meeting Commander Maynard, of 
the Nashville, he announced his intention of mov 
ing upon Holguin, where the garrison, commanded 
by General Luque, was in great straits for food, but 
apparently no serious fighting followed. 

Early in the morning of the I7th the Spanish 
troops began to deposit their rifles at the arsenal 
in Santiago, where they were re- 
surrender * ceived and inventoried by Lieutenant 
Brooke, Shafter s ordnance officer, the 
disarmed men being marched out to a camp near 
San Juan. Of the Spanish Mauser, the weapon of 
the regular troops, the number surrendered was 
7,902 rifles and 833 carbines, besides about 7,000 
guns of other makes, chiefly the Remington, which 
was used by the volunteers. There were only 1,500,- 
ooo rounds of Mauser ammunition less than 200 
cartridges for each gun. The store of food was 
larger than might have been expected, amounting 
on the authority of General Wood to 1,200,000 
rations, but including little except rice. 

Of the men, it seems that no precise count was 
taken a rather curious omission, f In his official 

* Or at least Shatter received a letter purporting to come from Gar 
cia. Its authenticity does not seem to be certain. 

t No report was made to Washington of the number of men form 
ing the garrison of Santiago. The only figures received by the War 



report Shafter estimates their number as about 
12,000. In his Century Magazine article he gives it 
as 11,500, which is still probably an overstatement. 
Lieutenant Miley, who was in a position to have 
exact information, puts it at 10,500,* and other esti 
mates are lower. Of these more than 2,000 were 
sick and wounded men in the four hospitals, f 

Toral s division included nine garrisons outside 
of Santiago, numbering 13,000 men, and stationed at 
Guantanamo, Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, El Cristo, 
El Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and 
Palma Soriano. The surrender of such considerable 
forces without a shot fired against them came as a 
surprise when the Spanish general offered it ; yet it 
is easily accounted for. General Pareja s men at 
Guantanamo, as was already known, were on the 
brink of starvation ; J and the other detachments 
were little better off. Toral told Miles that all of 
them were hard pressed by insurgents. With San 
tiago taken and the coast blockaded their position 
became hopeless, and if not surrendered to Shafter 
they would be left to the tender mercies of the 

Shafter commissioned Lieutenant Miley, of his 
staff, to receive the surrender of the inland garrisons. 
With two mounted troops of the Second Cavalry, 
under Captain Lewis, and accompanied by Captain 
Ramus, an aid of Toral s, the lieutenant started on 
July igth, making his way over the mountains, 

Department were those of the whole number of soldiers transported to 
Spain, 22,137, of whom 14,995, representing the garrisons of the city 
and of six inland stations, sailed from Santiago. 

* In Cuba with Shafter, p. 214. 

t "At the hospitals," says Lieutenant Muller, "only the seriously 
wounded and sick were admitted ; those who could stand on their feet 
were refused and sent back to the trenches. If this had not been the 
case, there would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor 
physicians to attend them." 

% The condition of the Spanish troops at Guantanamo may be 
judged from the fact that from April to September T2th nine hundred 
and eighteen men nearly one-seventh of Pareja s force died in 


through a country from which almost all traces of 
civilization had disappeared, to El Cristo. The 
small Spanish detachments here and at Moron and 
Dos Caminos * surrendered readily, but the coman- 
dante of the larger force at San Luis refused to 
accept the statements of Miley and Ramus until he 
had sent a messenger of his own to Santiago. At 
Palma Soriano, on the 22d, eight hundred men 
capitulated without resistance, though Miley had 
been warned at San Luis that he would probably be 
fired upon. The prisoners from all these places, and 
from El Songo, which yielded without a visit, were 
marched down to Santiago as rapidly as possible, 
and the First Infantry, a regiment which had 
scarcely suffered in the fighting, was sent up to gar 
rison the towns. 

The Spanish troops at Guantanamo surrendered 
to Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Ewers ; but it 
was not until August I3th the last day of the war 
that Lieutenant Miley, with another Spanish staff 
officer, Major Irles, set out for Baracoa and Sagua 
de Tanamo, on the northern coast. At neither place 
was there any attempt at resistance, though no news 
of the fall of Santiago had reached these isolated 
towns. Shafter s transports had passed within sight 
of Baracoa, and the comandante had told his men 

* This is a station on the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and 
must not be confounded with the village of the same name just outside 
of Santiago, on the road to Cobre, mentioned on page 298. " Dos 
Caminos," meaning Two Roads, or Crossroads, is a common Spanish 

Lieutenant Miley fin Cuba with Shafter, p. 193) thus describes the 
condition of these outlying Spanish posts : 

"Surrounding each of the towns there was a little cultivated zone 
Avith a radius of half a mile or a mile, depending on the size of the 
place, planted mainly to corn and sweet potatoes. The mango trees 
were to be found everywhere loaded with fruit. The natives in the 
towns consisted of old men, women, and children, while the able- 
bodied men were all soldiers in the insurgent army. I found all these 
towns surrounded by bands of insurgents, and the Spanish garrisons 
could not lay down their arms in safety unless I had American troops 
to leave as guard. For that reason the garrisons at El Cristo, Moron, 
and Dos Caminos were not disarmed until I came back on my return 
to Santiago." 


that they were Spanish ships, loaded with troops 
on their way to conquer the Americans. At Sagua, 
which Miley reached on the I5th, a bulletin was 
posted announcing a great victory won by Montojo 
at Manila. 

At Santiago, on July i6th, the refugees from 

Caney, a miserable procession of sick and starving 

people, who had endured horrors 

shafter s army orse than a bombardment, began to 

fever stricken. , . , r\ <i 

return to their homes. On the two 
following days the electric mines in the harbour 
mouth were exploded, and the contact torpedoes 
taken up, two that could not be moved being marked 
with buoys ; and on the afternoon of the i8th the 
transports, headed by the Red Cross ship State of 
Texas, were able to come into the bay. 

This ended all fear of a shortage of supplies ; but 
the victorious army was in a sorry and shocking 
condition of sickness and debility. More than half 
the soldiers were either down with malarial fever, or 
slowly recovering from it ; dysentery was prevalent, 
typhoid had appeared, and there were cases of yel 
low fever in every regiment. Attempts were made 
to fight this last, the most dreaded of diseases, by 
moving to fresh camping grounds, but it was soon 
found that the soldiers had not strength enough to 
move their tents and impedimenta. Any exertion 
in the hot sun only increased the sickness. The hos 
pital service was still utterly inadequate ; there was 
a lack of needed medicines, and a total absence of 
suitable food. 

The wounded and part of the sick were sent 
back to the United States on returning transports. 
On some ships notably the Seneca and the Concho, 
which reached Fort Monroe on the i8th and 28th 
of July respectively, and, hoisting the yellow flag, 
were ordered on to New York there was great 
suffering through their utter lack of proper accom 
modation and attendance. The Seneca had four 


deaths during the voyage, the Concho six ; and the 
arrival of these vessels with their wretched cargo in 
such pitiable contrast to the strong and eager host 
that sailed from Tampa a few weeks before was the 
first revelation to the people of the United States 
of the sinister results that a defective army organi 
zation had inevitably caused.* But still, both in 
Washington and in the country generally, there was 
no realization of the desperate plight of the soldiers 
in Cuba. 

On July 1 4th Secretary Alger had telegraphed 
to General Miles : 

As soon as Santiago falls, the troops must all he put 
in camp as comfortable as they can be made, and remain, 
I suppose, until the fever has had its run. 

Miles gave similar directions to Shafter several 
times, and on the 2ist he cabled to Washington from 
Guantanamo, where he was preparing to sail for 
Porto Rico : 

There is not a single regiment of regulars or volun 
teers with General Shafter s command that is not infected 
with yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to 
thirty-six in the Thirty-third Michigan. 

* " Algerism" is a word that was coined by certain newspapers to 
denote the cause of all the armv s sufferings. The term was an unfair 
attack upon the Secretary of War, and betrayed either political spite or 
ignorance of the true facts of the case. 

Secretary Alger did not accomplish such wonders as those that 
Stanton achieved when he brought order and efficiency out of the chaos 
of President Lincoln s war office. The task of equipping an army to 
fight Spain was well nigh an impossible one, and the badly organized 
system of which General Alger was the official head was incompetent 
to grapple with it. Much creditable work was done, but it was inev 
itable that there should be failure at many points, and that loss and 
suffering should result. But in attempting to fasten blame upon the 
personnel of the department it is impossible to find more than the un 
avoidable percentage of human error. Though he did not prove to be 
the rare and brilliant organizer who alone could have cut the obstruc 
tive red tape and met the overwhelming needs of the service, the secre 
tary himself laboured with the most devoted energv. 

The main cause of the armv s troubles is to be found in the illiberal 
and unintelligent policy that has been traditional with Congress in its 
control of the military establishment. The responsibility rests upon 
the national legislature, and indirectly upon the nation that it rep 


After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my 
opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the 
fever will be as I have directed namely, the troops to 
go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting 
fresh camps every day. If this does not check the spread 
of the disease, the only way of saving a large portion of 
the command will be to put them on transports and ship 
them to the New England coast, to some point to be desig 
nated by the surgeon-general. 

The plan of changing camps, as has been said, 
proved worse than useless, yet on August 3d Shafter 
was again instructed to move his command along 
the San Luis railroad to the high ground north of 
Santiago. It was quite impossible to carry out such 
an order. Shafter assembled his general officers, 
read the instructions he had received, and asked 
their opinion. One of them * was for seizing every 
ship in the harbour and starting northward at once, 
orders or no orders; all agreed that to leave Cuba 
was an imperative necessity. At the suggestion of 
General Bates, they drew up a " round robin " letter 
to the corps commander, stating that 

the arm y was utterl y disabled by ma 
larial feVer ; that it was in a condition 
to be destroyed by an epidemic, already threatened, 
of yellow fever; that it must be moved at once or 
perish as an army ; and that those responsible for 
preventing such a move would be responsible for 
the unnecessary loss of thousands of lives. 

This strong letter was signed by all the officers 
present Major-Generals Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, 
Bates, and Chaffee, Brigadier-Generals Sumner, 
Ludlow, McKibbin, Ames, and Wood, and Colonel 
Roosevelt, f There was, as Shafter says, no secrecy 

* General Shafter records this incident without mentioning names, 
but the outspoken officer was probablv General Ames, who expressed a 
similar opinion to a correspondent, and who sent a private telegram to 
Mr. Allen, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy : " This army is incapa 
ble, because of sickness, of marching: anywhere except to the transports. 
If it is ever to return to the United States, it must do so at once." 

t Brigadier-Generals Kent, Lawton, Bates, and Chaffee had just re 
ceived their major-generalships. General Ames a distinguished gen- 

3 26 


about it, and the newspaper correspondents cabled 
its contents to the United States, where it came as 
a revelation. This was no utterance of a sensational 
reporter ; it was the voice of an army that had been 
sent out to fight the nation s battles, and that now 
found itself left to parish on the soil it had won. 

At Washington Shafter telegraphed it to the 
War Department with an expression of his own 
opinion, saying that if the troops were not to be 
moved till the fever had passed there would be very 
few to move its effect was immediate. Next day 
(August 4th) the general was ordered to transport 
his men as rapidly as possible to Montauk Point, 
where General S. B. M. Young, himself a fever con 
valescent, was commissioned to prepare a camp for 

The embarkation began on August 7th, and was 
continued as rapidly as transports could be secured. 
On the 25th General Shafter sailed with almost the 
last men of his corps, leaving General Lawton in 
command of the province, with General Wood in 
charge of the city. Some of the " immune " regi 
ments were sent from the United States to do gar 
rison duty, it being expected too sanguinely, as it 
proved that they would not suffer from the climatic 
fevers that had been so disastrous to the Fifth Corps. 

The shipment of Toral s troops \ began on 
August 9th, and on September I7th all the pris 
oners had left Santiago except a small number who 

eral of the civil war, hailing from Massachusetts, though formerly gov 
ernor of Mississippi was in command of Kent s third brigade, formerly 
Colonel Wikoff s. Wood, promoted brigadier- general, had on July 
2oth succeeded McKibbin as military governor of Santiagp. Being a 
physician by profession, he was peculiarly fitted for a post whose most 
immediate and important problem was that of sanitation. Colonel 
Roosevelt, who had also gained a step in rank, was present as com 
mander of the second cavalry brigade. 

* Just before he sailed, Toral is said to have sent Shafter a letter 
commenting bitterly on the fact that the surrendered arms had not 
been returned, as recommended or promised, as the Spaniards seem 
to have understood by the American commissioners who negotiated 
the capitulation. 



elected to remain in Cuba, and a few yellow-fever 
patients at Baracoa and Guantanamo. The work 
was done by the Compania Transatlantica Espafiola, 
which made the lowest tender when bids were in 
vited by the quartermaster-general s department. 
It seemed, at first sight, anomalous that the United 
States Government should employ a Spanish com 
pany, some of whose ships were actually serving as 
auxiliaries in the enemy s navy ; and representatives 
of other ocean lines willing to accept the contract 
at a much higher price were greatly concerned at 
so extraordinary an arrangement. Undoubtedly, 
however, the War Department s action was busi 
nesslike and judicious. It was very satisfactory that 
the Spanish soldiers should be intrusted to their 
own people, so that no charge of ill treatment could 
be laid at any American door. For these hapless 
men were suffering terribly during the unhealthy 
months of August and September. Several hundred 
died before they could be taken on board the ships, 
and several hundred more during the voyage. On 
one vessel, the Pedro de Satrustegui, there were 
seventy-six deaths. 

The total number of people carried to Spain was 
22,864. This included 22,137 soldiers 1,163 
officers and 20,974 men ; the rest were officers 
wives and children, priests, and sisters of mercy. 
Of the soldiers, 5,820 sailed from Guantanamo, 
1,322 from Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, and the 
remainder from Santiago. The cost to the United 
States Government was a little more than half a 
million dollars. 

At Camp Wikoff as the Montauk encampment 
was named, in honour of the ranking American 
officer killed in the war there was at first much 
confusion, and some actual suffering, owing to the 
difficulty of preparing for so large a body of men 
at such short notice ; but the outburst of newspaper 
criticism that ensued was quite unwarranted. After 


the first weeks the comfort of the soldiers was well 
provided for, and private beneficence fairly show 
ered them with attentions, which in many cases 
took the form of delicacies actually injurious to men 
recovering from fever. There were 257 deaths in the 
camp during August and September, but quite or 
nearly all of them were due to disease contracted 
before arriving there. The total number of men it 
received was 21,870, of whom 17,577 were from 
Santiago, the remainder from Tampa and else 

The sanitary condition of some of the other 
camps, at this time, had become very unsatisfactory. 
The army s death rate in May and June 0.46 and 
0.70 per thousand respectively was not above 
normal. In July it rose to 2.15 " somewhat higher 
than that of most well-cared-for cities," Surgeon- 
General Sternberg said in his report for the year; 
but his comparison is palpably a most unfair one. 
An army consists only of picked men in the prime of 
life, and its mortality, apart from loss in battle, 
should be but a fraction of that of a community in 
cluding all ages and conditions. In August the rate 
was 4.08 per thousand, which even Sternberg char 
acterizes as " excessive." In September, when the 
most unhealthy camps had been abandoned, it fell 
to 2.45. The total number of deaths for the four 
months was 2,910. Secretary Alger may be cor 
rect in his assertion that this was " the smallest 
death rate recorded of any army of history," but it 
does not follow, in view of the recent advance of 
sanitary science, and of the fact that not a quarter 
of the troops saw any active service, that the mor 
tality was as low as it should have been. 

More discreditable than the actual number of 
deaths was the fact that there were about fifteen 
thousand cases of typhoid fever, that scourge of ill- 
kept camps. Of these Camp Thomas is charged 
with 3,426; the camp of the Seventh Corps, at 



Jacksonville, which proved particularly unhealthy, 
had about 4,600.* Some of the smaller encamp 
ments made a still worse showing, notably those of 
the Fifteenth Minnesota Volunteers, at St. Paul and 
Fort Snelling, where, in August, out of 1,323 sol 
diers, 260 contracted the disease. 

There were many causes that contributed to 
bring about this unsatisfactory state of affairs. One 
was that mainspring of the American army s 
troubles the inadequacy of the staff departments 
to the huge task suddenly thrust upon them. Some 
of the camp sites were badly chosen ; none was 
properly prepared for the occupancy of large bodies 
of troops. There was very little official inspection, 
half of the inspector-general s small corps of assist 
ants having taken line commissions in the volunteer 
army ; the supplies of tentage, transportation, medi 
cines, disinfectants, and camp requisites of all sorts 
were sometimes far from complete ; and the inex 
perience of volunteer officers frequently caused 
avoidable discomfort to the men under their charge. 
Many regimental camps were not properly laid out ; 
many were very inadequately policed. 

But most of the blame must rest upon the sol 
diers themselves. Of the regulars, perhaps, it was 
true, as a foreign officer observed, that " every man 
looked fit to command," and, as the adjutant-general 
asserted, that the force put into the field was, for its 
size, " the finest army the world had ever known " ; 
but it would be idle to deny that in a hasty levy of 
more than two hundred thousand volunteers, with 
the age limit as low as eighteen years, an undesir 
able element was present. Even a casual inspection 
of some of the camps Camp Black, for instance, 
the chief rendezvous of the New York volunteers 
was enough to show that " toughness " was too 
commonly mistaken for soldierliness. Surgeon- 

* The surgeon-general s figures are 4,760, including a few cases 
from Tampa. 



General Sternberg points out, in his report, that 
drunkenness and immorality were prominent causes 
of the early increase of sickness. For further testi 
mony on this unpleasant subject there may be cited 
the evidence given before the War Investigation 
Commission as to the shockingly unsanitary habits 
of the troops at Camp Thomas, and a report by 
Lieutenant Miner, of the navy, on the condition 
of some of the transports that carried volunteers 
from San Francisco to Manila.* 

* On one vessel, the Valencia, "the army officers were advised to 
take the necessary steps to preserve cleanliness, which some of them 
attempted to do, but were unable to carry out. The bedding soon be 
came unfit for use, and had to be thrown overboard. The troops were 
not clean in their persons, because no wise bathing regulations were 
adopted, and the regular scrub and wash clothes was unknown. Lice 
and other vermin were rampant. The men spit on the deck, threw 
waste food on deck, and defecated there without regard to the expos 
tulations of the officers of the transport." 



THE Spanish colony of Porto Rico had figured 
in the early war plans. General Miles had sug 
gested an attack upon it in a letter dated May 27th, 
and on June 6th Secretary Alger telegraphed to him, 
at Tampa : 

The President wants to know the earliest moment you 
can have an expeditionary force ready to go to Porto Rico 
large enough to take and hold island without the force 
under General Shafter. 

Miles replied that he could be ready in ten days 
an estimate that seems decidedly sanguine, in 
view of the experience of Shafter s corps, and of the 
lack of transports. On June Qth he was again in 
formed that " expedition No. 2 must be organized 
as rapidly as possible"; but on the I5th his 
preparations were interrupted by an urgent sum- 
.mons to Washington. On the 26th a new plan was 
formulated : General Brooke was to organize a corps 
from Chickamauga and Camp Alger, for operation 
against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico " ; 
Shafter s troops, or any that he could spare, were to 
join it, and Miles was to be commander-in-chief. 
But instead of detaching part of his force, Shafter 
began to plead for reinforcements, and Miles went 
to Santiago, where his share in the last days of the 
campaign has already been narrated. 

For some time after Sampson s resultless bom 
bardment of San Juan on May I2th, Porto Rico 
22 331 


scarcely appeared in the war news. On June 
to prevent the armed ships * at San Juan from 
attempting to molest the transports 
passing between the United States 
and Santiago, Admiral Sampson or 
dered the St. Paul and the Yosemite to blockade 
the port. Captain Sigsbee reached his station first, 
on the morning of the 22d, and he had been there 
only a few hours when he was attacked by the 
Isabel II and the Terror. 

The Spanish vessels had been ordered to drive 
the St. Paul off, and the bluff above the harbour 
mouth was crowded with people who came out to 
see the fight. The Isabel opened an entirely ineffec 
tive fire at long range, keeping close under the shore 
batteries. The Terror whose only weapons were 
her torpedoes and two small guns, her twelve-pound 
rapid-firers having been put aboard the Maria 
Teresa for the voyage across the Atlantic, and left 
there when she parted company with Cervera 
moved eastward along shore, to get out of the Isa 
bel s line of fire, and then steamed straight at the 
big liner. Such an attack showed more pluck than 
judgment. At night it might have succeeded ; in 
the daylight the St. Paul s five-inch guns were not 
likely to let her come within striking distance. The 
two ships were three quarters of a mile apart f when 
a shell shattered the Terror s steering gear. She 
veered around, practically disabled, and another 
shot went clear through her, killing three men, 

* At San Juan were the small Spanish cruiser Isabel II (1,130 tons, 
a sister ship to the Antonio de Ulloa and the Juan de Austria, de 
stroyed by Dewey in Manila Bay), the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, 
and three gunboats. This was no doubt known to the Navy Depart 
ment, which had an agent Ensign H. H. Ward, of the Bureau of 
Navigation in the city during June. Ensign Ward, who passed as an 
English traveller, was arrested on suspicion by the Spanish authorities, 
but was released on the demand of the British consul. 

f According to the account of the engagement given by her captain, 
Lieutenant de la Rocha, to Commander Jacobsen, of the German 
cruiser Geier, and published by the latter in the Marine Rundschau. 



damaging her engines, and making a dangerous 
hole in her side just below the water line. She 
was barely able to turn and get back into the 
harbour, where she was run aground to prevent 
her sinking, and was subsequently under repair for 
a month. 

During the same afternoon (June 22d) the Isabel 
appeared again, accompanied by a gunboat, appar 
ently attempting to draw the St. Paul under the 
shore batteries a challenge which Captain Sigsbee 
wisely declined, his great ship, with her high free 
board, being a mark that even Spanish gunners 
might have found an easy one. 

The Yosemite arrived on June 25th. On the 26th 
the St. Paul started for New York, to coal ; and on 
his way north Captain Sigsbee called at Cape Hai- 
tien and cabled to Washington that in order to 
blockade San Juan effectively a " considerable force 
of vessels " was needed. No other ships could be 
spared, and the Yosemite, manned by men of the 
Michigan Naval Reserve, was left to maintain the 
blockade alone. On June 28th she had a sharp en 
gagement. At dawn that day she caught the Span 
ish transport Antonio Lopez attempting to steal up 
to the harbour entrance from the west, and drove 
her ashore. The Isabel II and two gunboats prob 
ably informed of the Lopez s approach by a signal 
sent along the coast came out to rescue the block 
ade runner, and the shore batteries also opened fire. 
The odds were heavily against the Yosemite, but 
the Spanish gunners could not hit her, and a long- 
range artillery duel was kept up for four hours, end 
ing, as Commander Emory reported, in the repulse 
of the enemy s vessels, without any injury to his 

The Yosemite was alone off San Juan for three 
weeks ; in July the New Orleans was sent to the 
station, and later the Amphitrite, the Cincinnati, and 
some other men-of-war. 


On July 2 1st, as he had thirty-five hundred 
troops at Guantanamo, and reinforcements were on 
their way from Tampa and Charles- 
Miles moves on t General Miles decided to move 

Porto Rico, -r-. -.^. . ,., 

juiy 21. upon Porto Rico. The regiments 

with him were the Sixth Massachu 
setts and the Sixth Illinois, with two hundred and 
seventy-five recruits ordered to join Shafter s corps, 
but not needed at Santiago; Batteries C and F of 
the Third Artillery, B and F of the Fourth, and B 
of the Fifth; and detachments of engineers, of the 
signal corps, and of the hospital corps. He had 
requested permission to take the marines from Playa 
del Este, but the Secretary of War refused it, say 
ing " we have enough army for our work." His 
troops were on the Columbia, the Yale, and seven 
transports, and as a convoy Sampson assigned the 
Massachusetts, the Gloucester, and the Dixie, with 
Captain Higginson of the Massachusetts as senior 
naval officer. The Cincinnati was also ordered from 
the Havana station to Porto Rico. The admiral s 
hands were very full at this time, with almost the 
whole Cuban coast to patrol, and with some of his 
strongest men-of-war detached for service in Com 
modore Watson s Eastern Squadron ; and he had 
considered that with Cervera s fleet destroyed and 
San Juan blockaded, the Cincinnati alone, in addi 
tion to the guns of the Columbia and the Yale, 
would be a sufficient protection ; but at Miles s re 
quest, and finally upon the President s positive order 
that a battle ship should be sent, he added the three 
vessels mentioned. 

The garrison of Porto Rico consisted, according 
to General Miles s report, of 8,223 Spanish regulars 
and 9,107 volunteers. These figures, presumably, 
were obtained officially after the surrender, and are 
accurate, though Commander Jacobsen gives the 
Spanish army roll of January I, 1898 since which 
time it seems that no reinforcements were sent 



as showing 7,002 regulars. It was believed quite 
correctly, as it proved that the volunteers were dis 
affected, and would refuse to fight. The chief mill- 


tary stations, besides San Juan, were Mayaguez, in 
the west ; Ponce, the largest city in the island, in the 
south; and Guayama, in the southeast; but since 
the outbreak of war the Spanish forces had been 
concentrated in San Juan, only small detachments 
remaining elsewhere. 

The port of Fajardo, near Cape San Juan, at the 
northeast corner of the island, was the point selected 
for the landing of the expedition ; but on the way 
eastward from Guantanamo, General Miles went on 
board of the Massachusetts (July 23d) and told 
Captain Higginson that he preferred to make for 
Guanica, at the other end of Porto Rico, in the 
extreme southwest.* His reasons were that the 
enemy was likely to have information of his plans, 
and to be prepared to resist a landing at Fajardo ; 
that there were reported to be no defences either at 
Guanica or at the neighbouring city of Ponce, from 
which a fine military road led across the island to 
San Juan ; and that he would find there plenty of 
sugar lighters, which he could use in taking men 
and material ashore, the tugs and launches promised 
him from Washington having failed to arrive, f 
Captain Higginson at first demurred on the ground 

* It has been stated that a landing at Guanica or Ponce was really 
planned from the first, Fajardo being mentioned merely as a ruse ; but 
such does not seem to have been the case. On July i8th Miles tele 
graphed to Washington that Sampson and himself had agreed upon 
Cape San Juan (presumably meaning Fajardo). On the same day he 
received a despatch the result of a conference between the President 
and Secretaries Alger and Long authorizing him to use his own dis 
cretion in the matter. On July 26th, just before his report of the cap 
ture of Guanica reached Washington, the Secretary of War sent him a 
telegram that shows surprise, if not disapproval : 

" Conflicting reports here as to your place of landing. Why did 
you change ? Doraco TDorado], fifteen miles west of San Juan, is re 
ported an excellent place to land. Did you leave ships to direct Schwan 
and Wilson, now en route, where to find you ? " 

Miles replied with a despatch stating at length his reasons for pre 
ferring Guanica to Fajardo. 

t General Miles received valuable information about Porto Rico 
from Lieutenant H. H. Whitney, of the Fourth Artillery, who during 
May spent two weeks in the southern part of the island, travelling in 
disguise, and who now returned there on Miles s staff. 


that the harbour at Guanica was too shallow for the 
heavier ships, and that the southern coast was less 
convenient for coaling, and less sheltered from the 
prevailing winds; but he finally waived his objec 
tions, and after passing Haiti the fleet turned south 
ward by the Mona Passage, detaching the Dixie to 
summon any ships that might go to the abandoned 
rendezvous near Cape San Juan. 

Guanica was reached at sunrise on July 25th, 

and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright took the 

Gloucester into the harbour, scorn- 

nica d ju* *a U> ing th . e P ssible dangers of unknown 
batteries or torpedoes. A landing 
party of thirty men, under Lieutenant Huse, execu 
tive officer of the Gloucester, went ashore and 
hoisted the Stars and Stripes. At this a few shots 
came from the outskirts of the village, and a country 
man the only male inhabitant who had not fled 
at sight of the American ships told the lieutenant 
that the garrison of Guanica, thirty Spanish regulars, 
had sought shelter in the bushes, after telegraphing 
to Yauco for reinforcements. Huse barricaded the 
road leading inland, and a little later, when a small 
body of mounted troops appeared, a few shots from 
the Gloucester s three-pounders drove them off. 

By this time the transports had followed the 
Gloucester into the bay, and the soldiers were land 
ing in boats from the ships and in some lighters 
found in the harbour and promptly seized. The vil 
lage was occupied without further resistance, and at 
daylight next morning (July 26th) General Garret- 
son, with six companies of the Sixth Massachusetts 
and one of the Sixth Illinois, moved upon Yauco, 
about four miles inland. At the hacienda of Santa 
Desidera they encountered a Spanish force, which 
opened a brisk fusillade, and there was a moment of 
confusion among three companies of the Massa 
chusetts men whom Garretson had posted, as a re 
serve, in a hollow that proved to be unsheltered from 


the enemy s fire. They were soon rallied, however, 
the advance was continued, and the Spaniards re 
treated, leaving the road to Ponce open. The 
American loss in the skirmish was four men 
wounded, all in the Massachusetts regiment ; their 
antagonists had two killed and eighteen wounded. 

On the morning of the 27th the Wasp and the 
Annapolis joined Captain Higginson s squadron, 
and Major-General Wilson and Brigadier-General 
Ernst arrived from Charleston with the latter s bri 
gade, which included the Second Wisconsin, the 
Third Wisconsin, and the Sixteenth Pennsylvania. 
The troops were not landed at Guanica, as Miles was 
now ready to take and hold Ponce, a point of im 
portance in itself, and a better base for his move 
ment upon San Juan. 

It fell to Commander Davis, of the Dixie, to re 
ceive the surrender of Ponce and of its port, La 
Playa. With the Annapolis and the 

WaS P> the DLxie anch red in the har " 

bour before sunset that same day (July 
27th). Lieutenant Merriam, who was sent ashore, 
found that the garrison of La Playa had fled, leaving 
no one with whom he could deal ; but the British and 
German consuls came down from Ponce, with some 
representatives of mercantile interests, and through 
their mediation the comandante, Colonel San Martin, 
surrendered the city to Commander Davis, on con 
dition that he should be allowed to retreat unmo 
lested with his soldiers who numbered about three 
hundred, besides forty or fifty sick men who were 
left behind. He could have done nothing else ; the 
Dixie alone, with her guns trained on his defence 
less city, was a sufficient argument for capitulation, 
without considering the overwhelming force close 
behind her ; yet it was the luckless colonel s fate to 
be a scapegoat for Spain s resentment of her mis 
fortunes. On reaching San Juan he was arrested 
and court-martialed by Captain-General Macias, and 



sentenced to death for giving up Ponce without 
resistance. Upon the intercession of General 
Brooke and other American officers, his punish 
ment was subsequently commuted to life imprison 
ment, and it is understood that he was sent to the 
Spanish convict station at Ceuta, in Morocco. 

The transports came into the harbour of Ponce 
early on the 28th, and the army took possession of 
the city. Here, as elsewhere, they were received 
with a general display of friendliness by the natives. 
General Miles issued a proclamation, setting forth 
in somewhat flowery periods that the American 
forces were in Porto Rico " in the cause of liberty, 
justice, and humanity," and " bearing the flag of 
freedom ; " that they represented " the fostering 
arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power 
is in its justice and humanity to all those living 
within its fold. Hence," the general added, " the 
first effect of this occupation will be the immediate 
release from your former political relations, and, it is 
hoped, a cheerful acceptance of the Government of 
the United States." General Wilson was appointed 
military governor of Ponce, and Captain Chester, 
of the Cincinnati, captain of the port. 

General Miles had declined to consider himself 
bound by Commander Davis s agreement that there 
should be no pursuit of the withdrawing Spaniards 
for forty-eight hours, but he made no immediate 
movement. With this firm foothold in the south 
west of the island, he waited for the 
troops he needed to advance in force. 
Ihey came on the 3ist, when Briga 
dier-General Schwan arrived from Tampa with the 
Eleventh and the Nineteenth Infantry, a troop of 
the Second Cavalry, and two batteries of the Sev 
enth Artillery; and Major-General Brooke and 
Brigadier-General Hains brought nearly six thou 
sand men from Newport News, including the Third 
Illinois, the Fourth Ohio, the Fourth Pennsylvania, 



a company of the Eighth Infantry, a troop of the 
Sixth Cavalry, the Philadelphia City Troop, Troops 
A and C, New York Cavalry, and Rodney s bat 
talion of artillery. One of Schwan s transports had 
an adventure en route. .She was chased by the 
Eagle off the Cuban coast, and as her captain 
ignored Lieutenant Southerland s signals and 
warning shots she narrowly escaped being fired on. 

Miles s plan of campaign now began to disclose 
itself. At Ponce he had before him a fine highway 
running through Coamo and across the centre of 
the island for seventy miles to San Juan. General 
Brooke s division was carried eastward on its trans 
ports to Arroyo, which surrendered to Captain 
Goodrich, on the Gloucester, on August 1st. Land 
ing there, Brooke was to rnarch by Guayama to 
reach the San Juan road at Cayey. Schwan, mean 
while, was ordered to go ashore at Guanica and 
move around the western end of Porto Rieo, by 
way of San German and Mayaguez. Henry and 
Garretson with General Stone, famous as a road 
builder, to make a practicable highway out of a neg 
lected trail across the hills headed straight across 
the centre of the island, by Ad juntas and Utuado, 
to cut off the retreat of any Spanish forces dis 
lodged by Schwan. All four columns were to 
converge upon San Juan, where the Spaniards 
were likely to make their last stand, and where 
the final blow could be struck by army and navy 

The story of the Porto Rico campaign recalls 
the proverb which says that the happiest nation is 
the one that has the least history. Its brief annals 
are not lengthened by any record of sufferings and 
difficulties like those that made the story of San 
tiago. General Miles s well-laid plans were car 
ried out with almost clocklike precision, and in the 
nineteen days between the landing at Guanica and 
the end of the war his four advancing columns occu- 



pied about one third of the island, with the insig 
nificant loss of three men killed and forty wounded. 

General Schwan, with the westernmost column 
consisting of the Eleventh Infantry (Colonel De 
Russy), Troop A of the Fifth Cavalry, a battery of 
Catling guns, and two of field artillery, a total of 
1,447 men, with a few native guides left Yauco on 
August Qth. At San German, which was reached 
next morning, he heard that the garrison of Maya- 
guez eleven hundred Spanish regulars of the 
Alfonso XIII regiment, commanded by Colonel 
Soto, and a few volunteers was coming out to 
meet him. 

Moving on down the valley of the Rio Grande, 

the American advance guard encountered the 

enemy at Hormiguero, about four 

The fight at miles from Mayaguez. Here the 

Hormiguero, c j j 1 -11 -J 

Aug. 10. bpamards were posted on a hillside 

commanding the valley, and their fire 
caused a few casualties while Schwan s men were 
discovering their position and deploying for an 
attack. Turning into the fields on both sides of 
the road planted with sugar cane, and intersected 
by creeks and wire fences the American soldiers 
pushed steadily forward; the Catling guns, under 
Lieutenant Maginnis of the Eleventh, moved with 
the firing line, and the artillery was brought to bear 
from the foothills. The Spaniards, who had the 
advantage of position, but were outnumbered and 
had no guns, made a feeble resistance and a pre 
cipitate retreat. Schwan s losses in the skirmish 
were one man killed and sixteen wounded; the 
enemy s he estimated at fifty killed and wounded. 
Early next day (August nth) the American 
troops entered Mayaguez, a city of 22,000 people, 
and the chief seaport on the west coast of Porto 
Rico. The inhabitants received them with every 
demonstration of satisfaction. The garrison had 
retreated by a road running inland toward Lares, 



and Schwairs first intention was to hurry on in 
pursuit; but the settlement of affairs in Mayaguez 
demanded attention ; his men were tired, the roads 
were poor, and drenching rains helped to make 
operations difficult. He decided to send out a fly 
ing column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, of 
the Eleventh, to follow the enemy. 

With seven hundred men six companies of his 
regiment, a platoon of cavalry, and another of 
artillery Burke set out on the morning of the I2th. 
That night, after pushing all day along a road 
that climbed into the mountains, he had bivouacked 
in the trail, when news reached him that the Span 
iards had assembled from one to two thousand men 
at Las Marias, and were preparing to make a stand. 
He sent a courier back to General Schwan with this 
information, adding that he proposed to move for 
ward at daybreak and attack the enemy. 

Fearing that Burke s force might be inadequate, 
Schwan promptly hurried after him with the cavalry 
troop, ordering Colonel De Russy to follow as 
rapidly as possible with the rest of the brigade. He 
found the advance guard drawn up on the crest of 
a ridge, firing upon the Spaniards, who held the 
opposite hill and were scattered in the valley be 
tween. Through the valley ran a swift and deep 
mountain torrent, the Rio Prieto, which most of 
Colonel Soto s men had crossed, but some had been 
unable to cross. After a brisk exchange of shots, 
the main body continued its retreat, leaving the 
rear guard, utterly disorganized, to hide in the 
woods, where forty prisoners were rounded up by 
the American cavalry. Colonel Soto was found in 
a peasant s cottage, disabled by an injury ; his sec 
ond in command was also among the prisoners. 

Schwan was ready to move on early the next 
morning (Sunday, August I4th) to attack Lares 
which would no doubt have proved easy prey 
when he received word that the peace protocol had 



been signed the day before, and he had to recall 
his orders for an advance. " No troops," he says, 
" ever suspended with a worse grace." 

No fighting at all fell to Garretson s brigade, 
which, with General Henry as division commander, 
left Ponce on August 8th. Its move- 
d enry"coiumn. ments were slower than Henry had an 
ticipated. He had nothing but ox carts 
to carry his supplies through a hilly country where 
pack trains would have given better service. Be 
sides a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and a 
small mounted detachment Troop A, of the Sec 
ond Cavalry his force consisted of two unseasoned 
volunteer regiments, the Sixth Illinois and the Sixth 
Massachusetts. The discipline of the latter had 
been unsatisfactory both in the skirmish of July 26th 
before Yauco and during the march to Ponce. At 
Ponce several of the officers, who had been ordered 
before a board of inquiry, resigned their commis 
sions, and since then its morale had improved ; but 
on the first day s march northward Henry reports 
that there was much straggling in the brigade, 
" new shoes being the alleged cause." Only nine 
miles were covered on the 8th, and the troops did 
not reach Adjuntas until August loth. On the I3th, 
when the order to discontinue hostilities came, 
Henry was at Utuado with his regulars and two 
battalions of the Massachusetts men, preparing to 
advance upon Arecibo, where there was a small 
body of Spaniards ; Garretson, with the rest of the 
brigade, was still at Adjuntas. 

Meanwhile, after some delay in the landing of 
the necessary supplies and material at Ponce, 
Ernst s brigade the Sixteenth Pennsylvania (Colo 
nel Hulings), the Second Wisconsin (Colonel 
Born), and the Third Wisconsin (Colonel Moore), 
with two batteries, Potts s and Anderson s, both 
commanded by Major Lancaster had advanced 
along the main highway across the island, running 


eastward and northward to San Juan. Before leav 
ing Ponce the volunteers exchanged their Spring 
field rifles for Krag-Jorgensens. The Pennsyl 
vania regiment led the advance, and its reconnoi 
tring parties came into conflict with the outposts of 
the Spaniards, who were falling back slowly. On 
August 8th General Ernst, with the rest of the bri 
gade, passed the Pennsylvanians, and camped 
within four miles of Coamo. 

General Wilson, the division commander, came 
out from Ponce on the previous afternoon (August 
7th). From deserters and friendly natives he had 
full information of the Spaniards movements. They 
were preparing to meet him near Aibonito, at the 
highest point on the road, where it crosses the 
mountain ridge that parallels the south coast of the 
island. Here they had some two thousand troops 
in a strong natural position, which they were further 
strengthening with batteries and intrenchments. 
At Coamo, where the road first reaches the hills, 
was an outpost held by about three hundred men. 
This, too, was a strong position, not to be taken by 
direct assault without risk of serious loss, and Gen 
eral Wilson planned a turning movement. 

On the evening of the 8th the Pennsylvania 

regiment moved out from the rear and struck into 

a hill trail north of the road, which 

The action at i j i 1 1 T 

Coamo, July 9 . had been reconnoitred by Lieuten 
ant-Colonel Biddle and other staff 
officers. After bivouacking in the hills, the march 
a rough and difficult journey of about a dozen 
miles was resumed before daybreak, and at eight 
o clock next morning Colonel Hulings s men 
reached a point commanding the San Juan road in 
the rear of Coamo. The Spaniards were already 
retreating, Major Lancaster s guns having opened 
upon them in front. A few escaped toward Aibo 
nito, but their commander, Major Martinez, who ex 
posed himself with reckless gallantry, was shot down, 


and after returning the Pennsylvanians fire till their 
position was evidently hopeless, the main body gave 
up the fight, waving hats and handkerchiefs in 
token of surrender. The Pennsylvanians, who had 
had the fight practically to themselves, marched 
back into Coamo with two hundred and one pris 
oners. Their loss was only six wounded ; the Span 
iards had seven killed and sixtynine wounded.* 

A bridge over a deep ravine before Coamo had 
been destroyed, but General Wilson saved several 
others on the road to Aibonito by sending out a 
mounted detachment Troop C of the New York 
cavalry, under Captain Clayton in prompt pursuit 
of the fleeing enemy. Five and a half miles beyond 
Coamo the troopers came under fire from the Span 
ish batteries on the hill of Asomanta, commanding 
the highway where it winds up to the summit of the 
divide, over which it passes to the village of Aibo 
nito; and here the American cavalrymen were 
ordered to remain as an outpost. 

During the loth and nth General Wilson was 

bringing up his forces and reconnoitring. He 

found a serious task before him. 

The span- The Spaniards position gave them a 

lards stand at r i ,1 , 1 

Aibonito. plunging fire down the steep road, 

and the American artillery could not 
be brought to bear except with the disadvantage of 
firing from points several hundred feet lower than 
the enemy s guns. On both sides of the road the 
ground was broken by deep and precipitous ravines. 
Nevertheless General Wilson decided that another 
flanking movement was practicable, and ordered 
Ernst to be ready, on the morning of the I3th, to 
take a mountain trail branching to the left and run- 

* In his official report of the action, dated Coamo, August 10, 1898, 
Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Hulings stated the Spanish loss as 6 
killed, 40 wounded, and 167 prisoners. In a personal statement to the 
writer he substitutes the figures given above, saying that men were 
found later among the houses in the village. 



ning westward and northward over the divide to 
Barranquito, whence Aibonito could be taken in 
the rear. 

Meanwhile, on the I2th, to engage the Span 
iards attention and develop their strength, Major 
Lancaster took a field battery to a hilltop on the 
left of the road and opened fire upon the works on 
the hill of Asomanta. At first the Spanish guns 
replied feebly, and Major Lancaster thought he 
had silenced them ; but after an hour s firing, when 
his ammunition was running low, the enemy ap 
parently received reinforcements, and he found his 
battery the target of a hail of shells and bullets, his 
smoke powder helping the Spaniards to get his 
range. His position was evidently untenable, and 
the guns were withdrawn, Lieutenant Hains, who 
commanded one of them, being shot through the 
body, and the battery s whole loss being one man 
killed and six wounded, one mortally. 

Knowing that he might at any moment receive 
news of an armistice, General Wilson delayed 
Ernst s flanking movement and sent a flag of truce 
to the Spanish lines with a demand for surrender. 
The message was forwarded to San Juan, to the 
captain-general, whose reply, received early the 
next morning (August I3th) was a curt refusal ; and 
Ernst was on the point of starting when General 
Miles telegraphed from Ponce the order to suspend 

General Brooke s advance, too, was halted at the 

very moment when a sharp fight was imminent. 

His disembarkation at Arroyo was 

Brooke s ad- slow, there being no wharf and few 

vance from available boats, and two of his trans- 

ports being delayed by running 

aground at Ponce. On August 5th the infantry was 
ready to move, and that morning General Hains 
marched upon Guayama with the Fourth Ohio 
(Colonel Coit) and the Third Illinois (Colonel Ben- 



nitt), the former leading the way. About a mile 
from the town the Ohioans encountered a small 
number of Spaniards, who fired a few shots and 
retreated through Guayama, of which the Ameri 
cans took possession. Just beyond the town, on the 
road to Cayey, there was another skirmish, the 
enemy being dispersed again by the Ohio regi 
ment s dynamite guns. 

No further advance was made till the 8th, when 
General Hains ordered a company of the Fourth 
Ohio to reconnoitre toward Cayey. Colonel Coit 
took two companies, and three miles out they came 
under a sharp fire from Spaniards posted on a hill 
commanding the road, near the village of Pablo 
Vasquez. The enemy had the range accurately, 
and the reconnoitring party could do nothing but 
seek shelter and then fall back, which they did with 
five men wounded. They met the rest of the regi 
ment, with the dynamite guns, hurrying out to sup 
port them, an alarming report of disaster having 
reached Guayama. 

Again General Brooke was forced to wait, in 
order to get his cavalry and artillery ashore and to 
the front. On the I2th he issued orders for an 
attack, his plan being to threaten the Spanish posi 
tion with the Third Illinois, a battalion of the Fourth 
Pennsylvania, and a couple of batteries, while Gen 
eral Hains, with the Fourth Ohio, marched north 
ward into the hills to take it in the rear. Hains 
set out early next morning, and was close upon the 
enemy who would seemingly have been taken by 
surprise, and could scarcely have escaped capture, 
Brooke s guns being ready to open fire upon them 
in front when a staff officer overtook him with 
news of the signing of the protocol. 

The navy, which had opened the way for Miles s 
troops at Guanica, at Ponce, and at Arroyo, con 
ducted practically no offensive operations during 
the last days of the campaign. It made a small 


diversion by sending ashore thirty-five sailors and 
marines from the Amphitrite at Cape San Juan, 
on August 6th. The landing party, commanded by 
Lieutenant Atwater, occupied the Cape San Juan 
lighthouse, and defended it against a night attack 
by some one hundred and twenty Spanish mounted 
infantry ; but on the Qth, as the advantage of hold 
ing the place seemed slight, Captain Barclay with 
drew his men. They had suffered no casualties, 
except the fatal wounding of Naval Cadet Board- 
man by the accidental discharge of a revolver. 

A reason for the comparative inaction of the 
navy may possibly be found in certain despatches 
which General Miles sent to the Secretary of War. 
One was dated from Ponce, August 9th : 

I am informed the naval vessels at this place have been 
ordered round to San Juan. In order that there may be 
no conflict of authority I request that no aggressive action 
be taken against that place, that no landings be made, or 
communication held with the Spanish officials or forces 
on this island by the navy. 

And on the following day the general telegraphed 
to Secretary Alger : * 

I am fully convinced that Sampson has sent orders to 
the commander of this fleet, as soon as army leaves south 
coast, to take his fleet, go round to San Juan, and demand 
the surrender of the capital or bombard the city, and not 
to waste ammunition on any of the batteries. First, to 
bombard a city containing innocent women and children 
would be a violation of the first order of the President. 
Second, it is an interference with the work given the 
army by the President. I ask that any such action be 
suspended. After we have raised the flag over all the prin 
cipal cities and arrived at San Juan, any aid by the navy 
against land batteries, intrenchments, or fortifications 
would be advisable, but not against a city of non-combat 
ants. The control of all military affairs on the land of this 
island can safely be left to the army. 

* This despatch is not among; those published by the War Depart 
ment, but it appeared in the New York Sun, July 3, 1899, and is pre 
sumably authentic. 



It is only natural that General Miles should 
have been anxious to finish his well-planned cam 
paign with his own forces, but these letters cer 
tainly show professional jealousy carried to an ex 

Commander Davis, of the Dixie, submitted to 
Sampson, on August 2d, a plan for taking San 
Juan by a bombardment from the ocean front and 
by landing marines and light guns at the eastern 
end of the island on which the city lies ; and it can 
hardly be doubted that Sampson would have been 
willing to sanction the attack, which would have 
been tolerably sure of success. 



LIKE the invasion of Porto Rico, the campaign 
which completed Dewey s triumph in Manila Bay 
by forcing the surrender of the Philippine capital 
involved little actual righting ; but it was interesting 
in a military sense, from the novelty and the dif 
ficulty of the work it set before the American army, 
and its political importance was still more momen 
tous. It marked, indeed, a new era of history for 
the United States, setting its flag over a great em 
pire in the eastern hemisphere, and making it no 
longer an American power merely, but a world 

Very few Americans, even among those in au 
thority at Washington, realized this in the early 
days of May, 1898, when hurried preparations to 
follow up Dewey s victory were afoot. The irre 
sistible logic of events destiny, if the term be pre 
ferred was swiftly making obsolete the policy that 
had guided American statesmanship for more than 
a century ; yet it is hard to single out any precise 
point as that of the new departure, or, indeed, any 
point at which it was feasible to halt or turn back. 
Dewey s instructions (cabled from Washington on 
April 24th) were to " commence operations, particu 
larly against the Spanish fleet." A previous tele 
gram (February 25th) warned him that in case of 
war his duty would be " offensive operations in 


Philippine Islands." No despatch, or at least no 
published despatch, gave any more explicit order 
for an attack upon Manila, and the conquest of the 
islands can hardly have been a long-preconceived 
plan of the Administration that stood committed to 
a declaration that by the American code of morality 
the annexation of another power s territory would 
be " criminal aggression." * Yet to destroy Spain s 
fleet and leave her land forces at the mercy of the 
insurgents, to shatter her power without replacing 
it with any other constituted authority, would have 
been a disaster to civilization. 

That a land campaign in the Philippines had not 
been reckoned among the probable developments of 
the war is shown by the fact that during April the 
whole military resources of the United States had 
been concentrated in the East and South, the Pa 
cific coast being practically stripped of men and 
material. General Shafter, commanding the De 
partment of California, had gone to Tampa with his 
whole staff and most of the troops of his com 
mand, leaving only the Fourteenth Infantry (Colo 
nel Thomas M. Anderson, then stationed in Alaska) 
and part of the Third Artillery (Colonel Marcus P. 
Miller), the latter a force quite insufficient to man 
the defences of San Francisco. 

On May 7th, with Dewey s first announcement 
of his victory, there came another despatch saying : 

I control bay completely and can take city at any time, 
but I have not sufficient men to hold. . . . Will ammuni 
tion be sent? 

Secretary Long immediately replied : 

The Charleston will leave at once with what ammuni 
tion she can carry. Pacific Mail Steamship Company s 
steamer Peking will follow with ammunition and supplies. 
Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How 
many will you require? 

* President McKinley s message to Congress, December 6, 1897. 


Dewey s answer went from Cavite on May I3th, 
and from Hong-Kong two days later : 

I believe the Spanish governor-general will be obliged 
to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To 
retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands 
would require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force 
of five thousand men. . . . Spanish force is estimated ten 
thousand men. The rebels are reported thirty thousand. 

With such an estimate of the situation by no 
means an accurate one coming from the admiral, 
it is not strange that in the United States there 
should have been divergent opinions as to the task 
an army expedition would have to face and the force 
it would require. General Miles seems to have been 
the first to formulate a plan of operation. On May 
3d, when Dewey s victory was known, though not 
officially reported, he wrote to the Secretary of War : 

I have the honour to recommend that General Thomas 
M. Anderson be sent to occupy the Philippine Islands, in 
command of the following troops: two battalions Four 
teenth Infantry, two troops Fourth Cavalry, one regiment 
of infantry, California volunteers; two batteries heavy 
artillery, California volunteers; one regiment of infantry, 
Washington volunteers; the troops to go with all the 
necessary appliances, supplies, and equipment. 

Miles has been criticised for so greatly under 
estimating the force needed at Manila, just as 
Sampson received censure for his statement that 
ten thousand soldiers could take Santiago in forty- 
eight hours; but he might reply that his figures 
agree closely with Dewey s. 

On May nth Major-General Wesley Merritt, 
then commanding the Department of the East, was 
summoned to Washington, and on 

thC I2th ^ WaS ann Unced that he had 

been appointed to command an army 
corps the Eighth Corps to be or 
ganized immediately for service in the Philippines. 
General Merritt was fortunately unwilling to under 
take an almost unknown task with a mere handful 


of men, and requested (May I3th) a total force of 
fourteen thousand four hundred, including four 
regiments of regulars. Two days later, after some 
further study of the situation, he wrote to the Presi 
dent that still more men might be needed, adding, 
with remarkable foresight: 

It seems more than probable that we will have the so- 
called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards. 

General Miles who had not seen Merritt s esti 
mate submitted a different list of troops, includ 
ing only two regular regiments the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth with two squadrons of cavalry, three 
batteries of artillery, thirteen thousand volunteers 
from the Western States, and some heavy guns, 
which were to be mounted for the defence of Manila 
as soon as the city should be captured. " When 
this is accomplished," he suggested, " the fleet can 
be released for more important service." 

To this Merritt replied, on May I7th: 

Two regiments of regular infantry, two thirds of a 
regiment of regular cavalry, and two light batteries is a 
very small proportion of the forty-two regular regiments 
in the army when the work to be done consists of con 
quering a territory seven thousand miles from our base, 
defended by a regularly trained and acclimated army of 
from ten thousand to twenty-five thousand men, and in 
habited by fourteen million of people, the majority of 
whom will regard us with the intense hatred born of race 
and religion. 

My letters of May I3th and I5th give the composition 
and minimum strength of the regular force I deem neces 

Merritt s view prevailed at Washington, and 
orders were finally issued that twenty thousand 
men should be assembled and equipped at San 
Francisco, and sent across the Pacific as fast as 
transports could be secured. Organizing work was 
at once begun or rather had already been begun 
under Colonel Anderson, now appointed a briga 
dier-general of volunteers, and General Merriam, 


who had succeeded Shafter in San Francisco; and 
on May 25th the advance guard of the expedition 
the first soldiers the young republic of the west 
had ever sent into the ancient lands of the east 
sailed from the Golden Gate. It consisted of the 
First California (Colonel Smith), the Second 
Oregon (Colonel Summers), and six companies of 
the Fourteenth Infantry, in all 2,491 men, under 
General Anderson, in three transports, the City of 
Sydney, the Australia, and the City of Peking. 

At Honolulu, where the transports put in for 

coal, they found the cruiser Charleston, which left 

San Francisco a few days before them, 

Guam June *>. waitin g to Serve as their eSCOrt The y 

carried an order from Secretary Long 
to Captain Glass of the Charleston there being no 
cable to Hawaii instructing him to seize the island 
of Guam, in the Ladrones, on his way to Manila.* 
The expedition left Honolulu on June 4th, and 
reached Guam on the morning of the 2oth. Captain 
Glass first visited Agana, the capital, whose port he 
found entirely empty ; then in search of a Spanish 
gunboat of which he had heard rumours at Honolulu 
he took the Charleston into the picturesque har 
bour of San Luis d Apra, a reef-fringed bay com 
manded by rocky cliffs. The chart showed fortifica 
tions Fort Santiago and Fort Santa Cruz but 
these proved to be nothing more than abandoned 
ruins ; and the only vessel in the harbour was a 
small Japanese trader. No Spanish man-of-war 
had called at the island for eighteen months; no 
news had come from the outer world since April 
1 4th, and the exiles who formed Spain s garrison 

* The Ladrone or Marianne Islands had belonged to Spain ever 
since their discovery by Magellan in 1521. They consist of fifteen islets 
scattered in a broken line from north to south, with a total area of 420 
square miles and a population of about 10,000. Guam, the most im 
portant island, which was the seat of the Spanish colonial government, 
lies at the southern end of the chain, 900 miles north of the equator 
and 1,300 miles east of the nearest of the Philippines. 


in this remote speck of land knew nothing of the 
war with the United States. They had no defences ; 
the only cannon in Guam were four little cast-iron 
antiquities once used for saluting, but condemned 
as unsafe even for that peaceful purpose. 

Captain Glass fired a shot or two at the fortifica 
tions before he discovered that they were deserted, 
and the sound of his guns brought out two officers 
in a boat, who were mightily surprised to find 
themselves prisoners. They were paroled and sent 
ashore to summon the governor, Lieutenant-Colo 
nel Marina, from Agana. That official replied that 
the Spanish law forbade him to board a foreign 
vessel, but he would be pleased to confer with 
Captain Glass on shore. The captain s answer was 
a note sent ashore on the following morning, with 
a landing party under Lieutenant Braunersreuther, 
giving Marina half an hour to surrender uncondi 
tionally. No resistance was possible; the garrison 
sixty Spaniards and a few native soldiers was 
disarmed, the Spaniards were taken on board the 
Sydney, and on the 22d the four ships resumed 
their voyage, entering Manila Bay on June 3Oth. 

Here the situation had changed little since the 

destruction of Montojo s fleet two months before. 

Rear-Admiral Dewey (promoted to 

Anderson that rank M ^h) had been waiting 

reaches Manila, -,11 r it. r* *. 

June 30 m the bay, in possession ot the Lavite 

arsenal and of the fortifications on 
the island of Corregidor, and with Manila itself, 
rigidly blockaded, lying at the mercy of his guns. 
He had lost one of his officers, Captain Gridley, of 
the Olympia, through illness,* the vacant place 
being taken by Captain Lamberton, who had been 
serving on the flagship as the admiral s chief of staff. 

* Captain Gridley was "condemned by a medical survey" to use 
the cynical-sounding phrase that ends the career of many a brave 
sailor who has served his country well in May, and was ordered 
home. He died on the way, at Kobe, Japan, June 4th. 




Commander Wood, of the Petrel, had been put in 
charge of the station at Cavite, which was well 
equipped with storehouses and barracks, and with 
machine shops that proved very useful for small re 
pairs to the squadron. On May I2th another prize 
had been captured the Spanish gunboat Callao, 
which steamed into the bay in ignorance of Dewey s 
presence there. 

The position of the Manila garrison was a des 
perate one. In the harbour were Dewey s ships ; 
on the landward side they were hemmed in by the 
insurgents, who had pushed their lines close up to 
the city, and who mustered about fourteen thou 
sand men, commanded by General Emilio Agui- 
naldo. This remarkable young Fili- 
Dewey s pino leader, who has since been the 

relations with x , - , ... , . 

Aguinaido. author of such disasters to his coun 
trymen and so much suffering and 
loss to the American troops, landed at Cavite on 
May iQth, having been brought from Hong-Kong 
on the McCulloch, sent for despatches. Negotia 
tions with him had been begun in April, at Singa 
pore, by United States Consul Pratt, who, with 
Dewey s permission, sent him to Hong-Kong for 
a conference. Arriving there a few days after the 
admiral s departure, he was received by Rounsevelle 
Wildman, the American consul at Hong-Kong. 
Aguinaido afterward asserted that both Mr. Pratt 
and Mr. Wildman promised that their Government 
would assist him to establish the independent repub 
lic for which he had long been righting; but his 
allegations can not be credited in the face of their 
emphatic denials, and of Dewey s repeated and ex 
plicit assertion that no pledges of any sort were 
given. With or without pledges, however, it must 
be admitted that it was a mistake to accept his co 
operation on any basis. He proved to be an effect 
ive weapon against the Spaniards, but in thoroughly 
scrupulous fighting such a weapon should not have 



been employed. If the Filipinos were to have no 
political recognition, they should have had no mili 
tary recognition. If they were to be regarded no 
doubt correctly as incapable of civilized self-gov 
ernment, they should not have been used as allies 
in war, aided with gifts of arms, and intrusted with 
the care of Spanish prisoners. 

The admiral thus described his relations with 
the insurgents on June 27th, in answer to an inquiry 
from Washington : 

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, 
arrived May ipth, by permission, on Nanshan.* Estab 
lished self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of 
our guns, and organized his army. I have had several 
conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. 
Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any 
way with the force under my command, and on several 
occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, 
telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of 
the United States troops. At the same time I have given 
him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, 
being opposed to a common enemy. Aguinaldo has acted 
independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised 
of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed 
to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to 
take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal 
as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the 
war humanely, which he has done invariably. My rela 
tions with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. 
The United States has not been bound in any way to 
assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, 
to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he 
expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt 
ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion, 
these people are far superior in their intelligence and more 
capable oi self-government than the natives of Cuba, and 
I am familiar with both races. 

On the other side, Aguinaldo s attitude was stated 
in a proclamation he issued at Cavite, May 24th : 

Now that the great and powerful North American 
nation have come to offer disinterested protection for the 

* Apparently a mistake, as other accounts agree that Aguinaldo 
went to Manila on the McCulloch. 


effort to secure the liberation of this country, I return to 
assume command of all the forces for the attainment of 
our lofty aspirations, establishing a dictatorial government 
which will set forth decrees under my sole responsibility, 
assisted by the advice of eminent persons, until these islands 
are completely conquered and able to form a constitutional 
convention and to elect a president and a cabinet, in whose 
favour I will duly resign the authority. 

During June, as the insurgents gained in 
strength, Aguinaldo issued several decrees consti 
tuting a civil government in the territory they con 
trolled, and on July ist he proclaimed himself presi 
dent of the Filipino republic a step of which, por 
tentous as it was of coming trouble, no official 
notice was taken. 

Immediately after the battle of May ist, and be 
fore the naval weakness of the Spaniards was fully 
understood, there were rumours that they would 
make an effort to retrieve their first great disaster. 
When Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands, one of 
the many conflicting reports, or conjectures, as to 
his destination was that he was bound for the east, 
to attack the American fleet with what would in 
deed have been an overwhelming force. On May 
1 2th Secretary Long cabled to Dewey that the 
whereabouts of the powerful Spanish squadron 
was still unknown ; but that day its arrival at Mar 
tinique was reported by Captain Cotton, of the 

Although it had sent the flower of its navy to 
sure destruction in the West Indies, instead of 
probable success in the Philippines, the Madrid 
Government, it soon appeared, still entertained the 
idea that it could save Manila. Its attempt proved 
an utterly feeble one, and effected nothing save to 
expose its lack of resources and the almost ludicrous 
incompetence of the directors of its military policy. 
In the whole story of Spanish weakness and failure, 
the adventures of Camara s squadron form the most 
pitiable chapter. 



During May and June there were active prepara 
tions at the Cadiz navy yard watched, during part 
of the time, by two young American 
officers, Ensigns W. H. Buck and H. 
H. Ward, of the Bureau of Naviga 
tion, who had volunteered for secret service duty 
to equip for foreign service all the war ships that 
could be sent to sea. The available vessels included 
two battle ships the old 9,9OO-ton Pelayo and the 
Emperador Carlos V, a fine new ship of 9,235 tons, 
whose armament was still incomplete ; the two 
armed auxiliaries Rapido and Patriota, formerly the 
Hamburg-American liners Normannia and Colum 
bia ; and several torpedo boats and destroyers, of 
the class whose inefficiency, in Spanish hands, was 
demonstrated at Santiago. On June I7th it was 
reported that a squadron under Admiral Camara 
had left Cadiz, sailing eastward; on the I9th it had 
reached Cartagena. As far back as May 2oth Sec 
retary Long had warned Dewey that there were 
rumours of such a movement, but on May 29th he 
had cabled : 

There is no Spanish force en route to Philippine 

Even when Camara s sailing was reported, it was 
not believed at Washington that he would actually 
leave the Spanish coast. On June 22d Secretary 
Long telegraphed to Dewey : * 

Our special agents report Camara s fleet at Cartagena, 
Spain. It is thought reliable information. His future 
destination not ascertained yet. 

* Correspondence between Dewey and Washington went through 
the American consulate at Hong-Kong, requiring from two to five 
days to pass between Hong-Kong and Manila. The McCulloch and 
Dewey s supply ships made frequent voyages to and fro with de 

It appears that on cutting the Manila cable the admiral took the 
wire on board the Olympia and attempted to use it, but the Spanish 
Government prevented this by sealing the line at Hong-Kong a right 
reserved by its contract with the cable company. 


That there was no alarm at Washington is shown 
by the secretary s despatch of the same date to 
Sampson at Santiago : 

Spanish fleet at Cartagena, Spain; movement probably 
made to satisfy people. This information probably re 

As a matter of fact, Camara passed Cape Bon, in 
Tunis, on the 22d, and on the 26th he appeared off 
Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal. 
Sagasta, the Spanish premier, announced in the 
Cortes, on the 23d the legislature was dissolved OR 
the following day that Manila was the objective 
point of the expedition. On the 25th, and again on 
the 27th, Secretary Long cabled the news to Dewey. 
Admiral Dewey is established in the popular re 
gard as so invincible a hero that many Americans, 
no doubt, vaguely assume that if 
Camara had reached Manila he would 
have been destroyed as speedily as 
was Montojo s feeble fleet. They may be surprised 
to learn that the admiral himself was very far from 
possessing such an easy confidence. On the con 
trary, it is recorded by General Greene,* who was 
personally in conference with him, that he fully de 
cided, in case the Spanish squadron continued its 
voyage, to abandon Manila Bay and retreat before 
it. He was not prepared to pit his unarmoured 
cruisers against a pair of heavy battle ships. He 
resolved, the general relates, to take his men-of-war 
and the transports out into the Pacific, and cruise 
eastward to meet the monitors Monterey and 
Monadnock, which were on their way to him from 
California. With this important addition to his 
fighting strength, he would return and give battle 
to Camara. The army, meanwhile its senior 
officer, General Anderson, having readily accepted 

* The Capture of Manila, published in the Century Magazine for 
March and April, 1899. 


Dewey s plan would march inland from Cavite, in 
trench itself in the interior of Luzon, and await the 
fleet s return. The result, as General Greene ob 
serves, would have been a very interesting cam 
paign ; but on July 22d, just as the admiral was on 
the point of taking steps to put his design into 
action, the news came that Camara had turned back. 
To Dewey himself, apparently, belongs the first 
suggestion of the effective counter stroke that re 
moved the danger. In the first despatch he sent to 
Secretary Long after hearing of Camara s start 
from Cadiz he said: 

In my judgment, if the coast of Spain was threatened, 
the squadron of the enemy would have to return. 

This reached Washington on June 27th, and that 
very day an official bulletin of the Navy De 
partment announced that " Commo- 
watson s East- dore \Vatson sails to-day in the 

ern Squadron, . - T , "* A j 1 

June 27. cruiser Newark to join Admiral 

Sampson at Santiago, where he will 
take under his command an armoured squadron, 
with cruisers, and proceed at once to the Spanish 
coast." The new move was not kept a secret, and 
news of it immediately went all over the world, and 
to Madrid in particular. Further information was 
given out the same day. Watson s fleet the com 
mand, it may be presumed, would have been 
Schley s had he made a better record with the 
Flying Squadron was to be called the Eastern 
Squadron, and was to consist of the Newark as 
flagship, the battle ships Iowa and Oregon, the 
armed auxiliaries Yosemite, Dixie, and Yankee, 
and three colliers. When the squadron was actually 
commissioned (July 7th) these arrangements had 
been modified, the Massachusetts taking the place 
of the Iowa ; and as it never sailed for Spain, all the 
vessels named remained under Sampson s orders. 
Here we may note another testimony to the 


supreme importance of the destruction of Cervera s 
fleet as the great decisive event of the war. While 
his squadron remained intact it would have been 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to hold the 
American position at Santiago, to maintain the 
blockade of Cuba, and at the same time to detach 
a powerful force for offensive operations beyond the 
Atlantic. The triumphant ending of Sampson s 
naval campaign made this last undertaking entirely 
feasible, and ended Dewey s chief apprehension. 

Camara reached Port Said short of coal, after 
the fatal habit of Spanish admirals ; and according 
to instructions from Washington, Mr. Watts, the 
deputy consul-general, who was in charge of the 
American consulate at Cairo, promptly lodged a 
protest against his being allowed to take on fuel in 
any Egyptian port. The fact that the protest was 
successful is ascribed to the good offices of Lord 
Cromer, the British agent. Nevertheless, the Span 
iards passed through the canal except the three 
torpedo-boat destroyers, Audaz, Osada, and Pro 
serpina, which were ordered back to Spain from Port 
Said ; but they still lay at Suez on July 6th, the war 
ships having taken some coal from the auxiliaries, 
when an order came recalling them to the threat 
ened coast of the peninsula. The fiasco of the Ca- 
rnara expedition was over, and Manila was left to 
its fate. 

Though the position of the Spanish garrison was 
now hopeless, that of Admiral Dewey was not en 
tirely easy or comfortable. He was 
Diedrichs seven thousand miles from an avail 

able base; his stock of ammunition 
was small, and his supply of provisions most of 
which came from Australia more or less precari 
ous, though he never was actually short of food or 
fuel.* He had to face a peculiar embarrassment, 

* On June i3th Dewey sent to Washirf^ton a request for six months 
supplies in all departments, stating that it was "practically impossible 


moreover, in the behaviour of some of the foreign 
war ships which lay, ostensibly to watch the inter 
ests of their respective flags, in the blockaded har 
bour. Germany, in particular, was represented by 
a squadron that seemed disproportionate to her 
share in the commerce of Manila. Admiral Died- 
richs, commanding the German fleet on the East 
Asiatic station, came into the harbour on June I2th, 
and at the end of the month he had with him five 
vessels whose rated strength was superior to 
Dewey s small fighting force. 

Amid the excitement of war, and under the 
strain of a trying situation, it is probable that anx 
iety and resentment were created by incidents which 
under other conditions would have passed unno 
ticed. It is entirely clear, now, that the German 
Government cherished no insidious designs against 
the United States, and had no idea of provoking a 
conflict with its forces in Asiatic waters. It is 
equally clear that the American officers at Manila, 
from the admiral down, believed the situation to 
be one of real danger, and that there was a bitter 
ill feeling between the two fleets. It appears that 
Diedrichs failed to display a proper respect for 
Dewey s position as a blockader of the port, and 
that Dewey, at least on one occasion, was peremp 
tory in enforcing his rule that every vessel entering 
or leaving the harbour should be examined by his 
guard ship of the day. 

The situation was not improved by an incident 
which occurred early in July, when Aguinaldo sent 
word that his troops had captured the shore de 
fences of Subig Bay, and had endeavoured to attack 

to obtain further supplies within the limits of the station during the 
war." On July zcth, however, he said that he had six months pro 
visions on hand. On August gth he reported "provisions for three 
months, fresh ; also plenty of coal." A British ship, the Ellen A. 
Reed, brought him a cargo of coal from Cape Town in July ; he also 
took a supply from another British vessel, the Honolulu, laid up at 
Manila by the blockade. 


the main Spanish position on an island in the har 
bour (Isla Grande), but had been prevented from 
doing so by the German cruiser Irene, which had 
threatened to fire on their boats, on the ground 
that they flew no recognised flag. Dewey met the 
difficulty by sending the Raleigh and the Concord 
to Subig (July 7th), where the Spaniards, numbering 
about thirteen hundred, surrendered without resist 
ance, the Irene whose interference with the insur 
gents, though perhaps officious, was technically 
quite correct of course interposing no objection. 
The prisoners were turned over to the insurgents 
a transaction which came dangerously near to being 
a recognition of them as a belligerent power. 

The first American troops, as has been said, 
arrived on June 3Oth, and next morning General 
Anderson began to disembark his 
men an ^ material at Cavite. During 
the day he had an interview with 
Aguinaldo, whom he found to be in control of 
everything between the navy-yard gates and the 
Spanish lines. The Filipino leader, the general re 
ports, " did not seem pleased at the incoming of 
our land forces." No further move was made, 
though Anderson did some reconnoitring mean 
while, till July 1 5th. Then, in order to secure space 
for the landing of Greene s brigade, whose arrival 
was expected, a battalion of the California regi 
ment was sent across from Cavite to the eastern 
shore of the bay, and encamped near the hamlet of 
Tambo, some three miles from Malate, the south 
ernmost suburb held by the Spaniards. To the new 
camp christened Camp Dewey the rest of the 
Calif ornians went on the I7th, on which day the 
second army . expedition came into the harbour. 
This consisted of a battalion of the Eighteenth In 
fantry and another of the Twenty-third ; three regi 
ments of volunteer infantry, the First Colorado 
(Colonel Hale), the First Nebraska (Colonel Bratt), 


and the Tenth Pennsylvania (Colonel Hawkins) ; 
and two batteries of volunteer artillery from Utah 
in all 3,586 men, commanded by General Francis 
V. Greene, a former officer in the regular army, and 
late colonel of the Seventy-first New York. 

Greene s brigade left San Francisco on June 
1 5th, on the four transports China, Colon, Zealandia, 
and Senator. After calling at Honolulu (June 
23d to 25th), and passing Wake Island (July 4th) 
and Guam (July Qth), off Cape Engano, at the 
northern end of Luzon, the Boston was found wait 
ing to escort the transports to Manila. On the 
1 7th they were in the harbour, and next day the 
men began to go ashore at Camp Dewey, where 
General Greene took command, General Anderson, 
who until Merritt s arrival was senior officer, re 
maining at Cavite. Aguinaldo had moved his head 
quarters from Cavite to Bakoor, across the small bay 
of that name, to make room for the Americans, but 
his attitude was by no means cordial, and he gave 
them no aid in securing what they most needed 
vehicles and draught animals. The insurgents still 
occupied a thin line of intrenchments between 
Camp Dewey and the Spanish works. 

On July 25th the transport Newport, with 
Major-General Merritt and his staff, reached Ca 
vite, and on the 3oth five other ves- 
sels brought in Brigadier-General 
MacArthur and his brigade. This 
pretty nearly doubled the force in the field, the 
new arrivals numbering 4,847, including four vol 
unteer regiments the Thirteenth Minnesota, First 
North Dakota, First Idaho, and First Wyoming ; 
another battalion each of the Eighteenth and 
Twenty-third Infantry ; and the Astor Battery, a 
volunteer field battery organized as a gift to the 
Government by Colonel John Jacob Astor, of New 

With almost eleven thousand men under his 


command, besides nearly five thousand more 
already on their way from San Francisco,* General 
Merritt was eager to end a situation that was full 
of perplexities by an immediate attack on Manila. 
After reviewing the ground he decided, as Ander 
son and Greene had already agreed, that the best 
approach to the city was by the road from the 
south, the Calle Real (" Royal Road "), which ran 
parallel to the shore from Camp Dewey to the 
Spanish lines at Malate, within easy range of the 
guns of the fleet. To clear the ground for an ad 
vance it was necessary to get the insurgents out of 
the way ; and Greene was commissioned to arrange 
this with Aguinaldo unofficially, as Merritt pre 
ferred to have no dealings with the Filipino leader. 
Aguinaldo consented to withdraw his soldiers four 
hundred yards from the beach, on condition that 
the request should be made of him in writing; and 
on July 29th this arrangement was carried out, the 
abandoned line being occupied by some of Greene s 
men, who were promptly set to work to strengthen 
the trenches. 

The growth of the defences, in plain view of 
their lines, and but a thousand yards distant, seem 
ingly apprised the Spaniards that 
f American troops had taken the place 

of the Filipinos, and on the night of 
July 3 ist, just before midnight, they opened a heavy 
fire of musketry and artillery. The trenches were 
held, at the time, by the Tenth Pennsylvania, with 
four guns of the Utah artillery. The Spaniards 

* Five additional transports were on their way across the Pacific 
when the war ended : the Peru and the City of Puebla with 1,682 men, 
under Major-General Elwell S. Otis, who left San Francisco July i5th 
and arrived at Manila August 2ist ; the Pennsylvania, with 1,348 men, 
left San Francisco July igth ; and the City of Rio de Janeiro (July 23d) 
and the St. Paul (July 29th), with 1,735 men, under Brigadier-General 
Harrison Grey Otis. 

The monitor Monadnock started from San Francisco on June 25th, 
in company with the collier Nero, but did not reach Manila until 
August i6th. 

Sketch map of the scene of General Merritt s campaign 
in July and August, 1898. 


kept up a hot fusillade for about two hours, but did 
not advance from their works, though an attack 
in force was momentarily expected, and the whole 
American camp was under arms. A company of 
the Third Artillery, serving as infantry, hurried to 
support the Pennsylvanians, and the California regi 
ment was also moved up. 

It was a dark, stormy night, with high wind and 
tropical rain, and it was difficult to ascertain what 
was happening. Major Cuthbertson, commanding 
a battalion of the Pennsylvanians, reported that the 
enemy had sallied out and attempted to turn the 
right flank of the American line, but he was un 
doubtedly mistaken. General Greene, who was at 
the front, had been ordered to remain on the de 
fensive, and therefore sent no more men forward 
than were necessary to hold the trenches. For the 
same reason he did not signal to the Boston, which 
lay off the shore, ready to use her guns if called 
upon. The skirmish the expedition s baptism of 
fire ended without result, though not without 
casualties, Greene s loss being ten killed and forty- 
three wounded. 

After the night encounter of July 3ist, General 
Greene kept his men at work extending their in- 
trenchments, to secure the American right against 
the possibility of an attack in flank. Before the 
final advance upon Manila, a strong line of works 
had been completed, about twelve hundred yards in 
length, its left coming down to the bay, while its 
right extended across the Calle Real and rested 
upon a practically impassable rice swamp just be 
yond a parallel road farther inland, running into 
the city from the village of Pasay. To construct 
and hold this line was a task of no small difficulty 
and hardship. Any exposure drew the enemy s fire. 
Tropical rains were incessant, and shelter from 
them impossible. The soil was so wet that it could 
be held in place only by bagging it, and the mud 


so deep that shoes were ruined and many men per 
force went barefoot. One storm left two feet of 
water in part of the trenches. 

Almost every night the Spaniards fired upon the 
American works, generally with both artillery and 
musketry. Greene s instructions were to make no 
reply unless they actually came out to attack him; 
but with raw troops posted close to the enemy s 
lines, and under fire for the first time in the dark 
ness and rain, it proved impossible to enforce such 
an order strictly, and in four of these resultless 
nocturnal skirmishes a hundred and fifty thousand 
rounds of ammunition were expended. Almost 
every night, too, a few men were killed and 
wounded. It began to appear that though Greene s 
forward move was in accordance with the spirit of 
his orders, it was unfortunate that he had taken 
up so advanced a position so long before the be 
sieging forces were prepared to strike a decisive 

For though General Merritt was anxious to end 
the army s discomfort by an immediate attack, Ad 
miral Dewey now declared himself not quite ready 
for the final, move. It may be remembered that in 
May and June the admiral had repeatedly reported 
that he could take Manila at any moment.* Since 
then he had been strengthened by the arrival of the 
Charleston, while the Spaniards had been weakened 
in numbers and morale by the long siege, by their 
losing fight with Aguinaldo, and by the growing 
hopelessness of their position between the American 
fleet and army and the insurgent forces. It is pos 
sible that the prolonged strain of an anxious situa 
tion had lessened Dewey s confidence and increased 
his caution ; it is possible that he dreaded political 

* " I control bay completely, and can take city at any time," he 
said in his despatch of May 4th. Again, on May i3th : "I can take 
Manila at any moment" ; and on July 3d : "This squadron can re 
duce the defences of Manila at any moment." 



complications. To put into words what the admiral 
probably refrained from putting into words, if he 
should summon the Spaniards to surrender or stand 
his fire, and if one or more of the foreign squadrons 
should protest against a bombardment, he would 
find himself in a situation of great embarrassment, 
perhaps of humiliation. He had five cruisers, none 
of them armoured or very heavily armed ; two moni 
tors the Monterey and the Monadnock were on 
their way across the Pacific. The ten- and twelve- 
inch guns of these formidable fighting machines * 
would give him a trump card in any game he might 
be called upon to play ; and he wished to wait for 
them, or at any rate for one of them, before taking 

On August 4th the Monterey came into the bay 
fifty-four days from San Diego a remarkable voy 
age for a coast-defence ship, even though she was 
towed most of the way by the collier Brutus. On 
the 5th General Greene went to General Merritt,who 
had remained on his transport, the Newport, and 
reported the situation at the front. Merritt sent 
him on to Dewey, who explained his wish for a little 
further delay. To silence the Spaniards heavy guns 
without risk of loss, he needed the Monterey to 
engage the city batteries ; but she required time for 
slight repairs after her long journey. If the troops 
could not be withdrawn from the first line of 
trenches which Greene naturally regarded as im 
possible he would stand ready to aid them, if 
they were hard pressed, whenever they signalled to 
him from the beach ; but he would prefer not to 
use his guns, except in case of necessity, as he did 
not desire to bring on a general engagement. Be 
sides although this is not mentioned in General 

* Sampson reported the monitors inefficient for such service as the 
San Juan expedition, because they lacked speed and were poor gun 
platforms in a swell. They were well suited for fighting in the smooth 
water of Manila Bay. 



Greene s narrative he was negotiating through the 
Belgian consul, M. Andre, for the peaceful sur 
render of the city. 

Next day (August 6th) Dewey and Merritt had 

a further conference, and on the morning of the 

7th one of the navy launches took into 

surrenderor Manila the following joint note to 

Manila de- , t , . i -r? T j 

manded, Aug. 6. the captain-general, Fermm Jaudenes, 
who had superseded General Augustin 
on the 4th : * 

SIR: We have the honour to notify your excellency 
that operations of the land and naval forces of the United 
States against the defences of Manila may begin at any 
time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the 
hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner 
if made necessary by an attack on your part. 

This notice is given in order to afford you an oppor 
tunity to remove all noncombatants from the city. 

General Jaudenes replied promptly, thanking the 
American commanders for their " humane senti 
ments," and saying that as he was surrounded by 
the insurgents he was " without places of refuge for 
the increased number of wounded, sick, women, and 
children now lodged within the walls." 

As a result of the notice thus served upon the 
Spanish captain-general, there was no further firing, 
either by night or by day, upon the American 
trenches. Not another shot was exchanged between 
the opposing forces, until the last day of the cam 
paign and the war. 

At noon on the gth the forty-eight hours had 
expired, and Manila expected an immediate bom 
bardment. Red-cross flags were hoisted on build 
ings containing sick or wounded men. Boats came 
out of the Pasig carrying foreign residents, and the 
neutral squadrons steamed out of range. It was 

* The change is said to have been made under orders from Madrid, 
for the reason that Augustin had requested permission to surrender 
without further resistance. The orders must presumably have been 
sent through one of the foreign squadrons at Manila. 



noted as a significant fact though perhaps its 
meaning was exaggerated that the British and the 
Japanese vessels took up a position beside Dewey s, 
off Cavite, while the fleets of Germany and France 
moved away northward into the bay. But there was 
no bombardment. Instead, another joint note was 
sent to Jaudenes, formally demanding a surrender : 

SIR: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, 
sick, women, and children, in the event that it becomes our 
duty to reduce the defences of the walled town in which 
they are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully 
to the sympathies of a general capable of making the de 
termined and prolonged resistance which your excellency 
has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces, and with 
out hope of succour. 

We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high 
sentiments of honour and duty which your excellency en 
tertains, that surrounded on every side as you are by a 
constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your 
front, and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and 
assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in 
the event of an attack, and therefore every consideration 
of humanity makes it imperative that you should not sub 
ject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accord 
ingly, we demand the surrender of the city of Manila, and 
the Spanish forces under your command. 

The captain-general replied with a refusal to sur 
render, but offered to refer the question to Madrid 
if time were granted him to send and receive a mes 
sage by way of Hong-Kong. As this would involve 
a delay of several days, Dewey and Merritt declined 
the proposal, and made final arrangements for an 
attack. At the same time, almost up to the last 
moment, they continued their negotiations through 
the Belgian consul. M. Andre s mediation would 
no doubt have been entirely successful had not the 
Spanish officers feared the disapproval of the home 
Government in case they laid down their arms with 
out a fight. As it was, though no such agree 
ment was officially made or recorded, it was tacitly 
understood that nothing more than a show of re 
sistance would be offered. Manila, with its two 


hundred and fifty thousand people, lay at the mercy 
of Dewey s guns ; the insurgents had cut off its 
water supply, leaving it dependent upon the rains, 
and upon such food as was stored in the city; its 
garrison must have surrendered, before long, either 
to the Americans or to the still more hated and 
dreaded Aguinaldo. 

The reports of the army officers who com 
manded in the action of August i3th scarcely give a 

historical account of the events of the 
Aug " 3 f memorable day that saw the American 

flag hoisted over the capital of the 
Philippines. They relate the advance of their troops, 
the capture of the Spanish lines, the entry into 
the city, and its surrender, as if that told the whole 
story. As a matter of fact, though there was some 
real fighting, and though it was not the fault of the 
American troops that there was not more, the land 
" battle " of Manila was a curious and Pickwickian 
sort of combat. The Philippine capital was prac 
tically taken when Dewey destroyed Montojo s 
squadron on the morning of May ist. The affair 
of August 1 3th was little more than a formality. 
The Spaniards had seventy pieces of modern artil 
lery, of calibres up to nine inches, but they did not 
use them, with the exception of two small guns 
in the trenches, Dewey having promised M. Andre 
that if their batteries remained silent he would 
throw no shells into the city. Of Jaudenes thirteen 
thousand men only a very small part contested the 
American advance, though he might have massed 
nearly his whole force to meet it. Five thousand 
were held behind the fortifications of the old city, 
where they stood, without firing a shot, to watch 
Greene s men march under the walls. 

Had Dewey s fleet held aloof, had there been 
no besieging army of insurgents, and had the 
Spaniards resisted with all their power, Merritt s 
men would very probably have taken Manila; 



but the battle would have been an entirely differ 
ent one. 

The plan of attack was that Dewey should open 
fire upon Fort San Antonio, at Malate, seconded 
by Greene s artillery seven of the Utah guns, and 
three lent by the navy and manned by men of the 
Third Artillery. When the bombardment seemed 
to have been effective, Greene s brigade, on the 
American left, near the beach, was to advance upon 
the Spanish works. MacArthur,* who had the 
Astor Battery and one of the Utah guns, was to 
follow a similar programme on the right, where the 
centre of the Spanish position was a blockhouse 
marked as " No. 14 " on the plan of the Manila de 
fences. The admiral was then to signal a demand 
for the city s surrender, and it was understood that 
this would be yielded, although it was not known 
just how much resistance would satisfy the Span 
iards. The Oregon regiment was to come up from 
Cavite on a transport, in readiness to go ashore and 
take possession. The division commander, General 
Anderson, went over from Cavite to direct opera 
tions at the front ; General Merritt did not go 
ashore, making his headquarters on the Zafiro. 

At half past nine" the Olympia fired the first 
shot. The artillery on shore promptly followed suit, 
and the bombardment was kept up for three quar 
ters of an hour, the Spaniards making no reply 

* By an order dated August ist, Major-General Merritt organized 
his forces into a division (the second division of the Eighth Corps), 
under Brigadier-General Anderson, whose headquarters were at Ca 
vite. The division consisted of two brigades : 

First Brigade (Brigadier-General MacArthur) Fourteenth and 
Twenty-third Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota, First North Dakota, 
First Idaho, First Wyoming, and Astor Battery. 

becond Brigade (Brigadier-General Greene) Eighteenth Infantry, 
First California, First Nebraska, First Colorado, Tenth Pennsylvania, 
Third Artillery, Utah Artillery, and Company A, United States En 

The Second Oregon, the California Heavy Artillery, and a signal- 
corps detachment were stationed at Cavite, under the immediate or 
ders of General Anderson, who remained at that point until August 
I3th. General Merritt did not go ashore until Manila surrendered. 



whatever. Then, Fort San Antonio having been 
heavily buffeted, and its magazine exploded, Greene 
sent the First Colorado forward along the beach, 
and signalled the navy to cease firing. As the Colo 
rado men advanced, a few shots came from behind 
the Spanish lines. They volleyed in reply, forded 
the shallow channel in front of the fort, and entered 
its battered walls without opposition. The garri 
son had deserted it, carrying off the breech-blocks 
of the guns, and leaving behind a wounded man 
and two dead. 

MacArthur s artillery, on the right, opened o n 
the enemy s lines while Dewey was bombarding 
Fort San Antonio, the Utah gun firing upon Block 
house Fourteen, from which no response came, and 
the Astor Battery, on the extreme right, engaging 
in a brief duel with a couple of field guns in the 
Spanish lines. These latter having ceased firing, a 
squad of the Twenty-third Infantry scouted forward 
and found that the enemy s trenches were aban 
doned. The brigade then advanced, and the Thir 
teenth Minnesota occupied the blockhouse, where 
the American flag was hoisted about twenty min 
utes past eleven. Still pushing forward, no resist 
ance was encountered till the Minnesota regiment, 
leading the way, entered the streets of the suburban 
village of Cingalon. 

Here, of course, the ground had not been recon 
noitred. There was a blockhouse in the village, 
with emplacements fortunately empty for six 
guns. It was held by the rear guard of the retreat 
ing Spaniards, who fired into the Minnesota men 
at short range, causing them to fall back in some 
disorder. The position was a strong one, and it 
was obstinately held, though MacArthur brought 
up his force as rapidly as he could over the difficult 
ground. He was hampered by the necessity of 
moving along a single road, with thick timber and 
rice swamps on either hand. Only a small part of 


his brigade could be put on the firing line ; and the 
check was so serious that General Anderson, who 
was now in Malate, sent over the field telegraph a 
message instructing him to retreat from Cingalon 
and make his way over to the left to follow Greene s 
advance. This was at twenty-five minutes past one 
o clock, but when MacArthur received the order 
which is not mentioned in his report the Spanish 
fire was dying out, and a little later the blockhouse 
was abandoned, leaving the way to Paco and 
Manila open. 

Meanwhile Greene s brigade, entering Malate, 
had a brief exchange of fire with the Spanish posi 
tions farther inland ; but no serious resistance was 
offered, and after clearing the enemy s line of 
trenches the American troops marched steadily 
forward through Malate and Ermita, keeping close 
to the bay. The Callao, the captured Spanish gun 
boat, now commanded by Lieutenant Tappan, 
moved beside them along the shore. Occasional 
shots still came from street corners and from houses, 
though when they reached the open space of the 
Luneta the water-side parade ground of Manila 
and were in full view of the old walled city, a white 
flag was seen flying above its ancient fortifications. 
The white ensign of surrender had been hoisted 
shortly after eleven o clock, in answer to Dewey s 
signalled demand, and Lieutenant 
B . m ! ) y and Lieutenant -Colonel 
Whittier, representing the admiral 
and General Merritt, had already gone ashore to 
negotiate terms with General Jaudenes. The sur 
render was of course complete, but Spanish honour 
was salved by the proviso that the garrison should 
" capitulate with all the honours of war." This 
enabled them to claim the privilege for which Toral 
pleaded so hard at Santiago that of carrying their 
arms back to Spain. Merritt yielded the point 
which would no doubt have been disallowed by his 


official superiors had he been in communication 
with Washington, as Shafter was. For the rest, the 
articles finally signed on Sunday, August I4th, by 
a commission consisting of General Greene, Lieu 
tenant-Colonels Whittier and Crowder, of Merritt s 
staff, and Captain Lamberton, chief of staff to 
Dewey, and by General de la Pena and Colonels 
Reyes and Felifi for the Spaniards provided that 
the city, its defences, and all public property, should 
be turned over to the victorious army; that Jau- 
denes s troops should be prisoners of war pending 
the conclusion of a peace treaty, the officers retain 
ing their side arms, horses, and personal property ; 
and that the question of their return to Spain should 
be left to the United States Government. 

The casualties in Greene s brigade, on August 
1 3th, were one man killed and six -wounded; in 
MacArthur s brigade, four killed and thirty-nine 
wounded. In the firing between the trenches, 
earlier in the month, Greene had fifteen killed and 
sixty wounded, making the entire American loss in 
action during the Manila campaign twenty killed 
and one hundred and five wounded. 

It appears that most of the fighting on the I3th, 
and most if not all of the few casualties to Merritt s 
men, took place after the white flag had gone up 
over the Manila walls. The order to cease firing 
may have been delayed in transmission to some 
parts of the Spanish lines, or may not have been 
promptly obeyed when received. Each army, it 
seems, blamed the other for the desultory exchange 
of shots that accompanied Greene s march into the 
city. At one point a body of insurgents, on the road 
from Paco, had fired upon the Spaniards, and the 
latter replied with a volley that killed one man and 
wounded two of the First California, the only loss 
the regiment suffered during the day. 

Merritt had hoped, by closely following up the 
retreating Spaniards, and by holding the bridges 


on the roads entering Manila from the south and 
east, to keep Aguinaldo s men out of the city, where 
their presence could only be a serious embarrass 
ment and a menace to law and order. Moreover, 
their exclusion appears to have been part of the 
understanding with the captain-general. Unfortu 
nately, during the blocking of MacArthur s advance 
at Cingalon, some two or three thousand of them 
made their way in from Paco and established them 
selves at several points in the suburbs. They are 
said to have looted some houses, among them the 
residence of a Spanish official in Ermita, where they 
broke open the safe and appropriated the funds it 
contained. Though they were held in check by the 
American troops, and though they afterward with 
drew from the city, the friction thus caused helped 
to precipitate the disastrous rupture that ultimately 

By the evening of the I3th, except for the posi 
tions held by the insurgents, Manila was effectively 
occupied by the American troops. The Oregon regi 
ment had come up the Pasig in boats and taken 
possession of the walled city, where Merritt made 
his headquarters in the ayuntamiento, or city hall. 
MacArthur s brigade was distributed through Ma- 
late, Ermita, and the southern suburbs, while 
Greene held Binondo, Tondo, and the northern dis 
tricts. MacArthur himself was appointed governor 
of the city. 

And so, almost without a blow, the seat of Span 
ish power in the east was captured, with thirteen 
thousand prisoners of war, twenty-two thousand 
small arms, seventy modern and several hundred 
obsolete pieces of artillery, and a public fund of 
nine hundred thousand dollars. 



AFTER outlining the campaigns of Santiago, 
Porto Rico, and Manila, it only remains, in order 
to complete the military and naval record of the war, 
to chronicle several minor engagements that took 
place on the Cuban coast during the last two 
months of hostilities. The story of the blockade 
has already been briefly given up to the point at 
which the advent of Cervera changed the course of 
events. When the struggle centred about Santi 
ago, and the main strength of the American navy 
was concentrated there under Admiral Sampson, 
Commodore Watson was left in command off Ha 
vana. At this time, it may be recalled, the blockade 
covered only a hundred miles of the island s north 
ern coast, from Bahia Honda to Cardenas, and the 
port of Cienfuegos on the south ; but it was pro 
posed to extend it as soon as possible. To reinforce 
Watson s scanty fleet composed of small armed 
auxiliaries vessels were drawn from Commodore 
Howell s squadron, patrolling the North Atlantic 
coast ; and on June I9th Sampson sent word to 
Washington : 

The President may declare immediately the blockade 
of whole southern coast. 

Three days later Secretary Long telegraphed to the 
admiral : 

It is proposed to proclaim the blockade on the east * 
side of Cape Cruz, Cuba, to Cape Frances, Cuba. When 
will you be ready? 

* This word should probably read " south." 
25 379 


And again on June 24th : 

Reports constantly received of provisions reaching 
Spanish forces via southern port of Cuba, and of prepara 
tion at Mexico, Jamaica, to forward further supplies; 
therefore the department desires greatly to keep all block 
ade effective, to establish blockade from Cape Cruz, Cuba, 
to Cape Frances, Cuba. When shall you be ready for the 
latter to be proclaimed? 

On the 28th the proclamation was issued, the port 
of San Juan, in Porto Rico, being included. This 
set the navy a difficult task. Sampson had tele 
graphed, on June 23d, that the detachment of men- 
of-war for convoy duty with transports would " so 
reduce the available ships for blockade as to make 
it quite impossible to maintain strict blockade on 
the whole of Cuba. Vessels running blockade," he 
added, " are smaller in size but greatly increased in 

Watson had now been ordered to Guantanamo, 
to organize a squadron for a strategic move against 
the coast of Spain ; and to take his place, on June 
25th, Commodore Howell was instructed to bring 
his remaining ships south. On July ist, when he 
reached Key West, Howell was put in charge of 
the blockade, his new command being designated 
as the " first North Atlantic squadron," and being 
still subject to Sampson s authority as commander- 
in-chief. At this date the admiral had a total of 
ninety-eight vessels under his orders. 

During June, the tedious routine of the blockade 

was enlivened by but little fighting. On the I3th 

the Yankee ordered to Cienfuegos 

ci h e e nf Y ue n g k o e s at after ^ T brief service with Sampson 
June 13. at Santiago, and specially commis 

sioned to watch for the blockade run 
ner Purissima Concepcion, which was afterward 
destroyed at Manzanillo had a brush with two 
Spanish vessels, the Gallicia and a smaller gunboat; 
and though the enemy had the aid of shore bat- 


teries, her amateur gunners the New York naval 
reserve men drove their antagonists into the har 
bour. Cubans with whom Commander Brownson 
communicated a few days later told him that the 
Gallicia was so badly damaged when she retreated 
that she was beached to prevent her from sinking. 
The Yankee was not hit, though she had one man 
wounded by fragments of a shell that burst just 
outside a gun port. 

A week later (June 2oth) she exchanged shots 
with another gunboat at Casilda, the port of Trini 
dad, forty miles east of Cienfuegos as did also the 
Dixie on the 22d. On the 29th the Dixie, the 
Eagle, and the Yankton practised upon a body of 
Spanish cavalry at Rio Hondo, between Casilda and 

The chief Spanish strongholds on the south 

coast, west of Santiago, were Cienfuegos and Man- 

zanillo. The first reconnaissance of 

First attack on the j atter made Qn j th i 

Manzanillo, ... . , J ,, . ?, 

june 30. three auxiliaries of the mosquito 

class the Hist, the Hornet, and the 
Wompatuck. This adventurous little squadron, two 
yachts and a tug, with Lieutenant Young, of the 
Hist, as its senior officer, steamed boldly into the 
bay a wide, shallow sheet of water behind a line 
of keys. In the entrance it encountered a Spanish 
gunboat, which was speedily disabled and blown up. 
Nearing Manzanillo, quite a formidable array of de 
fences was found. Five gunboats and some armed 
pontoons were drawn up across the inner harbour ; * 

* Lieutenant Young reports seeing a large torpedo boat, four gun 
boats, and four large pontoons. Lieutenant Helm, of the Hornet, ob 
served "five to six armed vessels." Lieutenant Jungen, of the Wom 
patuck, saw a torpedo boat, three small gun vessels, an old steam 
cruiser, and a sailing vessel. Captain Barreda, the Spanish commander 
of the port, states that his force consisted of five gunboats the Guan- 
tanamo, the Estrella, the Delgado Pareja. the Guardian, and the Cuba 
Esoanola, the last two being disabled and the pontoon Maria, supported 
by the " few guns " that the city had. He reports his loss as two killed 
and seven wounded on the ships, and a few wounded on shore. On 


behind them were several small batteries on the 
water front, and another in a fort above the town, 
while for two miles the shore was lined with sol 

Though the odds were heavily against them, the 
three little American ships steamed up within a mile 
of the enemy, and for an hour and a half a brisk 
fire was exchanged. The attacking vessels were re 
peatedly hit, but received no material injury till a 
shot cut the Hornet s steam pipe, temporarily dis 
abling her, and scalding three of her crew. She 
was towed out of range by the Wompatuck, and 
the squadron withdrew. The Spaniards had suf 
fered far more severely. One of their gunboats and 
a sloop loaded with soldiers were sunk, and a pon 
toon burned ; but it was clear, as Lieutenant Young 
reported to Sampson, that a much stronger force 
than his was needed to capture the place. 

The Scorpion (Lieutenant-Commander Marix) 
and the Osceola (Lieutenant Purcell) were to have 
joined in the attack on Manzanillo, but they did not 
receive their orders in time. Arriving on the fol 
lowing day (July ist), and missing the Hist and 
her consorts, they made an independent reconnais 
sance, steaming into the bay and opening fire on 
the Spanish gunboats. The return fire was so 
heavy and accurate that after a twenty minutes en 
gagement Marix decided to withdraw. The two 
ships remained outside, watching the port, and cap 
turing some small prizes. The skipper of a British 
schooner, the Edmund Blunt, which came out car 
rying refugees to Jamaica, told them that the town 
was in great straits for food. 

On that same day (July ist) Commodore Howell 
arrived at Key West from the north, and took per 
sonal charge of the north coast blockade. As to the 

the other hand, the captain of the British ship Edmund Blunt told an 
officer of the Scorpion that an American shell killed thirteen men on 
the Maria. 


extent of this, there was some doubt and misunder 
standing. For once, the clocklike workings of the 
Navy Department seem to have 
Howeiiin slipped a cog. Howell found no or- 

charge of the , *.!_ ^ ^^ ixr i 

blockade July i ders awaiting him at Key West, and 
to his request for instructions the only 
answer was a despatch saying that his duty was to 
be " that formerly performed by Commodore Wat 
son as inspector of blockade." Taking his flagship, 
the cruiser San Francisco, to Havana, he found 
there only Watson s directions to the vessels on that 
one station. He therefore confined himself to pa 
trolling the coast from Bahia Honda to Cardenas, 
the limits fixed by the President s proclamation of 
April 2 1 st. 

On July Qth, however, Sampson sent him in 
structions to blockade the whole north coast of 
Cuba, as far as his force permitted, and especially 
the part of it between Nipe and Nuevitas, to pre 
vent communication between Havana and the Span 
ish troops in Santiago province. Howell carried 
out the order as well as he could, though he re 
ported that he needed fifty vessels more than 
twice as many as he could muster* to do the work 
effectively. He also applied to the Navy Depart 
ment for more precise information as to the status 
of the blockade ; but the misunderstanding seems 
to have continued, for on August 8th he received 
the following despatch from Secretary Long : 

By what authority are you blockading Sagua La 
Grande? It is not included in the President s proclama 
tion. Sampson has not informed department that he has 
blockaded it, and therefore no proclamation has been 

* On August 3d Howell reported only fourteen vessels at their sta 
tions on the north-coast blockade - nine off Havana, two off Matanzas, 
two off Sagua la Grande, one off Cardenas, none off such ports as 
Mariel and Bahia Honda and added : " I desire to call your attention 
to the small number of ships with which I am supposed to keep up an 
efficient blockade of over four hundred miles of coast, and also to the 
fact that most of these ships are of low speed, light gun fire, and would 
be entirely at the mercy of a hurricane." 


issued. Courts are releasing vessels captured. Claims for 
damages will be heavy. Protests from three governments 
already received at State Department. 

In reply, Howell informed the secretary of the 
directions received from Sampson, and stated that 
he had allowed the Nuevitas to Nipe blockade to 
lapse after the surrender of Santiago, but was 
patrolling the coast farther west, between Cardenas 
and Nuevitas, in order to prevent the landing of 
supplies for Havana, which, he had learned, was 
being done on a large scale. Secretary Long an 
swered by instructing him to restrict the blockade 
to its original limits, not molesting vessels trading 
with other ports, unless they were Spanish or car 
ried contraband cargoes ; and in compliance with 
this he withdrew his ships from the coast east of 

Though Howell s force was so small, it made 
two captures in July that seriously discouraged the 
business of blockade running. The victims were 
two Spanish Atlantic liners, vessels of five thousand 
tons each the Alfonso XII, which, after showing 
her heels to the Eagle off the Isle of Pines, was run 
ashore at Mariel by the Hawk, and set on fire by 
shells from the Castine ; and the Santo Domingo, 
which, pursued by the Eagle, met a like fate near 
Cape Frances, on the south coast. The latter vessel 
was armed with two five-inch guns which she did 
not attempt to use and carried in her hold two 
twelve-inch rifles and a full cargo of provisions, in 
tended for Havana. 

The capture of Nipe Bay, on the 2ist of July, 
was of importance because it secured another har 
bour of refuge for the blockading 
iy iPe squadron and a half-way station on 
the direct route to Porto Rico. It 
was executed by the Annapolis (Commander 
Hunker), the Wasp (Lieutenant Ward), the Topeka 
(Lieutenant-Commander Cowles), and the Leyden 


(Ensign Crosley), under direct orders from Samp 
son. Cuban insurgents had informed Cowles that 
the place was held by eight hundred Spanish troops, 
the nine-hundred-ton gunboat Jorge Juan, and a 
smaller vessel, with mines and a battery to defend 
the entrance. Approaching the mouth of the bay, 
Commander Hunker, senior officer of the attacking 
squadron, ordered the Wasp and the Leyden to 
steam ahead and develop the enemy s strength. The 
young officers commanding the two small vessels 
were so eager for the fray that they raced forward 
at full speed,* the Wasp overhauling her consort 
and reaching the entrance first. The shore battery 
proved to be dismantled ; the mines were there, as 
was afterward found, but the daring little craft 
passed them without injury probably for the same 
reason that made the torpedoes in Guantanamo Bay 
so harmless to the Texas and the Marblehead.f In 
the bay, quite unprepared for action no doubt 
through misplaced confidence in the protection of 
the mines lay the Jorge Juan, at anchor, with her 
awnings spread, her boats lowered alongside, and 
her firemen hurriedly attempting to get up steam. 
The Wasp and the Leyden promptly opened fire, 
which she returned with such of her guns her main 
battery consisted of three six-inch rifles as she 
could bring to bear, being of course unable to 
manoeuvre. The Annapolis and the Topeka were 
within range a few minutes later, and in half an 
hour the Jorge Juan was sinking. A boat from 
the Leyden captured her colours just before she 
went down, and the Annapolis took off one of 
her small guns. Her crew, or most of it, escaped 

* Lieutenant Ward was so anxious to establish the fact that he was 
instructed to go in first that he submitted a special report citing the 
names of thirty-five witnesses members of his crew who, he said, 
could testify that Commander Hunker authorized him to take the lead. 

t Page 202. 


The other vessel reported to be in the bay was 
not to be found. Insurgents afterward told Com 
mander Hunker that the Spaniards had taken her 
up a creek and sunk her, and had then abandoned 
the place, retreating to Holguin. 

Meanwhile, on the south coast, Lieutenant-Com 
mander Marix was still blockading Manzanillo, but 
had deferred another attack until an 
Attacks on Man- a( jequate f orce CO uld be mustered. 

zanillo, July 18 TT /L , 

and Aug. 12. He sent word to Sampson (by the 
Hist, on July nth) that he was 
willing and anxious to assault, but that he consid 
ered it his duty though it would probably place 
another officer in command to recommend that a 
protected man-of-war should be assigned to the 
work. As a result the Wilmington (Commander 
Todd) and the Helena (Commander Swinburne) 
were detached to join Marix s squadron, and on the 
1 7th these two gunboats rendezvoused with the 
Scorpion, the Hist, the Hornet, the Wompatuck, 
and the Osceola at Guayabal, twenty miles west of 
Manzanillo, Commander Todd being senior officer. 
Early next morning they were in the bay, where 
they lay for three hours deliberately firing upon the 
Spanish ships, opening at long range and gradually 
closing in, until nothing was to be seen afloat in the 
harbour. All the enemy s gunboats were burned 
or sunk, as was also the blockade-runner Purissima 
Concepcion. The American ships, which were en 
tirely uninjured, then withdrew, Sampson having 
ordered them not to engage the forts. 

One of the navy s marvellously few casualties 
during the war occurred on August 2d, when 
the Bancroft, which had been patrolling about 
the Isle of Pines,* sent a launch into Cortes Bay 
in pursuit of a schooner, and one of the boat s 

* It had been believed that provisions were being: sent to Havana 
from the Isle of Pines, but Commander Clover reported that this was 
probably untrue, as food was very scarce on the island. 


crew was killed by rifle fire from an ambuscade on 

The last action on the southern coast of Cuba 
was the fourth and final attack on Manzanillo, on 
August 1 2th. On the o,th the Newark now com 
manded by Captain Goodrich, formerly of the St. 
Louis, Captain Barker having been transferred to 
the Oregon and the Resolute, carrying Colonel 
Huntington s marine battalion, left Guantanamo for 
the Isle of Pines ; but as some smaller vessels, which 
were to have accompanied them, were not ready, 
Captain Goodrich decided, at the suggestion of 
Lieutenant Young, of the Hist, to strike at Man 
zanillo while waiting. With a flotilla consisting of 
the Newark, the Resolute, the Suwanee, the Hist, 
the Osceola, and the Alvarado the last being the 
gunboat captured at Santiago, now commanded by 
Lieutenant Blue he entered the bay on the morn 
ing of the 1 2th, and sent in a demand for the sur 
render of the town and garrison, which was refused. 
Goodrich then began to use his guns. After half 
an hour s firing he saw, or thought he saw, a white 
flag, and ordered the Alvarado, also flying the signal 
of truce, to go in and communicate with the Span 
iards. The latter, however, continued their fire, and 
the bombardment was resumed, and kept up until 
sunset, the Newark firing an occasional shell dur 
ing the night. 

At daybreak white flags were seen in the town, 
and a boat came out with the news that the peace 
protocol had been signed. The armistice robbed 
the navy of another victory, for it appears that the 
Spanish comandante had drawn up a formal docu 
ment of surrender on the previous evening, and 
was intending to send it to Captain Goodrich in 
the morning. 

The last shots of the Havana blockade were 
heard at dawn on the I2th, when the San Fran 
cisco went within range of the batteries, which fired 


on her, and a twelve-inch shell from the Morro 
went through her stern, doing but little damage. 
The last shots of the war were exchanged between 
the Mangrove and two Spanish gunboats off Cai- 
barien, in Santa Clara province, on the morning of 
August 1 4th. 



IN the early days of July, when Cervera s fleet 
had been destroyed; when the fall of Santiago was 
imminent, and the American troops were already 
preparing to move upon Porto Rico ; when the last 
hope of relieving Manila was abandoned, and Spain 
itself was threatened with attack, the hopelessness 
of prolonging the struggle began to be evident 
even at Madrid. The air was full of rumours of 
negotiations for peace. Rumours became certainty 
on the 26th of the month, when Jules Cambon, the 
French ambassador at Washington, called at the 
White House and presented an informal but definite 
inquiry, on behalf of Sagasta s Government, as to 
the terms upon which the United States would be 
willing to end the war. 

He got his answer on the 3Oth, in a long inter 
view with the President. The conditions offered 
were that Spain should renounce all claim to sover 
eignty in Cuba, and evacuate the island at once ; 
that Porto Rico, with its dependent islets, and one 
of the Ladrones, should be ceded to the United 
States ; and that the American forces should occupy 
the city and bay of Manila pending the conclusion 
of a treaty of peace, by which the " control, disposi 
tion, and government " of the Philippines should 
be finally decided. 

Sagasta s cabinet met on Monday, August ist, to 
consider these terms. It took several days for Span- 



ish pride to swallow so severe a dose of humiliation ; 
and it was not until the 7th that the minister of 
state, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, replied. 
His note accepted the first two propositions ; to the 
third it also gave a seeming acceptance, though in 
somewhat ambiguous terms. To remove all doubt, 
Secretary Day drew up a protocol 
Protocol" stating clearly, and without the slight 

est modification, the terms already 
offered to Spain ; and this document he sent to M. 
Cambon for signature. Its precise contents were: 

ARTICLE I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sover 
eignty over and title to Cuba. 

ART. II. Spain will cede to the United States the island 
of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sov 
ereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the 
Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. 

ART. III. The United States will occupy and hold the 
city, bay, and harbour of Manila pending the conclusion 
of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, dis 
position, and government of the Philippines. 

ART. IV. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sover 
eignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Govern 
ment will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, 
appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so ap 
pointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this 
protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging 
and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of 
Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Govern 
ment will, within ten days after the signing of this proto 
col, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within 
thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San 
Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and 
carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of 
Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sover 
eignty in the West Indies. 

ART. V. The United States and Spain will each ap 
point not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, 
and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris 
not later than October i, 1898, and proceed to the negotia 
tion and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall 
be subject to ratification according to the respective con 
stitutional forms of the two countries. 

ART. VI. Upon the conclusion and signing of this 
protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be sus- 


pended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon 
as possible by each Government to the commanders of its 
military and naval forces. 

Once more, of course, a reference to Madrid was 
necessary ; but acceptance was the only possible 
course, and M. Cambon was authorized -to sign 
the protocol with Secretary Day. The formal act 
that ended hostilities took place in the cabinet room 
of the White House, at twenty-three minutes past 
four o clock on the afternoon of August I2th. It 
has already been told how the news reached Miles s 
army in Porto Rico just in time to stop a battle at 
Aibonito and another near Cayey ; how it prevented 
the surrender of Manzanillo, but was too late to 
save Manila. 

On August 26th the President named the Amer 
ican peace commissioners William R. Day, Sec 
retary of State, chairman; Senator Davis, of Min 
nesota, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee ; Senator Frye, of Maine; Justice White, 
of the United States Supreme Court ; and Whitelaw 
Reid, formerly minister to France. One of these, 
Justice White, declined to serve, and his place was 
taken by Senator Gray, of Delaware, a leading 
Democratic member of the Senate. Spain s com 
missioners were Eugenio Montero Rios, president 
of the Spanish senate, chairman ; Senor de Abar- 
zuza, a member of the same body, and formerly his 
country s ambassador at Paris ; Senor de Garnica, 
a justice of the supreme court; General Rafael 
Cerero; and Senor de Villa Urrutia, Spanish min 
ister to Belgium. 

The commission met in Paris, on October 1st, 

the French Government providing quarters for it 

in the foreign office on the Quai 

^Pari^*" 116 * d rsai - Its conferences lasted ten 

Ocf TD CC 10. weeks, the Spaniards fighting hard for 

concessions that would at least enable 

their Government to put the best possible face on 



the disasters it had brought upon itself. Cuba be 
ing dealt with first, they sought to free Spain from 
the huge debt that she had contracted in her mal 
administration of the island s affairs, urging that 
international law requires that the liabilities of a 
territory should pass with its sovereignty. The 
American commissioners declined to admit the prin 
ciple in this particular case, for the reason a rea 
son of indisputable equity that the so-called Cuban 
debt was not contracted in any sense for the benefit 
of Cuba, but was incurred by Spain in her ineffec 
tual and costly efforts to subjugate the island. 

The Americans also declined a proposition that 
Cuba should be ceded direct to the United States, 
the Spanish contention being that if Spain withdrew 
her authority, and the United States asserted none, 
the island would be left in a state of anarchy. This 
was a mere technical objection, perhaps a deliberate 
attempt at embarrassment, the Washington Govern 
ment having pledged itself before the world to leave 
Cuba to her own people. 

A much more serious difference arose when the 
question of the Philippines was taken up, and the 
Spaniards were first informed (October 3ist) that 
entire possession of the great eastern archipelago 
was required for the United States. The demand 
was referred to Madrid, where it was answered by 
a flat refusal ; and it actually appeared, for a time, 
that the negotiations might be broken off. It seems 
clear that the Spanish Government regarded the 
protocol as leaving its sovereignty in the Philip 
pines intact, and not open to subsequent challenge. 
In a despatch sent on August 7th the Duke of 
Almodovar del Rio declared that in assenting to the 
clause about Manila, his country did not renounce 
her title to the islands, but left it to the peace com 
mission " to agree upon such reforms as the condi 
tion of these dependencies and the civilization of 
their natives may render desirable." But it is equally 



clear that the terms of the document have an en 
tirely different meaning. They express precisely 
what Secretary Day meant them to express that 
the United States Government had not decided 
whether it desired to annex the Philippines, and 
that their ownership was left for later settlement. 
" Possession " was the word in the original draft of 
the protocol ; " disposition " was substituted at M. 
Cambon s suggestion, as a word less offensive to 
Spanish sensibilities. 

The Spaniards suggested arbitration as to the 
/^-^rneaning of the protocol, which was of course re 
fused, and no progress was made until November 
2 1st, when the American commissioners made a 
final proposition practically an ultimatum, allow 
ing a week for a definite reply. The demand for 
the archipelago was not modified, but it was prom 
ised that for ten years Spanish ships and merchan 
dise should enter Philippine ports on equal terms 
with American traders, and that the United 
States should pay to Spain the sum of twenty 
million dollars. An impression went abroad that 
the money was offered as a repayment of such 
part of the Spanish Government s past expenditures 
in the islands as represented actual betterments. 
Spain s commissioners may have accepted it as such 
perhaps to veil the commercial character of the 
transaction ; but it appears that the offer was in 
tended by the American commissioners at any rate 
by most of them as practically a proposition of 
sale and purchase, or at least a douceur to facilitate 
the desired agreement.* Neither in the wording of 
the proposal as submitted on November 2ist, nor in 
the treaty as finally drawn, is any reason or con 
sideration for the payment specified. 

* That this view was taken by the American commissioners has been 
explicitly stated by at lea^t two of them. At the dinner of the Ohio 
Society in New York, February 25, 1899, Senator Gray spoke of the 
choice that presented itself of taking the islands either " by the ruthless 


On the 28th, the day by which an answer was 
required, the Spaniards signified their acceptance, 
coupling it with a formal and of course ineffectual 
protest. Recognising the impossibility of resisting 
their powerful antagonist, they declared, and to 
avoid still greater loss and suffering to their coun 
try, they could do nothing but yield to the victor s 
terms, however harsh. And so, on the evening of 
December loth, the commissioners met for the last 
time to sign the treaty that freed Cuba from Spain, 
and transferred a colonial empire from an ancient 
monarchy of Europe to the young and mighty re 
public of the west. 

hand of conquest, or by some concessions that comported with the 
greatness and character of this country. And therefore," he went on, 
u we believed that it was better ... to take them by voluntary cession 
and by purchase, so to speak." 

Secretary Day, in a letter published in the daily press on October 
12, 1899, quotes and approves Senator Gray s statement, and adds : 
" It was not claimed that the United States had a right to the Philip 
pine Islands as a matter of conquest. By the cession for a considera 
tion we obtained an indisputable title." 

On the other hand, Mr. Whitelaw Reid (Later Aspects of Our New 
Duties, page 9) says that when the American commissioners first de 
manded the cession of the islands, they "accompanied this demand for 
a transfer of sovereignty with a stipulation for assuming any existing 
indebtedness of Spain, incurred for public works and improvements of 
a pacific character in the Philippines. The United States thus asserted 
its right to the archipelago for indemnity, and at the same time com 
mitted itself to the principle of payment on account of the Philippine 
debt " ; and that though the ultimatum gave no reason for the twenty- 
million-dollar payment, "it was really nothing but the old proposition, 
with the mention for the first time of a specific sum for the payment, 
and without any question of pacific improvements. That sum just 
balanced the Philippine debt forty million Mexican, or, say, twenty 
million American dollars." 

The difference of opinion between Mr. Reid and his colleagues is 


Abarzuza, Senor de, Spanish peace commissioner, 391. 

Acosta, Commander, of the Reina Mercedes, 196. 

Adams, John Quincy, on Cuba, 18. 

Adjuntas, Porto Rico, 340, 343. 

Adria, American steamer, 155. 

Agafia, capital of Guam, 354, 355. 

Aguadores, Fort, 230, 235; Duffield s movement against, 259; bom 
barded by Sampson, 260; second movement against, 262. 

Aguadores River, 240, 242, 249; emergency hospital at, 264. 

Aguila Negra, Cuban revolutionary society, 21. 

Aguilera, governor of Madrid, 94. 

Aguinaldo, Emilio, Filipino insurgent, 130; relations with American 
forces, 356, 357; president Filipino republic, 358; reports German 
interference at Subig, 363; meets Anderson, 364; at Bakoor, 365; 
withdraws from before Malate, 366; followers enter Manila, 378. 

Aibonito, Porto Rico, 344; Spanish position at, 345. 

Alabama, American battle ship, 101. 

Albany, American cruiser, 103. 

Albemarle, Lord, at Havana, 8. 

Alcaniz, Major, at Las Guasimas, 226. 

Aldea, Colonel, 230, 253. 

Aleman, Jose B., Cuban insurgent, 52. 

Alert, British sloop of war, 294. 

Alfonso XII, Spanish cruiser, 68, 77; at Havana, 122. 

Alfonso XII, Spanish steamer, 384. 

Alger, R. A., Secretary of War, 145; restricts information to press, 
149; advises Shafter against retreat, 268; requests co-operation of 
Sampson, 308; work during the war, 324. 

Allen, Captain L. C., Sixteenth Infantry, 251. 

Allen, Colonel James, Signal Corps, 173. 

Allen, Lieutenant H. T., Second Cavalry, 294. 

Almirante Oquendo, Spanish cruiser, 100; at Havana, 71; at St. Vin 
cent, 118, 157; crosses Atlantic, 168; leaves Santiago, 272; in battle 
of Santiago, 276; driven ashore, 280, 284. 

Almodovar del Rio, Spanish Minister of State, 390, 392. 

Alvarado, Spanish gunboat, captured at Santiago, 319; at Manza- 
nillo, 387. 

Ambulances, lack of, at Santiago, 212, 264. 

Ames, Brigadier-General A., 325. 

Amphitrite, American monitor, 103, 108, 116; goes to San Juan, 159, 
161; with Sampson in Nicholas Channel, 178; off San Juan, 333; 
at Cape San Juan. 348. 

Anderson, Captain H. R., Fourth Artillery, 343. 

Anderson, Colonel Thomas M., Fourteenth Infantry, 351; brigadier- 
general of volunteers, 352; goes to Manila, 360, 364; at Cavite, 365, 
374; in attack on Manila. 376. 

Andre, Belgian consul at Manila, 131; negotiates for surrender, 371- 

Annapolis, American gunboat, 104, 215, 338; at Nipe Bay, 384, 385. 
26 395 


Annapolis, Spanish prisoners at, 288. 

Anthony, William, marine, of the Maine, 77. 

Antonio Lopez, Spanish gunboat, 154. 

Antonio Lopez, Spanish transport, 333. 

Arango, Francisco, Cuban statesman, 9. 

Aranguren, Nestor, Cuban insurgent, 64. 

Argonauta, captured by Marblehead, 151. 

Arias, Lieutenant, exchanged for Hobson, 301. 

Ariete, Spanish torpedo boat, 119. 

Army, American, 104, 204; health of, during war, 328. 

Army, Spanish, 97. 

Arroyo, Porto Rico, 340; Brooke lands at, 346. 

Artillery, American, in battle of Caney, 237; in battle of San Juan, 
255; before Santiago, 263. 

Aserraderos, 197, 217; conference at, 218, 301, 302; Cubans taken to 
Siboney from, 232. 

Asomanta, hill of, Porto Rico, 345, 346. 

Astor, Colonel John Jacob, on Shatter s staff, 365. 

Astor Battery, 365, 374, 375. 

Atlanta, American cruiser, 103, 108. 

Atwater, Lieutenant C. N., of the Amphitrite, 348. 

Audaz, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, 362. 

Augustin, captain-general of the Philippines, 129; issues proclama 
tion, 130; refuses Dewey s terms, 143; superseded by Jaudenes, 371. 

Australia, American transport, 354. 

Auxiliaries, bought by United States Government, 112. 

Ayres, Captain C. G., Tenth Cavalry, 266. 

Azcarraga, premier of Spain, 62. 

Azor, Spanish torpedo boat, 119. 

Bagley, Ensign Worth, killed at Cardenas, 153. 

Bahia Honda, Lopez lands at, 25; Virginius surrendered at, 35; limit 
of blockade, 122, 383. 

Bainbridge, Lieutenant-Colonel A. H., Fourth Infantry, 213. 

Bakoor, near Manila, 143, 365. 

Balloon detachment at Santiago, 215; in battle of San Juan, 242. 

Balmaceda, captain-general of Cuba, 31. 

Baltimore, American cruiser, 73, 103, 108: joins Dewey at Hong- Kong, 
109, 131; leaves Mirs Bay, 132; at Subig Bay, 132; enters Manila 
Bay, 133; injuries in battle, 139; captures Corregidor, 144. 

Bancroft, American training ship, used as gunboat, 108, 149, 216, 
218, 386. 

Banes, Cuban expedition lands at, 149. 

Baquero, Colonel J., killed at San Juan, 252. 

Baracoa, founded by Velasquez, 3; surrender of, 321, 322; Spaniards 
sail from, 327. 

Barbadoes, Oregon at, in. 

Barcelona, attack on American consulate in, 58. 

Barclay, Captain C. J., of the Amphitrite, 116, 348. 

Barker, Captain A. S., member of Naval War Board, 121; command 
ing the Newark, and later the Oregon, 387. 

Barker, W. B., American consul at Sagua la Grande, 52. 

Barreda, Captain, commander of port at Manzanillo, 381. 

Barton, Miss Clara, president of American Red Cross Society, 60. 

Bates, Brigadier-General J. C., 215: in battle of Caney, 234, 238; 
marches to San Juan, 259; at conference of July 2, 266; suggests 
the " round robin," 325. 

Bayamo, Garcia and Rowan meet at, 147. 

Bell, Colonel, quartermaster-general s department, 212. 

Benham, Colonel D. W., Seventh Infantry, 214. 

Bennington, American gunboat, 104. 

Bennitt, Colonel F., Third Illinois, 346. 

Beranger, Admiral, Secretary of Spanish Navy, 78. 

Bernadou, Lieutenant J. B., of the Winslow, 116; wounded at Car 
denas, 152. 



Berry, Commander R. M., of the Castine, 116. 

Best, Captain C. L., First Artillery, 214; in battle of San Juan, 250, 
257; retires to El Pozo, 263; moves forward, 298. 

Biddle, Lieutenant-Colonel J., on General Wilson s staff, 344. 

Bigelow, Captain J., Tenth Cavalry, 249. 

Binondo, suburb of Manila, 378. 

Bisbee, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H., First Infantry, 213. 

Black Warrior, seized at Havana, 27. 

Blanco, captain-general of Cuba, 55, 62; admits supplies for destitute 
Cubans, 60; abolishes reconcentration, 79; captain-general of the 
Philippines, 129; measures for defence of Santiago, 229; orders 
Cervera to leave Santiago, 270; consents to exchange Hobson, 
300; refers Shatter s demands to Madrid, 308. 

Blandin, Lieutenant J. J., of the Maine, 68. 

Blockade of Cuba, proclamation of, 122; difficulty of, 150; extended 
to south coast, 380; misunderstanding as to extent of, 383. 

Blockade of Santiago, 191. 

Blockhouse Fourteen, Manila, 374, 375. 

Blue, Lieutenant Victor, of the Suwanee, 197, 211, 260; commanding 
the Alvarado, 319, 387. 

Boardman, Cadet W. H., of the Amphitrite, 348. 

Bolivar, Soles de, Cuban revolutionary society, 15. 

Born, Colonel, Second Wisconsin, 343. 

Borrowe, Sergeant H. A., First Volunteer Cayalry, 228. 

Boston, American cruiser, 103, 108; leaves Mirs Bay, 132; at Subig 
Bay, 132; enters Manila Bay, 133; meets Greene s" expedition, 365; 
off Manila, 368. 

Boutelle, Congressman, opposes intervention in Cuba, 90. 

Bratt, Colonel J. P., First Nebraska, 364. 

Braunersreuther, Lieutenant W., of the Charleston, 355. 

Breckinridge, Major-General J. C., 145; with Fifth Corps, 215; opin 
ion of Shatter, 313. 

Brice, American consul at Matanzas, 53. 

British squadron at Manila, 372. 

Brooke, Lieutenant W., Fourth Infantry, 320. 

Brooke, Major-General J. R., 145, 146, 331, 339, 346, 347. 

Brooklyn, American cruiser, 101, 102, 108, 116; goes to Cienfuegos, 
172; to Santiago, 176; on Santiago blocka-de, 191; in battle of San 
tiago, 273, 277, 286, 288: bombards Santiago, 306. 

Brownson, Commander W. H., purchasing agent in Europe, 74; com 
manding the Yankee, 117, 381. 

Brumby, Lieutenant T. M., of the Olympia, 376. 

Brutus, American collier, 370. 

Buchanan, President, and Cuba, 28. 

Buck, Ensign W. H., Bureau of Navigation, 359. 

Buena Ventura, captured by Nashville, 123. 

Buffalo, American cruiser, purchaser! from Brazil, TIO. 

Burke, Lieutenant-Colonel D. W., Eleventh Infantry, 342. 

Burr, Captain E., Engineer Corps, 215. 

Burriel, General Juan, commander at Santiago, 34. 

Bustamente, Captain, chief of staff to Cervera, 195; mortally wounded 
at San Juan, 253. 

Byrne, Captain B, A., Sixth Infantry, 251. 

Cabanas, harbour of, near Santiago, 197, 216, 219, 307, 317. 

Cables cut on Cuban coast, 134, 155. 

Cabras Island, San Juan harbour, 161. 

Cadarso, Captain, of the Reina Cristina, 141. 

Cadiz, Cervera starts from, 118; Camara starts from, 359. 

Caibarien, Cuba, 388. 

Caimanera, 199, 202; Spanish forces at, 203. 

California Heavy Artillery, 374. 

Calkins, Lieutenant C. G., of the Olympia, 135. 

Callao, Spanish gunboat, captured, 356; in attack on Manila, 376. 

Calleja, Emilio, captain-general of Cuba, 43. 



Calle Real, near Manila, 366, 368. 

Camara, Admiral, 358; leaves Cadiz, 359; at Port Said, 360, 362; re 
called to Spain, 362. 

Cambon, Jules, French ambassador at Washington, 93; asks for terms 
of peace, 389; signs protocol, 391. 

Cameron, Senator, proposes recognition of Cuban independence, 59. 

Camp Alger, Falls Church, Va., 106, 232. 

Camp Black, near New York, 329. 

Camp Dewey, near Manila, 364, 365. 

Camp McCalla, Playa del Este, 200. 

Campos, Martinez, captain-general of Cuba, 37; premier of Spain, 40; 
returns to Cuba, 44; resigns, 46; raises fund for destitute, 55. 

Camp Thomas, Chickamauga, Ga., 106, 145, 146; unsanitary condition 
>f> L " 

Wikoff, Montauk Point, 3;. 
Canalejas, Jose, editor of the Madrid Heraldo, 66. 

Caney, 230; plan of attack on, 234; battle of, 236; troops left at, 259; 
Santiago refugees at, 295-297, 305, 323. 

Cannon, Congressman, 74. 

Canovas del Castillo, Spanish premier, 39; assassinated, 62. 

Canuelo, Fort, San Juan harbour, 161. 

Cape Engano, Luzon, 365. 

Cape Haitien, telegraph station at, 159, 333. 

Cape San Juan, Porto Rico, 336, 348. 

Capron, Captain A., First Artillery, 214, 227; in battle of Caney, 236, 
238; at El Pozo, 263; before Santiago, 298. 

Capron, Captain A. K., First Volunteer Cavalry, killed at Las 
Guasimas, 224*, 226. 

Cardenas, Lopez lands at, 24; action of May nth at, 152; limit of 
blockade, 122, 383, 384. 

Cardinal Cisneros, Spanish cruiser, 100. 

Carlier, Lieutenant D., of the Furor, 157, 282. 

Carlist war, in Spain, 30, 36. 

Carroll, Lieutenant-Colonel H., Sixth Cavalry, 214; in battle of San 
Juan, 241, 252. 

Cartagena, Camara at, 359. 

Castilla, Spanish cruiser, 136; destroyed in battle of Manila Bay, 141. 

Castillo, General, Cuban insurgent, 218, 223, 227, 228. 

Castine, American gunboat, 104, 116; off Cienfuegos, 173, 175; at 
Mariel, 384. 

Cataluna, Spanish cruiser, 100. 

Cavite, arsenal at, 135, 136; surrenders to Dewey, 142; Dewey s squad 
ron at, 143; Commander Wood in charge of, 356; Anderson lands 
at, 364. 

Cayey, Porto Rico, 347. 

Cerero, General Rafael, Spanish peace commissioner, 391. 

Cervera, Admiral, at St. Vincent, 118; sails for West Indies, 157, 167; 
reaches Santiago, 169; receives Hobson s surrender, 189; threatens 
to bombard Santiago, 269; leaves Santiago, 271; in battle of San 
tiago, 280; surrenders, 284; rumoured to be bound for Manila, 358. 

Cervera, Lieutenant Angel, 284. 

Cespedes, Carlos, Cuban insurgent, 29, 36. 

Chadwick, Captain F. E., serves on Maine commission, 70; captain 
of the New York, 116, 120; in charge of the Colon, 286, 287; con 
ference with Shafter, 305; goes to represent navy at surrender of 
Santiago, 310. 

Chaffee, Brigadier-General A. R., 214, 228, 234, 235; in battle of Caney, 
236, 237; reaches San Juan, 259; opinion of Shafter, 313; signs 
" round robin." 325. 

Charette, G., of the Merrimac crew, 187. 

Charleston, American cruiser, 103, 109, 351; captures Guam, 354; 
reaches Manila, 355, 369. 

Chester, Captain C. M., of the Cincinnati, 116; at Ponce, 339. 

Chicago, American cruiser, 103, 108. 

Chickamauga. See Camp Thomas. 



China, American transport, 365. 

Cienfuegos, blockade 01, proclaimed, 122; action of April 2Qth off, 151; 
cables cut off, 154; blockaded by Schley, 172; Yankee off, 380. 

Cincinnati, American cruiser, 103; fire in coal bunkers, 69; ordered 
to North Atlantic station, 108, 116; bombards Matanzas batteries, 
126; with Sampson in Nicholas Channel, 178; goes to Porto Rico, 

Cingalon, suburb of Manila, 375, 376. 

Cisneros, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Cuban insurgent, 37. 

City of Peking, American transport, 351, 354. 

City of Puebla, American transport, 366. 

City of Rio de Janeiro, American transport, 366. 

City of Sydney, American transport, 354, 355. 

City of Washington, Ward line steamer, 68; used as transport, 216. 

Ciudad Cadiz, Spanish transport, 118. 

Clark, Captain Charles E., of the Oregon, 109; opinion on Cervera s 

strategy, 271; in battle of Santiago, 279, 283. 
Clark, Colonel E. P., Second Massachusetts, 213. 
Clausen, R., of the Merrimac crew, 188. 
Clay, Henry, on Cuba, 18. 

Clayton, Captain B. T., New York Cavalry, 345. 
Cleveland, President, on Cuba, 58; proclamation against filibuster 

ing, 62. 

Clover, Commander Richardson, of the Bancroft, 149, 218. 
Coamo, Porto Rico, 340; action at, 344. 
Coast defences of United States, 106. 
Coghlan, Captain J. B., of the Raleigh, 132. 
Cogswell, Lieutenant-Commander J. K., of the Oregon, 287. 
Coit, Colonel A. B., Fourth Ohio, 346, 347. 
Colon, American transport, 365. 
Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, seizure of, 33. 
Columbia, American cruiser, 102, 116; carries troops to Santiago, 307; 

to Porto Rico, 334. 

Columbia, German liner, purchased by Spain, 359. 
Columbus, Christopher, discovers Cuba, 2. 
Comba, Lieutenant-Colonel R., Twelfth Infantry, 214. 
Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 125, 327. 
Competitor, filibustering schooner, 61 ; prisoners released, 62. 
Concas, Captain Victor, of the Maria Teresa, 157; wounded in battle 

of Santiago, 280. 

Concho, American transport, 323. 
Concord, American gunboat, 73, 104; leaves Mirs Bay, 132: at Subig 

Bay, 132; enters Manila Bay, 133; captures Spaniards at Subig, 364. 
Conde de Venadito, Spanish cruiser, 122. 
Conrad, Major C. H., Eighth Infantry, 213. 
Converse, Commander G. A., of the Montgomery, 116; suggests 

Merrimac manoeuvre, 185. 
Cook, Captain F. A., of the Brooklyn, 116; in battle of Santiago, 

274, 277, 279; receives surrender of Colon, 286. 
Coppinger, Major-General .T. J., 145, 146. 
Corbin, Adjutant-General H. C., 146, 308, 315. 
Cornish, Admiral, at Manila, 128. 

Corregidor Island, Manila Bay, 133; captured by Dewey, 144, 355. 
Cotton, Captain C. S., of the Harvard, 170, 292, 358. 
Cowles, Lieutenant-Commander W. S., of the Topeka, 384. 
Crank, R. K., assistant engineer of the Merrimac, 188. 
Crescent City, American ship, debarred from Havana, 26. 
Cristobal Colon, Spanish cruiser, 100; at St. Vincent, 118, 157; crosses 

Atlantic, 168; at Santiago, 182-184; leaves Santiago, 272; in battle 

of Santiago, 276, 284; surrenders, 286; sinks, 287. 
Crittenden, Colonel, comrade of Lopez, 25. 
Crofton, Lieutenant W. M., First Infantry, 148. 
Cromer, Lord, British agent in Egvpt, 362. 

Crosley, Ensign W. S., of the Levden, 385. 
Crowder, Lieutenant-Colonel E. H., of Me 

erritt s staff, 377. 


Crowninshield, Captain A. S., member of Naval War Board, 121. 

Cuba Espanola, Spanish gunboat, 381. 

Cuban soldiers at Aserraderos, 197, 217; transported to Siboney, 

232; in battle of Caney, 239. 
Cubitas, insurgent capital at, 48. 
Culebra Island, 160. 

Cummins, Captain A. S., Fourth Artillery, 214. 
Curagao, Cervera at, 169, 172. 
Cuthbertson, Major H. C., Tenth Pennsylvania, 368. 

Daggett, Lieutenant-Colonel A. S., Twenty-fifth Infantry, 213, 238. 

Daiquiri, Fifth Corps lands at, 219; artillery lands at, 232; reinforce 
ments land at, 307. 

Davis, Commander C. H., of the Dixie, 117, 338, 349. 

Davis, Senator, chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
86, 90; American peace commissioner, 391. 

Day, William R., Secretary of State, 65, 74, 390; chairman of Ameri 
can peace commission, 391, 394. 

Dayton, Commander J. H., of the Detroit, 116. 

Declaration of war by Spain, 124; by the United States, 125. 

Deignan, O. W., of the Merrimac, 187. 

Delehanty, Commander D., of the Suwanee, 197, 292. 

Delgado Pareja, Spanish gunboat, 381. 

Derby, Lieutenant-Colonel G. McC., Engineer Corps, 234, 242, 244. 

De Russy, Colonel I. D., Eleventh Infantry, 341, 342. 

Detroit, American cruiser, 103, 108, 116; goes to San Juan, 159, 161; 
with Sampson in Nicholas Channel, 178. 

Dewey, Commodore George, commanding Asiatic station, 108, 115; 
at Hong-Kong, 130; starts for Manila, 131; at Subig Bay, 132; 
enters Manila Bay, 135; battle of Manila Bay, 138; cuts Manila 
cable, 144; despatches to Washington, 351, 352; promoted to rear- 
admiral, 355; plan of retreat before Camara, 360; suggests attack 
on Spanish coast, 361; friction with German squadron at Manila, 
363; conferences with Greene and Merritt, 370, 371. 

Diana Key, Cardenas harbour, 152, 154. 

Diedrichs, Admiral, commanding German squadron at Manila, 363. 

Dillenback, Major J. W., Second Artillery, 214, 257, 263. 

Dingley, Congressman, 74. 

Dixie, American auxiliary cruiser, 117, 334, 337; at Ponce, 338; in 
Eastern Squadron, 361; on southern blockade, 381. 

Dolphin, American despatch boat, 116. 

Don Antonio de Ulloa, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

Don Juan de Austria, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

Dorado, Porto Rico, 336. 

Dorst. Lieutenant-Colonel J. H., assistant adjutant-general, 148, 295. 

Dos Caminos, surrender of, 321, 322. 

Dotterel, British cruiser, destruction of, 69. 

Downs, Colonel W. A., Seventy-first New York, 213. 

Draper, Sir William, at Manila, 128. _ 

Du Bosc, secretary of Spanish legation at Washington, 93. 

Ducrot house, near Santiago. 235, 259. 

Duffield, Brigadier-General H. M., 232, 233; movement against Fort 
Aguadores, 259; at Siboney, 316. 

Dulce, captain-general of Cuba, 31, 33. 

Dupont, American torpedo boat, 116, 151; off Cienfuegos, 173; goes 
to Key West, 175; at Guantanamo, 293. 

Dupuy de Lome, Spanish minister at Washington, 66; resigns, 67. 

Dyer, Captain N. M., of the Baltimore, 132. 

Eagan, Commissary-General C. P., 146. 

Eagle, American converted yacht, 151, 155: with Flying Squadron, 

174, 176; reports Spanish fleet in Nicholas Channel, 209; chases 

transport, 340; on southern blockade, 381, 384. 
Eastern Squadron, 334, 361. 
Eaton, Captain J. G., of the Resolute, 283, 291, 293. 



Eberle, Lieutenant E. W., of the Oregon, 274, 283. 

Edmund Blunt, British ship, 382. 

Egbert, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C., Sixth Infantry, 213; in battle of 

San Juan, 246. 

Egmont Key, transports rendezvous at, 215. 
Eighteenth Infantry, 364, 365, 374. 
Eighth Corps, 146, 352. 

Eighth Infantry, 213; in battle of Caney, 238, 239; m Porto Rico, 340. 
Eighth Ohio Volunteers, 307, 324. 
El Cristo, surrender of, 321, 322. 
Eleventh Infantry, 339. 

El Fraile, Manila Bay, Spanish battery on, 133, 135. 
Ellen A. Reed, British collier, 363. 
Elliott, Captain G. F., Marine Corps, 201. 
Ellis, Chief Yeoman, of the Brooklyn, 288. 
El Pozo, near Santiago, 232; American artillery at, 242, 250, 263; field 

telegraph at, 243, 248; field hospital near, 264; conference of July 

2d at, 266. 

El Songo, surrender of, 321, 322. 

Emory, Commander W. H., of the Yosemite, 117, 333. 
Emperador Carlos V, Spanish battle ship, 99, 160, 359. 
Endicott Board plans coast defences, 106. 
Ennis, Captain W., Fourth Artillery, 214. 

Ericsson, American torpedo boat, 151; in battle of Santiago, 273, 285. 
Ermita, suburb of Manila, 376, 378. 
Ernst, Brigadier-General O. H., 338, 346. 
Escario, Colonel Frederico, 229; reaches Santiago, 295; promoted 

to brigadier-general, 310; commissioner on surrender, 310. 
Esquirre, Cuban insurgent, 41. 
Estrella, Spanish gunboat, 381. 
Estrella Point, Santiago, 193. 

Eulate, Captain Antonio, of the Vizcaya, 157, 285. 
Evans, Captain R. D., of the Iowa, 116, 120; off Santiago, 183, 184; 

in the battle of Santiago, 274, 283, 285. 
Evarts, William M., Secretary of State, 41. 
Ewers, Lieutenant-Colonel E. P., Ninth Infantry, 213; in battle of 

San Juan, 245, 252; receives surrender of Guantanamo, 322. 

Fajardo, Porto Rico, 336. 

Falcon, American ship, fired on, 26. 

Fanita, American transport, 149. 

Farragut, Ensign Guillermo, 78. 

Felifi, Colonel J. M. de O., 377. 

Fernandina, troops encamped at, 106, 205. 

Fifteenth Infantry, 353. 

Fifteenth Minnesota Volunteers, 329. 

Fifth Artillery, 334. 

Fifth Cavalry, 341. 

Fifth Corps, 146; at Tampa, 205; embarkation of, 211; regiments and 

officers of, 213; landing at Daiquiri, 219; at Siboney, 220; losses 

while in Cuba, 233; sails for Montauk, 326. 
Filibustering in Cuba, 24; the Virginius, 34; the Competitor, 61; 

efforts to suppress, 62, 84; legalized, during war, 147. 
Fillmore, President, on Cuba, 26. 
First Artillery, 214. 

First California Volunteers, 354, 364, 368, 374, 377. 
First Cavalry, 214; at Las Guasimas, 223; in battle of San Juan, 246, 

249, 255. 

First Colorado Volunteers, 364, 374, 375. 
First Corps, 146. 

First District of Columbia Volunteers, 307. 
First Idaho Volunteers, 365, 374. 
First Illinois Volunteers, 307. 

First Infantrv, 1^8, 213; in battle of Caney, 235, 239. 
First Nebraska Volunteers, 364, 374. 


First North Dakota Volunteers, 365, 374. 

First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders), 204, 212, 214, 216; at Las 
Guasimas, 223, 224, 226; in battle of San Juan, 246, 249, 255, 257. 

First Wyoming Volunteers, 365, 374. 

Fish, Hamilton, Secretary of State, 36. 

Fish, Sergeant Hamilton, First Volunteer Cavalry, killed at Las 
Guasimas, 224. 

Fiske, Lieutenant B. A., of the Petrel, 133, 142. 

Flagler, Brigadier-General D. W., 146. 

Florida, American transport, 149, 218; disabled at Tampa, 208. 

Flying Squadron, 116, 158; moves to Key West, 171; to Cienfuegos, 
172; to Santiago, 175; made part of Sampson s command, 179. 

Fontan, Lieutenant-Colonel V., 310. 

Foote, American torpedo boat, 116, 152. 

Forsyth, John, on Cuba, 23. 

Fort San Antonio, Malate, 374, 375. 

Fourteenth Infantry, 351, 352, 354, 374. 

Fourth Artillery, 214, 334. 

Fourth Cavalry, 352. 

Fourth Corps, 146. 

Fourth Infantry, 213; in battle of Caney, 235, 239. 

Fourth Ohio Volunteers, 339, 346, 347. 

Fourth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 339. 

Fremont, Lieutenant J. C., of the Porter, 116. 

French squadron at Manila, 372. 

Fry, Captain Joseph, of the Virginius, 34. 

Frye, Senator, American peace commissioner, 391. 

Furor, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, 157; at Martinique, 168; 
reaches Santiago, 169, 173; leaves Santiago, 272; sunk off San 
tiago, 282. 

Gallicia, Spanish torped9 boat, at Cienfuegos, 151, 380. 

Garcia, Calixto, Cuban insurgent general, 147; meets Sampson, 217; 
meets Sampson and Shafter, 218; taken to Siboney, 232; fails to 
stop Escario, 295; leaves Santiago, 320. 

Garcia, Vicejite, Cuban insurgent, 38. 

Garnica, Senor de, Spanish peace commissioner, 391. 

Garretson, Brigadier-General G. A., 337, 343. 

Catling detachment at Santiago, 214, 250, 255. 

General Lezo, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

German squadron at Manila, 363, 372. 

Gibara, Garcia at, 320. 

Gibbs. Surgeon J. B., killed at Playa del Este, 202. 

Gise, Ensign W. K., of the Oregon, 283. 

Glass, Captain Henry, of the Charleston, 354, 355. 

Gloucester, American converted yncht, 218, 260; in battle of San 
tiago, 273, 275, 281, 289; goes to" Porto Rico, 334; at Guanica, 337; 
at Arroyo, 340. 

Gollan, Sir Alexander, British consul-general at Havana, 269. 

Gomez, Juan, Cuban insurgent, 41. 

Gomez, Maximo, Cuban general, 38, 44, 50; letter to McKinley, 51; 
orders plantations destroyed, 51; joined by expedition from United 
States, 150. 

Goodrich, Captain C. F., of the St. Louis, 155, 199; in charge of land 
ing of Fifth Corps, 219, 220; at Arroyo, 340; commanding the 
Newark at Manzanillo. 387. 

Graham. Major-General W. M., 145, 146. 

Grant, President, on Cuba, 32, 36, 83. 

Gray, Senator, American peace commissioner, 391, 393. 

Greely, Brigadier-General A. W., 145; reports on press censorship, 
148; reports Cervera at Santiago, 173; on use of balloon at San 
tiago, 242. 

Greene, Brigadier-General F. V., 360: goes to Manila, 365; com 
manding at the front, 366. 368, 370, 374; in attack on Manila, 376-378. 

Gridley, Captain C. V., of the Olympia, 132, 135; death of, 355. 



Grimes, Captain G. S., Second Artillery, 214; at El Pozo, 235, 242, 

255, 263, 298. 
Guam, Ladrone Islands, capture of, 354; Greene s expedition passes, 


Guanica, Porto Rico, landing at, 337. 
Guantanamo, Campos lands at, 44; cable cutting attempted at, 155, 

199; seizure of bay by Sampson, 198; Spanish forces at, 203; vessels 

coaling in bay, 273, 292; surrender of, 321, 322; Spaniards sail 

from, 327. 

Guantanamo, Spanish gunboat, 381. 
Guardian, Spanish gunboat, 381. 

Guayama, Porto Rico, 336; occupied by Hains, 347. 
Gussie, American transport, 148. 

Hains, Brigadier-General P. C., in Porto Rico, 339, 346, 347. 

Hains, Lieutenant J. P., Third Artillery, 346. 

Hale, Colonel I., First Colorado, 364. 

Hale, Senator, 74. 

Hall, Colonel R. H., Fourth Infantry, 148. 

Hamilton, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M., Ninth Cavalry, 214; killed at 
San Juan, 251. 

Harrington, Captain P. F., of the Puritan, 116; bombards Matanzas 
batteries, 125. 

Harvard, American auxiliary cruiser, 112, 158; reports Cervera s 
squadron at Martinique, i^o; ordered to Mona Passage, 171; to 
Santiago, 174; overtakes Schley, 177; alarm of mutiny on, 288; 
at Siboney, 292. 

Haskell, Lieutenant-Colonel J. T., Seventeenth Infantry, 214; 
wounded at Caney, 237. 

Hatuey, Cuban chief, 4. 

Havana, early history of, 5; captured by British, 7; prosperity in 
eighteenth century, 9; under Tacon, 21; Campos enters, 45; Weyler 
lands at, 46; Blanco sent to, 62; mob attacks autonomist news 
papers, 64; Maine ordered to, 65: Montgomery, Vizcaya, and Al- 
mirante Oquendo arrive at, 71; mines in harbour, 78; Sampson s 
plan for attacking, 119. 

Hawaii, Philadelphia ordered to, 108. 

Hawk, American converted yacht, 175; drives Alfonso XII ashore, 

Hawkins, Brigadier-General H. S., 213; in battle of San Juan, 241, 
245, 248, 252; wounded, 263. 

Hawkins, Colonel A. L., Tenth Pennsylvania, 365. 

Hawley bill, 74, 105. 

Hazeltine, Lieutenant C. W., of the Hist, 288. 

Hearst, William R., of New York, 112. 

Helena, American gunboat, 104, 108, 116; at Manzanillo, 386. 

Helm, Lieutenant J. M., of the Hornet, 381. 

Hengelmuller, Baron, Austrian minister at Washington, 93. 

Henry, Brigadier-General G. V., 307, 343. 

Hepburn, Congressman, opposes Hull bill, 75. 

Hercules, Spanish tug, 143. 

Hernandez, Colonel, Cuban insurgent officer, 217. 

Higginson, Captain F. J., of the Massachusetts, 116; off Santiago, 
184; goes to Porto Rico, 334, 336. 

Hinds, Lieutenant E., Second Artillery, 298. 

Hist, American converted yacht, 273, 285, 288; at Manzanillo, 381, 
386, 387. 

Hobson, Lieutenant (naval constructor), 185; sinks the Merrimac, 
189; released, 300. 

Holguin, Spanish forces at, 217, 230, 309, 320, 386. 

Hong-Kong, Dewey at, 130; Dewey leaves, 131. 

Honolulu, British steamer, 363. 

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, 354, 365. 

Hood, Lieutenant J.. of the Hawk, 175. 

Hormiguero, Porto Rico, action at, 341. 


Hornet, American converted yacht, 151; at Manzanillo, 381, 382, 386. 

Hotchkiss detachment at Santiago, 214, 223; in battle of San Juan, 
246, 255. 

House of Representatives, votes for recognition of Cuban insurgents, 
57; votes $50,000,000 for national defence, 74; Hawley bill, 74; defeat 
of Hull bill, 75; votes for intervention in Cuba, 90. 

Howell, Commodore, commanding Northern Patrol Squadron, 117, 
379; ordered to Key West, 380; in charge of north coast blockade, 

Hudson, American revenue cutter, 152. 

Hughes, Lieutenant E. M., of the Petrel, 142. 

Hughes, Lieutenant J. B., Tenth Cavalry, 215, 255. 

Hugh McCulloch, American revenue cutter, 113; leaves Mirs Bay, 
132; enters Manila Bay, 135; reports battle, 144; brings Aguinaldo 
to Manila, 356. 

Hulings, Colonel W. J., Sixteenth Pennsylvania, 343, 345. 

Hull bill, defeat of, 75; second bill passed, 105. 

Humphrey, Lieutenant-Colonel C. F., chief quartermaster of San 
tiago expedition, 215. 

Hunker, Commander J. J., of the Annapolis, 215, 384-386. 

Huntingdon, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W., Marine Corps, 199, 387. 

Huse, Lieutenant H., of the Gloucester, 282, 337. 

Hyatt, American consul at Santiago, 53, 64, 88. 

Illinois, American battle ship, 101. 

Indiana, American battle ship, 101, 108, 116; goes to San Juan, 159, 
161 ; with Sampson in Nicholas Channel, 178; at Key West for 
convoy duty, 205; convoys Fifth Corps, 215; in battle of Santiago, 
2 73 283, 288; meets the Kaiserin Maria Theresa, 293; struck by 
shell, 297; bombards Santiago, 306. 

Infanta Maria Teresa, Spanish cruiser, 100; at St. Vincent, 118, 157; 
crosses Atlantic, 168; reaches Santiago, 169; leaves Santiago, 272; 
driven ashore, 280, 284. 

Iowa, American battle ship, 101, 108, 116; goes to San Juan, 159, 161 ; 
to Cienfuegos, 173; off Santiago, 184, 191; in battle of Santiago, 
2 73> 2 79> 285, 289; assigned to Eastern Squadron, 361. 

Irene, German cruiser, 364. 

Irles, Major, aid of General Toral, 322. 

Irwin, Ensign, of the Baltimore, 139. 

Isabel II, Spanish gunboat, 332. 

Isabel la Catolica, Spanish cruiser, 100. 

Isla de Cuba, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

Isla de Luzon, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

Isla de Mindanao, Spanish transport, 136. 

Isla Grande, Subig Bay, 364. 

Isle of Pines, 384, 386, 387. 

acksonville, troops encamped at, 106, 329. 
acobs, Colonel, chief quartermaster, Fifth Corps, 212. 
acobsen, Commander, German navy, 332, 334. 
apanese squadron at Manila, 372. 

audenes, Fermin, captain-general of the Philippines, 371; surren 
ders, 376. 

efferson, Thomas, on Cuba, 18. 
enkins, Jonathan S.. Memoirs of, 21. 
enkins, Lieutenant F. W., of the Maine, 68. 
ewell, Captain T. F., of the Minneapolis, 116. 
ohnson, P., of the Vixen, 190. 

orge Juan, Spanish gunboat, 123; sunk in Nipe Bay, 385. 
ovellar, captain-general of Cuba, 37. 
ungen, Lieutenant C. W., of the Wompatuck, 155, 381. 
upiter Inlet, Oregon arrives at, in. 
uragua, iron mines at, 225. 

Kaiserin Maria Theresa, Austrian cruiser, 293. 
Kearsarge, American battle ship, 101. 

INDEX 405 

"Kellogg, Lieutenant-Colonel E. R., Tenth Infantry, 213. 

Kellogg, Lieutenant F. W., of the Baltimore, 139. 

Kelly, F., of the Merrimac, 187. 

Kent, Brigadier-General J. F., 213; in battle of San Juan, 241, 244, 
248, 252, 258; reports supposed Spanish sortie, 265; at conference 
of July 2d, 266; signs " round robin," 325. 

Kentucky, American battle ship, 101. 

Kerr, Captain J. B., Sixth Cavalry, 250. 

Kettle Hill, near Santiago, 247, 249, 251, 257. 

Key West, North Atlantic Squadron at, 108; supply depot and hos 
pital at, 114; troops to be concentrated at, 146; VVinslow towed to, 
153; Remey in command at, 159; Flying Squadron at, 171, 172; 
marine battalion at, 199; convoy ships at, 207, 210; Howell at, 382. 

Laborde, Alfredo, imprisonment of, 61. 

Lachambre, Spanish general, 129. 

Ladrone Islands, 354, 390. 

Lagaza, Captain Juan B., of the Oquendo, 157; drowned off San 
tiago, 280. 

Lamberton, Commander, chief of staff to Dewey, 132; captain of the 
Olympia, 355; commissioner on surrender of Manila, 377. 

Lancaster, Major J. M., Fourth Artillery, 343, 344, 346. 

Lares, Porto Rico, 341, 342. 

Las Casas, Bartolome de, Spanish priest, 4, 12. 

Las Casas, Luis de, captain-general of Cuba, 9. 

Las Guasimas, action at, 223. 

Las Marias, Porto Rico, 342. 

Lawton, Brigadier-General H. W., 213, 228, 234; in battle of Caney, 
235, 238; ordered to withdraw, 258; moves to San Juan, 259; at 
conference of July 2d, 266; before Santiago, 298; commissioner on 
surrender, 310; signs " round robin," 325; in command of Santiago 
province, 326. 

Leary, Captain R. P., of the San Francisco, ^117. 

Lee, Captain A. H., British military attache, 258. 

Lee, Major-General Fitzhugh, American consul-general at Havana, 
54; reports destitution in Cuba, 60; telegraphs for American ships, 
65; commands Seventh Corps, 146. 

Legazpi, colonizes the Philippines, 127. 

Lemus, Jose, Cuban revolutionist, 16. 

Lersundi, captain-general of Cuba, 29. 

Lewis, Captain T. J., Second Cavalry, 321. 

Lewis, Congressman, criticises the United States army, 75. 

Leyden, American auxiliary, 384, 385. 

Lieber, Judge-Advocate-General G. N., 146. 

Linares, Lieutenant-General Arsenio, 225, 229; wounded at San Juan, 
253; letter to Blanco, 309. 

Liscum, Lieutenant-Colonel E. H., Twenty-fourth Infantry, 213; 
wounded at San Juan, 245. 

Lizzie Major. American ship, seized at sea, 33. 

Long, John D., Secretary of the Navy, 74, 145. *73; declines to order 
Sampson to force Santiago harbour, 308. 

Lopez, Narciso, and his filibustering expeditions, 24. 

Loraine, Sir Lambton, of the Niobe, 35. 

Lorenzo, General, governor of Santiago, 22. 

Ludington, Ouartermaster-General M. I., 146. 

Ludlow. Brigadier-General W., 215; in battle of Caney, 235, 237; be 
fore Santiago, 208, 311; signs " round robin, 325. 

Ludlow, Captain Nicoll, of the Terror, 116, 165. 

Luneta, Manila, 376. 

Luque, General, at Holguin, 320. 

Lyman, General, at Havana, 8. 

Lyon, Commander H. W., of the Dolphin, 116. 

MacArthur, Brigadier-General A., 365, 3745 in attack on Manila, 375. 
377; military governor of Manila, 378. 



McCalla, Commander B. H., of the Marblehead, 116, 151; off Cien- 
fuegos, 175; in Guantanamo Bay, 203, 292. 

McCaskey, Major W. S., Twentieth Infantry, 215. 

McClernand, Lieutenant-Colonel E. J., adjutant-general of Fifth 
Corps, 241, 243, 248. 

McCulloch. See Hugh McCulloch. 

Maceo, Antonio, Cuban insurgent, 44; killed, 50; orders property 
destroyed, 52. 

Maceo, Jose, Cuban insurgent, 44: killed, 50. 

McFarland, Captain W. C., Sixteenth Infantry, 251. 

Machias, American gunboat, 104, 116; off Cardenas, 152, 154. 

Macias, captain-general of Porto Rico, 166, 338. 

Mackenzie, Commander M. R. S., of the Mayflower, 116. 

McKibbin, Lieutenant-Colonel C., Twenty-first Infantry, 213; briga 
dier-general, 311; military governor of Santiago, 319; signs " round 
robin," 325; succeeded by Wood, 326. 

McKinley, President, views on Cuba, 59; message of December, 1897, 
63; criticised by Dupuy de Lome, 66; answers European repre 
sentatives, 80; message calling for intervention in Cuba, 81 ; signs 
resolution for intervention, 91; proclaims blockade of Cuba, 122. 

Magellan, discoverer of the Philippines, 127. 

Maginnis, Lieutenant T. F., Eleventh Infantry, 341. 

Mahan, Captain A. T., member of Naval War Board, 121, 315. 

Mahoney, G., of the Vixen, 190. 

Maine, American battle ship, goes to Havana, ^65; destruction of, 67; 
commission of inquiry, 70; commission s report, 76; Spanish com 
mission, 71, 77. 

Malate, suburb of Manila, 364, 366, 374, 376, 378. 

Mangrove, American lighthouse tender, 70, 388. 

Manila, early history of, 127; Dewey s squadron off, 143; situation 
of garrison, 356, 369, 372; surrender of, 376; occupied by American 
troops, 378; cession to United States, 390, 392. 

Manila, Spanish survey ship, 136; captured by Dewey, 143. 

Manila Bay, topography of, 133; Dewey enters, 135; battle of, 138. 

Manning, American revenue cutter, 148. 

Mante, Chaplain, at Havana, 8. 

Manzanillo, Escario marches from, 229; attacked by American ships, 

381, 382, 386, 387. 

irblehead, American cruiser, 104, 108, 116; ott L-ientuegos, 151, 154; 

returns from Key West to Cienfuegos, 174, 176; off Santiago, 178, 

192; in Guantanamo Bay, 199, 202, 292. 

Maria, Spanish pontoon, 381, 382. 

Maria Cristina, Queen Regent of Spain, 93. 

Mariel, proposed expedition to, 146; blockade of, 383; Alfonso XII 
driven ashore at, 384. 

Marietta, American gunboat, 104, 109; reaches Key West, no. 

Marina, Lieutenant-Colonel, governor of Guam, 355. 

Marine battalion, organized in New York, 199; at Playa del Este, 
200, 304; leaves for Isle of Pines, 387. 

Marix, Lieutenant-Commander, serves on Maine commission, 70; 
commanding the Scorpion, 382, 386. 

Marques del Duero, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

Marti, Jose, Cuban insurgent, 44; killed, 45. 

Martinez, Major, killed at Coamo, 344. 

Martinique, Furor at, 168; Terror returns to, 169; Harvard at, 170. 

Mason, John Y., signs Ostend manifesto, 28. 

Mason, Robert, British vice-consul at Santiago, 310, 311. 

Massachusetts, American battle ship, 101, 108, 116; goes to Cien 
fuegos, 172; off Santiago, 184, 192; absent from battle of Santiago, 
273; fires on Reina Mercedes, 297; convoys Miles to Porto Rico, 
334; in Eastern Squadron, 361. 

Masso, Bartolome, Cuban insurgent, 43. 

Masso, Juan, Cuban insurgent, 64. 

Matanzas, plan for attacking, 122; harbour batteries bombarded, 125, 
151; blockade of, 383. 


Mauser rifle, 98; effect of bullets, 203; number surrendered at San 
tiago, 320. 

Maxfield, Major J. E., Signal Corps, 242. 

Maxim, Hiram S., on modern warfare, 97. 

Mayaguez, Porto Rico, 336; Schwan s column enters, 341. 

Mayflower, American converted yacht, 116; goes to Santiago, 180; 
on Santiago blockade, 191. 

Maynard, Commander Washburn, of the Nashville, 116; at Gibara, 320. 

Mejico, captured at Santiago, 319. 

Melville, G. W., engineer-in-chief, 153. 

Merriam, Brigadier-General H. C., 145, 353. 

Merriam, Lieutenant G. A., of the Dixie, 338. 

Merrimac, American collier, 116; with Flying Squadron, 173, 177; 
Hobson plans sinking of, 185; sinking of, 189. 

Merritt, Engineer, of the Alaine, 68. 

Merritt, Major-General Wesley, 145, 146; appointed to Eighth Corps, 
352; reaches Manila, 365. 

Merry, Commander J. F., of the Machias, 116; off Cardenas, 152. 

Miantonomoh, American monitor, 103, 108; with Sampson in Nicholas 
Channel, 178. 

Michigan Naval Reserve, 333. 

Miles, Colonel Evan, First Infantry, 213, 228; in battle of Caney, 235, 
238; succeeded by McKibbin, 311. 

Miles, Major-General N. A., 145; views on increase of army, 205; 
at Tampa, 208; letter to Garcia, 217; promises Shafter reinforce 
ments, 296; proposes withdrawal from Santiago, 299; reaches San 
tiago, 307; conference with Tpral, 310; relations with Shafter, 314; 
at Guantanamo, 316, 324; sails for Porto Rico, 334; landing at 
Guanica, 337; at Ponce, 339; plan of campaign in Porto Rico, 340; 
jealousy of navy, 348; views on expedition to Manila, 352, 353. 

Miley, Lieutenant J. D., Second Artillery, 212; in battle of San 
Juan, 247, 249; confers with consuls, 296; commissioner on sur 
render of Santiago, 310; receives surrender of Spanish garrisons, 
321, 322. 

Miller, Colonel Marcus P., Third Artillery, 351. 

Miller, Commander J. M., of the Merrimac, 116, 185. 

Milligan, Chief-Engineer, of the Oregon, 275. 

Mills, Senator, favours seizure of Cuba, 57. 

Miner, Lieutenant R. H., 330. 

Minneapolis, American cruiser, 102, 116, 171, 174; off Santiago, 176. 

Mirs Bay, Dewey at, 131. 

Mobile, troops encamped at, 205; Bates s brigade embarks at, 215. 

Monadnock, American monitor, 103, 109, 360, 366, 370. 

Mongada, Guillermo, Cuban insurgent, 43. 

Monitors, 103; reported inefficient by Sampson, 121; slow speed of, 
159; needed by Dewey, 370. 

Monocacy, American corvette, 130. 

Monroe Doctrine, 17. 

Montague, D., of the Merrimac crew, 187. 

Montauk Point, Fifth Corps ordered to, 326. 

Monterey, American monitor, 103, 109, 360; reaches Manila, 370. 

Montgomery, American cruiser, 104, 108; at Havana, 71; on North 
Atlantic station, 116; goes to San Juan, 159, 161 ; with Sampson in 
Nicholas Channel, 178. 

Montojo, Admiral, at Manila, 132, 135; wounded in battle of Manila 
Bay, 140. 

Moore, Colonel, Third Wisconsin, 343. 

Moreu, Captain E. Diaz, of the Colon, 157, 286. 

Moron, surrender of, 321, 322. 

Morrill, American revenue cutter, 151. 

Morro, of Havana, built by Philip II, 6; stormed by British, 8; San 
Francisco hit by shell from, 388. 

Morro, of San Juan, Porto Rico, 161. 

Morro, of Santiago, 193, 230; proposal to storm, 304. 

Morton, J, P., assistant engineer of the Vixen, 190, 191. 



Mullen, boatswain of the Merrimac, 187. 
Murphy, J. E., of the Merrimac crew, 188. 

Nanshan, American supply ship, 130. 

Nardiz, Ensign V., of the Reina Mercedes, 297. 

Nashville, American gunboat, 104, 116; captures the Buena Ventura, 
123; off Cienfuegos, 151, 154. 

Naval militia, American, 104. 

Navy, of Spain, 99; of the United States, 101. 

Nero, American collier, 366. 

Newark, American cruiser, 103, 108; flagship of Eastern Squadron, 
361 ; at Manzamllo, 387. 

New Orleans, American cruiser, purchased in England, 103; reaches 
New York, 108; goes to Santiago, 180, 184; on Santiago blockade, 
191, 194; off San Juan, 333. 

Newport, American gunboat, 104, 116. 

Newport, American transport, 365, 370. 

Newport News, Flying Squadron at, 116. 

New York, American cruiser, 102, 108, 116; captures the Pedro, 123; 
bombards Matanzas batteries, 126; goes to San Juan, 159, 161 ; in 
Nicholas Channel, 178; goes to Santiago, 180; on Santiago block 
ade, 191; bombards Fort Aguadores, 260; in battle of Santiago, 273, 
283, 285, 287; bombards Santiago, 306. 

New York Naval Reserve, 381. 

Niagara, American collier, 159, 164. 

Nima Nima, near Santiago, 280. 

Nineteenth Infantry, 339, 343. 

Ninth Cavalry, 214, 228; in battle of San Juan, 246, 249, 255. 

Ninth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 245, 252, 255. 

Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers, 235, 296. 

Nipe, Cuba, 383; capture of bay, 384, 385. 

Noble, Captain C. H., Sixteenth Infantry, 252. 

Norman, Lieutenant G. H., of the Gloucester, 284. 

Normannia, German liner, purchased by Spain, 359. 

Norvell, Major S. T., Tenth Cavalry, 214. 

Nuevitas, Cuba, 383, 384. 

Numancia, Spanish cruiser, 99. 

Ocampo, Spanish admiral, 5. 

Olivette outrage, 49. 

Olney, Richard, Secretary of State, 51; message to Spain on Cuban 
question, 58; opposes recognition of Cuban independence, 59. 

Olympia, American cruiser, 103, 108; leaves Mirs Bay, 132; enters 
Manila Bay, 133; in battle of Manila Bay, 138, 139; in attack on 
Manila, 374. 

Ordonez, Colonel S. D., wounded at San Juan, 252. 

Oregon, American battle ship, 101; voyage from Puget Sound to 
West Indies, 109; goes to Santiago, 180; on Santiago blockade, 
191, 260; in battle of Santiago, 273, 275, 279, 286, 288; in Eastern 
Squadron, 361 ; commanded by Captain Barker, 387. 

Osada, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, 362. 

Osceola, American auxiliary cruiser, 382, 386, 387. 

Ostend manifesto, 27. 

Otis, Brigadier-General E. S., 145; major-general of volunteers, 366. 

Otis, Brigadier-General H. G., 366. 

Pablo Vasquez, Porto Rico, Spanish position at, 347. 
Paco, suburb of Manila, 376-378. 
Page, Colonel J. H., Third Infantry, 215. 
Palma Soriano, 321, 322. 
Pando, General, 45, 233. 
Panther, American transport, 199, 200. 

Paredes, Captain Jose de, second in command of Cervera s squad 
ron, 286. 
Pareja, Brigadier-General Felix, 203, 230. 

INDEX 409 

Paris, meeting of peace commission at, 391. 

Parker, Lieutenant J. H., Thirteenth Intantry, 214; in battle of San 

Juan, 250, 255, 257; reports supposed Spanish sortie, 265. 
Parkhurst, Captain C. D., Second Artillery, 214; in battle of San 

Juan, 250, 257; before Santiago, 263, 298. 
Pasay, near Manila, 368. 
Patriota, Spanish auxiliary cruiser, 359. 

Patterson, Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-second Infantry, 213. 
Pauncefote, Sir Julian, British ambassador at Washington, 80. 
Pearson, Colonel E. P., Tenth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 

241, 246, 248; reconnoitres the Juragua Railroad, 303. 
Pedro, captured by New York, 123. 
Pelayo, Spanish battle ship, 99, 160; reported at Santiago, 173; with 

Camara s squadron, 359. 
Pena, General Nicolas de la, 377. 

Peninsulares, Spanish party in Cuba, 29, 40, 46; oppose autonomy, 64. 
Pennsylvania, American transport, 366. 
Peoria, American auxiliary cruiser, 149. 
Peru, American transport, 366. 
Petrel, American gunboat, 104; leaves Mirs Bay, 132; enters Manila 

Bay, 133. 

Philadelphia, American cruiser, 103, 108. 
Philadelphia City Troop, 340. 

Philip, Captain J. W., of the Texas, 116; in battle of Santiago, 274, 278. 
Philippines, early history of, 127; insurrections in, 129; cession to 

United States, 392, 393. See Manila. 
Phillips, G. F., of the Merrimac, 187. 
Pina, Ensign, 270. 

Pio Gullon, Spanish minister for foreign affairs, 93. 
Playa del Este, cable station at, 196, 199, 292. 
Pluton, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, 157, 189, 217; leaves Santiago, 

272; driven ashore, 281. 
Pocock, Sir George, at Havana, 8. 
Polaria, German steamer, 229. 

Polavieja, captain-general of Cuba, 41; of the Philippines, 129. 
Polk, President, proposes to purchase Cuba, 24. 

Polo, Luis, Spanish minister at Washington, 67; leaves Washing 
ton, 92. 

Ponce, Porto Rico, 336; capture of, 338; transports aground at, 346. 
Porter, American torpedo boat, 116, 159; at San Juan, 161; goes to 

Santiago, 180; off Santiago, 187, 189, 191. 
Porto Rico, plans of attack on, 331; Spanish forces in, 334; sketch 

map of, 335; American troops land in, 337; cession to United 

States, 390. 

Portsmouth, Spanish prisoners at, 288. 

Potter, Lieutenant-Commander W. P., of the New York, 70. 
Potts, Captain R. D., Third Artillery, 343. 
Powell, Cadet J. W., of the New York, 188, 195. 
Prairie, American auxiliary cruiser, 117. 
Pratt, American consul at Singapore, 130, 356. 
Primo de Rivera, captain-general of the Philippines, 129. 
Princesa de Asturias, Spanish cruiser, 100. 
Princeton, American gunboat, 104. 

Prizes taken by American ships, 123; at Santiago, 319. 
Proserpina, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, 362. 
Protocol, drawn up by Secretary Day, 390; signed, 391. 
Puerto Cabanas, Gussie expedition repulsed at, 148; fired upon by 

New York, 151. 

Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo, 167. 
Punta Gorda battery, Santiago, 193, 197, 230, 269. 
Purcell, Lieutenant J. L., of the Osceola, 382. 
Purissima Concepcion, Spanish steamer, 380, 386. 

Puritan, American monitor, 103, 108, 116; bombards Matanzas bat 
teries, 126; with Sampson in Nicholas Channel, 178. 
Putnam, Israel, at Havana, 8. 


Rabi, General Jesus, Cuban insurgent, 43, 197, 218. 

Rafferty, Major W. A., Second Cavalry, 215. 

Raleigh, American cruiser, 103, 108; leaves Mirs Bay, 132; enters 

Manila Bay, 133; captures Corregidor, 144; captures Spaniards at 

Subig, 364. 

Ramsden, F. W., British consul at Santiago, 35, 269. 
Ramus, Captain, aid of General Toral, 321. 
Randall, Chief-Engineer, of the McCulloch, 135. 
Randolph, Brigadier-General W. F., 307. 
Rapido, Spanish auxiliary cruiser, 359. 
Rapido, Spanish tug, 142. 
Rayo, Spanish torpedo boat, 119. 
Rea, George Bronson, American journalist, 48. 
Reconcentration, ordered by Weyler, 50, 51; abolished by Blanco, 

62, 79. 

Red Cross Society, relieves distress in Cuba, 60. 
Reed, Speaker, opposes recognition of Cuban insurgents, 61, 91. 
Reid, Whitelaw, American peace commissioner, 391, 394. 
Reilly, Captain H. J., Fifth Artillery, 311. 
Reina Cristina, Spanish cruiser, 136; destroyed in battle of Manila 

Bay, 140. 
Reina Mercedes, Spanish cruiser, 123; fires torpedoes at Merrimac, 

189; Hobson a prisoner on, 190; guns of, 193, 229; injured in bom 
bardment, 196; sinking of, 296, 297. 
Reina Regente, Spanish cruiser, loss of, 100. 
Relief, American hospital ship, 114. 

Remey, Commodore G. C., commanding at Key West, 159, 167, 209. 
Resolute, American auxiliary cruiser, 210, 273, 287, 291, 293, 304, 387. 
Restormel, collier, captured by St. Paul, 168, 176, 182. 
Reyes, Colonel Carlos, 377. 
Ricafort, captain-general of Cuba, 21. 
Rio de Janeiro, Oregon and Marietta at, no. 
Rio de la Plata, Spanish cruiser, 100. 
Rio Hondo, Cuba, 381. 
Rio Prieto, Porto Rico, action at, 342. 

Rios, Eugenio Montero, chairman of Spanish peace commission, 391. 
Rio Turquino, Colon goes ashore at, 286. 
Rivera, Rius, Cuban insurgent, 50. 
Rivers, Lieutenant T. R., Third Cavalry, 223. 
Rocha, Lieutenant F. de la, of the Terror, 157, 332. 
Rodgers, Captain Frederick, 112. 
Rodgers, General John I., 106. 
Rodgers, Lieutenant W. L., of the Foote, 116. 
Roncali, captain-general of Cuba, 24. 
Roosevelt, Theodore, Assistant Secretary of the United States Navy, 

121 ; lieutenant-colonel First Volunteer Cavalry, 212, 266; signs 

" round robin," 325. 

Rough Riders. See First Volunteer Cavalry. 
" Round robin," signed by Shatter s officers, 325. 
Rowan, Lieutenant A. S., mission to Garcia, 147, 148; its results, 217. 
Rubin, Brigadier-General, 220; attacked at Las Guasimas, 223, 225. 
Ruiz, Colonel Joaquin, murder of, 64. 
Ruiz, Ricardo, death of, 61. 

Sagasta, premier of Spain, 62; attempts conciliation, 79; speech on 
outbreak of war. 93; appeals to Spanish patriotism, 144; announces 
Camara s expedition to Manila, 360; authorizes Cambon to medi 
ate for peace, 389. 

Sagua de Tanamo, surrender of, 321, 322; Spaniards sail from, 327. 

Sagua la Grande, Cuba, 383. 

St. Louis, American auxiliary cruiser, 112, 155, 158, 171, 181, 219. 

St. Paul, American auxiliary cruiser, 112, 171; off Santiago, 176; meets 
Sampson, 180; engages the Terror off San Juan, 332. 

St. Paul, American transport, 366. 

St. Thomas, American liners ordered to, 160; Yale at, 166. 

INDEX 411 

St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, Spanish fleet at, 116, 118, 157. 

Salmeron, Spanish republican politician, 144. 

Sampson, Rear-Admiral, serves on Maine commission, 70; com 
mands North Atlantic Squadron, 115; plans attack upon Havana, 
119; ordered to blockade Cuba, 122; bombards Matanzas batteries, 
126; prepares to fight Cervera, 158; bombards San Juan, 161 ; re 
turns to Key West, 167, 172; correspondence with Schley at Cien- 
fuegos, 174; cruises in Nicholas Channel, 179; goes to Santiago, 
180, 184; arranges blockade, 191, 192; bombards Spanish batteries, 
195; seizes Guantanamo Bay, 198; estimate of Spanish forces at 
Santiago, 206; meets Garcia, 217, 218; bombards Fort Aguadores, 
260; in battle of Santiago, 274, 285, 287; misunderstanding with 
Shafter, 301; share in capitulat.on of Santiago, 318, 319. 

Sandoval, Spanish gunboat, 199, 202. 

Sands, Captain J. H., of the Columbia, 116. 

San Francisco, American cruiser, 103, 108, 117, 383, 387. 

San Francisco, Spanish transport, 118. 

San German, Porto Rico, 341. 

Sanguilly, Julio, release of, 61. 

San Juan, near Santiago, topography of, 240; battle of, 241; Spanish 
position at, 247; storming of heights, 249; Spanish strength and 
losses, 252; American strength and losses, 254. 

San Juan, Porto Rico, plan for attacking, 121; topography of, 160; 
bombarded by Sampson, 162; blockade of, 332, 380. 

San Luis, surrender of, 321, 322. 

San Luis d Apra, Guam, 354. 

San Martin, Colonel, surrenders Ponce, 338. 

Santa Desidera, Porto Rico, skirmish at, 337. 

Santiago de Cuba, founded by Velasquez, 3; attacked by British, 6; 
Virginius prisoners at, 34; distress at, during Cuban rebellion, 
53, 88; cable cut off, 155; Cervera arrives at, 169; incidents in 
history of, 181 ; Spanish troops at, 230; Cervera leaves, 271; naval 
battle of, 276; fugitives escape to, 288, 294; siege of, 298; bombarded 
by fleet, 306; surrender of, 312. 

Santo Domingo, filibustering attack on, 149. 

Santo Domingo, Spanish steamer, 384. 

Saranac, captured at Iloilo, 125. 

Sartorius brothers, Cuban insurgents, 41. 

Schermerhorn, Augustus, of New York, 112. 

Schley, Commodore, commanding Flying Squadron, 116, 158; ordered 
to Kev West, 171; to Cienfuegos, 172; to Santiago, 174; withdraws 
from Santiago and returns, 176, 178; sights Spanish ships, 183; on 
Santiago blockade, 191; in battle of Santiago, 274, 277, 286; praised 
at expense of Sampson, 315. 

Schools in Cuba, n. 

Schwan, Brigadier-General T., in Porto Rico, 339, 341, 342. 

Scorpion, American converted yacht, 172, 174; fires on Yankee, 210; 
at Manzanillo, 382, 386. 

Second Artillery, 214. 

Second Cavalry, 215, 235, 239, 257, 339, 343. 

Second Corps, 146. 

Second Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 246, 255. 

Second Massachusetts Volunteers, 213; in battle of Caney, 238, 239. 

Second Oregon Volunteers, 354, 374, 378. 

Second Wisconsin Volunteers, 343. 

Seguranc.a, American transport, 218. 

Senate, United States, votes for recognition of Cuban insurgents, 
57; Cameron resolution, 59; again votes for recognition, 60; warlike 
agitation in, 72; votes $50,000,000 for national defence, 74; Hawley 
bill, 74; Foreign Affairs Committee s report on Cuba, 86; votes 
for intervention in Cuba, 91. 

Senator, American transport, 365. 

Seneca, American transport, 323. 

Seventeenth Infantry, 106, 214; in battle of Caney, 237, 239; one 
company left at Caney, 259. 




Seventh Artillery, 339. 

Seventh Corps, 146, 328. 

Seventh Infantry, 214; in battle of Caney, 236, 237, 239; five com 
panies left at Caney, 259. 

Seventy-first New York Volunteers, 213, 365; in battle of San Juan, 
244, 255, 257. 

Sevilla, near Santiago, 222, 232. 

Shafter, Major-General W. R., at Tampa, 145, 146, 205; sails from 
Tampa, 215; meets Garcia, 218; on Seguranca, 228; at El Pozo, 233; 
plans to attack Santiago, 234; instructions for battle of San Juan, 
247; orders Lawton to withdraw from Caney, 258; considers with 
drawal from San Juan, 267; demands surrender of Santiago, 267; 
hears of Escario s arrival, 295; proposes withdrawal from San 
tiago, 299; misunderstanding with Sampson, 301; conferences with 
Miles and Toral, 307, 310; receives surrender of Santiago, 312; rela 
tions with Miles, 314; controversy as to captured ships, 319; sails 
for Mqntauk Point, 326. 

Sharp, Lieutenant A., of the Vixen, 191. 

Sharpshooters, Spanish, in Santiago campaign, 242. 

Siboney, landing at, 220, 232; hospital at, 264; cable landed at, 264; 
transports at, 291; reinforcements land at, 307; yellow fever at, 316. 

Sicard, Rear-Admiral, commanding North Atlantic Squadron, 108; 
succeeded by Sampson, 115; serves on Naval War Board, 121, 145. 

Sigsbee, Captain C. D., of the Maine, 67; of the St. Paul, 176; on 
construction of Spanish ships, 276; off San Juan, 332. 

Singapore, Aguinaldo in, 130. 

Sixteenth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 244, 245, 252, 255. 

Sixteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 343-345. 

Sixth Cavalry, 214; in battle of San Juan, 246, 255; in Porto Rico, 340. 

Sixth Illinois Volunteers, 307, 334. 337, 343. 

Sixth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 241, 245, 252, 255. 

Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers, 307, 334, 337, 343. 

Sixty-fourth Regiment, Spanish army, 201. 

Slavery in Cuba, 12; abolition of, 15. 

Smith, Colonel J. S., First California, 354. 

Smith Key, Santiago harbour, 196. 

Snyder, Brigadier-General S., 215. 

Socapa battery, Santiago, 193, 195, 197, 216, 230; proposal to storm, 304. 

Solace, American hospital ship, 114. 

Somers, American torpedo boat, purchased in Germany, 113. 

Soto, Colonel, of Alfonso XIII regiment, 341, 342. 

Soto, Hernando de, governor of Cuba, 5. 

Soule, Pierre, signs Ostend manifesto, 28. 

Southerland, Lieutenant W. H. H., of the Eagle, 209, 340. 

Spain, military resources of, 97. 

Springer, American vice-consul at Havana, 98. 

Stanton, Paymaster-General T. H., 146. 

State of Texas, Red Cross ship, 323. 

Staunton, Lieutenant S. A., of the New York, 302. 

Sterling, American collier, 181, 185. 

Sternberg, Surgeon-General G. M., 146, 212, 265, 330. 

Stone, Brigadier-General Roy, in Porto Rico, 343. 

Subig Bay, Dewey at, 132; surrender of Spanish garrison, 364. 

Suez, Camara s squadron at, 362. 

Summers, Colonel O., Second Oregon, 354. 

Sumner, Brigadier-General S. S., 214; at council of June 3oth, 235; 
in battle of San Juan, 241, 248, 258; signs " round robin," 325. 

Suwanee, American auxiliary cruiser, 197, 202, 260, 292, 297; at Man- 
zanillo, 387. 

Swinburne, Commander W. T., of the Helena, 116, 386. 

Tacon, Miguel, captain-general of Cuba, 21. 
Tambo, near Manila, 361. 

Tampa, troops encamped at, 106, 145, 146, 206; confusion in camp at, 
207; Fifth Corps sails from, 215. 



Tappan, Lieutenant B., of the Callao, 376. 

Taylor, Captain H. C., of the Indiana, 116, 120; commanding convoy, 
215; opinion of Cervera s strategy, 271; in battle of Santiago, 281, 

Tejada, Juan de, captain-general of Cuba, 6. 

Temerario, Spanish torpedo cruiser, no. 

Tenth Cavalry, 149, 214; at Las Guasimas, 223; in battle of San Juan, 
246, 255; 257. 

Tenth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 246, 255. 

Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, 365, 366. 

Ten Years War, the, 29; ending of, 38. 

Terror, American monitor, 103, 108, 116; goes to San Juan, 159, 161. 

Terror, Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, 157; at Martinique, 169; en 
gages the St. Paul, 332. 

Texas, American battle ship, 102, 108, 116; goes to Cienfuegos, 172; 
to Santiago, 176; on Santiago blockade, 192; in Guantanamo Bay, 
202; struck by shell, 219; in battle of Santiago, 273, 278, 283, 287, 
288; fires on Reina Mercedes, 297. 

Theaker, Colonel H. A., Sixteenth Infantry, 213; succeeds Hawkins 
as brigade commander, 263. 

Third Artillery, 334, 351, 368. 

Third Cavalry, 214; in battle of San Juan, 246, 255. 

Third Corps, 146. 

Third Illinois Volunteers, 339, 346, 347- 

Third Infantry, 215; in battle of Caney, 238, 239; marches from Caney 
to San Juan, 258. 

Third Wisconsin Volunteers, 343. 

Thirteenth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 245, 246, 252, 255, 258. 

Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers, 365, 374, 375. 

Thirty-fourth Michigan Volunteers, 232, 235. 

Thirty-third Michigan Volunteers, 232, 235; at Fort Aguadores, 260, 
262; at Siboney, 316; yellow fever in, 324. 

Tilley, Commander B. F., of the Newport, 116. 

Todd, Commander C. C., of the Wilmington, 116; at Cardenas, 152; 
at Manzanillo, 386. 

Tondo, suburb of Manila, 378. 

Topeka, American cruiser, purchased in England, 112, 113; at Nipe 
Bay, 384, 385. 

Toral, Major-General Jose, 253; refuses to surrender, 294, 300; com 
plains of breach of truce, 298; first offers to surrender Santiago, 
305; confers with Miles and Shatter, 307, 310; surrenders Santiago, 
312; sails for Spain, 326. 

Torp Key, Guantanamo Bay, 199, 202. 

Train, Commander C. J., of the Prairie, 117. 

Transports, American, 113, 216, 219; sanitary condition of, 330. 

Trocha, from Moron to Jucaro, 29, 45; from Mariel to Majana, 50. 

Troop A, New York Cavalry, 340. 

Troop C, New York Cavalry, 340, 345. 

Twelfth Infantry, 214; in battle of Caney, 236, 238, 239. 

Twentieth Infantry, 215; in battle of Caney, 238, 239; marches from 
Caney to San Juan, 258. 

Twenty-fifth Infantry, 213; in battle of Caney, 235, 238, 239. 

Twenty-first Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 246, 255. 

Twenty-fourth Infantry, 213; in battle of San Juan, 245, 252, 255. 

Twenty-second Infantry, 213; in battle of Caney, 238, 239. 

Twenty-third Infantry, 364, 365, 374. 375. 

Twickenham, collier, captured by St. Louis, 168. 

Ultimatum, presented to Spain, 92. 
Utah Artillery, 365, 366, 374, 375. 
Utuado, Porto Rico, 340, 343. 

Valencia, American transport, 330. 
Valladolid, insult to American minister in, 94. 
Van Buren, Martin, on Cuba, 19. 


Van Horn, Colonel J. J., Eighth Infantry, 213; fatally injured, 218. 

Vara del Rey, Brigadier-General, 230; in battle of Caney, 236, 239. 

Vara del Rey, Lieutenant-Colonel, 300. 

Vazquez, Lieutenant P., of the Pluton, 157, 282. 

Velasco, Spanish gunboat, 136. 

Velasquez, Diego, founds settlements in Cuba, 3. 

Vesuvius, American dynamite cruiser, 104; ordered to Santiago, 170- 
at Santiago, 216. 

Vicksburg, American gunboat, 104, 151. 

Viele, Lieutenant-Colonel C. D., First Cavalry, 214, 251. 

Villamil, Captain Fernando, commanding Spanish torpedo flotilla, 
118; telegram to Sagasta, 119; leaves St. Vincent, 157; killed in 
battle of Santiago, 282. 

Villa Urrutia, Senor de, Spanish peace commissioner, 391. 

Virginius, seizure of, 34. 

Vittoria, Spanish cruiser, 99. 

Vives, captain-general of Cuba, 15, 20. 

Vixen, American converted yacht, 175, 176, 190; on Santiago block 
ade, 192, 194, 195; in battle of Santiago, 273, 279. 

Vizcaya, Spanish cruiser, 100; at Havana, 71; at St. Vincent, 118, 
157; crosses Atlantic, 168; at Santiago, 183; leaves Santiago, 272; 
in battle of Santiago, 277, 284; driven ashore, 285. 

Volunteers, call for, 105. 

Volunteers, Spanish, in Cuba, 30. 

Vulcan, American naval repair ship, 114. 

Wade, Major-General J. F., 145, 146. 

Wainwright, Lieutenant-Commander R., in battle of Santiago, 281, 282. 

Wake Island, 365. 

Walker, Commander Asa, of the Concord, 132. 

Walker, E. H. R., British consul at Manila, 131, 143. 

Ward, Ensign H. H., Bureau of Navigation, 332, 359. 

Ward, Lieutenant Aaron, of the Wasp, 384. 

Wasp, American converted yacht, 148, 216, 338; at Nipe Bay, 384, 385. 

Watson, Captain J. W., Tenth Cavalry, 223. 

Watson, Commodore J. C., 158; in command of Eastern Squadron, 
334, 361 ; in command of north coast blockade, 379. 

Watts, E., American deputy consul-general at Cairo, 362. 

Webb, Major, Thirty-third Michigan, 262. 

Webster, Daniel, on Cuba, 23. 

Wells, Lieutenant B. W., of the Brooklyn, 290. 

Wessels, Major H. W., Third Cavalry, 214. 

Weston, Colonel J. F., chief commissary of Santiago expedition, 215. 

Weyler, Valeriano, captain-general of Cuba, 46; reconcentration order, 
50, 51; recalled, 62. 

Wheeler, Major-General Joseph, 214, 222; at Las Guasimas, 223; recon 
noitres near Santiago, 234; absent from council of June 3oth, 235; 
in battle of San Juan, 241; refuses to retreat, 262; at conference of 
July 2d, 266; advises against attack on forts, 303; commissioner on 
surrender, 310; opinion of Shafter, 313; signs " round robin," 325. 

Wheeling, American gunboat, ICM. 

Wherry, Lieutenant-Colonel W. M., Second Infantry, 213. 

White, Justice, nominated as American peace commissioner, 391. 

Whitney, Lieutenant H. H.. Fourth Artillery, 336. 

Whittier, Lieutenant-Colonel C. A., of Merritt s staff, 376, 377. 

Wikoff, Colonel C. A., Twenty-second Infantry, 213; in battle of San 
Juan, 241 ; killed, 245. 

Wildes, Captain Frank, of the Boston, 132. 

Wildman, Rounsevelle, American consul at Hong-Kong, 356. 

Willard, Ensign A. L., of the Machias, 154. 

Williams, Oscar F., United States consul at Manila, 131. 

Wilmington. American gunboat, 104, 116, 151; at Cardenas, 152; at 
Manzanillo, " 

Wilson, Brigadier-General T. M., chief of engineers, 146. 
Wilson, Major-General J. H., 146; in Porto Rico, 338, 3 

339, 344, 346. 

INDEX 415 

Windom, American revenue cutter, 154. 

Winslow, American torpedo boat, 116, 151; disabled at Cardenas, 152. 

Winslow, Lieutenant C. McR., of the Nashville, 154. 

Wisconsin, American battle ship, 101. 

Wompatuck, American tug, 155, 159, 181 ; at San Juan, 161, 164; con 
voying Fifth Corps, 218; at Manzanillo, 381, 386. 

Wood, Colonel Leonard, First Volunteer Cavalry, 214; at Las Gua- 
simas, 224; in battle of San Juan, 241, 258; signs " round robin," 
325; military governor of Santiago, 326. 

Wood, Commander E. P., of the Petrel, 132, 142. 

Wood, Lieutenant S. S., of the Dupont, 116. 

Woodford, General, American minister to Spain, 72; submits propo 
sition for armistice in Cuba, 79; ordered to present American ulti 
matum, 92; leaves Madrid, 94. 

Woosung, Monocacy left at, 130. 

Worth, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S., Thirteenth Infantry, 213; wounded 
at San Juan, 245. 

Yale, American auxiliary cruiser, 112, 158; scouting for Cervera, 166, 
171; off Santiago, 176; brings Miles to Santiago, 307; to Porto 
Rico, 334. 

Yankee, American auxiliary cruiser, 117; on Santiago blockade, 194; 
in Guantanamo Bay, 199; fired on by Scorpion, 210; in Eastern 
Squadron, 361; off Cienfuegos, 380; off Casilda, 381. 

Yankton, American auxiliary cruiser, 381. 

Yauco, Porto Rico, 337. 

Yorktown, American gunboat, 104. 

Yosemite, American auxiliary cruiser, 117, 332; blockades San Juan, 
333; in Eastern Squadron, 361. 

Young, Brigadier-General S. B. M., 214, 222; at Las Guasimas, 223, 
227; suffers from fever, 241; at Montauk Point, 326. 

Young, Lieutenant L., of the Hist, 381. 

Yucatan, American transport, 216. 

Zafiro, American supply ship, 130, 374. 
Zanjon, compromise of, 38. 
Zealandia, American transport, 365. 



Puerto Rico and its Resources. 

A book for Travelers, Investors, and others, 
containing Full Accounts of Natural Features and 
Resources, Products, People, Opportunities for 
Business, etc. By FREDERICK A. OBER, author 
of "Camps in the Caribbees," "Crusoe s Island," 
etc. With Map and Illustrations. I2mo. Cloth, 

"You have brought together in a small space an immense 
amount of most valuable information, which it is very important 
to have within the reach of the American people at this time." 

" An orderly and intelligent account of the island. Mr. Ober s 
book is both timely and trustworthy." New Tork Evening Post. 

"The best authoritative and < eyewitnessing book on this 
subject yet printed. . . . Mr. Ober describes in a definite, 
practical way its commercial, strategic, agricultural, financial, 
political, and geographical features, and furnishes just the informa 
tion sought for by intending settlers." Boston Globe. 



A History of the American Nation. 

By ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, Professor of 
American History in the University of Michi 
gan. With many Maps and Illustrations. i2mo. 
Cloth, $1.40 net. 

" One of the most attractive and complete one- volume his 
tories of America that has yet appeared." Boston Beacon. 

" Complete enough to find a place in the library as well as in 
the school." Denver Republican. 

"This excellent work, although intended for school use, is 
equally good for general use at home." Boston Transcript. 

"It should find a place in all historic libraries." Toledo 

"Clearness is not sacrificed to brevity, and an adequate 
knowledge of political causes and effects may be gained from this 
concise history." New/ York Christian Advocate. 

"A remarkably good beginning for the new Twentieth Cen 
tury Series of text-books. . . . The illustrative feature, and 
especially the maps, have received the most careful attention, 
and a minute examination shows them to be accurate, truthful, 
and illustrative." Philadelphia Press. 

"The work is up to date, and in accord with the best modern 
methods. It lays a foundation upon which a superstructure of 
historical study of any extent may be safely built." Pittsburg 

" A book of rare excellence and practical usefulness." Salt 
Lake Tribune. 

"The volume is eminently worthy of a place in a series des 
tined for the readers of the coming century. It is highly 
creditable to the author." Chicago Evening Post. 



The American Revolution, 1763-1783. 

Being the Chapters and Passages relating to America, from the 
Author s "History of England in the Eighteenth Century." 
edited, with Historical and Biographical Notes, by James Albert 
Woodburn, Professor of American History and Politics in Indiana 
University. I zmo. Cloth, $1.25. 

A French Volunteer of the War of Independence. 

By the Chevalier DE PONTGIBAUD. Translated and edited by 
Robert B. Douglas. With Introduction and Frontispiece, 
i zmo. Cloth, $1.50. 

Germany and the Germans. 

By WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON, author of " German Socialism 
and Ferdinand Lassalle," " Prince Bismarck and State Social 
ism," etc. 2 vols., 8vo. Cloth, $6.00. 

"This excellent work a literary monument of intelligent and conscientious 
labor deals with every phase and aspect of state and political activity, public 
and private, in the Fatherland. . . . Teems with entertaining anecdotes and 
introspective apergus of character." London Telegraph. 

"Mr. Dawson has made a remarkably close and discriminating study of 
German life and institutions at the present day, and the results of his observa 
tions are set forth in a most interesting manner." Brooklyn Times. 

A History of Germany, from the Earliest Times 
to the Present Day. 

By BAYARD TAYLOR. With an Additional Chapter by MARIE 
HANSEN-TAYLOR. With Portrait and Maps. I zmo. Cloth, 

" When one considers the confused, complicated, and sporadic elements of 
German history, it seems scarcely possible to present a clear, continuous narra 
tive. Yet this is what Bayard Taylor did. He omitted no episode of impor 
tance, and yet managed to preserve a main line of connection from century to 
century throughout the narrative." Philadelphia Ledger. 


A History of American Privateers. 

By EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A. M., author of * A History of 
the United States Navy." Uniform with " A History of the 
United States Navy." One volume. Illustrated. 8vo. Cloth, 


After several years of research the distinguished historian of American sea power 
presents the first comprehensive account of one of the most picturesque and absorb 
ing phases of our maritime warfare. The importance of the theme is indicated 
by the fact that the value of prizes and cargoes taken by privateers in the Revo 
lution was three times that of the prizes and cargoes taken by naval vessels, 
while in the War of 1812 we had 517 privateers and only 23 vessels in our 
navy. The intimate connection between privateers and the navy, the former 
serving often as a training school for the latter, is brought out in the author s 
narrative. From forgotten monographs, the records of historical societies, from 
unpublished log books, and from descendants of noted privateersmen, he has 
obtained intimate and vivid accounts of the fitting out of the vessels, the 
incidents of their voyages, and the thrilling adventures of the brave sailors who 
manned them. Mr. Maclay s romantic tale is accompanied by reproductions of 
contemporary pictures, portraits, and documents, and also by illustrations by 
Mr. George Gibbs. 

A History of the United States Navy, from 
1775 to 1898. 

By EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A. M. With Technical Revision 
by Lieutenant Roy C. Smith, U. S. N. New edition, revised 
and enlarged, with new chapters and several new Illustrations. 
In two volumes, 8vo. Per volume, cloth, $3.50. 

This work has been adopted as the Text- Book upon United States Naval 
History in the U. S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. 

The Private Journal of William Maclay, 

United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791. With 
Portrait from Original Miniature. Edited by EDGAR S. MACLAY, 
A.M. Large 8vo. Cloth, $2.25. 

During his two years in the Senate William Maclay kept a journal of his 
own in which he minutely recorded the transactions of each day. This record 
throws a flood of light on the doings of our first legislators. 



History of the People of the United 

By Prof. JOHN BACH MCMASTER. Vol. V. 8vo. 
Cloth, with Maps, $2.50. 

The fifth volume of Prof. J. B. Me Master s 
"History of the People of the United States" 
will cover the time of the administrations of John 
Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, and will de 
scribe the development of the democratic spirit, 
the manifestations of new interest in social prob 
lems, and the various conditions and plans pre 
sented between 1825 and 1837. To a large extent 
the intimate phases of the subjects which are treat 
ed have received scant attention heretofore. A pe 
culiar interest attaches to the various banking and 
financial experiments proposed and adopted at 
that time, to the humanitarian and socialistic 
movements, the improvements in the conditions 
of city life, to the author s full presentation of the 
literary activity of the country, and his treatment 
of the relations of the East and West. Many of 
these subjects have necessitated years of first-hand 
investigations, and are now treated adequately for 
the first time. 



Edited by 

EDMUND GOSSE, Hon. M. A. of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
J2mo, Cloth, $1.50 each. 



Member of the Spanish Academy. 

ff Mr. Kelly has written a book that must be read and 
pondered, for within its limits it has no rival as * A History 
of Spanish Literature. " The Mail and Express. 

" The work before us is one which no student can hence 
forth neglect, ... if the student would keep his knowl 
edge of Spanish up to date. . . . We close with a re 
newed expression of admiration for this excellent manual ; 
the style is marked and full of piquancy, the phrases dwell 
in the memory." The Spectator. 

ft A handbook that has long been needed for the use of 
the general reader, and it admirably supplies the want. 
Great skill is shown in the selection of the important facts ; 
the criticisms, though necessarily brief, are authoritative and 
to the point, and the history is gracefully told in sound 
literary style." Saturday Evening Gazette. 

ft For the first time a survey of Spanish literature is pre 
sented to English readers by a writer of ample knowledge 
and keen discrimination. Mr. Kelly s work rises far be 
yond the level of the text-books. So good a critic does not 
merely comment on literature; he makes it himself." 
New York Bookman. 


The Harmonic Method for Learning Spanish. 

Designed for Elementary Use. By Luis A. BARALT, A. B., 
M. D., Instructor in the Spanish Language and Literature in 
the College of the City of New York, and in the New York 
Evening High School. $1.00 net. 

De Tornos s Combined Spanish Method. 

New edition. With a Pronouncing Vocabulary. Revised edi 
tion, with the new orthography conforming to the rules of the 
Spanish Academy. By ALBERTO DE TORNOS, A. M. I zmo. 
Cloth, $1.50. Key to Combined Spanish Method, 50 cents. 

Cervantes El Cautivo. 

An Episode from "Don Quixote." Text based on the edition 
of the Royal Spanish Academy. Edited, with an Introduction, 
Grammatical and Explanatory Notes, and a Spanish- English 
Vocabulary, by EDUARDO TOLRA Y FORNES, Professor Normal, 
University of Barcelona. I zmo. Cloth, 50 cents net. 

El Si de las Ninas. 

Edited, with a Biographical Notice, Explanatory Notes, and a 
Spanish- English Vocabulary, by EDUARDO TOLRA Y FORNES, 
Professor Normal, University of Barcelona. 1 zmo. Cloth, 
50 cents net. 

The Elementary Spanish Reader and Trans 

By MIGUEL T. TOLON, Professor of Modern Languages and 
Spanish Literature. New and revised edition. 12010. Cloth, 
75 cents. 



" The True Story of the Boers/ 

Oom Paul s People. 

By HOWARD C. HILLEGAS. With Illustrations. I zmo. 
Cloth, $1.50. 

" Gives precisely the information necessary to those who desire to follow 
intelligently the progress of events at the present time." New York Com 
mercial Advertiser. 

" Has all the timeliness of an up-to-date newspaper article ; in fact, some 
portions of it read almost like a cablegram from the Transvaal." New York 
Sunday World. 

"A book on the Boer troubles that is free from British prejudices and 
misrepresentations. ... It is the best book of the hour in its unbiased pres 
entation of the Boer side of the controversy." Chicago Tribune. 

Actual Africa ; or, The Coming Continent. 

A Tour of Exploration. By FRANK VINCENT. With Map 
and 104 full-page Illustrations. 8vo. Cloth, $5.00. 

Mr. Vincent s important and instructive book has a peculiar interest for 
readers at this time. The author presents vivid accounts of his visits to 
Delagoa Bay, and to Durban, in Natal, whence he traveled to Newcastle, 
Charlestown, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. Mr. Vincent gives most graphic 
accounts of the life of the Boers, and the mining and other interests of the 
Transvaal. His visit to the Transvaal was followed by a journey through 
the Orange Free State, where he visited the capital, Bloemfontein, and after 
ward he made a careful study of the Kimberley diamond mines. His journey 
southward and his stay in Cape Town furnished additional facilities for a 
comprehensive view of the present theater of action in Africa. The results 
of this personal study of the territory now attracting so much attention in 
clude many characteristic illustrations. 

" The completest guide-book to the Dark Continent ever published." 
New York Herald. 



Uniform Edition. Each, J2mo, cloth, $J.OO. 

The Hero of Manila. 

Dewey on the Mississippi and the Pacific. By ROSSITER JOHNSON, 
author of "Phaeton Rogers," "A History of the War of 
Secession," etc. Illustrated by B. West Clinedinst and Others. 
A new book in the Young Heroes of our Navy Series. 

"A complete biography up to date. The aid of fiction has only occasion 
ally been brought in to heighten the effect of some of the schoolboy anecdotes, 
which are themselves based upon fact." New York Herald. 

"Will have much fascination for boys." New York Tribune. 

The Hero of Erie (Commodore Perry]. 
By JAMES BARNES, author of " Midshipman Farragut," "Com 
modore Bainbridge," etc. With 10 full-page Illustrations. 

Commodore Bainbridge. 

From the Gunroom to the Quarter-deck. By JAMES BARNES, 
author of " Midshipman Farragut." Illustrated by George 
Gibbs and Others. 

Midshipman Farragut. 

By JAMES BARNES, author of "For King or Country," etc. 
Illustrated by Carlton T. Chapman. 

Decatur and Somers. 

By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL, author of " Paul Jones," "Little 
Jarvis," etc. With 6 full-page Illustrations by J. O. Davidson 
and Others. 

Paul Jones. 

By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL. With 8 full-page Illustrations. 

Midshipman Paulding. 

A True Story of the War of I 8 1 2. By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL. 
With 6 full-page Illustrations. 

Little Jarvis. 

The Story of the Heroic Midshipman of the Frigate Constellation. 
By MOLLY ELLIOT SEAWELL. With 6 full-page Illustrations. 



" This work marks an epoch in the history-writing 
of this country." -6Y /. ^ /-/>M/a/crA. 

. .-. .-> *. ,-.-. -- --.-. <E. 

lHILACELPHtA, 1707. 

WARD EGGLESTON. Richly illus 
trated with 350 Drawings, 75 Maps, 
etc. Square Svo. Cloth, $2.50. 


The present work is meant, in the first instance, for the young- not alone 
for bovs and girls, but for young men and women who have yet to make 
themselves familiar wilh the more important features of their country s 
historr. By a book for the young is meant one in which the author studies to 
make his statements clear and explicit, in which curious and picturesque de 
tails are inserted, and in which the writer does not neglect such anecdotes us 
lend the charm of a human and personal interest to the broader facts of the 
nation s storr That history is often tiresome to the young is not so much 
the fault of history as of a false method of writing by which one contrives 
to relate events without sympathy or imagination, without narrative connec 
tion or animation. The attempt to master vague and general records of 
kiln-dried facts is certain to beget in the ordinary reader a repulsion from 
the study of history-one of the very most important of all studies for its 
widening influence on general culture, _ 

" Fills a decided gap which has existed for -^ 

die past twenty years in American historical 
literat ire. The work is admirably planned 
and executed, and will at once uke its place as 
a standard record ot the life, growth, and de- 
of the nation. It is profusely and 


and boys. The lavish use the publishers have made of colored 
plates, woodcuts, and photographic reproductions, gives an un 
wonted piquancy to the printed page, catching the eye as surely 
as die text engages the mind." -Vw York Critic. 

"The author writes history as a story. It can "never be 
less than that. The book wiil enlist the interest of young 
people, enlighten their understanding, and by the glow of its 
statements fix the great events of the country firmly in the 
Frmndtcm Bulletin, 

beautifully illustrated."-^ AMAW 

"The book in its new dress makes a much 
finer appearance than 
before, and will be wel 
comed by older readers 
as gladly as its 

New York - D. APPLETOX & CO.. 72 Fifth Avenue. 

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